



APPENDIX

TO THE

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION

APPOINTED BY

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL

TO ENQUIRE INTO THE

ORGANIZATION AND EXPENDITURE

OF THE

ARMY IN INDIA.

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VOL. I.

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SIMLA:  
GOVERNMENT CENTRAL PRESS.  
1879.





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# VOLUME I.

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## APPENDIX I.

### Resolution of the Government of India appointing the Commission.

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*Extract from the Proceedings of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council in the Military Department,—No. 201 S.B., dated Simla, 7th July 1879.*

Read again the following papers regarding reduction of expenditure, viz.,—

Resolution in the Financial Department, No. 410, dated Simla, 1st May 1879.

Memorandum, Financial Department, No. 444, dated 3rd May 1879.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 168 of the 22nd May 1879, regarding the reduction of Military expenditure and the appointment of a Special Commission to undertake a thorough and exhaustive enquiry into the Military system in India, and the practicability of introducing economy into the Military administration without loss of efficiency.

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**RESOLUTION.**—In furtherance of the object referred to in the preceding papers, His Excellency the Governor-General in Council has been pleased to determine that a Special Commission shall assemble at Simla, on such date as will be hereafter notified, and to appoint the following officers to serve on the Commission :—

*President :*

The Hon'ble SIR ASHLEY EDEN, K.C.S.I.

*Members :*

Major-General P. S. LUMSDEN, C.B., C.S.I., Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, Bengal Staff Corps.

Major-General F. S. ROBERTS, R.A., C.B., V.C.

Brigadier-General R. PHAYRE, C.B., Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, Bombay Staff Corps.

Brigadier-General H. H. O'CONNELL, Madras Staff Corps.

Brigadier-General H. T. MACPHERSON, C.B., V.C., Bengal Staff Corps.

Colonel T. D. BAKER, C.B., Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, 18th Foot.

Colonel C. M. MACGREGOR, C.B., C.I.E., Bengal Staff Corps.

Major O. R. NEWMARCH, Bengal Staff Corps.

C. E. BERNARD, Esq., C.S., C.S.I.

*To be Secretary to the Commission :*

Captain E. H. H. COLLEN, Bengal Staff Corps.

2. The Commission is empowered to call upon all officers or departments, civil or military, serving under the several Governments and Administrations in India, for any information it may deem necessary in the prosecution of its enquiries; and the several Governments will be requested to afford the Commission every assistance and information that may be needed.

3. The instructions of the Government of India, in regard to the scope of the enquiries to be instituted by the Commission, and the nature of the report required from it, will be communicated to the President from the Military Department.

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Copy to the Governments of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, &c.; to the Chief Commissioners, British Burma, Central Provinces, &c.; and to Departments.

(Sd.) H. K. BURNE, Colonel,  
Secretary to the Government of India.

## APPENDIX II.

Letter addressed by the Government of India in the Military Department to all Local Governments and Administrations regarding the Military requirements of the various Provinces of India, and replies thereto—

A. Bengal.  
B. Assam.  
C. North-Western Provinces and Oudh.  
D. Punjab.  
E. Bombay.  
F. Central India.  
G. Rajputana.

H. Central Provinces.  
I. Madras.  
J. Hyderabad.  
K. Mysore and Coorg.  
L. British Burma.  
M. Andamans.

No. 204 S.B., dated Simla, 7th July 1879.

From—COLONEL H. K. BURNE, C.B., Secretary to the Govt. of India, Military Dept.,  
To—All Local Governments and Administrations.

I am directed by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council to inform you that a Commission on Army Organization and Expenditure in India has been appointed, and that in His Excellency's opinion it is most desirable it should have the advantage of becoming fully acquainted with the views of the \_\_\_\_\_ on the military requirements of that Government in reference to its necessary garrison; the immediate repression of internal disturbance or insurrection; and for the maintenance of order.

2. I am therefore to request that the Commission may be furnished at the earliest possible date with full particulars on the following points:—

- (a) Strength of Native population.
- (b) Strength of European and Eurasian population (exclusive of army).
- (c) State of feeling.
- (d) Elements of danger.
- (e) Strength of police.
- (f) Distribution of police.
- (g) Efficiency of police.
- (h) European and Eurasian population considered as—

- (1) strength in combatant power and for the maintenance of order;
- (2) weakness in necessity for provision of safety of non-combatants, women and children;
- (3) of possible greater utility than at present if organized for the maintenance of order in case of disturbance.

- (i) Question of compulsory enrolment.
- (j) Development of volunteer system.

3. His Excellency in Council also begs the Commission may be furnished with the opinion of the \_\_\_\_\_ on the general military requirements of the Province—

- (a) for "garrison" purposes and the maintenance of order;
- (b) for internal and external military purposes irrespective of (a).

4. I am in conclusion to beg the favor of a reply at the earliest possible date, which should not be later than the 15th August. Your reply should, if possible, be printed and addressed to—

THE PRESIDENT,

*Army Organization, &c., Commission, Simla,*

20 spare copies being at the same time sent to the Secretary.

## A.—BENGAL.

No. 1721 T., dated Darjeeling, 9th August 1879.

From—H. A. COCKERELL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bengal,

To—The President of the Commission on Army Organization and Expenditure in India, Simla.

In letter No. 204 S.B., dated the 7th ultimo, from the Government of India in the Military Department, the Lieutenant-Governor was requested to furnish the Commission on Army Organization and Expenditure with information on the points noted in paragraph 2 of that letter, and also to

communicate the views of the Government of Bengal on the military requirements of the Province in reference to its necessary garrison, the immediate repression of internal disturbance or insurrection, and the maintenance of order.

2. With reference to paragraphs 1 and 3 of the letter cited above, I am directed to forward a copy of a note drawn up by Sir Ashley Eden on the distribution of troops in Bengal; and to say that Sir Steuart Bayley fully concurs in the views therein expressed. It will be seen from that note that the Government of Bengal recommend the abolition of all small cantonments in Bengal, with the exception of Baxa, Darjeeling (Jellapahar), Cuttack, and Dorunda; and the concentration of troops at two centres, Calcutta and Dinapore. If, as proposed, the regiment of Europeans at Dum-Dum is removed to Darjeeling, the troops to be stationed at Calcutta, *i.e.*, Fort William, Alipore, and Barrackpore, will be as follows :—

Fort William	...	...	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ Garrison battery.} \\ 1 \text{ European regiment.} \\ 1 \text{ Regiment of Native infantry.} \end{array} \right.$
Alipore	...	...	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 2 \text{ Regiments Native infantry.} \\ 2 \text{ Batteries of artillery.} \end{array} \right.$
Barrackpore	...	...	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 2 \text{ Companies European infantry.} \\ 2 \text{ Regiments of Native infantry.} \\ \text{Detachment of Native cavalry.} \end{array} \right.$

Or, if only a wing remains at Baxa, then two-and-a-half regiments of Native infantry should be stationed at Barrackpore. At Dinapore there would be one field battery, one regiment European infantry, and one regiment Native infantry; at Dorunda there would be one regiment Native infantry, with a detachment at Hazaribagh; and at Darjeeling one regiment of European infantry, with a detachment at Barrackpore. The regiment at Cuttack would remain there, but it should be a Bengal, and not a Madras, regiment.

3. This scheme would set free the regiment at Julpigore with its wing at Dacca, the regiment at Bhaugulpore with its detachment at Nya Doomka, the detachment at Berhampore, and the cavalry at Segowlie. The force in Bengal would be diminished by two regiments of Native infantry, one regiment of Native cavalry, and one battery of artillery.

4. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that the distribution of troops now proposed would suffice to meet the general requirements of Bengal, both for garrison purposes and the maintenance of order, and for internal and external military purposes. The troops proposed to be stationed at Fort William, Alipore, and Barrackpore would always leave three or four regiments of Native infantry available and ready to be sent, if required, on any emergency or in any direction.

5. The annexed Statements I and II show the strength of the Native population, the strength of the European and Eurasian population (exclusive of troops), and the strength and distribution of the police in this province.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that in these provinces there is nothing in the state of public feeling which can be considered to constitute an element of danger. Notwithstanding the occasional rash utterances of a portion of the Press, there is not, in Sir Steuart Bayley's opinion, any general feeling of hostility to Government, nor, if taxation is kept within moderate limits, does he see any element likely to give rise to such a feeling. Of the political sources of disquiet which have at different times been discerned in the Ferazis of Eastern Bengal and in the Wahabis of Patna, the Lieutenant-Governor has little hesitation in saying that, at present at all events, he can see in these sects no source of danger or disturbance; and should the gradual improvement in the condition of the agricultural population be attended, as has sometimes been apprehended, with agrarian riots, there is no reason to suppose that such disturbances will ever be anything but local, or more serious than can be met by the action of the police. On this subject, however, as Sir Ashley Eden is President of the Commission, it is unnecessary for Sir Steuart Bayley to give more than an outline of his views. The President's own knowledge and position entitle him to speak with far greater authority and with more fulness on the subject; and Sir Steuart Bayley has little doubt that that authority will be found to support his own views.

7. With regard to the efficiency of the police, I am to say that the force in the Lower Provinces was recently reduced to the lowest possible strength compatible with the maintenance of internal peace and order. In the event of the proposals made above for the reduction and redistribution of the troops in Bengal being adopted, it will be necessary to entertain an additional force of two European inspectors, three sub-inspectors, 20 head-constables, and 250 constables, at a total cost of Rs. 31,800 per annum. This force will be carefully drilled, and be divided into three parties. A European inspector, a sub-inspector, eight head-constables, and 100 men will be stationed at Dacca; and a similar party at Bhaugulpore. A sub-inspector, four head-constables, and 50 men will be posted at Moorshedabad, the object being to strengthen the reserves at these places in case of any local disturbances.

8. The total strength of the European and Eurasian population of Bengal, exclusive of the army, is 41,453, of whom 19,661 live in Calcutta. The remaining 21,792 are scattered in small numbers throughout the country, as will be seen from Statement No. I appended to this letter. Except in Calcutta and the suburbs, and in a few large towns, such as Dacca, Chittagong, and Serampore, the Eurasian population is very small. In Behar and Darjeeling there are a considerable number of non-official European planters, who would materially assist in the maintenance of order in the event of any serious internal disturbance; but, on the whole, the Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that, except in Calcutta, the strength of the European and Eurasian population, in combatant power and for the maintenance of order, is about counterbalanced by the necessity of providing for the safety of their women and children in case of disturbance. The Lieutenant-Governor does not consider that the scattered European and Eurasian population outside Calcutta could be so organized as to be of any greater utility than at present. In Calcutta the Europeans and Eurasians form a most powerful and valuable element of strength both as a combatant and as a protective power.



P. Neither Sir Ashley Eden nor Sir Stenart Bayley considers the compulsory enrolment of Europeans and Eurasians possible or desirable, nor do they look forward to any great development of the volunteer system beyond the stage that it has now reached.

*Note by the Lieutenant-Governor on the distribution of Troops in Bengal.*

This Government is about to be asked by the Government of India what reductions it is possible to make in the number of troops stationed in Lower Bengal, and specially in the number of small cantonments and detachments.

Now, the position of Bengal in respect to the stations which it is necessary to occupy with troops has very much changed in late years, and, since the subject was last considered and settled, we now have railway communication in a few hours between Calcutta and the North-Eastern Frontier, and we can also send troops from Calcutta to Dacca by railway and steamer in a day and night.

There can be no greater mistake than to shut troops up in isolated cantonments; it is an enormous waste of power, and a great expense. The regiment, which has a wing at Julpigoree and a wing at Dacca, may be at once withdrawn. Julpigoree is within 18 hours by rail of Calcutta; and if the regiment at Baxa ever wanted support, it would be supported almost as easily from Calcutta as from Julpigoree. I understand that the Commanding Officer and the Commissioner think that Baxa is a better cantonment than Julpigoree, and that there are strong reasons for maintaining it at Baxa. But they think a wing sufficient; the other wing might be withdrawn to Calcutta. Troops are not likely to be wanted at Dacca on any sudden emergency; and, for the Eastern districts, Goalundo is as good a centre as any other place, and troops could be sent just as easily from Calcutta to the Eastern districts as from Dacca. It may be necessary, however, if the garrison is withdrawn from Dacca, to slightly increase the police reserve. The work likely to fall upon any force in the Dacca division is police work proper, the maintenance of internal peace and order, and not the control of a foreign enemy.

The regiment at Bhaugulpore is not wanted. The people of Bhaugulpore are as quiet, loyal, and well-behaved as the people of any place in India. The detachment at Nya Doomka may be withdrawn, their place being taken by a strong police guard, if necessary.

The Sonthal country, which is now settled and quiet, is surrounded by railways; and troops could be poured into it more easily from Calcutta and Dinapore than from any other place. The detachment at Berhampore is quite useless except to occupy barracks erected at an enormous expense only to be condemned.

The detachment of Europeans at Hazaribagh is not wanted; and it must be demoralising to such a small detachment to be separated from its head-quarters. There is a regiment of sepoy at Dorunda; and if the European detachment is removed, one company from Dorunda might be sent on detachment at Hazaribagh.

I have never been able to understand why a cavalry regiment should be stationed at a detached outlying station like Segowlie, where it could only be available for local purposes. If it is meant to overawe Nepal, I think it is entirely wasted. If Nepal invades British territory, it will only be after long preparation and warning; and, under such circumstances, a far more formidable force than a Native cavalry regiment would have to watch the frontier. If this cavalry regiment is required for purposes of a general military character, it should be removed to Dinapore or Benares or Allahabad, or some military centre from which it can be detached and sent by rail in any direction in which it is required.

There is a battery of artillery at Darjeeling which is not absolutely necessary. Indeed, how unnecessary it is may be gathered from the fact that it has for years not had any serviceable guns. It may be that it is required to be stationed in the hills for sanitary purposes; but if this is so, one battery the less might be retained at Barrackpore, and the Darjeeling battery moved down there when required. At present, entirely unequipped as it is, it is a most useless and extravagant waste of money. It would be very much better to remove this battery, and, with the barracks it would vacate, there would be accommodation for the head-quarters of the regiment now at Dum-Dum. If further accommodation was required, there is plenty of room for building cheap barracks or cottages: the barracks lately constructed are far more massive and costly than is necessary.

I also think that the second regiment of Europeans now stationed at Dum-Dum would be much better stationed at Darjeeling, or, at all events, the head-quarters and one wing. It might be necessary probably to leave a detachment of the regiment at Barrackpore. With the tramway running into Jellapahar, and joining the Northern Bengal Railway, this regiment could always be sent for when wanted in the plains; and having regard to the extraordinary unhealthiness of Dum-Dum, and the great sickness of the regiment there, I am sure it would be good economy to station it at Jellapahar. If this is determined upon, cheap huts should be constructed instead of the expensive stone barracks now used for the troops. If the battery were removed, as I have said above, very few new barracks would be wanted for a wing. If a regiment, or the head-quarters of a regiment, was stationed at Jellapahar, men sent up as convalescents could be attached temporarily to the different companies of such regiment, and be brought under the control of officers and non-commissioned officers far more completely than they now can be.

The system of convalescent depôts is wasteful and extravagant. The establishment of officers and hospital staff alone costs Rs. 58,000 a year. It is quite unnecessary to make an expensive command of a hill depôt. Any regimental field officer would be glad to take the command for a command allowance of Rs. 200 a month. A regimental officer would gladly take the appointment of staff officer on Rs. 50 a month. But if a wing of a regiment was sent up to the depôt, and sick men from other regiments attached temporarily to that, all such allowances would cease. At present there is a charge of Rs. 25,000 for hospital staff for an average of 15 men.

It will be seen from this that, with the exception of Baxa, Darjeeling (Jellapahar), and Dorunda, I would abolish all small cantonments in Bengal, and would concentrate the troops at two centres, Calcutta and Dinapore. In Calcutta, I of course include Alipore, Fort William, and

Barrackpore, taking them for my purpose as one station. I would station troops there, supposing the Dum-Dum regiment is removed to Darjeeling, as follows :—

Fort William	...	...	{ 1 Garrison battery.
			{ 1 European regiment.
Alipore	...	...	{ 1 Regiment Native infantry.
			{ 2 Regiments Native infantry.
			{ 2 Batteries of artillery.
Barrackpore	...	...	{ 2 Companies European infantry.
			{ 2 Regiments of Native infantry.
			{ Detachment of Native cavalry.

or, if only a wing remains at Baxa, I would give Barrackpore two-and-a-half regiments Native infantry.

This would always give three or four regiments of Native infantry to send in any direction, either to East or North Bengal, or elsewhere. At Dinapore I would have—

- 1 Field battery.                      1 Regiment European infantry.  
1 Regiment Native infantry.

At Dorunda, one regiment Native infantry, with detachment at Hazaribagh. At Darjeeling, one regiment European infantry, with detachment at Barrackpore. This would set free the regiment at Julpigoree with its wing at Dacca, the regiment at Bhagulpore with its detachment at Nya Doomka, and the detachment at Berhampore and the cavalry regiment from Segowlie. The force in Bengal would be diminished by two regiments of Native infantry, one regiment of Native cavalry, one battery of artillery.

### No. I.

*Statement showing the strength of Native population and strength of European and Eurasian population (exclusive of army).*

Districts.	Strength of Native population.	Strength of European and Eurasian population, exclusive of army.	Total.
<b>BENGAL.</b>			
<b>WESTERN DISTRICTS.</b>			
<i>Burdwan Division.</i>			
Burdwan ... ..	2,034,212	533	2,034,745
Bankoora ... ..	526,739	33	526,772
Beerbhoom ... ..	695,830	91	695,921
Midnapore ... ..	2,540,746	217	2,540,963
Hooghly and Howrah ... ..	1,487,157	1,399	1,488,556
Total ... ..	7,284,684	2,273	7,286,957
<b>CENTRAL DISTRICTS.</b>			
<i>Presidency Division.</i>			
24-Pergunnahs ... ..	2,204,879	4,466	2,209,345
Calcutta ... ..	408,927	19,661	428,588
Nuddea ... ..	1,812,582	213	1,812,795
Jessore ... ..	2,074,830	141	2,075,021
Moorsshedabad ... ..	1,353,315	311	1,353,626
Total ... ..	7,854,583	24,792	7,879,375
<i>Rajshahye Division.</i>			
Dinagapore ... ..	1,501,903	21	1,501,924
Rajshahye ... ..	1,310,628	101	1,310,729
Rungpore ... ..	2,149,931	41	2,149,972
Bograh ... ..	689,448	19	689,467
Pubna ... ..	1,211,562	32	1,211,594
Darjeeling ... ..	94,292	420	94,712
Julpigoree ... ..	418,633	32	418,665
Total ... ..	7,376,397	666	7,377,063

Districts.		Strength of Native population.	Strength of European and Eurasian popu- lation, exclusive of army.	Total.
<b>BENGAL—continued.</b>				
<b>EASTERN DISTRICTS.</b>				
<i>Dacca Division.</i>				
Dacca ...	...	1,847,032	5,961	1,852,993
Furzedpore ...	...	1,012,505	84	1,012,589
Backergunge ...	...	2,377,279	154	2,377,433
Mymensingh ...	...	2,319,810	98	2,319,917
Tipperah ...	...	1,533,880	51	1,533,931
Total	...	9,120,515	6,348	9,126,863
<i>Chittagong Division.</i>				
Chittagong ...	...	1,126,360	1,012	1,127,402
Noakholly ...	...	713,707	227	713,934
Chittagong Hill Tracts ...	...	69,577	30	69,607
Total	...	1,909,644	1,269	1,910,913
<b>BEHAR.</b>				
<i>Patna Division.</i>				
Patna ...	...	1,557,418	1,358	1,558,776
Gya ...	...	1,919,629	121	1,919,750
Shahabad ...	...	1,723,571	403	1,723,974
Mozufferpore ...	...	4,381,480	217	4,381,706
Darbhanga ...	...			
Saran ...	...	2,063,736	124	2,063,860
Chumparun ...	...	1,410,722	93	1,410,815
Total	...	13,119,565	2,316	13,121,881
<i>Bhaugulpore Division.</i>				
Monghyr ...	...	1,812,038	918	1,812,956
Bhaugulpore ...	...	1,826,121	169	1,826,290
Purneah ...	...	1,714,484	311	1,714,795
Southal Pergunnahs ...	...	1,259,075	212	1,259,287
Maldah ...	...	676,359	37	676,426
Total	...	7,288,107	1,677	* 7,289,784
<i>Orissa Division.</i>				
Cuttack ...	...	1,491,380	404	1,491,784
Pooree ...	...	769,650	24	769,674
Balasore ...	...	770,151	81	770,232
Tributary Mehals ...	...	1,283,308	1	1,283,309
Total	...	4,317,489	510	4,317,999
<i>Chota Nagpore Division.</i>				
Hazaribagh ...	...	770,472	1,403	771,875
Lohardugga ...	...	1,237,029	94	1,237,123
Singbhoom ...	...	415,001	22	415,023
Manbhoom ...	...	995,517	53	995,570
Tributary Estates ...	...	495,980	...	495,980
Total	...	3,823,999	1,572	3,825,571
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	...	<b>62,094,983</b>	<b>41,453</b>	<b>62,136,436</b>
<i>Native States.</i>				
Cowp Bhar ...	...	...	...	532,565
Hill Tipperah ...	...	...	...	35,262

## No. II.

Statement showing the strength and distribution of Police in the Lower Provinces, including Calcutta.

COMMISSIONERS' DIVISIONS.	Names of districts.	SANCTIONED STRENGTH OF POLICE FORCE.										DISTRIBUTION OF FORCE.							
		Inspector-General, Deputy Inspector-General, and Assistant Inspector-General.	Strength of district, cantonment, town, or municipal and waterpolice, paid for wholly or in part from Imperial revenues.						Strength of cantonment, town, or municipal and water police, paid wholly from other than Imperial revenues.		Total of columns 2 to 10.	In district.						On town, municipal, or harbour duty.	In cantonments.
			Number of District and District Subordinate officers on 10 and upwards.	Number of subordinate officers on less than Rs. 100.	Number of mounted police constables.	Number of foot police constables.	Number of water police constables.	Officers.	Men.	Guards at district, central, or subsidiary jails.		Guards over lock-ups and treasuries, or as escort to prisoners and treasure.		On other duties.					
										Officers.		Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
BENGAL.																			
Western Districts.																			
DIBRUGH.	Dardwan ...	...	...	91	...	410	...	18	300	539	1	8	7	48	94	303	318	...	
	Hankooa ...	...	...	33	...	133	...	3	61	235	1	9	1	8	33	110	67	...	
	Beerbhoom ...	...	...	36	...	161	...	1	23	223	1	5	4	13	33	143	21	...	
	Midnapore ...	...	...	136	...	683	21	9	161	1,027	2	19	17	122	121	673	170	...	
	Hooghly ...	...	...	63	...	803	...	20	331	721	1	6	10	37	66	260	351	...	
	Howrah ...	...	...	60	...	671	...	...	8	666	...	...	2	24	63	207	380	...	
Central Districts.																			
PRESE.	24-Pergunnahs ...	...	...	120	...	651	84	60	576	1,494	1	5	29	189	110	544	692	24	
	Nuddea ...	...	...	85	...	436	...	13	265	606	1	6	8	63	83	367	278	...	
	Jessore ...	...	...	95	...	479	49	...	70	701	2	32	15	117	86	419	70	...	
	Mooreheadabad ...	...	...	106	...	497	...	13	251	877	2	21	10	41	101	432	259	6	
RAJSHAH.	Dinapore ...	...	...	57	...	320	...	2	30	411	1	6	2	20	59	294	32	...	
	Rajshahye ...	...	...	66	...	318	...	5	65	453	1	11	12	31	62	273	70	...	
	Rungpore ...	...	...	72	...	418	...	3	26	526	8	52	6	36	71	380	29	...	
	Bogra ...	...	...	39	...	185	...	2	30	250	1	5	4	28	57	162	32	...	
	Poona ...	...	...	54	...	241	...	4	68	374	1	6	5	28	52	211	72	...	
	Darjeeling ...	...	...	33	...	160	...	2	22	227	1	12	8	43	28	111	21	...	
JALPAIGUR.	Jalpaigore ...	...	...	46	...	214	...	1	13	306	1	21	4	43	43	107	14	...	
Eastern Districts.																			
DACA.	Dacca ...	...	...	68	...	329	14	11	278	701	1	14	7	57	66	272	281	...	
	Farrakpore ...	...	...	65	...	296	23	3	70	467	1	6	6	35	63	283	73	...	
	Hackerpunge ...	...	...	93	...	410	...	3	110	654	2	29	7	46	92	374	113	...	
	Mymensingh ...	...	...	71	...	369	9	...	92	516	2	32	6	27	71	310	89	...	
	Tipperah ...	...	...	41	...	270	...	5	49	367	2	28	4	47	39	195	62	...	
CHITTAGONG.	Chittagong ...	...	...	65	...	310	...	5	66	450	1	6	2	26	67	258	61	...	
	Noakhali ...	...	...	45	...	271	...	1	11	338	2	30	4	34	13	211	15	...	
	Chittagong Hill Tracts ...	...	...	45	...	597	...	...	...	610	...	...	2	9	50	553	...	...	
Total ...		...	42	96	1,712	...	9,126	205	189	2,950	11,320	32	367	180	1,161	1,606	7,413	3,479	32
BEHAR.																			
PATNA.	Patna ...	...	...	106	...	932	...	20	362	1,420	3	42	10	80	61	325	814	53	
	Gya ...	...	...	71	...	402	...	16	287	871	2	15	7	43	93	409	301	...	
	Shahabad ...	...	...	78	...	282	...	8	233	712	1	12	10	96	74	238	261	...	
	Muzaffarpore ...	...	...	54	...	253	...	11	165	519	1	6	6	43	52	234	176	...	
	Darbhanga ...	...	...	19	...	235	...	11	135	453	1	11	3	23	48	216	146	...	
	Saran ...	...	...	67	...	324	...	11	162	568	2	30	10	108	67	169	173	...	
BHOJIPUR.	Chumpanan ...	...	...	62	...	210	...	3	37	314	1	11	6	31	43	207	49	...	
	Monghyr ...	...	...	51	...	294	...	9	137	490	1	6	3	28	52	261	136	...	
	Bhagulpore ...	...	...	62	...	320	...	6	128	521	2	10	7	35	58	269	131	...	
	Purneah ...	...	...	73	...	362	...	6	117	563	1	6	16	113	63	243	123	...	
	Southern Pergunnahs ...	...	...	38	...	261	...	1	10	315	...	...	7	93	33	166	11	...	
	Maldah ...	...	...	36	...	195	...	2	36	272	1	5	8	22	35	168	33	...	
Total ...		...	20	40	762	8	4,305	...	101	1,819	7,030	16	167	103	723	673	2,911	2,395	54
ORISSA.																			
ORISSA.	Cuttack ...	...	...	81	...	401	3	8	60	535	1	5	5	79	84	323	69	9	
	Pooree ...	...	...	71	...	302	...	5	65	346	1	5	4	29	60	268	70	...	
	Balsore ...	...	...	53	...	265	26	2	28	594	1	5	6	27	81	359	50	...	
	Gurjata ...	...	...	28	...	150	...	...	...	211	...	...	4	37	27	143	...	...	
Total ...		...	6	11	260	...	1,251	20	16	183	1,760	3	16	18	172	261	1,003	180	9
CHOTA NAAGPORE.																			
South-West Frontier Agency.																			
CHOTA NAAGPORE.	Hazaribagh ...	...	...	88	14	411	...	3	73	593	6	47	8	30	78	318	71	6	
	Lohardugga ...	...	...	85	...	366	...	1	69	528	1	10	5	33	83	321	70	...	
	Singbhoom ...	...	...	27	...	188	...	...	10	177	1	10	2	46	36	180	10	...	
	Manbhoom ...	...	...	60	10	235	...	2	46	857	1	6	6	31	67	209	45	...	
	Total ...	...	6	0	260	24	1,150	...	6	168	1,631	9	72	22	102	241	1,000	199	6
Total of districts ...		...	73	156	3,000	32	15,833	231	311	6,120	21,792	60	617	323	2,180	2,784	12,177	6,252	69
Government Railway Police Office of Inspector-General of Police, Lower Provinces		1	...	7	78	...	480	...	...	...	575	...	...	...	...	86	480	...	...
Total ...		5	...	7	78	...	480	...	...	...	579	...	...	...	...	90	480	...	...
GRAND TOTAL ...		5	73	163	3,078	32	16,322	234	311	6,120	22,371	60	617	323	2,180	2,774	12,906	6,252	69

SANCTIONED STRENGTH OF POLICE FORCE.										DISTRIBUTION OF POLICE.					
1	2	Strength of police paid for wholly or in part from Imperial revenue.					Strength of police paid from additional consolidated fund.		Total of columns 2 to 9.	Government at large, including Port police.		Three police, salt-tax station, preventive establishment under Act XIV, 1888.		Other duties.	
		Deputy Comdants-in-Chief.	Superintendents.	Subordinate officers.	Constables.	Mounted constables.	Subordinate officers.	Constables.		Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
Calcutta and Benares ..	1	1	7	30	2,177	6	25	262	3,075	61	351	31	174	252	2,210
Total police in the Lower Provinces, including Calcutta ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	23,416	...	...	...	...	...	...

## B.—ASSAM.

*Note by the Chief Commissioner on the Military requirements of Assam.*

In order to lay fully before the Commission my views on the military requirements of Assam, it

Physical geography of Assam, and relations with the wild tribes contiguous to the frontiers of the province.

is necessary to advert briefly to the physical configuration of the province, and to the nature of the various tribes within and around it. Speaking roughly, the province consists of the two valleys of the Brahmaputra and the Surma rivers, with the intervening ranges of mountains. It is bounded on the north by the lower spurs of the eastern Himalayas; and our neighbours on this border, beginning from the west, are first the people of Bhootan proper, next the Bhootias of Towang, a dependency of Thibet. Both peoples live under an organized government, and have for some years past been very good neighbours, from whom we have nothing to fear.

2. Next come the savage tribes of Akas, Dufflas, and Miris. With the Dufflas we had some trouble five years ago; but none of these are warlike tribes, nor need any serious injury be apprehended from them. Outposts of armed police, however, have to be maintained along the frontier, to guard against any petty raids that might be projected. Eastward again beyond these are the Abors, a warlike and turbulent tribe, against whom we have made more than one unsuccessful expedition. In their claim to the whole country between the low hills and the Brahmaputra, and in their predatory habits, there are standing causes of quarrel which will probably lead to an open attack before long. The proposed advance of our line of posts on this frontier will strengthen our position; but for many years to come this portion of the frontier will need to be strongly guarded both to repel and, if need be, to punish aggression.

3. Beyond these are the Mishmis, who also occasionally give trouble, but who will be held completely in check by the advanced line of posts. From them no serious danger need be apprehended; but, in their case likewise, numerous armed posts have to be maintained for defensive purposes. On the eastern frontier, the Mishmi hills, which sweep round the Brahmaputra valley, form our boundary, and are inhabited by Singhpoos and Khamptis, the latter a Shan tribe, and the former having also a Burmese origin. These tribes give no trouble, and under ordinary circumstances are unlikely to give any; but through their country lie the routes between the valley of the Brahmaputra, and both Upper Burma and the Bathang-Bhamo road, and it is probable that we shall some day come into closer relations with them, either amicable or hostile.

4. There is a portion of the boundary here, where the hills turn to the south-west, not yet surveyed. These hills are inhabited by some of the

Munipore.

tribes who go under the indiscriminate name of Nagas; but the Nagas generally will come under consideration hereafter. Turning southward, the frontier marches with that of Munipore for some distance. Munipore has an estimated army of 5,000 or 6,000 strong. The men are said to be of good physique and possessed of many soldierly qualities; and the Political Agent thinks that, with the assistance of a few European officers, they might be made of very great use in case of complications arising with Burma, and, even as they now are, may be very useful auxiliaries against the Nagas on one side or the Lushais on the other. Their ignorance of drill and discipline makes them of little account in scientific warfare; and, under present circumstances, I apprehend no danger whatever from Munipore. I ought not to omit here the fact, *quantum valcat*, that the Assam valley has been, and might again be, disturbed by the incursion of Burmese over the Patkoi into the valley of the Dehing. Personally I look upon such a contingency as in the highest degree improbable; but attention having been called to it in the newspapers by a gentleman\* of great

\* Mr. S. Paul.

knowledge and experience, I think proper to mention it.

5. Leaving Munipore, the boundary of the Assam province on the south may be said for the present to be the range of low hills inhabited by the Lushai tribes, and further west by the people of Hill Tipu, beyond which it is needless to go. The Lushais have at times given us serious trouble, and inflicted very considerable loss; but since the expedition of 1871-72 there have been no raids made by them, and by the maintenance of bazars in their neighbourhood we have acquired a very

considerable hold over them. But pressure from other tribes to the south-east, or internal dissensions, or the rise of a new chief, may at any moment bring about a renewal of their restless spirit, so that, on our part, an incessant watchfulness, and the maintenance of numerous and efficient posts, are still of the first necessity along this part of our boundary.

6. I have hitherto abstained from speaking of the most formidable and aggressive of the tribes with whom we have to do, *viz.*, the heterogeneous clans or tribes whom we group under the name of Nagas,

Nagas.

because they are not, geographically speaking, external to the province, but inhabit the range of hills dividing the valley of the Brahmaputra, east of the Doyang, from that of the Surma, east of the Jaintia hills, and may be said to be almost wholly within the territorial boundaries of the province. We have lately taken up a permanent position at Kohima, in the centre of the Angami tribe of Nagas, from which we can control this the most warlike of the clans far better than from Samuguting; but with this position we have also undertaken the responsibility of bringing the tribes gradually under subjection to the law, and of repressing the unceasing raids and massacres which have, with sickening reiteration, been reported in every annual report, but which have never yet been systematically met or repressed. It is needless to say that the retention of Kohima and its sub-division of Wokha in the Lhota-Naga country will, no less than the steady enforcement of the Government policy, be in all probability resented by them, and that both our outposts and communications in this country will require to be most carefully guarded. Consequently a strong force, not only for defensive purpose, but available for punitive and repressive measures, must be deemed an absolute necessity; and for some years to come our position will be that of a garrison in an enemy's country.

7. Little need be said of the other races inhabiting this range of mountains. To the west of the Nagas come the Syntengs or Jaintias, who broke into rebellion 18 years ago, but who, like their neigh-

Khasias, Jaintias, and Garos.

bours the Khasias, are now a peaceful and contented race, unlikely to give trouble; and again, to the west of the Khasia and Jaintia hills, come the Garos, who likewise are settling down into a peaceable and civilized community. But though I anticipate no trouble from these hill tribes, it must be remembered that their peacefulness and abstinence from bloodshed is of recent date, and is a lesson still only partially learnt; consequently that they cannot be left, like the people of the plains, to the mere moral authority of the civil police, but must be subjected to the visible control of some armed force among them.

8. From the above survey it will be seen that we have little to fear from any organized aggression of a foreign enemy, or from internal rebellion, but that, on the other hand, we have to guard at every point along an enormously extended external frontier, and along the quasi-frontier of the Naga hills, against raids from barbarous tribes, who, although of no organized strength, can yet issue from the hills, cut up villages, and carry back their plunder with great ease, causing us much harassment and expense in the endeavour to enforce punishment. Speaking generally, none of these tribes have any cohesion; none of them act together. Some of them have neither tribal nor even village chiefs; and if it were a question of meeting them in our own territory only, 50 men at any one point would be more than a match for any force that could well be brought against that point. But it might very easily happen, not by design, but accidentally, that we were simultaneously called on to meet Lushai incursions in the south and Abor incursions in the north, while a Naga expedition was going on in the middle of the province. The occasional necessity, moreover, of meeting these incursions by punitive measures, and making hostile expeditions into the enemy's country, must not be lost sight of. This necessity involves something in the shape of reserves at particular points on the frontier, in addition to the actual strength of the defensive posts, besides central reserves, properly so called; and it is from the double necessity of guarding and strengthening numerous posts along the frontier, and at the same time being ready to undertake frequent hostile expeditions, that the existing system of distributing our armed force has grown up. This system I now proceed to describe.

9. The central reserve consists of the head-quarters of four native regiments, each 800 strong.

Present system of frontier posts.

Of these, two are stationed at Shillong, which has the advantage of being very healthy, and so far centrally situated as to be equidistant from the northern, southern, and Naga hills frontier. But it has some disadvantages, in that supplies have to be brought up either from the Brahmaputra by 60 miles of an imperfectly metalled cart-road, which is almost impassable in the rains, or else 50 miles from Bholagunge (the nearest point for water-carrage on the south side) by a steep and difficult bridle-path. Consequently, Shillong is one of the most expensive places in India; the moving of troops from there is not easy; and the reserve there, though equidistant from many points of danger, is within easy reach of none. For the requirements of the Khasia hills themselves, two companies would suffice.

The head-quarters of another regiment is at Dibrughur, the highest point on the Brahmaputra to which the river steamers ply; and a glance at the map will show that at present this is the most suitable place that could be chosen in Upper Assam, and the head-quarters of the remaining regiment is at Cachar (Silechar), which, being the furthest available spot on the Surma river, having the Lushais to the south, Mumpore and Burma to the east, and Naga hills to the north, is obviously an obligatory spot in any system of military defence.

Next in the chain come what (for want of a better name) I may call the local reserves of detachments from these regiments, at Gowhati, Jaipore, Golaghat, and Sulya, none of which (hardly even the last) are frontier outposts; and finally come the series of frontier posts, strictly so-called, including the Naga hills posts.

10. These frontier posts are 50 in number (excluding the above local reserve stations); and

\* Including the frontier police of the Naga hills reserve at Kohima.

of these 50, some 36\* are held by frontier police with 734 men, and 14 by the military with 616 men.

I should explain that in Assam the police are divided into two branches—(a) the civil police, who take the ordinary station duties connected with detection and prevention of crime; and (b) the armed or frontier police, whose duty it is to guard jails and treasuries, furnish escorts, and man these frontier

outposts, but who have nothing to do with the ordinary criminal work of the district. These frontier police are armed with rifles, and are drilled and receive musketry instruction, and their duties are almost entirely of a military nature; and in the districts where they have to deal with hostile tribes, such as Garo and Naga hills and Cachar, they are enlisted mainly for their qualities as soldiers, from among such races as the Nepalese or the tribes inhabiting the hills and slopes of Assam, such as Jharias, Rabhas, Cacharis, &c.

These 50 frontier outposts, as I have said, are held partly by military and partly by frontier police. A complete list of them, with their geographical distribution and the class and number of the garrison, will be found in Appendix A, from which it will be seen that the numbers garrisoning them vary in the outposts proper from about 50 men of all ranks to 14 of all ranks in those held by the military, and even dwindle down to five and seven in a few of those held by the police.

They are held, moreover, quite indiscriminately—here a police outpost, there a military, then two more police posts, then again one held by troops. There is no sort of system, such as central posts being held by troops and flanks by police, or important and dangerous posts by troops and the less dangerous by police, or even one district by troops and another by police; but it is an absolutely haphazard arrangement, with a slight tendency observable to relieve the military of the most unhealthy and of the most distant posts; but even this much has been carried out in a very erratic and uncertain fashion.

11. The inconveniences and objections to this system are obvious. The first is the want of administrative unity. The posts being garrisoned by men under different organizations, they cease at once to be a

connected chain of posts, ready to co-operate with each other; but each post communicates with its own military or civil head-quarters only, and practically, instead of being a link in a chain, is merely an isolated garrison commanding the ground on which it stands. Patrolling between the posts is not kept up. The duty can be enforced on the police, but not on the military, unless the commanding officer approves. The district officer, who is responsible for meeting and repelling such petty raids; can do what he likes in regard to the police outposts. He can give no orders to the military without delay and circumlocution, and without obvious danger of friction.

12. From a military point of view, the objections to the present system are even greater. It breaks the hearts of commanding officers to see their regiments split up on this petty detachment duty. Small bodies of troops, rarely more than 50, and sometimes as few as 15, are sent off by themselves to distant and unhealthy posts in the jungle, where it is difficult to supply them with food, and where they remain unvisited by a European officer sometimes as much as six months together. Naturally the commanding officer complains that it is impossible to keep up proper discipline, proper drill, proper shooting figures, proper health, or proper smartness in such circumstances; and there cannot be a doubt that detachment duty, when it involves, as in these cases, enforced idleness, isolation in small parties, and absence of supervision, must have the worst effect both on the health and discipline of the men. Add to this that the provisioning and maintenance of these posts is a troublesome and expensive business; and it will be admitted that the military dislike to sending men on this duty is justified.

13. Unfortunately, as I have shown above, the frontier posts must be kept up, and detachment duty must be done; but I am quite of opinion that it need not, in Assam, be done by the troops. It seems to me that, theoretically speaking, this sort of small outpost duty is strictly and properly work for an armed frontier police, not for disciplined troops organized on the regimental unit. It is not the defence of the country against invasion: it is to guard against petty raids, committed by 50 or 100 savages at a time, that we keep up these posts. I conceive the legitimate duty of the military to be that of an armed reserve, collected at convenient central stations, whence they could be sent to support the police on an emergency, or to undertake the brunt of any hostile expedition outside our own territory. I may observe, in support of my views as to the proper distinction of duties, that, in the Chitragong Hill Tracts and along the Arracan frontier (I believe), where the circumstances are almost identical with those of the Assam frontier, the outpost duty is wholly and entirely taken by the armed police.

14. I next have to enquire whether such an arrangement as is here suggested is feasible; and this depends on the question whether our frontier police are up to the work (1) in efficiency, (2) in numbers. In point of efficiency, I have little hesitation in saying that for this special business—the prevention and punishment of raids among savage tribes in jungle-covered hills—the armed police are even more efficient than the military. The actual fighting is the smallest part of the task: the essential qualities are mobility and handiness. Now the troops are not easily moved, and are in fact very helpless in the jungle. I am not speaking of exceptional regiments like the 44th S. L. I., which is recruited from Nepalese, and has had very special experience of jungle warfare, but of the ordinary Poorbeah or Punjabi sepoy. The troops require a large proportion of carriage; they require to have their paths cut for them, their supplies brought to them, their stockades built for them. In fact, they require to be waited on; whereas the armed policeman is accustomed to the jungles from his infancy, cuts his own paths, runs up his own huts, fetches his own food, and waits upon himself. The sepoy is armed with a breech-loader, and is thus no doubt more useful in actual fighting; but in actual fighting, when it comes to musketry, none of the wild tribes are much to be dreaded, and there is ample evidence on the records both of the Bhootan and Lushai campaigns, and of the many subsequent expeditions that have taken place in the Naga hills, that in actual fighting the armed policeman is quite fit to take his place side by side with the sepoy. That I am not speaking without authority in the foregoing remarks, I would refer to what took place in 1875, when it was resolved to send a punitive expedition against the Nagas. Colonel Keatinge, who was at that time Chief Commissioner of Assam, found that the orders of the Supreme Government could not be carried out; and in explanation stated that, owing to panic amongst the coolies, he was unable to impress them for transport purposes, or even to guard them when impressed; and as he could not provide carriage for the baggage and provisions, the troops were unable to leave their head-quarters. Finally, a small force of 150 men was sent out; but, being under orders to return within three days, they accomplished nothing. It was not until the

cooly corps liberated by the termination of the Duffla expedition had been placed at the Chief Commissioner's disposal that effective measures were taken for the punishment of the Nagas.

Colonel Johnstone, Political Agent at Muniore, in his annual report, dated 25th February 1879, to the Government of India, notices this want of mobility in our troops. He points out that, while the Muniore raw levies were ready to march at a moment's notice, carrying their own baggage supplies, and at the end of the march building their own huts and stockades, our Native troops were unable to move without a long array of coolies, who had to do everything for them.

15. In point of efficiency, then, I say that the frontier police are even now not less efficient than the men of ordinary Native regiments, and, from their greater mobility, would be, if armed with breech-

Comparative expense of military and police.

loaders, decidedly more efficient for this particular duty. In point of expense, there can be no comparison. Each soldier of an Assam regiment costs the Government not less than Rs. 337 a year; each policeman costs Rs. 180. And if equal efficiency is granted, it is obvious that considerations of economy point to the change; but numerically the force of armed police is at present too weak to relieve the military of all the frontier posts, and will have to be increased by about 1,000 men. If this is done, I am of opinion that two Native regiments can, with perfect safety and unquestionable economy, be set free from Assam.

The following are the details of the scheme.

16. The Assam armed police force as at present constituted consists of—

13 English officers,	135 Head-constables,
8 Inspectors,	1,899 Constables,
30 Sub-inspectors,	21 Buglers,

distributed over the different districts as shown in Appendix B, and holding 35 frontier posts.

The cost of the present force of armed police, including a moiety share of European officers' salaries, is Rs. 3,43,208. Full details are given in Appendix B.

In making up the strength of the police to 3,000 men, I would propose certain modifications both as to the constitution of the force and as to salaries.

The following statement gives my views as to the constitution of a cadre of 1,000 men, and shows the salaries that would have to be paid to officers and men :—

	Rs.		Rs.
4 Inspectors, <i>i.e.</i> —		20 Buglers—	
2 Inspectors at Rs. 150		10 Buglers at Rs. 10	
2 Ditto at „ 100		10 Do. at „ 9	
Yearly cost ...	6,000	Yearly cost ...	2,280
10 Sub-inspectors, <i>i.e.</i> —		2 Armourers at Rs. 50	
2 Sub-Inspectors at Rs. 60		Yearly cost ...	1,200
8 Ditto at „ 50		Good-conduct pay at Re. 1 per 15	
Yearly cost ...	6,240	per cent. of strength, 150 by 12	
100 Head-constables—		Yearly cost ...	1,800
20 Head-constables at Rs. 25		1 Marksman's pay at Rs. 50	
20 Ditto at „ 20		Yearly cost ...	600
40 Ditto at „ 15		Clothing allowance at Rs. 8 per man,	
20 Ditto at „ 12		1,120 men ...	8,960
Yearly cost ...	20,880	Contingencies at Rs. 5 per cent. ...	7,750
1,000 Constables—			
200 Constables at Rs. 10		Total ...	1,62,510
500 Ditto at „ 9			
300 Ditto at „ 8			
Yearly cost ...	1,06,800		

On this scale of pay, the cost of 3,000 frontier police, including the full complement of Native officers, would be Rs. 1,62,510 by 3 = Rs. 4,87,530. The present frontier police force is officered by seven district superintendents and six assistant superintendents, whose salaries amount to Rs. 80,000, one-half of which, or Rs. 40,000, is debited to the frontier police, the other half (as these officers have to perform ordinary police work) is met from civil funds. It would be necessary to increase the European staff on strengthening the present police force; and I consider that four additional assistant superintendents of police would be sufficient.

The European staff would be graded as follows :—

	Rs.		Rs.
1 District Superintendent at Rs. 1,000		4 Assistant Superintendents at Rs. 400	
2 District Superintendents at „ 800		4 Ditto at „ 300	
3 Ditto at „ 600		2 Ditto at „ 250	
2 Ditto at „ 500		Total yearly cost ...	94,800

one-half of which would be met from civil funds.

	Rs.
The total yearly cost of the proposed new frontier police would be ...	4,87,530
Half-pay of European officers ...	47,400
Total ...	5,34,930

which gives an average cost of Rs. 178½, or, roughly, Rs. 180 for each constable (excluding pension charges). For distribution of this force, see Appendix D.

17. It will be seen from Appendix C that each sepoy costs the State Rs. 337.

There is therefore a saving of Rs. 157 on each frontier police constable substituted for a sepoy.

18. Assuming that the military are relieved of the entire outpost duty of the province, the question remains as to what force is necessary for the purposes of a reserve, pure and simple.

Proposed reduction of military garrison.



I am of opinion that a garrison of two full regiments would be ample.

In the earlier part of this note I have shown what, in my opinion, the chances of danger from external attack are; and for offensive operations, should we have to undertake a serious punitive expedition against any one of the more powerful tribes, such as Nagas, Lushais, or Abors, I consider that a force of 500 men is the largest that could be effectually utilized, considering the quality of the enemy, the nature of the country, the difficulties of transport, and the want of communications.

If we had to invade Manipore or Bhootan, it might be necessary to increase our strength; but this would involve imperial and not merely local interests; and in either case there would be ample time to draw upon the central reserves at Calcutta.

I am of opinion that with such an armed police as I have proposed, maintained at its full strength, and armed with breech-loaders, a force of 1,200 troops would, in existing circumstances, be sufficient to ensure the safety of the province; but as regiments are now organized at a strength of 800 men, I would say two full Native regiments are ample.

To make this force effective for instant defence and punishment of the frontier tribes, it should be placed more directly than is usual at the disposal of the Chief Commissioner, not of course in matters of detail, but in the general power of ordering immediate operations of reinforcement or pursuit.

These two regiments I would distribute as follows:—

1 full regiment at Shillong.

1 regiment { 400 men at Sudya.  
                  { 400 men at Cachar.

I prefer Sudya to Dibrooghur as being somewhat healthier and more available for reinforcing the chain of posts along the north bank of the Brahmaputra, as it is 60 miles up-stream, and the troops can come down-stream rapidly, but move up-stream with difficulty. The choice, however, between these two sites is quite open; and I lay no great stress on the selection. The reasons for selecting Cachar have already been explained. With these as the stations for the central reserve, all the minor reserve stations may eventually be abandoned, though, until the police force is brought up to its full strength, the local reserves at Golaghat and Sudya must necessarily be retained.

The regiments should, if possible, be recruited from Nepalese and other hill tribes. Neither Hindustanis nor Punjabis thrive in the climate; nor are they well adapted for jungle-work. It is probable that, with only two Native regiments in Assam, a separate brigade staff will be deemed superfluous.

19. I would make one more suggestion—that if the regiments be in any sense of the word local (I mean to the same extent as the present Assam regiments are local), some special compensation should be given to the officers.

Service with Assam regiments is much disliked. The cost of living and of food and of the necessaries of life is abnormally great. Once stationed in Assam, it is difficult to obtain a transfer; and, while there is little or no chance of seeing real service, there exists always much exposure to jungle-fighting of a troublesome and inglorious character.

Officers cannot look forward to improving themselves much in their profession, owing to lack of opportunities and to the impossibility of being brigaded with first class regiments elsewhere. The sepoy and nearly all members of public departments receive Assam allowance; and the Chief Commissioner would suggest that some similar privilege be extended to British officers serving with the troops in Assam. The following allowances might perhaps be granted:—

	Rs.
Officer commanding regiment at Shillong and troops in Assam	300
To all officers below rank of commanding officer	Houses rent-free.
To all officers below rank of major	100
To all officers—horse allowance at Rs. 30 for each horse they are ordered by Military Department to keep.	

By these allowances officers serving in Assam would be placed on the same footing as their brother-officers in other parts of India.

The cost of these allowances would be—

	Rs.
Assam allowance to 10 captains and subalterns, at Rs. 100 per mensem	12,000
Horse allowance to 14 officers, at Rs. 30 per mensem	5,040
Ditto to 12 officers, at Rs. 60 per mensem	8,640
Special allowance to officer commanding at Shillong	3,600
Total	29,280

20. In consideration of the extra work that will be entailed upon him both in reorganizing and supervising the frontier police, the Chief Commissioner would further recommend a maximum increment to salary of Inspector-General of Police of Rs. 300 per mensem. Including this increment, the Assam allowance would be Rs. 32,880.

21. The cost (including officers) of a Native infantry regiment of 800 men receiving Assam allowance is shown in Appendix C to be Rs. 2,31,356, exclusive of the cost of rations over and above what the sepoy contribute.

22. The cost of military and police forces now maintained in Assam is—

				Rs.
4 regiments, at Rs. 2,31,356 each	...	...	...	9,25,424
Brigade staff	...	...	...	57,400
Frontier police	...	...	...	3,43,208
				<hr/>
Total	...	...	...	13,26,032

(exclusive of loss on rations, which will be shown hereafter).

A sepoy is allowed the following ration :—

1 seer flour or rice.	1 chittack ghee.
2 chittacks dhall.	$\frac{1}{2}$ chittack salt.

This ration costs per mensem—

				Rs. A. P.
Taking flour at 6 seers the rupee, 30 seers flour	...	...	...	5 0 0
2 Seers dhall at 4 annas per seer	...	...	...	0 8 0
2 Seers ghee at Rs. 1-4	...	...	...	2 8 0
10 Chittacks salt	...	...	...	0 2 6
				<hr/>
Total	...	...	...	8 2 6

The men each contribute Rs. 3-8.

Government therefore sustains a loss of Rs. 4-10-6 per mensem on each sepoy for ration-money.

Taking Rs. 4 as the loss per man, the total loss sustained on 3,200 sepoyas will be Rs. 12,800 monthly, or in the year Rs. 1,53,600. This does not represent the total loss sustained by Government, as every Native commissioned and non-commissioned officer and all camp-followers get their rations at Rs. 3-8, whatever the cost may be to the State.

23. Adding this loss on rations to the cost already shown, the total cost of police and military forces now maintained in Assam is—

Rs.
13,26,032
1,53,600
<hr/>
14,79,632

24. The cost of proposed frontier police and troops would be—

				Rs.
2 regiments Native infantry at Rs. 2,31,356	...	...	...	4,62,712
Add loss on rations for 1,600 sepoyas at Rs. 4 each per mensem	...	...	...	78,800
Assam allowance to officers	...	...	...	32,880
Cost of 3,000 frontier police	...	...	...	5,34,930
				<hr/>
Total	...	...	...	11,09,322

25. The cost of combined military and police forces now maintained in

Assam has been shown to be	...	...	...	14,79,632
Deduct proposed expenditure	...	...	...	11,09,322
				<hr/>
Total saving effected	...	...	...	3,70,310

26. To sum up, my proposals are—

- (1) to relieve the military of all frontier outpost duty ;
- (2) to make this duty over to the frontier police ;
- (3) to bring up the strength of the frontier police to 3,000 men ;
- (4) to reduce the military garrison of Assam by two regiments ;
- (5) to abolish the brigade staff ;
- (6) to place the two remaining regiments—  
one at Shillong,  
one-half at Sadya or Dibrooghur,  
one-half at Silchar,  
abolishing all other cantonments ;
- (7) to give special allowances to officers serving in Assam ;
- (8) to increase the allowances of Inspector-General of Police ;

27. The saving would probably be in reality somewhat more than this ; but enough has been said, I think, to show that the proposed changes involve a more efficient and scientific system of frontier defence, with a very substantial saving in expense.

(Sd.) S. C. BAYLEY,

The 12th August 1879.

Chief Commissioner, Assam.

## APPENDIX A.

*Names of outposts, with strength of garrisons, on the Assam Frontier.*

## SURMA VALLEY.

SYLHET DISTRICT	Police	...	{	Adampore	...	...	32
		...	{	Khambar Ghat	...	...	32
		...	{	Langai	...	...	33
				Total	...	...	97
	Military	...	{	Alenagar	...	...	46
		...	{	Chargola	...	...	45
				Total	...	...	91
CACHAR DISTRICT	Police	...	{	Assabao	...	...	11
		...	{	Themkar	...	...	18
		...	{	Hengrooma	...	...	18
		...	{	Mugloo	...	...	18
		...	{	Chakanehara	...	...	40
		...	{	Ghahnachara	...	...	42
		...	{	Mamadbar	...	...	27
		...	{	Ghiri Ghat	...	...	19
				Total	...	...	193
	Military	...	{	Momerktal	...	...	41
		...	{	Nawarbond	...	...	41
		...	{	Political Agent, Muni pore, guard	...	...	41
				Total	...	...	123

## HILL DISTRICTS.

GARO HILLS	Police	...	{	Rongengiri	...	...	27
		...	{	Myalguri	...	...	14
		...	{	Ryak	...	...	14
		...	{	Demalguri	...	...	14
				Total	...	...	69
KHASI HILLS	Military	...	Jowai	...	...	...	50
		...					
NAGA HILLS	Police	...	{	Dimakpore	...	...	18
		...	{	Diphupani	...	...	9
		...	{	Bhendari	...	...	7
		...	{	Dokha	...	...	44
		...	{	Samuguting	...	...	30
				Total	...	...	108
	Police	...	Reserve at Kohima	...	...	...	100
		...					
	Military	...	{	Wokha	...	...	61
		...	{	Samuguting	...	...	43
		...	{	Kohima	...	...	100
				Total	...	...	214

## ASSAM VALLEY.

DURRUNG	Police	...	{	Helem	...	...	13
		...	{	Balipara	...	...	13
		...	{	Damrara	...	...	13
				Total	...	...	39
	Military	...	Oodalguri	...	...	...	58
NOWGONG	...	...	...	...	...	...	Nil
GOWHATI	...	...	...	...	...	...	Nil
GOALPARA	...	...	...	...	...	...	Nil
SIBSAGAR	Police	...	{	Dehapahar	...	...	9
		...	{	Anguri	...	...	5
		...	{	Gelleki	...	...	11
		...	{	Behubar	...	...	14
		...	{	Obhoypore	...	...	11
				Total	...	...	50

## APPENDIX A—concluded.

## ASSAM VALLEY—concluded.

LUKHIMPORE	...	Police	...	Makum	...	...	17
				Dipoo	...	...	18
				Dikrong	...	...	11
				Demah	...	...	11
				Bordolune	...	...	7
				Lalakdoleni	...	...	7
				Borpakar	...	...	7
	...	Military	...		Total	...	78
				Pobha Mukh	...	...	46
				Seesre	...	...	24
				Dibong	...	...	14
				Jaipore	...	...	26
				Total	...	110	
Police posts				...	...	...	...
Military posts	...	...	...	...	14		
			Total	...	49		

Excluding head-quarters, there are—

35 police outposts with 634 frontier police.

14 military outposts with 646 military.

The average strength of police outpost garrisons: strength of military outposts : : 18 : 46.

				Rs.
Total	...	...	...	2,66,208
Add miscellaneous charges	...	...	...	37,000
Half-pay of European officers	...	...	...	40,000
Total				3,43,208

1,899 men cost Rs. 3,43,208 = Rs. 180 per man.

## APPENDIX B.

Sanctioned strength and cost of the Frontier Police in the Province of Assam for 1878-79.

Rank.				Number.	Salary.	Sanctioned budget, 1878-79.	Total men.
GOALPARA.					Rs.	Rs.	
Sub-inspector	3rd grade	...	...	1	60	720	2
Ditto,	4th	...	...	1	50	600	
Head-constable,	1st	...	...	1	25	300	
Ditto,	2nd	...	...	2	20	480	10
Ditto,	3rd	...	...	3	15	540	
Ditto,	4th	...	...	4	10	480	
Constable,	1st	...	...	5	9	540	96
Ditto,	2nd	...	...	41	8	3,936	
Ditto,	3rd	...	...	50	7	4,200	
Bugler	...	...	...	1	9	108	2
Do.	...	...	...	1	8	96	
Total				...	...	12,000	
KAMROOP.							
Sub-inspector,	2nd grade	...	...	1	70	840	2
Ditto,	4th	...	...	1	50	600	
Head-constable,	1st	...	...	1	25	300	
Ditto,	2nd	...	...	2	20	480	10
Ditto,	3rd	...	...	3	15	540	
Ditto,	4th	...	...	4	10	480	
Constable,	1st	...	...	16	9	1,728	96
Ditto,	2nd	...	...	48	8	4,608	
Ditto,	3rd	...	...	32	7	2,688	
Bugler	...	...	...	1	9	108	2
Do.	...	...	...	1	8	96	
Total				...	...	12,468	
Carried over				...	...	24,468	

## APPENDIX B—continued.

Rank.			Number.	Salary. Rs.	Sanctioned budget, 1878-79. Rs.	Total men.
DURRUNG.						
Brought forward...				...	24,468	
Sub-inspector,	1st grade	...	1	80	960	2
Ditto,	4th "	...	1	50	600	
Head-constable,	1st "	...	2	25	600	
Ditto,	2nd "	...	2	20	480	15
Ditto,	3rd "	...	3	15	540	
Special head-constable		...	2	12	288	
Head-constable,	4th grade	...	6	10	720	154
Constable,	1st "	...	25	9	2,700	
Ditto,	2nd "	...	50	8	4,800	
Ditto,	3rd "	...	79	7	6,636	2
Bugler	...	...	1	10	120	
Do.	...	...	1	9	108	
Total				...	18,552	
NOWGONG.						
Sub-inspector,	4th grade	...	1	50	600	1
Head-constable,	1st "	...	1	25	300	
Ditto,	2nd "	...	1	20	240	
Ditto,	3rd "	...	2	15	360	6
Ditto,	4th "	...	2	10	240	
Constable,	1st "	...	10	9	1,080	
Ditto,	2nd "	...	18	8	1,728	58
Ditto,	3rd "	...	30	7	2,520	
Bugler	...	...	1	8	96	
Total				...	7,164	
SIBSAGAR.						
Sub-inspector,	1st grade	...	1	80	960	2
Ditto,	4th "	...	1	50	600	
Head-constable,	1st "	...	1	25	300	
Ditto,	2nd "	...	3	20	720	17
Ditto,	3rd "	...	4	15	720	
Ditto,	special	...	3	12	432	
Ditto,	4th grade	...	6	10	720	174
Constable,	1st "	...	29	9	3,132	
Ditto,	2nd "	...	58	8	5,568	
Ditto,	3rd "	...	87	7	7,308	2
Bugler	...	...	1	10	120	
Do.	...	...	1	9	108	
Total				...	20,688	
LUKHIMPUR.						
Inspector,	4th grade	...	1	100	1,200	1
Sub-inspector,	2nd "	...	1	70	840	
Ditto,	4th "	...	1	50	600	
Head-constable,	1st "	...	2	25	600	20
Ditto,	2nd "	...	4	20	960	
Ditto,	3rd "	...	8	15	1,440	
Ditto,	special	...	6	12	864	200
Constable,	special	...	34	10	4,080	
Ditto,	1st grade	...	66	9	7,128	
Ditto,	2nd "	...	100	8	9,000	2
Bugler	...	...	1	10	120	
Do.	...	...	1	9	108	
Total				...	27,540	
SYLHET.						
Inspector,	2nd grade	...	1	200	2,400	1
Sub-inspector,	2nd "	...	1	70	840	
Ditto,	4th "	...	1	50	600	
Head-constable,	1st "	...	3	25	900	21
Ditto,	2nd "	...	3	20	720	
Ditto,	3rd "	...	7	15	1,260	
Ditto,	special	...	4	12	576	2
Ditto,	4th grade	...	4	10	480	
Carried over Sylhet				...	7,776	
Carried over				...	98,412	

## APPENDIX B—concluded.

Rank.		Number.	Salary.	Sanctioned budget, 1878-79.	Total men.
			Rs.	Rs.	
	Brought forward	...	...	98,412	
	Brought forward Sylhet	...	...	7,776	
Constable, 1st grade	...	60	9	6,480	282
Ditto, 2nd "	...	100	8	9,600	
Ditto, 3rd "	...	122	7	10,248	
	Total	...	...	34,104	

## CACHAR.

Inspector, 3rd grade	...	1	150	1,800	1
Sub-inspector 2nd "	...	1	70	840	5
Ditto, 3rd "	...	1	60	720	
Ditto, 4th "	...	3	50	1,800	
Head-constable, 1st "	...	3	25	900	38
Ditto, 2nd "	...	6	20	1,440	
Ditto, 3rd "	...	14	15	2,520	
Ditto, special	...	15	12	2,160	
Constable, special	...	64	10	7,680	339
Ditto, 1st grade	...	137	9	14,796	
Ditto, 2nd "	...	88	8	8,448	
Ditto, 3rd "	...	50	7	4,200	
Bugler	...	2	10	240	6
Do.	...	4	9	432	
	Total	...	...	47,976	

## GARO HILLS.

Inspector, 1st grade	...	1	250	3,000	3
Ditto, 3rd "	...	1	150	1,800	
Ditto, 4th "	...	1	100	1,200	
Sub-inspector, 1st "	...	1	80	960	6
Ditto, 2nd "	...	1	70	840	
Ditto, 3rd "	...	1	60	720	
Ditto, 4th "	...	3	50	4,800	
Head-constable, 1st "	...	4	25	1,200	24
Ditto, 2nd "	...	4	20	960	
Ditto, 3rd "	...	10	15	1,800	
Ditto, special	...	6	12	864	
Constable, special	...	50	10	6,000	300
Ditto, 1st grade	...	150	9	16,200	
Ditto, 2nd "	...	100	8	9,600	
Bugler	...	1	10	120	2
Do.	...	1	9	108	
	Total	...	...	50,172	

## NAGA HILLS.

Inspector, 3rd grade	...	1	150	1,800	2
Ditto, 4th "	...	1	100	1,200	
Sub-inspector, 1st "	...	1	80	960	
Ditto, 2nd "	...	1	70	840	6
Ditto, 3rd "	...	1	60	720	
Ditto, 4th "	...	3	50	1,800	
Head-constable, 1st "	...	4	25	1,200	24
Ditto, 2nd "	...	4	20	960	
Ditto, 3rd "	...	10	15	1,800	
Ditto, special	...	6	12	864	
Constable, special	...	130	10	15,600	200
Ditto, 1st grade	...	70	9	7,560	
Bugler	...	2	10	240	2
	Total	...	...	35,544	

GRAND TOTAL

3,65,208

## APPENDIX C.

*Cost of Regiment Native Infantry.*

## BRITISH OFFICERS (a).

			Monthly.		
			Rs.	A.	P.
1 Colonel commanding	...	...	1,427	14	0
1 Major, second-in-command, Rs. 640-14 <i>plus</i> Rs. 270	...	...	910	14	0
1 Captain and wing-commander, Rs. 375-1-6 <i>plus</i> Rs. 230	...	...	605	1	6
1 Lieutenant and adjutant, Rs. 225-12 <i>plus</i> Rs. 250	...	...	475	12	0
1 Lieutenant and quartermaster, Rs. 225-12 <i>plus</i> Rs. 150	...	...	375	12	0
1 Captain and wing officer, Rs. 375-1-6 <i>plus</i> Rs. 100	...	...	475	1	6
1 Lieutenant and wing officer, Rs. 225-12 <i>plus</i> Rs. 100	...	...	325	12	0
1 Surgeon	...	...	600	0	0
Total			5,196	8	0

## NATIVE OFFICERS (b).

4 Subadars at Rs. 100	...	...	400	0	0
4 Ditto at Rs. 80	...	...	320	0	0
4 Jenadars at Rs. 50	...	...	200	0	0
4 Ditto at Rs. 40	...	...	160	0	0
Total			1,080	0	0

## NATIVE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (c).

40 Havildars at Rs. 14	...	...	560	0	0
40 Naiks at Rs. 12	...	...	480	0	0
Total			1,040	0	0

## SEPOYS (d).

800 Sepoys at Rs. 7	...	...	5,600	0	0
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## BUGLERS (e).

16 Buglers at Rs. 7	...	...	112	0	0
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## STAFF (f).

1 Drill havildar	...	...	5	0	0
1 Drill naik	...	...	2	8	0
8 Pay havildars at Rs. 5	...	...	40	0	0
8 Color havildars at Rs. 2	...	...	16	0	0
2 Bugle-majors at Rs. 5	...	...	10	0	0
1 Subadar major	...	...	50	0	0
1 Native adjutant	...	...	17	8	0
1 English schoolmaster	...	...	8	0	0
1 Vernacular schoolmaster	...	...	9	0	0
Total			158	0	0

## CAMP-FOLLOWERS (g).

8 Lascars at Rs. 6	...	...	48	0	0
8 Bhistics at Rs. 7	...	...	56	0	0
8 Sweepers at Rs. 7	...	...	56	0	0
1 Tindal	...	...	9	8	0
1 Chowdhry	...	...	11	0	0
2 Bildars at Rs. 10	...	...	20	0	0
1 Mutsuddi	...	...	7	0	0
2 Weighmen at Rs. 6	...	...	12	0	0
Total			219	8	0

## BATTAL (h).

800 Sepoys at Rs. 2-8	...	...	2,000	0	0
80 Non-commissioned officers at Rs. 2-8	...	...	200	0	0
16 Buglers at Rs. 2-8	...	...	40	0	0
Total			2,240	0	0

## GOOD-CONDUCT PAY (i).

Approximately	...	...	1,000	0	0
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## APPENDIX C—continued.

CONTINGENT ALLOWANCES (j).					Monthly. Rs. A. P.		
Mess	...	...	...	...	100	0	0
Band	...	...	...	...	100	0	0
School	...	...	...	...	20	0	0
Repair of butts at Rs. 4	...	...	...	...	8	0	0
2 Wing-commanders at Rs. 85	...	...	...	...	170	0	0
Quartermaster	...	...	...	...	25	0	0
Total					423	0	0
SUBORDINATE MEDICAL (k).							
1 Hospital assistant	...	...	...	...	30	0	0
2 Hospital assistants at Rs. 25...	...	...	...	...	50	0	0
1 Medical pupil at Rs. 5	...	...	...	...	5	0	0
Total					85	0	0
HOSPITAL ESTABLISHMENT (l).							
1 Shop coolie	...	...	...	...	7	0	0
2 Bhistics at Rs. 7	...	...	...	...	14	0	0
1 Sweeper	...	...	...	...	7	0	0
1 Gooyah	...	...	...	...	7	0	0
1 Mate bearer	...	...	...	...	10	0	0
3 Bearers at Rs. 9...	...	...	...	...	27	0	0
Total					72	0	0
HALF-ALLOWANCE (m).					Annually.		
800 Men at Rs. 4...	...	...	...	...	3,200	0	0
A sepoy is allowed following ration daily—							
1 seer flour or rice.					1 chittack ghee.		
2 chittacks dhall.					$\frac{1}{3}$ chittack salt.		
Assuming selling price of flour or rice to be 6 seers per rupee—							
dhall at 4 annas per seer,							
ghee at Rs. 1-4 per seer,							
salt at 4 annas per seer,							
the monthly cost of ration is—							
Flour or rice	...	...	...	...	5	0	0
Dhall	...	...	...	...	0	8	0
Ghee	...	...	...	...	2	8	0
Salt	...	...	...	...	0	2	6
Total					8	2	6
Each sepoy contributes	...	...	...	...	3	8	0
Loss to Government	...	...	...	...	4	10	6
or say Rs. 4 per sepoy.							
KIT ALLOWANCE (n).							
60 Recruits at Rs. 30	...	...	...	...	1,800	0	0
MUSKETRY PRIZES (o).							
Best instructor	...	...	...	...	60	0	0
Best shot	...	...	...	...	25	0	0
Second best shot	...	...	...	...	15	0	0
50 marksmen at Rs. 5	...	...	...	...	250	0	0
Best judge of distance	...	...	...	...	10	0	0
8 Best ditto in company	...	...	...	...	40	0	0
Total					400	0	0
CLOTHING (p).							
912 Men at Rs. 8 each (value of clothing given)	...	...	...	...	7,296	0	0
MILITARY REWARDS (q).					Monthly.		
Order of British India	...	...	...	...	60	0	0
Order of merit	...	...	...	...	20	0	0
Total					80	0	0



## APPENDIX C—concluded.

For 12 months—						Annually.		
(a) ==	...	...	...	...	...	62,354	4	0
(b) ==	...	...	...	...	...	12,960	0	0
(c) ==	...	...	...	...	...	12,480	0	0
(d) ==	...	...	...	...	...	67,200	0	0
(e) ==	...	...	...	...	...	1,344	0	0
(f) ==	...	...	...	...	...	1,896	0	0
(g) ==	...	...	...	...	...	2,634	0	0
(h) ==	...	...	...	...	...	26,880	0	0
(i) ==	...	...	...	...	...	12,000	0	0
(j) ==	...	...	...	...	...	5,076	0	0
(k) ==	...	...	...	...	...	1,020	0	0
(l) ==	...	...	...	...	...	864	0	0
(m) ==	...	...	...	...	...	960	0	0
						2,07,548	4	0
(n) ==	...	...	...	...	...	3,200	0	0
(o) ==	...	...	...	...	...	1,800	0	0
(p) ==	...	...	...	...	...	400	0	0
(q) ==	...	...	...	...	...	7,296	0	0
Total						2,20,244	4	0
Add 5 per cent. contingencies						11,012	0	0
						2,31,256	4	0
Add loss on rations at Rs. 4 per sepoy monthly						38,400	0	0
Total						2,69,656	4	0

Total cost of one Native infantry regiment (annually) in Assam is Rs. 2,69,656, or average cost of each of 800 men is Rs. 337 (exclusive of cost of doolie-bearers, and calculated at a minimum for loss on rations, as Native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, and also camp-followers, get their rations at reduced rates).

## APPENDIX D.

*Statement showing the strength and distribution of existing Frontier Police Force, and the strength and distribution of new proposed Force which will take over all outposts now garrisoned by the troops.*

## SURMA VALLEY.

## Existing distribution.

Frontier  
police.

## Proposed distribution.

Frontier  
police.

CACHAR	...	339	In Cachar outposts are garrisoned by	197
Distributed as follows:—			When Cachar military outposts are taken over, there will be required an additional force of	172
Silchar ordinary police guards, treasury guards, &c.	...	39		
North Cachar police guards, Assaloo, &c.	...	58	The Sylhet outposts are garrisoned by	160
Manadhar and Jhiri Ghat police guards	...	50	Total strength of garrisons	529
Political Agent, Munipore's police escort	...	50		
		—197	Allowing a reserve of 100 per cent. of effective strength to provide for guards, escorts of prisoners, &c. &c.	529
Leaving a reserve of	...	142		
Military guards in Cachar district occupying frontier posts	...	172	Total frontier police force required for Surma Valley will be 1,058, or approximately	1,000
SYLHET	...	252	Existing force of frontier police	621
Distributed as follows:—			Additional police force required	379
Sylhet station police guards	...	70		
Sylhet frontier	...	90		
		—160		
Leaving a reserve of	...	122		
Total frontier police force in Surma Valley	...	621		

## APPENDIX D—concluded.

## HILL DISTRICTS.

*Existing distribution.*

Khasia hills frontier police	...	Nil
Garo hills	...	300
Naga hills	...	200
Total frontier police in hill districts	...	500
Naga hills military frontier outposts' guards	...	250

*Proposed distribution.*

The military force to be withdrawn from the Naga Hills and replaced by a force of frontier police constables.		
Proposed force, Garo hills	...	250
Ditto, Khasia hills	...	60
Ditto, Naga hills	...	400
Total frontier police in hill districts	...	710
Increase in frontier police under proposed scheme	...	210

## ASSAM VALLEY.

*Existing distribution.*

The frontier police force at present maintained is—		
Goalpara	...	96
Kamroop	...	96
Durrung	...	154
Nowgong	...	58
Sibsagar	...	174
Lukhimpore	...	200
Total frontier police force in Assam valley	...	778
Military guards occupying frontier posts as follows:—		
Gowhati	...	212
Oodalgari	...	58
Tezpor	...	13
Golaghat	...	104
Sadiya	...	125
Pobhamukh	...	46
Seesre	...	24
Debong	...	14
Jaipore	...	26
Total military employed on outposts' garrison duty in Assam valley	...	622
Total existing frontier police force in Assam	...	1,399

*Proposed distribution.*

The frontier outposts now held by the military will be taken over by the frontier police, which will be increased as follows:—		
Goalpara	...	96
Kamroop	...	150
Durrung	...	178
Nowgong	...	82
Sibsagar	...	250
Lukhimpore	...	650
Total proposed frontier police force for Assam valley	...	1,406
Existing frontier police force	...	778
Additional frontier police force required	...	628
Total proposed frontier police force in Assam	...	3,000
Proposed increase in frontier police force	...	1,101
Military relieved from frontier outpost duty	...	1,044

No. 1669, dated Shillong, 11th September 1879.

From—L. HARE, Esq., Assistant Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam,

To—The Secretary to the Army Organization Commission, Simla.

In continuation of the note by the Chief Commissioner of Assam on the military requirements of this province, I am directed to forward herewith a copy of a letter No. 6080, dated 13th ultimo, from the Controller of Military Accounts, Calcutta, enclosing a statement showing the cost of the regiment of Native infantry stationed in Assam for 1878-79.

With reference to the figures given in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the note, I am directed to say that the Chief Commissioner has considerably under-estimated the savings that would be effected by the substitution of Frontier Police for the two Native regiments.

No. 6080, dated Calcutta, 13th August 1879.

From—COLONEL T. B. HARRISON, Controller of Military Accounts,

To—The Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam.

In continuation of my letter No. 4174, dated 2nd July 1879, I have the honor to forward herewith a statement showing the cost (exclusive of pay and allowances) of the regiments of Native infantry stationed in Assam for the year 1878-79.

2. The total amount was Rs. 3,58,271; and this sum may be taken as the average for the past three years.

Statement showing the cost in 1878-79 of the Native troops stationed in Assam.

Grants.	Heads of Service.	Debited amount.	Total.
	<i>Adjutant-General's Department.</i>	Rs.	Rs.
	Travelling and outstation allowances ... ..	7	
	<i>Divisional and Brigade Staff.</i>		
	Travelling and outstation allowances ... ..	224	231
IV	Travelling and outstation allowances ... ..	9	
	Godown establishments ... ..	3,362	
	Cattle establishments and marching allowances ... ..	5,463	
	Doolie-bearers and marching allowances ... ..	826	
	Provisions for Natives ... ..	2,61,272	
	Compensation to Natives for dearness of provisions ... ..	1,024	
	Feed of Commissariat cattle (elephants) ... ..	8,396	
	<i>Hire of Transport.</i>		
	Movements of troops ... ..	7,884	
	Commissariat ... ..	601	
	Clothing ... ..	39	
	Barrack ... ..	3	
	Medical ... ..	205	
	Ordnance ... ..	242	
	<i>Inland water charges.</i>		
	Movements of troops ... ..	11,202	
	Commissariat ... ..	4,491	
	Clothing ... ..	5	
	Barrack ... ..	39	
	Medical ... ..	513	
	Ordnance ... ..	21	
	Regimental equipments and camp contingencies ... ..	5	
	Cattle-gear, implements, godown furniture, and contingencies ... ..	1,325	
	<i>Miscellaneous.</i>		
	Incidental ... ..	755	3,07,682
VI	Making clothing, great-coats, and cloaks for European and Native troops.	1,899	
	Packing materials and charges ... ..	60	
	Europe stores ... ..	10,139	12,098
VII	Purchase of barrack bedding ... ..	37	
	Cost of supplies for lighting of barracks and hospitals ... ..	610	
	Cost of miscellaneous supplies for barracks and hospitals ... ..	844	1,491
IX	Cost of medicines and medical stores provided in India ... ..	5,199	
	Cost of bedding and equipments ... ..	255	5,454
X	Ordnance stores and camp equipage ... ..	31,315	31,315
	GRAND TOTAL ... ..	...	3,58,271

FORT WILLIAM;

(Sd.) T. B. HARRISON, Colonel,

The 13th August 1879. }

Controller of Military Accounts.

## G.—NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH.

No. 2449, dated Naini Tal, 4th September 1879.

From—C. ROBERTSON, Esq., Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces and Oudh,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

With reference to your letter No. 204 S.B., dated 7th July 1879, and subsequent reminder, calling for information on certain points in connection with the military requirements of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, I am directed to forward, for the information of His Excellency the

Governor-General in Council, abstracts of the replies received from the officers consulted, in regard to points (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), and to communicate the following remarks.

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3. Of the ten points mentioned in paragraph 2 of your letter, the tabular statement enclosed gives details in regard to points (a), (b), (e), (f), and (g) as accurately as with the very short time allowed was possible.

The figures of (a) and (b) are taken from the North-Western Provinces and Oudh census reports. The details of Europeans and Eurasians are not quite accurate, though they are sufficiently so for the present inquiry; for the figures for Lucknow and L'yzabad in the Oudh census included the military as well as the civil element: in these cases the numbers roughly estimated by district officers and Commissioners have been adopted. Sitapur is blank, but the numbers are insignificant. The details in connection with points (e), (f), and (g) have been taken from a report by the Inspector-General of Police, North-Western Provinces and Oudh. In regard to the question of efficiency of the police, I am to invite special attention to the remarks in the last column of the statement, which show the extent to which (it is believed) the police force of these provinces can deal with riots and such like disturbances.

4. The subject of point (c), state of feeling, is a very wide one, and closely connected—so closely as to be incapable of entirely separate treatment—with point (d) (elements of danger). The general substance of the replies on this question points to the following conclusion.

On the part of the great landholders the general feeling is one of loyalty. They hold their property by a tenure which would in many cases be very uncertain were it not for the strong hand of the Government. Their dignity is recognized, their honor is protected, their position is assured, by the British Government. In short, they have everything to gain and nothing to lose by any subversion of the present state of things.

The trading classes are in much the same position. It is only under a really strong Government that they could hope to be able to carry on their occupations in peace, and to enjoy in security the fruits of their labor.

As regards the great mass of the rural population, the general feeling is one of contented indifference—not much active loyalty, but no active disloyalty and no apprehensions of it, with a bias, slight but obvious, towards the established order of things. The lower stratum of the Muhammadans, and such of the higher middle class of Muhammadans as are too proud to beg and too lazy to work, constitute the only really dangerous classes in most part of these provinces. But they are not united; they have no leaders to look up to, and no principle of action to guide them in a definite line of policy, beyond a religious antagonism, based on bigotry and the desire for plunder.

The positive loyalty of the people in the Cawnpore district, vouched for strongly by the Magistrate, is, His Honor apprehends, a rose-coloured reflection of his own friendly feeling to the people among whom he has long served. In curious contrast to this is the opinion expressed by the Magistrate of Allahabad, who speaks of the general feeling as one of apathetic disaffection. The city of Lucknow has the unenviable reputation of decided, but impotent, disaffection to British rule; and His Honor has no doubt as to the truth of this. The glories of the Nawabi are still fondly remembered by crowds of discontented pensioners and starving hangers-on, who contrast the present with the past state of affairs in a manner very unfavorable to the former, and cordially hate our rule.

With these exceptions, which are sufficiently marked to be noteworthy, the general summary given above may be accepted as describing pretty accurately the prevailing state of things. It need hardly be added that where our rigid system of law has operated harshly, the feeling is not friendly. Thus dispossessed landholders all over the province would, from their own standpoint, welcome a change; but this is not so much from dislike to our Government as from hatred to the new men whom our measures have operated to substitute for themselves.

5. To point (d) (elements of danger) much that has been said on point (c) applies. The following is a brief summary of the replies received from the various officers:—

*Meerut Division.*—A serious negative element of danger is the want of personal influence of district officers over the Native population, due to constant changes, and to the absorption of district officers in petty work.

*Rohilcund Division.*—After instancing such special points as the low-class Muhammadans, the inflammable cities of Bareilly and Moradabad, the Native State of Rampur (a potential, not a present, danger; the present Nawab is loyally disposed), the Commissioner sums up the main elements of danger as under:—

(a) Decay of landed gentry and transfer of hereditary property.

(b) Removal of power from the landlord; influence of the patwari.

(c) Fall in value of land.

(d) Want of employment for the younger sons of Muhammadan families.

The first two cases are obvious enough: they are the inevitable results of a rigid and just system of government, coupled with an improvident and extravagant landed class, jealous of old privileges. The third calls for no remark. As regards the fourth, I am to say that the Government has lately done some thing to alleviate this evil.

*Agra Division.*—The latent element of danger is chiefly that of the low-class Muhammadans. There is not, however, any cause for alarm, unless it be in regard to the Native States bordering the division—an important point in view of possible complications.

*Allahabad Division.*—There are no special elements of danger here, beyond that connected with the Native States in the districts of Hamirpur and Banda. At Allahabad itself the central and district jails, with over 3,000 bad characters, might become a source of trouble. The Magistrate's remarks, as to general but apathetic disaffection, have already been referred to.

*Benares Division.*—In the trans-Gogra districts, the contiguity of Nepal, the small number of Europeans, and the paucity of means of communication, are indicated as possible elements of danger in times of trouble.

*Jhansi Division.*—A naturally turbulent people, the contiguity of Gwalior, and the isolation of the head-quarters (owing to want of rail and telegraph), are mentioned by the Commissioner under this head.

*Kumaun Division.*—No elements of danger exist here. This is the view of the Commissioner, who is thoroughly acquainted with the country and people.

*Oudh.*—In Oudh there is nothing special to notice, except as regards the city of Lucknow (already referred to under point c), and the high-class Brahmans and Thakurs of Fyzabad. His Honor believes that the general feeling in Oudh is favorable rather than otherwise to our rule; and that the dangerous classes are less numerous here than in the older province.

Of general grounds of possible elements of future danger there is, Sir George Couper is constrained to confess, no lack. Our rigid revenue system, resulting in constant transfers of landed property; our still more rigid judicial system, with its complications and technicalities; the necessarily narrow field open to younger sons of the old Muhammadan families; the predatory instincts of certain classes; the bigoted animosity of the lower Muhammadans, who hate us as infidels, as superseders, and as just and strong rulers: these are all instances to the existence of which we cannot shut our eyes. Finally, there is little doubt that the late increase in direct taxation has embittered many who might otherwise have been loyally inclined.

Of overt elements of danger there are few in these provinces. The contiguity of Native States is certainly one; and perhaps it is of all the most important. The isolation of such tracts as Jhansi and Gorakhpur is another. In both cases, the presence of British troops is the only safeguard. The riff-raff of the larger Muhammadan cities, such as Lucknow and Bareilly (with one or two others of less importance), form a dangerous element, ready to break out on a favorable opportunity, and needing something more than the ordinary police to overawe them and hold them in check.

6. Before closing the remarks on this head, I am to invite the particular attention of His Excellency in Council to three points.

The first is the decreasing influence of district officers, alluded to by the Commissioner of Meerut. It is most necessary, in His Honor's opinion, to retain an officer as long as possible, consistent with the exigencies of the public service, in charge of a district. In this way alone can he become intimate with the people, gain their confidence, and be able to influence them. The constant changes are mainly due to the new furlough rules. Under these rules officers may run home every three years; and many are tempted to avail themselves of this privilege. The result this year was that nearly two-thirds of the districts changed hands. The absorption of the Magistrate and his covenanted assistants in petty work of a routine character is also to be deprecated.

The second point is the recent increase of direct taxation. This has unquestionably done much to render our rule unpopular with both the trading and landed classes. In the case of traders this might, to a certain extent, be disregarded; but in that of landholders—a more numerous and influential body—the Government cannot so easily overlook it; and the fact must be borne in mind.

With regard to the third point, I am to say that if one of the objects of the Commission is to reduce the element of military force, by enlarging the scope of civil influence in winning the good-will of the people, they will deserve well of the country if they propose some modification of the functions of the Legislative Department of the Government of India as at present constituted.

Even before the mutiny our civil law and procedure were such that the Natives declared that the evils arising therefrom far counterbalanced the advantages offered by our rule; and the Lieutenant-Governor believes that if the populations of this empire could be polled, it would be found that they are of the same opinion still.

Both the people and the executive are hampered and tied down by the operation of strict laws, which there is no getting free from, however advantageous or even necessary it may be to depart occasionally from their strict letter. It may be very desirable, for all the parties concerned to do a certain thing; but it is found that the proposal is to some extent opposed to a certain section of a certain law, and the consequence is that nothing can be done. It may be right to do the thing; it may be certain that it had not occurred to the framers of the law that such a contingency would arise, or they would assuredly have made provision for it; but nevertheless nothing can be done until the time comes for a general revision of the law,—it may be years afterwards. All this might be remedied by a modification of the present system. When it is necessary to pass an enactment to legalize any measure which the Government thinks it expedient to adopt, the Bill might run: "Whereas it is expedient to provide by law for carrying out a certain measure; It is hereby declared that this measure shall be carried out under rules to be framed by the Local Government, which, when they have received the sanction of the Government of India, shall have the force of law.

"It is further enacted that, subject to the same sanction, the Local Government shall have power at any time to add to, modify, or alter the said rules."

This, Sir George Couper believes, would be all that would be necessary in the interests of justice, equity, and good conscience, as opposed to the interests of law; and he feels certain that the step would be hailed with the greatest delight by the entire community, with the exception of the lawyers. In the event of any difficulty arising, such as that referred to above, the necessary addition or alteration could at once be made to the rule. Some such arrangement would certainly suffice to meet most local requirements. For Acts embracing in their scope the entire empire, it might be necessary to be somewhat more elaborate in the preliminary procedure; but here, too, action ought to be in the direction above indicated. And it may further be questioned whether such general Acts are not now too numerous, and whether it would not be better for the Supreme Government to declare what is wanted, and then leave each Local Government to carry out its wishes in the way best suited to the people with which it has to deal, subject of course to the ultimate sanction of the Government of India.

The Lieutenant-Governor believes that the time has arrived when it is imperatively necessary to simplify our law and procedure in the manner above described, or in some other manner. The evil has attained gigantic proportions, and is increasing daily. As already said, the Executive is hampered

and the people are harassed and fleeced. The only class who are gainers by the system are the vakils and mukhtars who throng our courts, and who, His Honor believes, are more dreaded and detested by the rest of the community than any other class, not excepting dacoits. But, under existing circumstances, they are a necessary evil; for the business of the law courts, as at present constituted, could hardly be carried on without them. It is worthy of remark that at the recent examination of candidates for the office of pleader held in these provinces, nearly one thousand passed. It seems to Sir George Couper positively startling to think that every year the number of this class is increasing in this way; for they can only get a living by fleecing the ignorant and poor. If, however, some such measure as His Honor has indicated above were carried out, their occupation would mainly be gone; for it is they who, by picking holes in Acts, and by showing that a proposal, though perfectly right in itself, is opposed to such and such a section of such and such an Act, cause the difficulties and embarrassments which His Honor complains of, and which strike at the very root of executive efficiency and popular content.

It is, however, too late, His Honor fears, to go back to the "non-regulation system," pure and simple, although it was the one most approved of by the people, and is still in force in the main in Native States. The people themselves, having been so long accustomed to rely on legal aid, would probably be reluctant to revert to it. But if Acts were simplified and made susceptible of immediate correction or addition whenever they were found defective, the evils of the present system, if they would not be altogether removed, would at least be very greatly modified, so much so that it could be worked smoothly and at a vast diminution of expense both to the Government and the people; while our prestige would be restored and maintained by the vastly improved relations which would thus spring up between the people on the one side and the Government on the other.

If it be said that this would be a retrogressive measure, the Lieutenant-Governor would ask why a retrogressive step should not be taken, provided only that it be right. He does not see why this should be the only country in which it is impossible to draw back when it is shown that we have gone too far. In England, only a few years ago, a new measure of army reform was introduced, which it was thought would prove a great success; and now, if telegrams are to be trusted, it has proved to be such an utter failure that the authorities are about to revert to the old system. Sir George Couper does not see why we should not follow this example in India, if the necessity or expediency of such a step be demonstrated.

7. Point (4) deals with European and Eurasian population considered under the sub-heads of—(1) strength, (2) weakness, (3) improvement by organization.

Under this head it is to be noted that the figures given by district officers, being only approximate and of a later date, do not quite coincide with those for the European and Eurasian population given under (b) in the tabular statement.

The following is a brief *resumé* of the several replies:—

*Meerut Division.*—In the Dun, which is exceptional, the Native population is small, and the European and Eurasian considerable. Combatant strength, aided by the Goorkha pensioners, may be said to be considerable. Meerut and Ghaziabad have 250 able-bodied men, partly enrolled as volunteers; Saharanpur and Roorkee have 220 efficient to 250 non-efficient, with organized volunteers in both centres. All of these may be said to possess sufficient strength to protect the women and children. In Aligarh there are some 60 men to 70 women and children; no source of strength for combatant purposes, but no direct element of weakness, as the railway is at hand.

Elsewhere in the division the numbers are insignificant.

*The Rohilkund Division* is decidedly weak. In Bareilly alone is there any considerable number of Europeans and Eurasians—some 50 men to 150 inefficient, useless as a combatant body and insufficient for protective purposes.

*The Agra Division* has only one district—that of Agra itself—with any pretensions to combatant power. In Agra there are 360 men (210 of whom are volunteers) to nearly 1,200 women and children. The Fort being available, there is no direct element of weakness.

*The Allahabad Division* has, in Cawnpore and Allahabad, two fairly large centres, in both of which there is a certain amount of combatant strength. Cawnpore has 170 able-bodied to 450 inefficient; Allahabad, 600 able-bodied to 1,700 inefficient.

In both places there are organized bodies of volunteers; and Allahabad has the fort to fall back upon.

*The Benares Division* has no centre of any importance. Ghazipur possesses about 50, and Benares about 90 capable men. In all the other districts the numbers are small. The Chunar Fort would of course be available. A volunteer corps exists at Ghazipur. The number of women and children is large all over the division; and this would be a serious element of weakness.

*The Jhansi Division* has no centre of any size, and its isolation is a distinct source of weakness.

*The Kumaun Division* (except in the hot season) has no large centre; but the circumstances of this tract are quite exceptional.

In *Oudh* the numbers of Europeans and Eurasians are so small, except in Lucknow, as to be useless from a combatant standpoint. Lucknow has some 900 capables to 1,800 inefficient; many of the former drilled and armed, sufficient for protection and utilizable on occasion for attack.

Summing up, the only centres of combatant strength are the following:—

The Dun.	Agra.
Meerut (Ghaziabad).	Cawnpore.
Saharanpur (Roorkee).	Allahabad.

Lucknow.

And in most of these the large number of people to be protected tends to weaken this strength seriously. Where there is no combatant strength, there is of course weakness; that is, all over the provinces except at the above centres.

As regards the question (third clause of point 4) of the organization of the European and Eurasian population, I am to say that this can best be discussed in connection with points (2) and (3).

## 8. Point (i) refers to compulsory enlistment.

The general opinion seems to be against the measure. At all large centres, where there is combatant strength, there are already organized bodies of volunteers, who would form a nucleus in case of danger. Sir George Couper is inclined, however, to agree with the Lucknow Commissioner, that enrolment in the Volunteers should be made compulsory on all Europeans and Eurasians; and certainly in the case of such as are in the service of Government should be made a condition of appointment, so that all might acquire familiarity with the use of the rifle and the elements of drill: the members to be enrolled in a reserve body when they had served a certain time in an active corps, where regular attendance is enforced. In connection with this subject, I am to say that His Honor has taken every opportunity to impress on all at head-quarters the importance of the movement, and has used his influence to induce all employes of the large offices to join the Volunteers. But His Honor is strongly of opinion that, whether enlistment be made compulsory or not, there must be more encouragement on the part of Government to those concerned in the movement.

9. This leads naturally to the last point (j) alluded to in your second paragraph—development of the volunteer system. Such development mainly rests with the Government. That the system should be heartily encouraged by the Government in every way possible may be taken as admitted, and in this respect much remains to be done. The measures His Honor has already recommended, and which he would again press on the consideration of His Excellency in Council, are (1) the appointment of a paid and professional adjutant to each battalion of volunteers. Such an officer is of immense help, both to the officers and men. One such officer has already been appointed in these provinces, with the best results. (2) The encouragement of the movement by the grant of liberal prizes, and in other ways, such as an increase to the pension of Government servants who have proved themselves efficient volunteers. In connection with this subject, I am to invite attention to the note by Major C. A. Dodd, Commandant of the Allahabad Volunteer Rifle Corps, on the volunteer movement in India, forwarded with the letter from this office No. 1955, dated 12th August 1878, to which His Honor has very little to add.

10. In the third paragraph of your letter the opinion of this Government is asked for on the subject of the military requirements of these provinces; and with reference to this I am to submit the following remarks. The latest orders of the Government of India in regard to the distribution of the European army appear to be contained in the Resolution communicated with the letter from the Public Works Department No. 38, dated 10th July 1872. Similar orders in regard to the distribution of the Native army have not been traced; and, judging by the latest Army List, it would seem that those orders have not yet been completely carried out. His Honor has not, in the short time allowed for replying to your questions, been able to ascertain exactly the strength of force sanctioned for each military station. Assuming, however, that the sanctioned force is that entered for Europeans in the Resolution above referred to, and for Natives that which is indicated in the Army List as ordinarily stationed in each cantonment, the conclusions to which His Honor has come are as follows:—

A.—The forces at present sanctioned for the stations noted on the margin ought to be maintained in undiminished strength, for reasons which will now be indicated in each case.			
Oudh	...	1. Lucknow. 2. Iyzabad. 3. Bareilly.	N.-W. Provinces.
N.-W. Provinces...	...	4. Jhansi. 5. Lalitpur.	
		6. Cawnpore. 7. Allahabad. 8. Chunar. 9. Benares.	

(1) *Lucknow*.—This garrison should be able to guard the fort, overawe the city, and to spare a force for service in the field wherever it may be required in Oudh. If this is done, the force at Sitapur can be withdrawn.

(2) *Iyzabad*.—This force must be maintained to check disaffection in neighbouring districts, and to guard the Nepal frontier.

(3) *Bareilly* is the capital of Rohilkund. The garrison should be able, if required, to spare a force for the suppression of a rising or serious disturbance in any part of the division, in the other principal towns of which, as well as in Bareilly itself, there are not a few elements of danger. If this garrison is maintained, the force at Moradabad can be diminished, and that at Shahjahanpur withdrawn.

(4) *Jhansi* is difficult of access, and borders on Native States filled with people of turbulent disposition, whence unexpectedly inroads may at any time be made.

(5) *Lalitpur* ought to retain its detachment of a Native infantry regiment. It is isolated, nearly surrounded by Native States in which serious disorder may at any time arise, and the people of the district would readily join in any disturbance.

(6) *Cawnpore*.—This is now the most important commercial entrepôt in these provinces; its trade and population are rapidly increasing. It is the centre of a great railway system, and commands the railway bridge over the Ganges leading into Oudh—a work which should never be left unprotected. It is the centre of very large commissariat arrangements, and possesses extensive flour mills, which grind wheat for the whole of the army of Upper India. It has a large Government harness factory, which it is understood it is in contemplation to make the sole source of the supply of army equipments and accoutrements. It is also a great manufacturing centre for army clothing, half-mountings, cloth and tents, with a population accustomed to supply the wants of the army. It is, moreover, a point from which a force could be detached to repress disturbances in Bundelcund. If the force is kept up at its present strength, the detachment of a Native infantry regiment at Banda might be withdrawn.

(7) *Allahabad* is the capital of the united provinces, contains an important fort, is the head of the railway communication with Bombay, and commands the Jumna bridge.

(8) *Chunar*.—The fort here would be valuable as a place of refuge in disturbances, and should retain its garrison, unless it is entirely dismantled.

(9) *Benares*.—A large city, to which strangers of all kinds flock in large numbers, and the people of which are under the influence of Brahman priests, who have no very strong reason for attachment to our rule and system.

*B.*—In regard to other military stations, I am to remark as follows :—

(1) *Roorkee*.—As the head of the Ganges canal and the seat of important Public Works Department establishments, this should not be left unprotected. Injury to the head of the canal might cause incalculable loss. It should retain a wing of a European infantry regiment.

(2) *Meerut*.—The force here is not required for maintenance of order, and might be largely reduced. At any rate, the European cavalry regiment might be withdrawn.

(3) *Agra and Muttra*.—The force at Muttra is really part of the Agra garrison. As far as the Civil Government is interested, *i.e.*, in regard to the protection of order, both the European cavalry regiment and one Native infantry regiment may be withdrawn. The present strength is, it is presumed, kept up as a protection against the Rajputana States, but would be too weak if a serious attack were to be made from there, while for ordinary circumstances the force proposed to be retained will be sufficient.

(4) *Fatehgarh*.—The force here is not required for maintenance of order; but the defence of the fort and the protection of the Gun Carriage Agency will probably require the maintenance of present arrangements.

(5) *Moradabad*.—At least a wing of a Native infantry regiment should be stationed here. There is always risk of *émutes* and serious disturbances. The European force may be withdrawn, if the Bareilly garrison is maintained at its full strength.

(6) and (7) *Shahjahanpur and Sitapur*.—The garrisons here may be withdrawn, if Bareilly and Lucknow are garrisoned as proposed.

(8) *Banda*.—The wing of a Native infantry regiment stationed here may be withdrawn, if the Cawnpore force is retained at its present strength.

(9) *Gorakhpur*.—This station ought to have a wing of a Native regiment and 20 Native cavalry. It is isolated, has no railway communication, and commands the Nepal frontier. It should, moreover, have telegraphic communication with Fyzabad.

*C.*—No reference has been made in the foregoing to the depôts for European troops at Ranikhet and Chakrata or to those for the Goorkhas at Almora and Dehra, as His Honor presumes that these will be retained.

*D.*—The foregoing proposals will permit of the following reduction in the troops now stationed in these provinces :—

	R. Artillery.	E. Cavalry.	E. Infantry.	N. Infantry.	N. Cavalry.
Roorkee ...	...	...	... 1 wing	...	...
Meerut ...	...	1	...	...	...
Muttra ...	...	1	...	...	...
Agra ...	...	...	...	1	...
Moradabad ...	...	...	... Detachment	...	...
Shahjahanpur ...	...	...	... Ditto	...	...
Sitapur ...	1	...	... Ditto	...	1
Banda ...	...	...	...	Wing	...
Total ...	1	2	1 Regt. at least	1½	1

The reduction will be greater, if the garrison at Meerut be further diminished, or dispensed with altogether, as His Honor thinks it might be from a civil point of view; but this is a point on which the military authorities will probably have something to say.

11. In conclusion, I am to observe that Sir George Couper has not advanced any objections which might be urged against the proposed concentration of the army at large centres, such as the greater healthiness of the smaller stations and their relative cheapness. Much might be said on these and other points; but His Honor presumes that all such have been duly considered, and that concentration must be regarded as an accomplished fact. But the Lieutenant-Governor would strongly deprecate going further in that direction in the first instance than he has suggested in the foregoing paragraphs. For it is a pure experiment, and a very delicate one; inasmuch as there can be no question that the mere sight of troops keeps the dangerous classes in order, while it remains to be seen what will be the effect upon them of their entire withdrawal. It must, moreover, be borne in mind that concentration is not an unmixed advantage. It might be so in a country where the hand of the rest of the community is immediately raised against the disturbers of the public peace; but it is different here where the people remain absolutely apathetic, and where, until Government aid arrive, the wrong-doers have it all their own way.

It is agreeable to think that, immediately on the outbreak of a disturbance at an outlying town, intimation can be flashed to the nearest garrison, and aid despatched within a few hours by rail. But there is another view of the case; and that is, that the organizers of the disturbance may have taken the precaution to cut the wire as a preliminary to their proceedings, in which case incalculable mischief might be done before intelligence could reach the garrison through any other channel; and if the rioters took the further precaution of tearing up the rails, it might be difficult to bring succour at all until the mischief had been fully perpetrated.

It is for these reasons that the Lieutenant-Governor would deprecate any sweeping reductions in the present strength of the army based on the supposed additional power which would be given by concentration. We had better proceed tentatively at first, and extend operations afterwards, if we find that what we propose to do at present has been unattended by harm.



[illegible]

The district police forces are, as a rule, efficient and quite competent to deal with most local disturbances likely to arise in these provinces, but would with the present armaments be inefficient against organized bodies of trained Native troops. The armed police are only a quasi-military body, badly armed and with little practice in drill, as the armual reserves are so constantly on duty and absent from the barracks.

A.—Out of these, 149 are district inspectors and 2 European sergeants.  
B.—Includes 1 sergeant.

C.—Includes 1 sergeant.

E.—Totals of columns 1 and 2.

## D.—PUNJAB.

No. 406C., dated Simla, 19th August 1879.

From—COLONEL S. BLACK, Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department,  
To—The President, Army Organization Commission, Simla.

In accordance with the instructions conveyed in the Government of India's letter, Military Department, No. 204-S.B. of the 7th July last, I have now the honor to supply the information therein called for, and to give an expression of the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion on the military requirements of the Punjab, in reference to its necessary garrison, the immediate repression of internal disturbance or insurrection, and for the maintenance of order.

2. In reply to questions (a) and (b) in the letter above quoted, I am desirous to submit the following

Strength of population.

ing approximate statistics, as to the number of the  
Native population (exclusive of the population of the

Native States), and of the European and Eurasian population, exclusive of the army :—

Native.

(a) Native population—

Total in 1868	...	...	...	17,590,545
Add increase 10 per cent. to bring up to date	...	...	...	1,759,055
Present population	...	...	...	19,349,600

European and Eurasian.

(b) European and Eurasian—

European population in 1868, including the army	...	...	...	17,574
Deduct European force in the Punjab for that year	...	...	...	13,347*

Balance non-military	...	...	...	4,227
Eurasians, 1868	...	...	...	3,379
Increase to 1879	...	...	...	337
				3,716

Total Europeans and Eurasians, say	...	...	...	8,000
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3. (c) and (d) Although information regarding the 'state of feeling' in the Punjab and 'the

State of feeling and elements of danger.

elements of danger' it contains is placed by the

Government of India in their inquiries under separate heads, yet it is not possible so to separate them in the reply. Putting aside danger from without—that of foreign invasion—as apparently beyond the scope of the present reference, the elements of danger in the country are found alone in a fanatical, disloyal, or hostile state of feeling in the population. So long as the state of feeling in the country is cordial and friendly towards Government, no elements of danger of any importance can be said to exist. For these reasons, it is essential to treat the two points on which information is requested, as one.

4. It is a matter of extreme satisfaction to the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor that he is able to record his deliberate opinion, founded upon long experience of the people of the Punjab and the testimony of many experienced and able officers, that the state of feeling in this province is, at the present time, excellent; and His Honor does not believe that in any other province in India there will be found an equal amount of sympathy between the rulers and the ruled, so much identification of the interests of the people with those of the Government, or so much real, hearty, and active loyalty, as in the Punjab.

5. The population of the province is almost equally divided between Hindus (including Sikhs) and Muhammadans, the latter being somewhat more numerous, and in the frontier districts of the Peshawar and Derajat divisions forming the entire bulk of the agricultural population, the Hindus being only found in any considerable number in the villages and towns.

6. The Hindu population, proportionally most numerous in the Delhi and Hissar divisions, becomes about equal to the Muhammadan population at the Sutlej; while at the Chenab, the Muhammadans are vastly superior in numbers.

7. The Sikhs mostly inhabit what is known as the Malwa country, about Umballa and Ludhiana; the Jullundur Doab; the Manjha, about Amritsar and Lahore, the central districts of the province; and the Sialkot and Gujranwala districts in the Rechna Doab. In the Raval Pindi division some fifty thousand Sikhs are found; but to the south, in Delhi, Mooltan, and beyond the Indus, they are almost unknown.

8. In briefly noting the state of feeling among these three important divisions of the population, it is only necessary to observe, with regard to the Muhammadans, that, owing to a variety of causes, which, however interesting, it would be out of place to discuss here, they are far less fanatical and less swayed by religious bigotry than elsewhere in India. It is among the independent tribes, inhabiting the fringe of hill territory between India and Afghanistan, that we have to go to find a Muhammadan population upon whom the preaching of moollas can produce any great or immediate effect. The Wahabi sect has generally in the Punjab shown itself as peaceable and as well-affected as any other class of the community; and it is only three years ago that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, in replying to an address of the principal members of the sect, assured them, in terms which produced the happiest effect in restoring their confidence, which was somewhat shaken, that the Government looked upon them with no ill-favor, but had full belief in their loyalty. The presence of a small and fanatical Wahabi colony on the north-west border has for some time directed attention to the Punjab as a most likely centre of Muhammadan intrigue; but the activity and influence of these

\* These figures do not include the women and children, who should also be deducted; but they may be taken as a set-off against subsequent increase.

exiles has been much exaggerated. The Lieutenant-Governor does not believe that there is any part of India where Muhammadans are so well-disposed to the Government as in the Punjab; nor does the most careful and secret inquiry show that there is, at the present time, any movement on the part of the Punjab Wahabis against the Government. The agitation in this province is more religious than political; and although there can be no doubt that the sect has largely increased in numbers, yet its hostility is directed against the orthodox Muhammadans rather than against Government.

9. The Sikhs are among the most warlike, as they are the most compact, class of the Punjab population. The Lieutenant-Governor is not aware that there is any feeling among the Sikhs hostile or unfriendly to the Government. On the contrary, they supply the most numerous and valuable recruits for Punjab regiments; and having been defeated by the British army in 1845, 1846, and 1849 with great difficulty and after a prolonged struggle, the pride and self-respect of the people were not crushed, as they have unfortunately been elsewhere. The governing race regards them as equal in physical strength and courage; and the conquered, instinctively appreciating these generous sentiments, look upon the English with an entirely friendly spirit, and undoubtedly feel some common national pride in the victories of the British arms in which they have been permitted to share. The only hostile element among the Sikhs is found in a dissenting sect, the Kukas, who are to Sikhism what the Wahabis are to Muhammadanism. Their numbers are, however, small; their principal leaders were summarily arrested and transported beyond British India some years ago—a blow from which the sect has never recovered; and though from time to time they show some activity, yet it has not been lately considered necessary or politic to interfere with them. Their doctrines are repugnant to the general body of the Sikh nation; and the Lieutenant-Governor, while considering that the Kukas require constant watch, does not see in them any cause of present danger.

10. The third class of the population includes the mass of the Hindu population, regarding which there is little to be said. The religious influences which affect the Sikhs, affect the Hindu population in the same, or perhaps in a greater, degree; though the Hindus, except in the Delhi and Hissar divisions, representing rather the commercial and manufacturing than the agricultural and warlike part of the community, do not here require any special attention.

11. The excellent spirit of loyalty of the people of British territory is worthily supplemented by the active loyalty of the Native independent States in political connection with the Punjab Government. When the Afghan war broke out, the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor pressed upon the Government of India the employment of the contingents of such Native States as possessed well-disciplined troops; and His Excellency the Viceroy, in cordially acceding to the proposal, permitted to be tried an experiment the undoubted and notorious success of which may be embarrassing to the Government unless they are prepared to carry it still further. The troops of the Punjab Native States are drawn from the people of those States. They are not, as in other parts of India, mere mercenaries, over whom the ruler has no hold or control except the engagement of service. It is obvious, therefore, that so long as the loyalty of the Punjab Chiefs is assured, their troops will be loyal. The Punjab States gave their men with a ready alacrity that has never been surpassed. The officers and men, inspired by the loyal spirit of their rulers, have throughout the Afghan campaign performed harassing and arduous duties, with such good spirit, discipline, and gallantry as to win the highest praise from the most competent military critics. That the loyalty and good spirit of the Punjab Chiefs is sincere the Lieutenant-Governor does not doubt: it has been proved on many occasions, and especially in the mutiny, when they, each in his order, did excellent service for the Government. Their loyalty was confirmed after the mutiny by the generous and liberal manner in which the Government rewarded those services; while, differing from the rest of India, they have one long tradition of friendship with, and protection by, the British Government from the time of their first connection with it, in the beginning of the century. These Chiefs, whose dignity it is the interest of the British Government to maintain and increase, are in this province an indisputable guarantee of the good conduct of the general population. When a people sees its natural leaders strongly on the side of the Government, they, by reflection or by instinct, follow the example set them.

12. Protection has to be afforded to British subjects against the various independent tribes on

Elements of danger to a portion of our territory from foreign enemies.								
District.	Trope.	Race.	Strength.	District.	Trope.	Race.	Strength.	
Hazara ...	Allahi (Swatis)	Pathan	1,000	Dera Ismail Khan.	Wazirs	Pathan	44,000	
	Akazai	"	1,700		Shoranis	"	6,000	
	Binsunzi	"	2,500		Ustaranas	"	90	
	Saduns	"	2,000		Kusranis	Bluch	1,500	
Peshawar...	Bonerwals	"	6,000	Dera Ghazi Khan.	Bodders	Pathan	2,700	
	Swatis	"	5,000		Khetrans	Bluch	4,500	
	Utmun Khel	"	5,000		Khosas	"	4,000	
	Mohmunds	"	16,000		Lugharias	"	3,700	
	Afridis	"	23,500		Gurchanis	"	1,200	
	Afridis	"	23,500		Marris	"	2,500	
Banna ...	Orakzais	"	29,500			Bugtis	"	1,500
	Zaimukhts	"	4,500			Mazaris	"	2,000
	Turis	"	3,000					
	Wazirs	"	44,000					
				Total	...	170,000		

the north-west frontier. These tribes occupy the country on our north-west and western border for a length of 700 miles; and aggregate in fighting strength 170,000 men. The statement in the margin gives a list of the tribes and their approximate strength. Fortunately any combination amongst them is impossible; and even in our dealings with the larger

tribes it has been found practicable to detach one or more unoffending sections. The force which it has heretofore been necessary to maintain in the six frontier districts is as follows:—

In the Peshawar district	...	...	8,000 men and 19 guns.
In the other five districts	...	...	11,000 " " 12 "
In all about	...	...	19,000 men and 31 guns.

The strength of the Peshawar garrison was fixed, however, on considerations which do not refer wholly to the frontier tribes.

13. There appears to His Honor to be little more to say on the state of popular feeling or the elements of possible danger. The Government of India is well aware that questions like these are surrounded with mystery, difficulty, and doubt. Popular feeling is as the sea, smooth to-day, and to-morrow troubled by a storm. Trifles, which to the eyes of English rulers may appear as the little cloud like a man's hand, may bring the whirlwind of religious fanaticism and passion. But of one thing the Lieutenant-Governor is at least certain—that the most probable elements of danger are in the Government and not in the people. Docile, patient, and long-suffering, the people of the Punjab will remain well-disposed to individual Englishmen, and loyal to the Government, so long as they are ruled with justice and consideration. The elements of danger lie in the increase of taxation, burdening the population beyond its strength, and in unsympathetic legislation, subversive of Native custom, and undemanded by the voice of the people, against which the Lieutenant-Governor has during the past two years been compelled more than once to protest.

14. (c) and (f) The following two statements contain the necessary information under these

Strength and distribution of police.

heads :—

Superior officers, European	...	...	62
Subordinate officers	...	...	565
Mounted men	...	...	905
Foot-constables	...	...	18,694
Total			20,226
Subordinate officers.			Men.
Guards on jails	...	5	745
Guards on lock-ups, treasuries, and escort duty	...	18	2,348
Town and municipal and cantonment duties	...	28	4,996
Distribution throughout districts	...	514	*11,510
Total			19,599

The distribution within districts may generally be said to be proportional to the amount of the population; although in large and thinly-peopled districts the proportion of police to population is necessarily increased.

15. Regarding enquiry (g) the force is, for police purposes, a most efficient body: 9,197 are armed with firearms, 10,400 with swords and batons, and 567 with batons only. The men are tolerably well

Efficiency of police.

drilled to move in small bodies; and His Honor believes that the following opinion, expressed by the Inspector-General of Police in his last report on a detachment detailed for blockade duty during the Kohat pass complication, applies to the whole force :—

"This detachment was formed by selection from volunteers from districts of the Rawal Pindi circle. The men, hoping to see service, volunteered in a body; and very many were necessarily disappointed at being left behind. They marched from Rawal Pindi in the highest spirits, and during their stay at Kohat behaved extremely well. I note this to show that the old spirit of the police battalions still animates the force, and that should at any time half-trained soldiers be required for any emergency, the Punjab police will receive such a requisition with avidity."

For physique and warlike spirit the Punjab police are not inferior, if they be not superior, to many Native regiments, while their discipline is in no way contemptible. In time of emergency, they would form a most valuable reserve to the regular army.

16. Should the Army Commission desire further or more detailed particulars regarding the population of the Punjab, or the strength and efficiency of the police, I am to refer them to the administration report of this Government, which has been supplied to all departments of the Government of India, and which, with the departmental police report for last year, herewith forwarded, supplies all the information that can be desired.

17. The strength of the European and Eurasian population has been taken at 8,000 souls. Of

(b) European and Eurasian population—

(1) its strength;

this number, one-third, or 2,666, may be able-bodied men capable of bearing arms. These are scattered over the stations of the Punjab, and many of them (about 900)

are to be found in the Volunteer companies composing the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Punjab Volunteers.

The military training which the Volunteers receive gives them confidence, and prevents the occurrence of panic amongst the civil population. In the event of local disturbance, the Volunteers would render very valuable assistance to the Government; and they can materially help towards the protection of their own families and property, and thus relieve the regular troops.

18. The duty of providing some protection for the non-combatants of our scattered civil stations

(2) non-combatants, women and children;

can in some places be left to the body of Volunteers; and it is desirable to encourage, as far as practicable, the Volunteer movement.

19. The Lieutenant-Governor does not think that it will be possible, except at an expense in-

(3) possibility of organizing it for the preservation of order.

commensurate with the results, to form the whole of the European and Eurasian male population of the Punjab into organized bodies for the maintenance of order.

He would encourage a spirit of volunteering for self-defence; but he thinks that any attempt at enforcing compulsory service would be resisted, and would not give a more efficient body of auxiliaries than we have at present in the Volunteers, and, by bringing into the ranks unwilling recruits, might possibly lower the good tone and ardent spirit which now pervades the Volunteer corps.

20. The Lieutenant-Governor is decidedly against any measure of compulsory enrolment of the

(v) Compulsory enrolment.

European population in the Punjab. As before stated, he thinks that it would give a less efficient body of men

than we have at present, or may hope to have, by encouraging volunteering amongst all the civil classes.

21. The Lieutenant-Governor very strongly recommends that the Volunteer movement should be encouraged by Government as far as practicable. In this province there are 900 enrolled volunteers; and

(j) Development of the Volunteer system. lately a proposal has been submitted to Government for the formation of a separate Railway Corps, and, if sanctioned, His Honor believes that many additional new members will be obtained.

22. What the Lieutenant-Governor would recommend as a substantial encouragement to volunteering is the grant of uniform free of cost, in addition to the authorized capitation allowance, to all *efficient*s. At present uniform has to be paid for by the funds of the corps; and the consequence is, that commandants find it exceedingly difficult to keep down debt. If this recommendation were sanctioned, many of the difficulties experienced in raising new companies or bodies of volunteers would disappear.

Three corps of Volunteers proposed.

23. At present there are in the Punjab two Volunteer corps, with one paid adjutant; but recent recommendations have been made for—

I.—The formation of a third or Railway Volunteer Corps, to include all employes of the Sind, Punjab and Delhi Railway Company and the Indus Valley (State) Railway, with one paid adjutant, and its head-quarters at Lahore.

II.—The 1st Punjab Volunteer Rifle Corps without its Railway members, with head-quarters at Lahore, } with one paid adjutant at Lahore in winter

III.—The 2nd Punjab Volunteer Rifle Corps with its head-quarters at Simla, } and at Simla in summer as at present.

But if the two latter corps increase in numbers beyond 600 *efficient*s, the Lieutenant-Governor would recommend that a third paid adjutant be sanctioned—one for the Lahore Corps, to include all stations north of Umballa, and the other for the Simla Corps to include Umballa and all stations to the south.

(3) Military requirements.

24. In considering the military requirements of the Punjab under the headings laid down in the Government of India's letter under reference—

(a) for garrison purposes and maintenance of order,

(b) for internal and external military purposes irrespective of (a),

the Lieutenant-Governor would remark that, from the replies given to the questions contained in paragraph 2 of the Government letter, it will be understood that he has a high opinion of the general loyalty of the population of this province, and that he considers the Chiefs of the Punjab Native States exceedingly friendly and well-disposed to the British Government.

There is no doubt, Sir Robert Egerton thinks, that the Punjab people have, more than the inhabitants of any other part of India, identified themselves with the British nation, and are inclined to support our Government as the best they can have.

25. The local distribution of the army in the Punjab, which was made after annexation, and

Loyalty of Native States.

His Honor believes the distribution may, if convenient, be modified in accordance with those altered conditions. The necessity for watching Native States, which led to the formation of stations at Umballa, Jullundur, and Sialkot, to guard against risk of invasion, no longer exists. The protected Sikh States and Kapurthala are thoroughly loyal: their troops have been repeatedly employed with our own forces, as auxiliaries, and can be relied upon to help us both to preserve the peace of the province and also in war.

26. While urging this view of the feeling of the people and Chiefs of the province, the Lieutenant-Governor does not forget that we are foreigners of alien race and religion, and that we must at all times be prepared to hold with the sword the country we have won from a warlike population by the sword. For internal purposes, however, it is not necessary to place troops to watch particular States whose services have placed the loyalty of their Chiefs and people beyond doubt.

The Lieutenant-Governor observes that the people of the Punjab and of the Native States look upon the great towns of the province as the capitals of their nationality. Lahore and Amritsar are metropolitan centres for all Punjabis, whether residing in British territory or in Native States. It is from these great centres that the minds of the people over all the country are affected; and the Lieutenant-Governor considers it necessary always to exhibit military strength at these places, where it can be seen by the greatest number of persons, in order to produce the greatest effect upon the population.

27. On the trans-Indus frontier the case is different. The considerations which led to the formation of the Punjab Frontier Force remain almost unaltered up to the present time. The tribes which

Necessity of maintaining frontier garrisons.

occupy the hill country immediately beyond the border in the Peshawar and Derajat divisions, although the policy which has been consistently pursued towards them has had the best results in restraining their predatory habits and encouraging a more friendly spirit towards the Government, are still savage and uncertain in temper. They are still much given to making plundering expeditions into British territory; and the country still requires military protection against their incursions. The Punjab Frontier Force is also required for punitive expeditions against the border tribes, for which their training and local knowledge specially fit them.

28. The remarks which I am desired to offer in reply to the questions in the third paragraph of the Government letter will therefore relate almost entirely to that portion of the Punjab which lies east of the Indus, but will necessarily include the Peshawar valley, which is held by troops under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

29. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks that there are some stations in the Punjab which can now be given up. The great improvement which has been made in military weapons has more than doubled

Reductions recommended.

the fighting efficiency of the British and the Native soldier, so that, in His Honor's opinion, we can afford to reduce our numbers, and to concentrate our forces. In doing this, however, he would very strongly advocate that whatever troops are maintained should be rendered mobile, and that some system of transport should be kept up ready to put one-half the troops in the Punjab into the field. Heretofore the transport arrangements have always been a great difficulty; and in our recent experiences this fact has been prominently brought to notice. But if we can now do our work with reduced numbers of troops, the difficulties in transport arrangements should be very much lessened; and the cost of these may be met by reductions in the strength of the army.

30. After giving this subject careful consideration, His Honor thinks that our troops, and more especially the British troops, should be stationed in those places where the intelligent and wealthy portions of the population are collected, and where the greatest commercial activity and life exist. He is averse to a system which divides our British strength into small detachments, or which scatters these troops over many parts of the country. He would not place one British soldier across the border, but would rather concentrate them in our own provinces, both in order to impress our own subjects with an idea of our strength, and also as a power ready to move forward in cases of emergency. Our Native troops are fully fitted both in physique and in bravery to cope with any of the tribes on our border, to whom they are also by a long course of national tradition hostile; and His Honor thinks there are many reasons which should induce the Government to concentrate rather than scatter our British troops.

31. In the first part of the following statement the Lieutenant-Governor has given those places which he thinks must be maintained as stations for British troops; but he remarks that the greater part of the garrisons entered for Mooltan and Rawal Pindi are required chiefly as supports to our troops holding the front or border line.

These stations are, with the exception of Rawal Pindi and Ferozepore, all upon the line of railway. The line to Rawal Pindi will soon be completed; and it will not be necessary to hold Ferozepore with British troops after the arsenal is removed.

32. The two Goorkha regiments stationed at Bukloh and Dharmasala may be treated exceptionally: they are for certain reasons kept in a cool climate and made local corps, whilst they are ready for any service that may arise.

		ARTILLERY.		CAVALRY.	INFANTRY.	
		British.		Native.	British.	Native.
		Horse, field, or mountain.	Garrison.	Mountain.	Regiments.	Regiments.
Delhi	...	...	1	...	1	1
Lahore with Amritsar	...	3	2	1	2	3
Rawal Pindi	...	3	...	1	2	3
Peshawar	...	2	1	3	3	4
Mooltan	...	2	1	2	2	2
Ferozepore	...	...	1	...	1	1
		10	6	7	11	14
Bukloh and Dharmasala	...	...	...	...	...	2
Frontier	Hazara	...	...	1	...	2
	Murdan	...	...	1	...	1
	Kohat	...	...	1	1	2
	Edwardesabad	...	...	1	1	2
	Dera Ismail Khan	...	...	1*	1	2
	Dera Ghazi Khan	...	...	1	1	2*
New assigned districts under Punjab Government.	Rajanpore	...	...	1*	...	...
	Lundi Kotal	...	...	1	...	2
	Ali Musjid	...	...	...	...	1
	Jamrud	...	...	...	...	1
		...	...	4	6	14
		10	6	4	13	30

Only required so long as the arsenal remains.

Goorkha regiments, local.

\*1 Battery  
1 Native cavalry.  
1 Native infantry.

} Available for new station in Beluch hills.

Only required so long as the arsenal remains.

Goorkha regiments, local.

\*1 Battery  
1 Native cavalry.  
1 Native infantry. } Available for new station in Beluch hills.

33. According to the above proposed distribution, the following stations need not, for purposes of internal security or external defence, be held by troops at all, but other considerations may render it expedient to continue the occupation of them:—

- |                |               |
|----------------|---------------|
| (1) Umballa.   | (6) Phillour. |
| (2) Sialkot.   | (7) Talagang. |
| (3) Jullundur. | (8) Nowshera. |
| (4) Jhelum.    | (9) Subathu.  |
| (5) Ludhiana.  | (10) Dugshai. |

And British troops may be withdrawn from—

- (1) Kangra.
- (2) Dera Ismail Khan.

34. In regard to Umballa, if it is considered that the presence of a large number of troops at that station may have confirmed the loyalty of the Sikh States, and that it is imprudent to remove them, I am to point out that the existence of the railway has made it possible to move troops in the course of a few hours from points at a distance formerly prohibitive on both sides to Umballa. Moreover in 1857, when our Native troops at Umballa were in mutiny, the Government was supported at once by troops from Patiala; and the Lieutenant-Governor believes that on account of the existence of the railway and the telegraph, as well as on account of the well-tryed loyalty of the Sikh States, it is not necessary to continue to occupy Umballa, though for years to come it may be convenient to do so, on account of the existence of barracks there.

35. As accommodation in barracks to the full extent does not exist at Lahore, Mooltan, and Peshawar, it may therefore be necessary to continue to occupy the following stations with the troops mentioned:—

(1) Umballa	...	{	2 Batteries	Royal artillery from Meean Meer and Mooltan.
			1 Regiment	British infantry from Meean Meer.
(2) Dugshai	...	{	1	Native infantry from Meean Meer.
			1	Native cavalry from Mooltan.
(3) Nowshera	...	{	1	British infantry from Mooltan.
			1	British infantry from Peshawar.
	...	{	1	Native cavalry from Peshawar.
			1	Native infantry from Mooltan.

36. The second British infantry regiment at Peshawar might under ordinary circumstances be withdrawn during the hot season to the hills in the Hazara district. His Honor thinks it will be necessary to retain some British troops in the Peshawar valley; but if our political arrangements with Cabul strengthen our position with the Khyber and Mohmand tribes, he will then have no objection to the reduction of the British garrisons in the Peshawar valley, which has always had a bad reputation for salubrity.

37. In the above statement no provision has been made for British cavalry. This arm of the service can, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, be dispensed with, as no service is likely to arise in the

Cavalry unnecessary.

Punjab or on the border requiring, as an absolute necessity, the presence of British cavalry. On this subject, however, the Lieutenant-Governor offers an opinion with some diffidence, as he is aware that most military authorities would not consider a force of British troops complete without a proportionate number of this arm.

38. The Lieutenant-Governor has made no remarks on the requirements of the Kuram

Assigned districts not considered.  
Importance of Kohat.

the Afridi and other tribes with whom we

- \* 1 Native cavalry regiment.
- 2 Native infantry regiments.

become necessary to increase this station to its original strength of three Native infantry regiments.

Cantonment in Beluch hills.

39. For the occupation of a new cantonment in the Beluch hills, the Lieutenant-Governor has stated that—

- 1 Mountain battery from Dera Ismail Khan,
- 1 Native cavalry from Rajanpore,
- 1 Native infantry from Dera Ghazi Khan,

will be available, if that cantonment is formed. But in the event of no advance being made in this direction, these troops will be required at existing border stations for frontier defence.

40. The following statement shows the strength below which the garrisons at the stations named should not be reduced when any occasion calling for a general concentration of troops may arise:—

	ARTILLERY.		Cavalry, Native.	INFANTRY.	
	Field or horse.	Garrison.		British.	Native.
Delhi	...	...	...	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>
Lahore and Amritsar	...	...	...	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>
Rawal Pindi	...	...	...	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>
Peshawar	...	...	...	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>
Mooltan	...	...	...	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>
Ferozepore	...	...	...	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>
Frontier Force stations	...	...	...	...	6
New assigned districts, Lundi Kotah, Khyber, &c....	2	6	8	3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	11 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>
	...	...	...	...	4
	2	6	8	3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	15 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>

This leaves for external or internal military purposes—

- 8 Batteries royal artillery, horse or field,
- 4 Native mountain batteries,
- 5 Regiments Native cavalry,
- 7 Regiments British infantry,
- 14½ Regiments Native infantry,

which would give 6,000 British and 12,000 Native troops, one-half of which should be ready to take the field at once, and the other half in six weeks.

41. Comparing the strength of troops in the Punjab before the late war with Afghanistan with the numbers now considered requisite, the following results are obtained :—

Result.

			ARTILLERY.		CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.	
			British.	Native.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.
In 1877-78 before the war	...	...	21	4	3	15	13½	31
Now proposed	...	...	16	4	...	13	11	27*
Proposed reduction	...	...	5	...	3	2	2½	4

Estimate of annual saving effected by proposed reduction of strength of Punjab garrisons as above.

5 Batteries artillery	...	...	{ 3 horse }	=	9,50,970
3 Regiments British cavalry	...	...	{ 2 field }	=	17,01,000
2 Regiments Native cavalry	...	...	at Rs. 5,67,000	=	5,26,664
2½ Regiments British infantry	...	...	at „ 2,63,322	=	14,61,182
4 Regiments Native infantry	...	...	at „ 5,84,473	=	7,22,420
			at „ 1,80,585		
Total				...	53,62,236

42. In framing the above proposals, the Lieutenant-Governor has been guided chiefly by the requirements of the Punjab as he estimates them; but inasmuch as this province contains the most warlike population in India, and has a line of frontier inhabited by fierce predatory tribes, he thinks that a reduction in the strength of the garrisons of the Punjab will not necessitate the maintenance of a larger force in other parts of the Indian empire, and that, if his proposals are accepted, the Indian army may be reduced to the extent which he has indicated. The Lieutenant-Governor is aware of the grave responsibility which attaches to the expression of the opinions contained in this letter, but he believes that the creation of railways in the Punjab, within a very recent period, and the immense increase of fighting-power which our troops have gained by the use of breech-loading rifles, justify him in the recommendations he has made, even were the feeling of the people towards the British Government less loyal than it is.

## E.—BOMBAY.

Answers to questions regarding the strength, the duties, and the requirements of the Bombay Army.

*Minute by the Governor of Bombay, dated 31st July 1879.*

My hon'ble colleagues have doubtless considered duly the very important questions addressed to us by the Government of India in their letter No. 204 S.B., dated 7th July 1879, regarding army organization, to which we are requested to send our replies by the 15th of August.

I proceed to note the replies that occur to me for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief and my hon'ble colleagues. I shall follow exactly the order of the questions put, quoting the words of each question.

The first question is “(a) *Strength of Native population.*” This was shown as below for the Bombay presidency by the census of 1871-72 :—

	Souls.
1. Hindus	13,403,675
2. Muhammadans	2,528,344
3. Asiatics, not Natives of India	240,448
4. Feudatory States, including Baroda	9,298,612
Total	25,471,079

Of the above, 8,332,246 (about) are adult males.

\* Excluding the Khyber garrisons of Native infantry.



For 1, 2, 3, see table 23, page 53, "Memorandum on the Census of British India of 1871-72." For 4, see page 5 of the same.

But as the Bombay army supplies troops to guard State interests in Central India and Rajputana, it may be well to add the population of the Native States in those two political divisions thus (census, 1871-72)—

Central India	...	...	...	...	Souls.	7,699,502
Rajputana	...	...	...	...	...	8,981,588
Total					...	16,681,090

If this be added to the total of the presidency proper, above shown, then the grand total of the population with which the Bombay army is concerned will amount to 42,152,169 souls.

The next question is "*(b) Strength of the European and Eurasian population, irrespective of the army.*"

This is shown as below by the census of 1871-72 for the Bombay Presidency:—

British	...	...	...	...	Souls.	23,907
Other Europeans	...	...	...	...	...	4,681
Americans	...	...	...	...	}	3,839
Africans	...	...	...	...		
Australians	...	...	...	...		
Eurasians	...	...	...	...	...	3,671
Indo-Portuguese	...	...	...	...	...	29,737
Total					...	65,835

*Deduct—*

European army all ranks, and European officers and non-commissioned officers, Native army*	...	...	...	...	...	12,047
--	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	--------

Total European and Eurasian population irrespective of army, but inclusive of Indo-Portuguese	...	...	...	...	...	53,788
---	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	--------

"*(c) State of feeling*" of the Native population. For this question the presidency may be divided into the Deccan, the Concan, Guzerat, Kattywar with Cutch, Sind, and lastly the great city of Bombay.

The Deccan may be here taken to include all the country from the river Nerbudda in the north to the boundary of the Mysore territory in the south, comprising Khandesh, the country round Poona, the cluster of Native States called the Southern Mahratta Country and Dharwar.

The mass of the peasantry are generally well-disposed and loyal to Government; but as their immediate ancestors were much engaged in wars and revolutions, many martial qualities survive in them, and even of late years they have in some parts shown a certain sort of excitability which tends to violence. The hilly nature of the country sustains habits of hardihood and self-reliance. Experience has shown that, in event of a rising, many of the wilder or more adventurous spirits among this peasantry would either actively join or indirectly assist the insurgents. Among them, too, are some hill tribes, such as Bhils, and some tribes inhabiting both plains and hills, such as Mangs and Ramosis, who are always ready for mischief, and capable of doing it, if opportunity offers itself. The Bhils were once very troublesome; and though they have greatly improved of late years, still it cannot at all be said that all apprehension about them has passed away.

There is a considerable Mahratta nobility, called Sirdars of the Deccan, once powerful, and, though no longer powerful, still influential: although there was, as I understand, anxiety about them in 1857, they are now esteemed to be personally well-disposed. But much as we may confide in each chief individually, as we see him now-a-days, it is to be remembered that these people are the descendants within two generations of those who formed the court and camp of the Peishwas; that their immediate ancestors enjoyed wealth, power, honor, all which inevitably pass away in consequence of a foreign rule like ours; that despite all the arrangements which we can reasonably be expected to make for the partial continuance of their emoluments for limited periods, despite also such concession in perpetuity as may be allowed consistently with the interests of the country, these people must be much worse off under our rule than under the preceding rule; that they, whose families were in bye-gone times above all law, now feel the restrictions of a civilized administration; and that all these circumstances affect not only the heads of houses, but their numerous dependents and retainers. All this should be weighed in estimating the chances of trouble. During the earlier days of our rule it would have had more potential import than at present; and it may decrease gradually year by year. But it still exists in some degree, and so far it should be borne in mind.

There are certain classes among the humbler orders in some of the cities, such as Poona, Satara, and Nasik, who appear to be hostilely disposed, and who might under certain circumstances become a turbulent mob.

The educated classes, fast growing in numbers and intelligence, are, as a rule, loyal; indeed, I should say they must necessarily be loyal and well-disposed to Government. But among them there are unfortunate exceptions to this good rule—men who are many in the abstract, though not numerous relatively to the whole of the upper and middle classes; men whose minds seem discontented and unsettled, and who are, it is to be feared, actually ill-disposed towards Government. There are also scattered among the community individuals who are of a restless, intriguing, plotting disposition,

\* N.B.—These numbers, besides European army, include staff corps, general list cavalry and infantry, unemployed and officers.

seemingly irreconcilable to British rule, and of an ambitious nature, who might, under some circumstances readily conceivable, become influential for mischief. Indeed they are mischievous already both directly by their own conduct and indirectly by their influence upon others; and of this there are many indications abroad.

Of the Native States above mentioned, some have at times during British rule, even up to recent years, been centres of political mischief, with a tendency towards combination. But these evil characteristics have of late decreased, perhaps almost disappeared. Some, such as Kolhapur, are under British management during a minority, and are so far to be depended on for loyalty; in some, too, the Chiefs are actively loyal. Experience must convince us that, in the event of a general disturbance however, it is but too probable that attempts would be made to corrupt the fidelity of these States.

Throughout the whole of the Deccan, the mind of the people is, I believe, affected by the past associations of Mahratta rule, which, so far from being forgotten, are better remembered than would ordinarily be expected, and by the long-retained memory of the Mahratta uprising against the Muhamadans—a memory which is constantly recalled by the sight of the mountains which rendered that uprising first practicable and then successful, and by the traditions always so apt to survive in mountainous countries. This memory constantly suggests the analogy between the position of the British and that of the Moguls in the Deccan.

There is a general tendency also to criticize to an extreme degree, not only the proceedings of Government and its officers, but also the national conduct and policy of the British in respect to India. Though much of this criticism is legitimate, and is not at all to be confounded with disaffection, still some of it often verges towards that degree which is hardly distinguishable from disloyalty.

The Concan may here be taken to include North Canara on the south, and to extend to near to Surat in the north. I have to report favorably of this tract of country, with the exception of some hill tribes, Kolis and others, who are excitable and slightly mischievous after their kind.

The Canarese people are peaceable and loyal. In the Concan proper, the principal class are the Khotes, or superior landlords, who are, as a rule, all that could be expected in respect to loyalty.

The peasantry are intent on industry, with no thought of mischief. The pensioners of the Native army chiefly reside in the Concan, and draw in the aggregate a large sum annually from the Government treasury. Their loyalty has a considerable influence socially.

The Native States of Sawantwari and Janjira are well-disposed; but in both of them there has been trouble—in Sawantwari many years ago, and in Janjira more recently—which, though possible again in the future, is not likely to recur. Experience even up to recent times, however, indicates that, if any political trouble arose in the Deccan, the excitement would spread to the Concan.

In Guzerat are included the rich country from Surat to Ahmedabad, the Native States of Rewa Kanta, Mahi Kanta, Pahlapur and Radhanpur, and the large State of Baroda.

The peasantry is prosperous and loyal, and generally free from excitability; but there are some tribes among them, Kolis and others, of a turbulent disposition.

Of the landed gentry, some are of excellent character and undoubted loyalty. Others are broken in fortune and doubtful in character; and respecting some of these the caution I have expressed regarding the Mahratta aristocracy of the Deccan is applicable.

Of the large urban population in this province, the inhabitants of Surat and Broach have alone evinced a turbulent disposition.

In the Native States, and in one of the British districts (Panch Mahals) received in exchange from a Native State, there used to be many lawless characters of various tribes; but they have of late years been either improved or repressed, though they might break out again if opportunity were to offer. In other respects most of the lesser Native States appear to be thoroughly loyal to the British Government, though, as Rajputs, capable of contending even violently with the Mahratta State of Baroda in event of disputes about the complications of landed tenures which exist in that quarter. Such disputes have, however, been for the most part settled, and we may hope that no trouble will arise.

Even in Guzerat, however, the conduct imputed to Radhanpur in 1857, and the rebellion of the Rana of Nagar Parkar near Cutch during that time, should inspire us with some diffidence in casting up the total of our chances in event of danger.

Of the present management of the Baroda State, of the loyal disposition of its Chiefs and people, I form a very favorable estimate. But experience and information convince us that, in event of any sort of trouble in the Deccan, there will be sympathy with it among some individuals, perhaps some classes at Baroda; or *vice versa*, if the trouble be at Baroda, there will be a sentiment aroused in the Deccan. This circumstance must, I think, be regarded as a political factor.

Kattywar was once much infested by lawless people, but of late years all these elements of trouble are fast disappearing. The disposition of this large cluster of Chiefs is quite loyal. The temper of the peasantry is peaceful and industrious. The improvement in Kattywar within this generation reflects honor on British rule in Western India. Still the smouldering or hardly extinguished elements of trouble might break out again in the event of a general disturbance. Similar remarks may be applied to Cutch.

In Sind the temper of the cultivating peasantry is quite loyal to the Government. So also, I think is the disposition for the most part of the landlords, large and small. But some of the larger landlords are broken in fortune; and when this is the case, we must reflect that the sufferers are often apt to attribute their misfortunes to a change of political rule, however undeserved such imputation may be. It is to be remembered that the population of Sind is mainly Muhamadani, while the population of the rest of the presidency is mainly Hindu.

Along the whole sea border of the presidency from Kurrachee, past Cutch and Kattywar, past Guzerat and the Concan, and Canara, down to the confines of Madras, there are hardy maritime classes, once dangerously piratical, but now addicted to lawful ocean-borne trade, and very well affected.

In the great city of Bombay the population is in the main thoroughly loyal. There is not one disloyal class; while some classes, such as Parsis, are conspicuously loyal. But the mob is not free from excitability; and we know that some classes are capable of violent contention one with the

other—as, for instance, the lower class of Muhammadans and Parsis in 1851 and 1874. In such a city, with so many diverse constituents and elements, it were vain to suppose that no disaffected or dangerous persons exist. There must ever be many such individuals; and the tendency to carry legitimate criticism on public affairs too far, as already noticed in the Deccan, is sometimes perceptible in the capital also.

For the presidency generally, it is to be remembered that, during the past three years, there has been a protracted tension of misfortune, first drought and famine, then inundation, pest, sickness—all which, though borne with exemplary fortitude, must in many respects affect the temper of the people.

There is no Muhammadan fanaticism anywhere in the presidency; and if there ever was any Hindu fanaticism, it has long ago been subdued by education.

But if religious Brahmanism be decaying (as many believe it is), still political Brahmanism is not extinct in those parts of the presidency which were subject to Mahratta rule. The Brahman caste has not forgotten, will probably never forget, that it was at the head of the great Mahratta confederation.

In Western India the rapid development of commerce, foreign and domestic; the expansion of industrial activity; the accumulation of capital—all tend to loyalty and good-will towards Government. Nowhere is it more true than in Western India that those who have the command of capital—that cardinal resource in danger—are in the foremost rank of loyalty.

I should add here that though a general disarming of the people in Guzerat and parts of the Deccan was carried out many years ago, there are still many arms in the hands of the people, not nearly so many as there used to be in former times, yet enough to be in some degree auxiliary to mischief in event of a general crisis.

On this brief review of the state of feeling of the people there is much to cause satisfaction, but much to demand watchfulness, and something, under various conceivable circumstances, to excite anxious forethought.

There is generally some fermentation in the public mind among the Natives of Western India whenever the British Government is engaged in wars or in grave political affairs. In any event which might cause British power to shake, even in the slightest degree, such fermentation would speedily become aggravated. Then the several elements of mischief I have mentioned would become active, while (as is usual with Oriental nations) most of the numerous elements of good would remain comparatively passive; and so Government would be left to deal with its difficulties, unaided even by its loyal subjects. Under such circumstances the conduct even of the agricultural classes would not be satisfactory in respect of co-operation with the Government.

#### (d) *Elements of danger.*

These elements may be regarded as *internal* and *external*.

*Internal*, first as respects the contour of the country. A range of mountains, 2,000 to 4,000 feet above the sea, running like a dorsal ridge right through the presidency from end to end, from north to south, on the west side generally precipitous like a wall, on the east side trending into undulations, or branching off into transverse ranges which run eastwards. This is, in technical phrase, “a very strong military country” with fertile assailable tracts on either side of it. In the rainy season, for five months in the year, it is very hard to be traversed. It is inhabited by races that possess the qualities incidental to rugged regions. From the earliest ages it was regarded as a military base and was studded with hill forts. This base was so developed by Sivaji and his successors, that it afforded such military cover as enabled them to operate successfully against the foreign invaders (Moguls), and so it became the foundation of the Mahratta power. There always was a two-fold aspect in this power, which was first predatory, and secondly directed against alien conquerors. Whenever there has been trouble in Western India, it has assumed these very forms, in varying degrees of course, and generally in a much milder degree. The nature of the country, which on this particular line cannot be artificially changed, is a standing reason why the history of the past should repeat itself in the future. The tendency is perceptible even in times of peace; and in time of war or disturbance will probably manifest itself markedly.

In one respect, however, this abiding difficulty has been to some extent, and is still being, overcome, because the range of mountains has been pierced east to west by railways on two points,\* and by first-rate military roads for wheeled carriage in eleven points,† and some more lines of similar communications are contemplated.

The hill forts on this mountain system have held a dominant place in the military history of the Deccan. Some of them were dismantled, though imperfectly, in 1858, while others (which now belong to our feudatories) remain intact. Their seizure would hardly be attempted by common insurgents; but in the event of a general insurrection, the possession of them by our enemies would be most serious, as they are not only hard to take even with modern appliances (though of course they can be taken), but have also cultivation, pasturage, and such like resources of supply at their base, and abundant water in their interior. Therefore they are always kept before our minds. Two of the most important are held by our troops,‡ four are close under our observation,§ five|| are held by our feudatory Mahratta Chiefs.

*Internal*, secondly as regards the people. These will be gathered from my foregoing remarks regarding the state of feeling among the people. They may be summarized thus—

Political ambition among certain classes which can hardly be satisfied under British rule.

A certain degree of disaffection, which, though very partial, is not likely to be removed, or even mitigated, by any remedies which a foreign Government can adopt.

A Native aristocracy which has unavoidably suffered in wealth and position by the introduction of foreign rule.

\* Thal Ghât and Borghât.

† Kunda Bar, Thal, Bhor, Warunda, FitzGerald, Kumarli, A'mba, Phonda, A'mboli, Yellapur, and Dewamani.

‡ Satara and Parandhar.

§ Singad, Parbhargh, Raigarh, and Sewnera (Junnar).

|| Rajgarh, Torna, Vishalgad, Bowna, and Rangna.

Clusters of lesser Native States inside the presidency, which, despite the personal loyalty of the Chiefs, might, indeed probably would, become centres of political intrigue in event of general disturbance.

Certain tribes, such as Bheels, Kolis, Ramosis, Waghirs, and others, either inclined occasionally to lawlessness and violence, or else of a predatory disposition hardly corrigible.

*External.*—The territories of the Nizam contiguous with this presidency for full four hundred miles, full of recent times, during which the improvement has been wonderful, and most Government. But in a certain number Rohillas, and such like Muhammadans, still exist in those territories, who have no congenial employment in peace, and who, in event of general disturbance, would menace, perhaps even harass, this presidency. The existence of armed Arabs at Hyderabad also should not be overlooked.

Lawless characters of diverse sorts in the hilly districts of Central India and Rajputana, who would threaten Guzerat and Khandesh in event of general disturbance.

On the Sind frontier the tribes of Murris, Bugtis, Brahuis, and Beluchis, some of whom have in former days caused much trouble. But apprehension on their account has been very considerably lessened by recent political arrangements in the Khelat territory, and on the south-eastern border of Afghanistan.

These arrangements will, however, enlarge our responsibilities respecting the tribes which occupy the Bolan and Moola passes, and will cause our relations to extend not only to the line of communication with Herat *via* Kandahar, but also to the line with Furra and Seistan *via* Khelat and Nooshy. The Khan of Khelat has, in his time, been a source of anxiety, but he seems to be now a faithful vassal, or at least a good ally; and he is at peace with his feudatories, who formerly were so troublesome. He has a force of about four thousand men.

In general terms, the Bombay presidency may be described as surrounded on all sides, except the sea, by large Native States (external to the presidency), who have in the aggregate considerable armed forces in various degrees of discipline, armament, and equipment. However justly and sincerely we may rely on the loyalty of these Native sovereigns and their surroundings, still we cannot tell beforehand whether, in event of widespread trouble, they could keep all these forces in control.

To this category of "*external*" might be added the military and political contingencies surrounding Aden—a place which, garrisoned by Bombay troops, is becoming the outpost of British power and influence in South-Western Arabia; an outpost which really supports the arbitrament which we now exercise between the contending Chiefs and factions in a region so often stained with bloodshed; an outpost, too, from which detachments might be demanded for Perim, Socotra, and other points in event of general war. Also there are the coasts of Mekran, Oman, both the Arabian and Persian shores of the Persian Gulf, and the islands situated in the Gulf—in all which places troubles have occurred, demanding armed interference by the British Government, and in parts of which detachments of Bombay troops are stationed, that have sometimes not only to quell disturbance on land, but also to assist in the suppression of plundering at sea.

Before proceeding to the next heading, I must remark that the considerations set forth in the two preceding headings (c) and (d), namely, "*State of feeling*" and "*Elements of danger*," clearly indicate that an adequate and effective military force must be maintained in the Bombay presidency for garrison purposes and maintenance of order.

#### (c) *Strength of the police.*

The following is the strength of the police of the Bombay presidency (Administration report of Bombay, 1877-78):—

1. Commissioner, Bombay City	...	...	...	1
2. Deputy Commissioner, Bombay City	...	...	...	1
3. District and assistant superintendents	...	...	...	26
4. Superintendents of railway Police	...	...	...	2
5. Subordinate officers, District Police	...	...	...	3,049
6. Ditto Water Police	...	...	...	61
7. Ditto Railway Police	...	...	...	134
8. Mounted constables, District Police	...	...	...	1,294
9. Foot constables, District Police	...	...	...	14,069
10. Ditto Railway Police	...	...	...	844
11. Ditto Water Police	...	...	...	753
12. Subordinate officers, mounted and foot constables, Bombay City Police	...	...	...	1,413
Total all ranks				21,647

The police of the Bombay presidency are under the immediate orders of the Commissioner in Sind, and the Commissioners of the Northern, Central, and Southern Divisions, and the Police Commissioner of the City of Bombay.

*(f) Distribution of the police.*

The police is distributed as below :—

<i>Northern Division.</i>				Officers and men.
Including Ahmedabad, Kaira, Panch Mahals, Broach, Surat, Tanna, Colaba	...	...	...	5,062
<i>Central Division.</i>				
Including Khandesh, Nasik, Ahmednagar, Poona, Satara	...	...	...	5,843
<i>Southern Division.</i>				
Including Belgaum, Dharwar, Kaladgi, Kanara, Ratnagiri	...	...	...	3,537
<i>Sind.</i>				
Including Kurrachee, Hyderabad, Shikarpur, Thar and Parkar, Jacobabad	...	...	...	4,800
Railway	...	...	...	980
Bombay city	...	...	...	1,415
Total*				21,647

*(g) Efficiency of the police.*

Its efficiency is here to be considered in reference to its power of repressing armed violence. Such repression must be effected, if not by the police, by the army eventually. Thus the question is, how far would the police be auxiliary to the army in this respect; and what would be the demand of the civil power upon the army? The answer will depend, not only on the character of the police, but also on the character of those with whom they have to deal. Now, looking to the courage, daring, and hardihood of the classes who sometimes commit crimes of violence on a large scale in the Deccan; looking also to the ordinary conduct of the police, I must answer that the police are sometimes found unable to cope with the robbers of Western India. It has happened that bands of these men armed—it is hard to say how—have proved themselves more than a match in open fight for parties of policemen, and have succumbed only to regular sepoys. I hope that the quasi-military drill and discipline of the police will be improved. Strenuous endeavours will be made with this view, as it has become evident that the purely civil element, however desirable in itself, has too exclusively prevailed in the police. On the other hand, the robbers of the Deccan, on their own hilly ground, have shown themselves to be as much as regular sepoys can manage. In short, if a band of these men is to be attacked on the hillside, it would be held desirable that a European officer should be present. Similar experience was had in Khandesh with the Bheels some years ago.

If, therefore, even casual trouble arises in the Deccan, either the police must be made equal to soldiers—a result hardly likely to be attained—or else the civil power must call for troops, and the military must be prepared to meet the demand, which is the only sure way of dealing with the affair.

*(h) European and Eurasian population considered as—*

- (1) *strength in combatant power and for the maintenance of order;*
- (2) *weakness in necessity for provision of safety of non-combatants, women and children;*
- (3) *of possible greater utility than at present if organised for the maintenance of order in case of disturbance.*

The strength in combatant power of the European and Eurasian population in this presidency can be estimated from the statistics given under heading (b).

The number is swollen by the inclusion of Indo-Portuguese, who, though quite trustworthy and loyal, have a physique different from that of Europeans, and would not ordinarily be classed with Europeans available for any sort of military service. In extreme danger, however, a considerable number could be organized of Indo-Portuguese of the humbler classes, who, whatever their fighting qualities, would be entirely with us in sympathy. Exclusive of Indo-Portuguese and foreigners, who would not ordinarily be called upon for military service, I should estimate the Europeans and Eurasians in the Bombay presidency who could in emergency be counted upon for bearing arms as something under five thousand. Much would depend in the conduct of the Local Government at the time, and perhaps the number might not exceed four thousand; but three thousand, I believe, would be, and certainly ought to be, obtained. This opinion is given after frequent consideration in reference to the Volunteer movement. It is given also on the assumption that the European community continues to be much as it is now; while some circumstances tend to the growth of this community, other circumstances check that growth, notably the advance of the Natives in practical education, which conduces to their employment in many departments of skilled labor hitherto occupied by Europeans.

The statistics under heading (b) show what a multitude of non-combatants, women and children—many thousands—we should have to guard in Western India in the event of general danger. The majority are of course in the city of Bombay. But many are, as usual in India, scattered over the country. There are not, as a rule, places of refuge in our military and civil stations, and there are very few habitable fortresses which could be thus used. The following forts could, however, be used in this way :—

Ahmednagar.  
Asseerghur.  
Belgaum.  
Satara.  
Neemuch.

The castle of Surat might be added to this number. It was arranged in 1857 that women and children should go there, if there was an outbreak. Troops and sailors were then stationed there.

The fort at Sholapur also, though unoccupied, is not dismantled, and might at short notice be fitted up as a place of refuge.

For Poona a place of refuge could be inexpensively and efficiently provided at Kirkee. The city of Bombay is not at all suited for any such arrangement.

The various railway stations are not, as a rule, constructed so as to be technically defensible; still, by ready skillfulness in emergency, such defensibility might be improvised. And most of the railway workshops and depôts could be defended by British volunteers, at least against an armed mob.

It will be presently shown that the volunteering system in the Bombay presidency has recently been much developed, but that still it is only about half what it might be.

Therefore we must reply that the European and Eurasian community might certainly become of greater utility than at present, if organized for the maintenance of order. The question, however, immediately arises whether this organization should be compulsory or voluntary. I recommend its being continued voluntary, as at present. There are many obvious objections to its being made compulsory, as such a plan would probably prove unpopular with those concerned, and might not sensibly add to the actual fighting power which we now obtain from the voluntary system.

(i) *Question of compulsory enrolment.*

It will be seen from the preceding answer that I cannot undertake to recommend this, though I quite see its practicability, and would do my utmost to promote it, if it be ordered by supreme authority. The first step would be comparatively easy. Every European British subject in India capable of bearing arms would be required to enrol himself before some authority duly appointed on that behalf. There would be constant difficulty in keeping correct the register of such enrolment, by reason of the changes to which the Anglo-Indian community is subject beyond any other community in the world. Every person enrolled would be required to obtain a certificate of having passed his drill, and of having acquired a prescribed proficiency in musketry.

Much of this would be congenial enough to most Anglo-Indians; but every thing in the shape of compulsion is so distasteful to Englishmen, even for objects which they approve, that I should prefer to devote our efforts to the subject which has next to be noticed, namely—

(j) *Development of volunteer system.*

In the Bombay presidency we have three Volunteer corps—namely, that of Bombay, with 8 companies and 500 officers and men; that of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, with 11 companies and 700 officers and men; that of the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway, with 2 companies and 150 officers and men. In all 21 companies, with a total effective strength of 1,350 officers and men. The movement has in some places arisen, and in other places materially advanced since 1877, partly on account of the political and warlike circumstances of the times; and I have of course done my best to encourage it. It is generally thought that the existing orders applicable to volunteering throughout India, though good so far as they go, might in several particulars be liberally expanded, so as to afford additional encouragement. These particulars, being purely matters of detail, need not be specified here. But I am sure that the most potent encouragement to my countrymen in Western India to volunteer will be the approach of real danger. Then, indeed, they will assuredly flock to the standards of the several corps which have been, or may yet be, organized.

Next our opinion is required on the—

*“General military requirements of the Bombay presidency—*

*(a) for garrison purposes and maintenance of order;*

*(b) for internal and external military purposes irrespective of (a).”*

These questions presumably refer, in effect, to the Native army mainly; for it will probably be admitted immediately that the European force on the Bombay establishment is already as low as would be consistent with the general safety.

It may be as well, however, to summarize the numbers in the several arms of this European force, as below (*vide* East India Finance and Revenue Accounts for 1877-78 presented to Parliament):—

	Officers and men.				
Cavalry ... ..	...	...	...	...	483
Artillery ... ..	...	...	...	...	2,549
Infantry ... ..	...	...	...	...	8,271
Engineers ... ..	...	...	...	...	68
Invalid and Veteran establishment	...	...	...	...	11
Staff Corps ... ..	...	...	...	...	259
General List, Cavalry	...	...	...	...	13
Ditto, Infantry	...	...	...	...	26
Unattached officers ...	...	...	...	...	2
General officers unemployed	...	...	...	...	28
Total ... ..	...	...	...	...	11,710

Inside the presidency the distribution of European troops is in this wise—

Inland above the mountains from the Tapti river on the north down to Mysore on the south, an expanse of British territory 500 miles in length, there are ordinarily five batteries of artillery and three-and-a-half regiments of infantry. Of these regiments, two are at Poona, one of which furnishes a detachment to Satara, one is at Belgaum, and the half-regiment or wing is at Ahmednagar.

On the coast, or below the mountains, there are five batteries of artillery, half a regiment of infantry at Bombay itself, and one regiment distributed between Ahmedabad, Baroda, and Deesa.

In Sind there are two batteries of artillery and one regiment of infantry distributed between Kurrachee and Hyderabad.

At Aden there are three batteries of artillery and one regiment of infantry.

It is to be noted that there is no European cavalry stationed inside the presidency.

Outside the presidency, in Central India, there is one regiment of European cavalry, two batteries of artillery, and one regiment of infantry at Mhow, and half a regiment at Neemuch.

In Rajputana there is one battery of artillery at Nusseerabad and half a regiment of infantry.

The necessity of maintaining this European force in Western India depends partly on considerations affecting the Indian empire, which considerations need not be set forth here. This force is necessary to support British power, and the moral impression of that power during peace. Out of it a part ought to be, must be, would be, spared for war. But we cannot say beforehand what that proportion would be. That must depend on the circumstances of the occasion as it shall arise. Such circumstances might be menacing near the presidency, in which case the proportion to be spared for external war would be less. Or they might be comparatively favorable within the presidency, while extreme need existed at some distant point, in which case the proportion would be greater. It would be possible to imagine hypothetically a minimum European force, with which a crisis in Western India might possibly, with the favor of Providence, be surmounted; the unavoidable risks being incurred as incidental to such a crisis. But it would not be prudent to state beforehand such a conceivable minimum, because this would have the appearance of presumption in knowingly accepting those risks which ought not to be hazarded, save under absolute necessity. During any time of war, however, Western India is one of those portions of the empire which must be guarded effectually by European troops. And some stations especially could not be safely left at such a time for a moment without an adequate garrison of European infantry, namely, Poona, Satara, Belgaum, Deesa, Mhow, Nusseerabad, and Aden, to which should be added always a detachment in the fortress of Ascerghur in the Satpura range between the Nerbudda and Tapti. I have not included Bombay in the above, because the volunteer infantry there might, together with the regular artillery, hold the city in time of danger (though of course some regular infantry garrison would be desirable), nor Ahmedabad, because with the opening of the railway the station of Deesa would be near enough.

I should here mention, by way of reminder, that we have since 1877 consistently recommended, after careful consultation with the naval and military authorities, that for the two turret-ships at Bombay a strength of 200 Europeans should be provided, including marine artillerymen, who would be accommodated on shore, and would form a part of the Bombay army.

I must add, too, that in reference to the needs of the sea-ports of Bombay, Kurrachee, and Aden, an additional garrison battery is much wanted in the Bombay presidency.

I now advert to the Native portion of the army. Since the end of 1877 the normal distribution of the Native army has been slightly modified, owing to the demands for Malta, for Khelat, and for Afghanistan. But of recent years up to 1877 the distribution has been as follows:—

				Cavalry regiment.	Infantry regiment.
Deccan	...	Poona	...	1	3
		Ahmednagar	...	0	1
		Malegaon	...	0	1
		Satara	...	0	1
		Sirur	...	1	0
		Sholapur	...	0	1
		Kolhapur	...	0	1
		Dharwar	...	0	1
Concan	...	Kaladgi	...	0	Dett.
		Belgaum	...	0	2
		Bombay	...	0	3
		Tanna	...	0	Dett.
Central India and Rajputana.	and	Mhow	...	0	1½
		Indore	...	0	Wing.
		Nusseerabad	...	Squad.	1
		Neemuch	...	1	1
		Asseerghur	...	0	Dett.
		Matthpur	...	0	1
Guzerat	...	Ahmedabad	...	0	2
		Deesa	...	1	1
		Baroda	...	0	1
		Rajkot	...	Squad.	1
		Bhooj	...	0	1
		Surat	...	0	1
Sind	...	Kurrachee	...	0	1
		Hyderabad	...	0	1
		Jacobabad	...	3	1
		Aden	...	Troop	1
				7 & 1 troop.	30

Before indicating the force necessary for the general garrison of the country, I must ask remembrance of the fact that our Native battalions are numerically weak; their established strength consisting of only 712 officers and men, of whom 600 are sepoys.

It appears to me that, for garrison purposes and maintenance of order, the following Native force is needed in the Deccan above the Ghât mountains:—

			Cavalry regiment.	Infantry regiment.
Malegaon for Khandesh and Nasik	...	...	0	1
Siur (near Poona)	...	...	1	0
Poona	...	...	1	4
Satara	...	...	0	$\frac{1}{2}$ *
Belgaum	...	...	0	2
			2	$7\frac{1}{2}$

I set down four regiments of infantry for Poona, so that they may, if desired, make up two brigades with the two European infantry regiments there—an arrangement which, as I understand, the military authorities have often desired. In this case detachments might be furnished to Ahmednagar and Sholapur, at which latter place there is an unoccupied, but not dismantled, fort, near to the Nizam's frontier. But if Ahmednagar be kept up as a station, then one of the four regiments would be there, and three regiments would remain at Poona, as at present. But four regiments are necessary for this part of the country (whether placed at Poona, Ahmednagar, or elsewhere), in proof of which it is to be noted that a recent trouble (it could hardly be called disturbance) in this quarter occupied two battalions for its effectual repression, our Native battalions being so numerically weak.

For the station of Dharwar, held now by a battalion, a detachment from Belgaum might suffice. Kolhapur, having some local infantry of its own, might be left without British troops.

The two cavalry regiments above set down are indispensable, inasmuch as, taken together, they would not supply more than 700 sabres for service in a territory stretching from the Nerbudda to Mysore, and inasmuch as the mounted police are so few in numbers—too few to make an impression on any disturbance. In illustration of this, I may note that in the recent trouble, just alluded to, it was necessary to employ a whole cavalry regiment.

Similarly, in the country below the Ghât mountains, the following Native force is needed:—

			Cavalry regiment.	Infantry regiment.
Bombay	...	...	0	$2\frac{1}{2}$
Surat	...	...	0	1
Baroda	...	...	0	1
Ahmedabad	...	...	0	1
Deesa	...	...	1	1
Cutch (Bhooj)	...	...	0	1
Rajkot (Kattywar)	...	...	0	1
			1	$8\frac{1}{2}$

It is to be remembered that out of the Native infantry at or near Bombay, detachments have to be furnished for the Mekran coast and the Persian Gulf.

In Sind the following Native force is needed:—

			Cavalry regiment.	Infantry regiment.
Kurrachee	...	...	0	1
Jacobabad	...	...	2	1
			2	2

and for Aden—

1 troop† 1

For Central India and Rajputana there are needed the following Native troops:—

			Cavalry regiment.	Infantry regiment.
Mhow	...	...	0	1
Mehidpur	...	...	0	1
Necmud	...	...	0	1
Nusseerabad	...	...	1	1
			1	4

\* i.e., a wing, the other wing being added to the force at Bombay.

† Supplying detachments to Rajkot, if necessary.

‡ The Aden troop.



I have set down one regiment only for Mhow, the ordinary complement consisting of two regiments, on the assumption that the Governor-General's Agent there would assent to Mhow being left with only one regiment in event of external war.

The two mountain batteries (Native) would doubtless remain as they are.

The corps of sappers and miners, just 500 strong, officers and men, is already as low in strength as it could properly be.

If, in any modification of the distribution of the troops, it should be proposed to abandon any existing station, still we must remember that such changes involve cost; because thereby buildings previously used for the accommodation of troops have to be sacrificed, while possibly new buildings might have to be constructed elsewhere.

Again single-regiment stations—that is, stations where a regiment of Native infantry constitutes the only force—are justly considered by the military authorities to militate against efficiency; because the regiment cannot be exercised with other regiments in brigade manoeuvres, does not come constantly under inspection by superior authority, and unavoidably deteriorates in various ways. Therefore, if (as often happens) some troops must for political reasons be kept at an isolated station, it were probably better that a detachment only be so kept, while the head-quarters of the regiment is at some larger station. I understand that the more the troops are concentrated in large stations, the better in a military point of view. But in this country political necessity often interferes with such concentration.

Further, it sometimes happens that political considerations demand that a certain total of strength be maintained in a certain part of the country, the detailed distribution being left to military convenience, and so on.

But be all this as it may, whatever be the distribution, still a certain strength of troops, as above set forth, is wanted for the protection of the country internally.

For purposes of garrison and maintenance of order, there are then needed—

				Cavalry regiment.	Infantry regiment.
Deccan	...	...	...	2	7½
Coast	...	...	...	1	8½
Sind	...	...	...	2	2
Aden	...	...	...	1 troop	1
Central India and Rajputana	...	...	...	1	4
				6 & 1 troop.	23

One corps sappers and miners and two mountain batteries.

Probably no person acquainted with the requirements of the country would venture to set down a force less than that indicated above for purposes of garrison and maintenance of order alone. In the above estimate there is no real margin whatever left for war or other demands of service. Possibly, by careful management, a company here and a company there, a troop here and a troop there, might be literally gleaned, so as to find men for foreign service; and in extreme need some troops might be abstracted from the proper garrison of the country and sent on to the front, notwithstanding all attendant risks to internal order. But doubtless our military arrangements are never made beforehand to incur risks, which can be reasonably foreseen and safeguarded.

This estimate, then, of six regiments of Native cavalry and one troop, and 23 regiments of Native infantry, required for garrison purposes and maintenance of order, as compared with the total Native army of the presidency, namely, seven regiments and one troop cavalry, called the Aden troop, and 30 regiments infantry, leaves just a slender margin of one regiment of cavalry and seven regiments of infantry for the objects set forth at (b), namely, "*Internal and external military purposes irrespective of (a).*" This slender reserve should continue to be kept at some point or other, or at various points within the presidency, according to the convenience of the time. And this is all that is left if we are required to meet requisitions from the Government of India, to supply troops for war on the frontier or beyond the sea, to despatch reinforcements to Aden or the Persian Gulf, to assist another presidency, or to deal with any more than ordinarily serious affairs within our own presidency.

Out of this reserve of seven regiments of Native infantry, there would be taken the troops for Quetta and Peshin, say four regiments, which would leave only three regiments to be kept within the presidency proper; and there are several of the stations abovementioned where additional troops are usually placed, besides those required for maintenance of internal order, notably such as Mhow, Ahmedabad, Hyderabad (Sind), and some stations which are now denuded of troops, but which ordinarily have one regiment each, such as Sholapur and Kolhapur.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that the established strength of the Bombay army consists of only 11,716 officers and men Europeans and 26,635 Natives, in all 38,355\*—an establishment about equal to an army-corps,—which is stationed in a territory abounding in difficulties, physical and moral, and stretching from the Punjab to Mysore, a distance of one thousand miles.

(Sd.) RICHARD TEMPLE.

\* East India Finance and Revenue Accounts for 1877-78 presented to Parliament.

*Statement showing the strength and distribution of the police, Bombay presidency.*  
[Administration Report, Bombay, 1877-78.]

District.	SANCTIONED STRENGTH OF POLICE FORCE.									Total of several divisions.
	Commissioner of Police.	Strength of district, cantonment, town, or municipal and water police paid for wholly or in part from Imperial revenues.						Strength of cantonment, town or municipal and water police paid wholly from other than Imperial revenues.		
		Number of district and assistant district superintendents.	Number of subordinate officers on Rs. 100 and upwards	Number of subordinate officers on less than Rs. 100.	Number of mounted police constables.	Number of foot police constables.	Number of water police constables.	Officers.	Men.	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
<i>Northern Division.</i>										
Ahmedabad ...	...	2	3	226	101	902	...	...	...	
Kaira ...	...	1	1	142	35	575	...	...	...	
Panch Mahals...	...	2	2	111	36	673	...	6	30	
Broach ...	...	1	2	77	22	315	...	...	...	
Surat ...	...	1	2	118	23	509	...	...	4	
Tanna ...	...	1	2	146	...	659	...	...	...	
Colaba ...	...	1	2	56	...	260	...	3	10	
Total ...	...	9	14	876	217	3,893	...	9	44	5,062
<i>Central Division.</i>										
Khandesh ...	...	3	3	275	83	1,358	...	...	...	
Nasik ...	...	1	2	127	29	586	...	9	40	
Ahmednagar ...	...	1	2	107	26	485	...	3	18	
Poona ...	...	1	2	182	25	894	...	...	60	
Sholapur ...	...	1	1	96	15	427	...	...	3	
Satara ...	...	1	2	188	18	779	...	...	...	
Total ...	...	8	12	975	196	4,529	...	12	121	5,853
<i>Southern Division.</i>										
Belgaum ...	...	1	1	115	9	543	...	...	...	
Dharwar ...	...	1	2	120	28	599	...	...	...	
Kaladgi ...	...	1	1	109	27	517	...	...	...	
Canara ...	...	1	2	115	...	580	...	...	...	
Ratnagiri ...	...	1	2	123	...	639	...	...	...	
Total ...	...	5	8	582	64	2,878	...	...	...	3,537
<i>Sind.</i>										
Kurrachee ...	...	2	5	195	160	1,078	...	20	257	
Hyderabad ...	...	1	4	125	137	625	...	...	98	
Shikarpur ...	...	1	5	163	165	795	5	18	130	
Thar and Parkar ...	...	...	1	71	316	110	...	...	14	
Frontier, Upper Sind ...	...	...	1	12	39	161	...	2	84	
Total ...	...	4	16	566	817	2,769	5	40	583	4,800
<i>Railway.</i>										
G. I. P. Railway ...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	84	495	
B., B. & C. I. Railway ...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	50	349	
Total ...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	134	844	980
City of Bombay ...	1	1†	...	...	...	284*	...	...	1,129*	1,415
GRAND TOTAL ...	1	29	50	2,990	1,294	14,353	5	195	2,721	21,647

\* The numbers returned for the city of Bombay include subordinate officers and constables, both mounted and foot, no details having been supplied.

† Deputy Commissioner.

*Minute by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, dated 30th July 1870.*

The views of the Government of Bombay are so admirably expounded in His Excellency the Governor's minute, that I do not propose to make any remarks on the political necessities of this presidency.

I desire, however, to offer some remarks on those points raised in Government of India letter No. 204 S.B. which have a more strictly military bearing.

(A) European and Eurasian population, considered as—

(1) strength in combatant power and for the maintenance of order;

(2) weakness in necessity for provision of safety of non-combatants, women and children;

(3) of possible greater utility than at present if organized for the maintenance of order in case of disturbance.

Although it is possible that a careful examination of the statistics of the non-official European and of the Eurasian population in this presidency might show that in some specially favored places local circumstances and numbers may give exceptional value to this class, I believe it may generally be accepted for the whole of India that the European and Eurasian population, consisting as it does in an unusual proportion of women

and children, must ever be a source of weakness rather than of strength to the British Government. For some of the large centres, such as Bombay and Poona, it might be possible to utilize the men as defenders of a place of refuge in case of a general rising of the Natives against the English rule; but even then the assistance they could give would do but little more than meet the extra demands which the presence of their families would give rise to. As long as there is no open disaffection among the Natives of India, and no organized opposition to the English Government, the presence throughout the country of Europeans, even singly or in small numbers, is doubtless beneficial, and tends to maintain order; but I consider that their existence throughout India must, in times of real danger, be counted a responsibility and a charge with no sort of commensurate advantage in the matter of military strength. The application to this increasing class of the population of some form of organization is without doubt desirable, as giving some hope that in great emergencies a portion of them at any rate could be utilized to defend and protect their own families and property.

Both these methods of giving a military organization to the European and Eurasian population in India have their merits as well as their defects. I assume that the compulsory enrolment referred to includes the elementary training of every able-bodied

(i) Question of compulsory enrolment.

(j) Development of the volunteer movement.

European and Eurasian so enrolled; and their enforced attendance at a certain number of drills every year. Such an arrangement would possess an element of certainty and stability to which no system of volunteering could ever attain; and in this respect compulsory enrolment must be held very superior to any development of the volunteer movement. On the other hand, there can be no doubt about the unpopularity of such a measure, and the strong opposition which would be raised both in India and in England to its adoption. It would also be an extremely costly arrangement, as it would be necessary that the means of military instruction should be brought to each enrolled man, or the individual brought in to the large centres for periodical training. When it is remembered how scattered are the members of the European and Eurasian population, it will at once be recognized how heavy would be the cost of any attempt at a universal application of compulsory enrolment; and it would be in the highest degree unfair to apply the system only to those who are resident in large towns or near military stations, while exempting from its operation those in isolated positions, where military training would be specially necessary.

Although volunteer corps can show a certain kind of success in most of the large centres in India, and their members attain a respectable degree of proficiency, it must be acknowledged that up to the present the movement has only drawn within its influence a very small percentage of the available population, and that as a means of utilizing the Europeans and Eurasians in India it must be considered a failure.

The causes of this are no doubt—

1st, the natural disinclination of men (who have to earn their livelihood by labor, whether of head or hand, in an uncongenial climate) voluntarily to devote their short leisure time to a course of unremunerative labor; and

2nd, the fact that volunteering imposes on both officers and privates an amount of extra expenditure which neither class is able to bear.

Were it probable that the European and Eurasian population in India could be made a really effective force by means of compulsory enrolment, I would, despite its unpopularity, advocate the adoption of the system. But I do not see how this could be hoped for, and therefore I would deprecate the application to India of a scheme based on enforced training; and would prefer an effort to develop the volunteer movement, it being clearly understood that, however good may be their moral effect in times of peace, entire dependence cannot be placed on *volunteers* in times of danger, unless their enrolment for service in such times is made compulsory, by bringing all volunteer corps under military law.

The 1,350 Railway volunteers shown in His Excellency's minute may guard Railway property, and keep open the railway lines, thereby dispensing with the services of a certain number of regular troops, who would otherwise be required for these purposes; but, as an armed military body, the Railway volunteers cannot be depended upon; nor can it be expected that the Bombay Volunteer Rifle Corps would desert their families until the latter were placed in safety, or abandon their property to destruction unless compelled to assemble at certain fixed points to serve as an armed force for the general protection of the city.

The development of the volunteer movement cannot, I fear, be arrived at by any further appeal to the military or patriotic feelings of the European and Eurasian population, but must be obtained by an expenditure of State funds. It must be remembered that the adoption of compulsory enrolment would entail, as a matter of course, the payment of the men while undergoing training, which would be a very serious matter, and in comparison with which the expenditure which I would propose on the volunteer force would be trifling. There are a certain number of Europeans, and a much larger number of Eurasians, in poor circumstances who would be attracted to the volunteer force if they were guaranteed against all expense, and could obtain some small pecuniary benefit from their connection with it.

I would therefore propose that, in addition to the present capitation allowance, which should go, as now, for regimental purposes, each volunteer should be enabled to earn a further annual grant, which would vary from Rs. 20 to Rs. 50 according to his proficiency in the use of his rifle and the number of parades he had attended, and that this grant should be given to the individual who had earned it.

There are other minor points, such as assistance to enable corps to go into camp once a year, provision of offices and armouries and of rifle ranges, which would tend to make the movement popular.

General military requirements of the presidency—

(a) for garrison purposes and maintenance of order;

(b) for internal and external military purposes irrespective of (a).

The Bombay army consists of—

- 1 Regiment British cavalry.
- 2 Batteries horse artillery.
- 10 " field artillery.
- 7 " garrison artillery.
- 2 Mountain batteries.
- 9 Regiments British infantry.
- 7 " Native cavalry.
- 5 Companies sappers and miners.
- 30 Regiments Native infantry.

On calculating the number of infantry required to furnish the guards, it appears that under ordinary circumstances about 2,000 Europeans and 8,000 Natives would suffice for the mere garrison duties of the presidency. I use the word "garrison" in its technical and military sense; that is, for the guards and routine duties of military stations. But, as indicated by the Government of India, it is also necessary to consider the force required for the maintenance of order, and, in calculating the force required for internal and external military purposes, to give due weight to the existence of many powerful Native States bordering on the limits of this presidency.

Distributed as presently shown, the troops now employed within the presidency command are in a position to meet all probable demands for internal military purposes, and will furnish on occasions of necessity a small force for external or foreign service.

At present we have the following troops on special service on and beyond the frontier of Sind, viz. :—

1 Battery field artillery,

1 Mountain battery,

2 Regiments Native cavalry,

4 " " infantry;

and should necessity arise for putting more troops in the field, the following additional corps might be made available by withdrawing them from such stations as at the moment might be found most expedient :—

1 Field battery.

1 Heavy " "

1 Mountain " "

1 Regiment British infantry.

1 " Native cavalry.

2 Regiments " infantry.

#### Distribution.

Stations.	Royal horse artillery.	Field artil- lery.	British cavalry.	Garrison ar- tillery.	British infantry.	Native ca- valry.	Native in- fantry.	Sappers and miners.
Sind	...	2	...	...	1	3	3	...
Bhoj	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...
Rajkot	...	...	...	...	...	...	1½	...
Deesa	...	1	...	...	1	1	1	...
Ahmedabad	...	...	...	...	D	...	2	...
Baroda	...	...	...	...	D	...	1	...
Surat	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...
Bombay	...	...	...	3	½	...	2½	...
Kirkee	1	2	...	...	D	...	...	1
Poona	...	...	...	...	2	1	3	...
Sirur	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...
Satara	...	...	...	...	D	...	½	...
Belgaum	...	1	...	...	1	...	2	...
Ahmednagar	...	1	...	...	½	...	1	...
Asseergurh	...	...	...	...	D	...	D	...
Malegaon	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...
Mhow	1	...	1	1	1	...	1½	...
Indore	...	...	...	...	D	...	½	...
Mehidpur	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...
Neemuch	...	1	...	...	D	1	1	...
Nusseerabad	...	1	...	...	1	...	1	...
Dharwar	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...
Sholapur	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...
Kolhapur	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...
Aden	...	...	...	3	1	...	1	...
Tanna or elsewhere...	...	...	...	...	...	...	½	...
TOTAL	2	10	1	7	9*	7	30	1

\* These nine regiments are inclusive of the detachments represented by the letter D in this column.

It seems hardly necessary to put forward arguments to prove that it would be hopeless to look for efficiency or military spirit from a body of troops whose sole functions were to carry out certain routine duties in garrison, and preserve order among the civil population.

It is, however, evident throughout the communication from the Government of India that it is held to be indispensable that we, as the governing class in this country, should be prepared for organized opposition to our rule, not only from without our borders, but within them; and this being so, the necessity for a well-trained and highly-disciplined military force is clear. These qualities can only result from practical training in the field, and, when opportunity offers, against an enemy; and from both of these opportunities this army would be debarred if it were reduced to a strength barely sufficient for the internal routine duties devolving on it. Important as these considerations are, a still stronger reason remains to be urged against any reduction in the strength of the rank and file of the Western army; and that is the vast importance of maintaining between the various component parts of the army of India such a balance of power as would render it impossible for any one section of the military forces to attain a dangerous pre-eminence. It appears to be universally admitted that the interests of the empire demand that a diversity of sentiment and feeling should be preserved between the various territorial divisions of the army of India; and it is clear that this important principle is seriously affected, if one division is allowed to exceed another in number to any great degree. The Native armies of India as they now stand show an approximate strength as follows, *viz.*—

Bengal army	...	...	...	...	47,500.
Corps under the Government of India	...	...	...	...	26,500
Madras army (about)	...	...	...	...	32,000
Bombay army	...	...	...	...	25,000

from which figures it may be deduced that, if the principle referred to is accepted as of any value and worthy of being upheld, it is essential that no reduction whatever in actual numbers should be admitted in this army.

It is highly satisfactory to find that, except in minor details, so little difference exists in the opinion of the civil and military authorities regarding the distribution of the force throughout the Bombay presidency, and that all are of opinion that no material reduction can be made in the actual strength of the army.

Should it be found practicable to reduce the number of stations and the detachments from European regiments, I feel satisfied it would increase the efficiency of the British regiments.

(Sd.) H. J. WARRE, *Lieut.-General.*

## F.—CENTRAL INDIA.

No. 1227, dated Indore, 11th August 1879.

From—*LIEUT.-GENL. SIR H. D. DALY, K.C.B., Agent, Governor-General for Central India,*  
To—*The President, Army Organization Commission, Simla.*

I have the honor, in obedience to instructions received from the Secretary to Government in the Military Department, to submit my reply on the questions under consideration.

### (a) *Strength of Native population.*

There are 71 Native States in Central India, big and little, with a population estimated at 8,361,571, spread over an area of 88,738 square miles. This may be assumed as fairly correct in the

Gwalior	...	...	2,500,000
Indore	...	...	635,450
Bhopal	...	...	769,200
Rewah	...	...	2,035,000
(Baghelcund)	...	...	

absence of a general census, which has at no time been simultaneously taken in States having little or no connection one with another. Four States—Gwalior, Indore, Bhopal, Rewah—count more than half of the population of Central India.

Oorecha	...	...	195,000
Datia	...	...	180,000
Panna	...	...	133,000
Chirkhari	...	...	121,000
Bijawar	...	...	102,000
Chhatarpur	...	...	170,000
Samthar	...	...	108,000
Smaller States	...	...	219,000

Bundelcund has an aggregate population of 1,279,000, spread over 20,000 square miles.

Western Malwa, exclusive of the possessions of Scindia and Holkar, numbers about 242,000; while the Bheel Agency, with petty Chiefs and Thakurs, count 252,592. Thus the population of the Native States of Central India may be assumed to be not far short of 8½ millions.

### (b) *European and Eurasian population, exclusive of army.*

These can hardly be said to exist in Central India, the few descendants of adventurers, French, Italians, English, who served in Dowlut Rao's army, with the conspicuous exception of Jean Baptiste's descendants now living in Scindia's service at Gwalior, have lost their language, name, and nationality.

### (c) *State of feeling.*

Four of the States, composed chiefly of Rajputs, are held by Mahrattas—Scindia, Holkar, Dhar, Dewas—who, almost within the memory of living man, ruled by plunder and bloodshed. Peace and order, established by the British Government and maintained by British garrisons, bringing with them security, have won the people to habits of industry and almost contentment. But the feeling displayed in 1857-58 by Rajput Thakurs towards Scindia round Gwalior, and Holkar in Malwa, showed that the old spirit is not dead. A word would have put them in arms.

The Muhammadan rulers, especially Bhopal and Jowra, foreigners though they are, have been more fortunate in winning their hold on the people. Their rule is popular.

In Bundelcund, amongst Bundelas, Ahirs, Gujars, the feeling towards the Chiefs is feudatory and strong. The same amongst the Baghels: despite oppression and hard poverty, the spirit is loyal to the hereditary Chief.

With regard to the state of feeling in Native States towards the British Government, my experience confirms the observations and conclusions of Colonel Sutherland, than whom no sounder Englishman has lived amongst the Chiefs and people of India, that in Native States and at Native Courts the presence of an English officer is hailed as a safeguard against oppression. The visit of the Governor-General's Agent to a Native Court, his passage through a State, is the event of the year. Chiefs and people invest the Agent with mysterious influence, and all receive his camp with acclamation. The Chief thinks his position and dignity strengthened. Thakurs and subjects hold that they owe peace and prosperity to the great Government which the Agent represents. The Agent comes into no collision. He has nothing to assess; no tax to levy. He is the mediator between the people and the Chief, between the Chief and the Government of India.

This feeling plainly spoke in results during the troubled time of 1857-58. While in British territory an Englishman hardly found a resting-place for his feet, in Native States he was welcomed and sheltered.

(d) *Elements of danger.*

Under this head general opinion, handed down from the days when the armies of Scindia and Holkar struggled with the British for mastery, holds that the armies of the present day are still formidable, and that Scindia's is specially so, as he passes thousands of his subjects through the ranks, thus making reserves of his people.

The Political Agent, in reviewing the state of the Gwalior regular army in March last, having seen all available paraded at a camp of exercise, commanded by the Maharaja, reported that recruiting had not kept pace with dismissals, resignations, and casualties. The force was 2,100 combatants below the treaty number of all arms of disciplined troops (*viz.*, 7,200).

The men who form this force are mainly drawn from the British provinces. The cavalry (about 1,200) are chiefly Muhammadans from the North-Western Provinces, with pay of Rs. 22 per mensem; infantry (3,600), Rs. 7 (Chandoree). In this body there may be 800 or 900 Gwalior subjects, mostly wandering Muhammadans, a poor class. There is not a Mahratta in the ranks. The few Mahrattas who remain are silladars in the irregular service.

The artillery is efficient and well cared for—two batteries of 6-pounders, horsed, five field-battery trains, 9-pounders (bullocks), two 18-pounders, elephants. The treaty number (480) is not maintained, the present strength being about 100 short. The men are chiefly our own Poorbeahs, with some 50 or 60 men from the Deccan. The high price of food which has prevailed in Gwalior during two years of famine has led to a reduction in the Gwalior force through resignations and dismissals. The element of danger here would be, supposing mutiny in the Indian army, the effect on British-born sepoys in the Gwalior service; but there is little in that poorly-armed body to cause anxiety.

*Indore.*—Holkar has no army worthy the name. Three regiments of Poorbeahs, fairly drilled; cavalry also from British India, badly drilled and mounted. The artillery (bullocks) in use is good and well-appointed, manned by Poorbeahs.

Bhopal has a small body of troops in fair order for the work they have to do.

In Bundelcund the people are a warlike race, and capable of being first-class soldiers; but they shrink from regular service. Every man bears sword and matchlock.

*Baghelcund, Rewah.*—The Thakurs and Baghels are a splendid body of men, living in a state of semi-independence. The disciplined soldiers in the service of Rewah were chiefly refugees, British sepoys of the mutiny period, now dying out.

One conspicuous element of danger in 1857-58 was the want of roads through Native States, in which rebel sepoys sought shelter and plunder. That difficulty has been removed. Metalled roads now intersect Bundelcund, Malwa, and Central India. Mhow, which was unapproachable in the rains of 1857, is now linked to Gwalior by a metalled road. The rail courses past it, and will soon be at Neemuch, and in communication with Nusseerabad and Agra by the Rajputana State Railway.

(e), (f), (g), *The police.*

Life and property in Malwa, and along the Agra and Bombay road, from Mhow to Gwalior 305 miles, are now as secure as in any part of British India. In the days before the mutiny passage along that road was never attempted without an escort. Large gangs of dacoits moved about the country. Patrols of the Central India Horse have wrought this change. Without these troops and the Bhopal Battalion the feeling of security would give way. Holkar will not forego the presence of a wing of Bombay Native infantry at Mchidpur in place of the united Malwa contingent of three arms, through fear of this anchor slipping; though the withdrawal of the wing would restore the rich opium land of the cantonment, and relieve his territory of British sepoys.

I now come to the general military requirements of Central India; and here I would refer to a "Report on the garrisons within the Central India Agency, in view to deciding which should be reduced or strengthened and which abandoned," submitted by me to the Secretary to Government in the Military Department on 5th January 1872, in which the question was fully discussed. I have asked the Secretary to lay a copy of that report before you, in view to its being attached to this letter.

British garrisons in Native States should be few and strong. Local corps which are maintained at the cost of Chiefs are popular with them and the people, and form a valuable link between us. The Central India Horse, with head-quarters 150 miles apart, have a personal acquaintance with every village Thakur. Every track, every stream in the country, is familiar to them. The officers, selected men, know how to associate with Chiefs and people; and exercise vast influence in favor of the prestige of the Government of India.

Since submitting my report in January 1872, enormous changes have taken place in roads and railways, which strengthen the view then expressed. I suggested the abandonment of Jhansi and Nagode as cantonments in Bundelcund, and the consolidation of our garrison at Nowgong, 100 miles from the East Indian Railway at Sutna.

Nagode has been abandoned. Jhansi is still the head-quarters of a British infantry regiment, and a Native regiment with detachments at the fortress of Gwalior and Lalitpur. With the fort and city of Jhansi in Scindia's hands, the position of this weak garrison, without guns, is indefensible from any point of view.

On the completion of the railway to Gwalior, the retention of Morar as a cantonment will be subject for consideration.

As the crow flies, the straggling barracks of Morar are 6 miles from the fortress, and scarcely visible. In the event of trouble in the city, the cantonment could afford little support; but the fort could lay in ruins every building in the city, which is at its feet.

We are bound by treaty to keep a "Subsidiary Force" constantly stationed within the Maharaja's territory, the expense of which shall not be less than 16 lakhs per annum; but this would admit of modification in friendly intercourse with the Maharaja.

For all the purposes of the Government of India, the tenure of the fortress, with rail to Agra, is ample. The fortress is the high place, Morar nothing.

The railway from Indore to Neemuch will be at Mandsaur, within 30 miles of Neemuch, by the end of this year.

With Neemuch and Nusseerabad, 140 miles apart, linked by rail, as they will be in three years, the maintenance of British cantonments at both places in the present form will be unnecessary. Good barracks have been built at both cantonments. Neemuch belongs to Scindia; but the territory of Holkar, Oodeypore, and Tonk meet there, and the people around are lawless and turbulent. It will be necessary under any circumstances that the place should not be abandoned.

In my report of January 1872, paragraph 24, I drew attention to the danger of artillery in Native States. I had just become aware of Mahamja Holkar's factory and arsenal. Since 1872 great progress has been made in arms of precision and gunnery in the British army. Amongst the Natives of India there has not only been no change in this respect, but trained artillerymen are rare; and every step in advance taken by us removes apprehension of danger. So long as the manufacture of guns of precision is kept down in India, and Native gunners find no place in our service, the chances of serious trouble are small.

#### Garrisons to be maintained.

(1) *Mhow*, 1,900 feet above the sea, admirably suited for British troops.

*Indore* (garrisoned from Mhow, as at present).

(2) *Fortress Gwalior*.

(3) *Neemuch*.—In the event of Nusseerabad becoming the larger garrison, a regiment of Native infantry and squadron of Native cavalry will be necessary.

(4) *Nowgong*.—In the heart of Bundelcund, 65 miles from Jhansi, 120 from Gwalior, 100 from Sutna, with metalled roads.

#### Garrisons by Contingents.

*Augur* } —(Scindia) Central India Horse.

*Goona* }

*Schore*—Bhopal Battalion and detachment Central India Horse.

*Sirdarpur*—Malwa Bheel Corps.

#### To be abandoned by troops of the line.

*Jhansi*—

*Mehidpur*—(Holkar), formerly head-quarters of Mehidpur Contingent. Wing Native infantry to be withdrawn; detachment Central India Horse to remain.

Statement showing the cantonments in Central India, how garrisoned, and their present and proposed strength.

NAMES OF CAN- TONMENTS.	PRESENT STRENGTH.					PROPOSED STRENGTH.					REMARKS.
	CAVALRY.		ARTILLERY.	INFANTRY.		CAVALRY.		ARTILLERY.	INFANTRY.		
	Euro- pean	Native.	European.	European.	Native.	Euro- pean.	Native.	European.	European.	Native.	
MHOW DIVISION.											
Mhow ...	1	...	2 Batteries	1	1½	1	...	2 Batteries.	1	2	Minimum. To depend on Nus- seerabad. Wing N.I. to be with- drawn. Wing might be with- drawn. Supplied from Mhow. Bhopal Battalion. Malwa Bheel Corps.
Neemuch ...	..	1	1 Battery.	Wing.	1	...	...	...	...	...	
Melidpur ...	..	Det. C.I.H.	"	"	½	...	...	...	...	...	
Augur ...	..	1	"	"	½	...	...	...	...	...	
Indore ...	..	..	"	"	1	...	...	...	...	...	
Schore ...	..	Det. C.I.H.	"	"	1	...	Det. C.I.H.	...	1 Co.	Wing.	
Sirdarpur ...	..	..	"	"	1	...	...	...	...	1	
GWALIOR DISTRICT.											
Morwad Fort ...	..	1	3 Batteries.	1½	2	1	...	3 Batteries.	1½	2	If held, no reduction politic. Det. from Gwalior (Cavalry). C. I. Horse.
Elipri ...	..	1 Squad. (Detach)	"	1 Hd. Qrs.	1	...	...	...	...	...	
Goona ...	..	1	"	"	"	...	1	...	...	...	
SATONCH DISTRICT.											
Nowgong ...	..	1 Squad.	1 Battery.	(3 Co.)	4 Co.	...	1 Squad.	1 Battery.	1	1	
Sutna ...	..	1 Do.	"	"	"	...	1 "	...	...	...	

The above are reports of a force of—  
 2 Batteries Royal Artillery.  
 1 Regiment of European Cavalry.  
 1 Regiment of Native Cavalry—  
 1 Bhopal.  
 1 Bhopal.  
 1 C.I. Horse.

3½ Regiments of European Infantry.  
 9½ Do. Native Infantry—  
 4 Bhopal.  
 2 Bhopal.  
 1 Bhopal Battalion.  
 1 Malwa Bheel Corps.

(Sd.) H. D. DALY, Lt.-Genl.,  
 Agent, Govr.-Genl. for Central India.

No. 5M., dated Camp Kuchnara, 5th January 1872 (*Confidential*).

From—MAJOR-GENL. SIR H. D. DALY, C.B., Agent, Governor-General for Central India,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I have the honor to reply to your No. 59 of 2nd November last, calling for a report on the garrisons within the Central India Agency, in view to deciding which should be reduced or strengthened and which abandoned.

2. The Native States within the Central India administration comprise an area of some 84,000 square miles, nearly equal to that of England, Wales, and Scotland united. The total military force at the disposal of the Government of India in the stations now occupied in this territory is as follows:—

- 8 Batteries of artillery.
- 1 Regiment of British dragoons.
- 3 Regiments and 3 companies of British infantry.
- 5       "       of Native cavalry.
- 11       "       of Native infantry.

Distribution is given below. The troops belong to the presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. Two corps of the Native cavalry (the Central India Horse), 2 Native infantry, the Bhopal Battalion, and Malwa Bheel Corps have fixed head-quarters within the Agency; and though the Central India Horse and Bhopal Battalion have been raised for general service, practically they are local corps, performing the duties in Malwa of the great contingents, Gwalior, Mehidpur, and Bhopal, which mutinied in 1857, and, like the Malwa Bheel Corps, are supported by contribution (under treaty) from Native States.

#### MHOW DIVISION (BOMBAY ARMY).

MHOW.

*Artillery.*

E Battery D Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery.  
No. 1 Battery 6th Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery.

*British Cavalry.*

15th (The King's) Hussars.

*British Infantry.*

49th Regiment of Foot.

*Native Infantry.*

10th Regiment, Native Light Infantry.

16th Regiment, Native Infantry.

NEEMUCH.

*Artillery.*

D Battery 18th Brigade, Royal Artillery.

*British Infantry.*

Detachment, 59th Regiment.

*Native Cavalry.*

3rd Regiment, Light Cavalry.

*Native Infantry.*

22nd Native Infantry.

MEHIDPUR.

25th Regiment, Native Light Infantry (head-quarters).

AUGUR.

Wing, 25th Regiment, Native Light Infantry.

INDORE.

1 Company from the British infantry at Mhow.

3 Companies from one of the Native Infantry regiments at Mhow.

#### GWALIOR DISTRICT (BENGAL ARMY).

MORAR FORT.

*Royal Artillery.*

B Battery F Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery.

C Battery 16th Brigade, Royal Artillery.

Head-Quarters, 24th Brigade, Royal Artillery.

No. 4 Battery 24th Brigade, Royal Artillery.

No. 3 Battery 25th Brigade, Royal Artillery.

*British Infantry.*

1st Battalion 11th Foot.

Detachment, 106th Foot.

*Native Cavalry.*

6th Bengal Cavalry.

*Native Infantry.*

6th Native Infantry.

34th Ditto.

JHANSI.

*British Infantry.*

106th Foot.

*Native Cavalry.*

Squadron, 14th Bengal Cavalry.

*Native Infantry.*

39th Regiment, Native Infantry.

SIPRI.

*Native Cavalry.*

Detachment, 6th Bengal Cavalry.

*Native Infantry.*

Detachment, 39th Native Infantry.

#### SAUGOR DISTRICT (BENGAL AND MADRAS ARMIES).

NOWGONG.

*Royal Artillery.*

F Battery 23rd Brigade, Royal Artillery.

*British Infantry.*

Detachment, 106th Foot.

*Native Cavalry.*

3rd Bengal Cavalry.

*Native Infantry.*

Wing, 15th Madras Native Infantry.

NAGODE.

*Native Cavalry.*

3rd Bengal Cavalry (detachment).

*Native Infantry.*

6th Madras Native Infantry.

#### LOCAL CORPS OF THE CENTRAL INDIA AGENCY.

AUGUR.

1st Regiment, Central India Horse.

GOONA.

2nd Regiment, Central India Horse.

SEHORE.

Bhopal Battalion.

MEHIDPUR.

Detachment, Central India Horse.

SIRDARPUR.

Malwa Bheel Corps.



3. Previous to 1857, the only European soldiers throughout Central India were the few gunners of the batteries at Mhow and Neemuch. Morar, Mhow, Neemuch, Nowgong, Jhansi, were without a British bayonet. The Great Indian Peninsula Railway had as yet accomplished but a short part of its course, and Mhow, with the deadly jungles below the Vindhya and incomplete roads, was with difficulty accessible from the south, and during the rains the 14 miles between it and Indore were not traversable by carriages.

4. The Mhow and Neemuch road was but a jungle track; and between Mhow and Agra, some 400 miles, few of the small streams and none of the large rivers were bridged; and for scores of miles together depots and wild beasts were in possession. Jhansi was similarly cut off from Morar, for that road of 70 miles was unmade.

5. Nowgong in Bundelcund was isolated; and Nagode pretty much the same. Since 1857, the change in Central India has been marvellous. We have now bridged roads and accessible cantonments with British bayonets and guns, where formerly these things were conspicuously absent; and the work of transition is still so busy, that it is difficult to write about garrisons which were put down before the change set in.

6. I will begin with *Mhow* on the crest of the Vindhya, 1,850 feet above the sea. From salubrity and position Mhow will form one of the prominent garrisons in the country. The rail is now within 80 miles. Four years hence the Nerbudda will be bridged, and the rail will pass by Mhow to Neemuch through Rajputana to the north-west. Mhow will then form one of the available reserves of India. It is within 14 miles of Indore and 100 of Bhopal; and there is now an admirable road through the heart of Central India from Mhow to Gwalior, 310 miles, by Biciura, Goona, and Sipri, which can be traversed by a mail-cart at all seasons at 12 miles an hour. Thus Mhow with rail and roads will command Central India and be a ready reserve for Rajputana.

7. *Neemuch*, 170 miles to the north-west of Mhow and about 150 miles from Ajmere, with railway communication north and south, will be the imperial garrison for Rajputana. It is 1,550 feet above the sea-level on laterite soil, and should, with well-built barracks, be little, if at all, inferior to Mhow in point of health. With roads linking the cities of Native States to various stations along the rail, Neemuch, with a British regiment of infantry and two batteries of artillery, and Native troops as at present (1 cavalry and 1 Native infantry), supported by Mhow, would suffice for all the purposes of the Government of India in Rajputana.

8. *Mehidpur*, in Holkar's territory, 74 miles north of Mhow and 30 miles west of Augur, was the head-quarters of the Mehidpur Contingent, supported by contributions from Holkar, Jowra and Dewas. The contingent, consisting of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, mutinied in 1857, since which its place at Mehidpur has been taken by a regiment of Bombay Native infantry and a detachment of Central India Horse from Augur.

9. The site of the lines on the banks of the Sipra is so confined, that it was found necessary to remove one wing permanently to Augur, and, but for the change thus afforded, the men would not be able to remain at Mehidpur.

10. The cantonment is liable to inundations from the rise of the Sipra during the rains. Three times within the last few years the sepoys with their families have saved life and property by flight into the city; but so sudden was the river's rise last year, that, but for daylight, the result would have been terrible. For six months in the year 30 per cent. of the small garrison are in hospital from fever, and frequently this number has been exceeded. Committees have been twice assembled in view to selecting another site; but the country affords none.

11. Mehidpur should cease to be a cantonment; and if, under treaty engagements with Holkar, it is necessary to provide troops for the district, other arrangements should be made.

12. Mehidpur is without roads; and a handful of sickly sepoys in such a place is not a creditable garrison.

13. *Morar and the Fortress of Gwalior*.—I have nothing to say respecting these garrisons, having already expressed my opinion.

14. The cantonments of Goona, Augur, Schore, Sirdarpur, held by the Central India Horse, Bhopal Battalion, and Malwa Bheel Corps, do effective silent service in preserving order and security. These troops enable the Government of India to maintain imperial garrisons intact; and they form outposts, and give our officers valuable opportunities of being acquainted with the feelings of the people of Native States, and what is actually going on within them.

15. *Sipri* (Scindia's) on the Agra and Bombay road, midway between Goona and Gwalior (about 60 miles from each), about 1,500 feet above the sea, was a sanitarium for British troops during the operations of 1858-59, and previous to the mutiny was a garrison of the Gwalior Contingent. From salubrity of climate and position on the trunk road of Central India, and at the head of an excellent road lately constructed connecting Jhansi (63 miles) and Bundelcund with Rajputana and the west, it must always be an important military post. During the last few years it has been in the hot and rainy months a sanitarium for the British regiment at Jhansi. With the abandonment of Jhansi, it is feared Sipri may be lost sight of. Scindia is anxious to make it a cantonment of his own—a step much to be deprecated. The massing of his troops at Gwalior is far preferable to his occupying Sipri with the command of important roads and on the skirts of Rajputana.

16. Sipri, though it ceases to be a British cantonment, should remain a post held by a small detachment of Native cavalry, either from Goona or elsewhere.

17. I now come to *Bundelcund*, with 35 Native States, 3½ millions of people, and an area of 22,000 square miles, or a little more than one-fourth of the territory within the Central India Agency—a province exceeding the kingdom of Greece in area, and with twice its population; and about one-third less than Ireland in area and population. At the time of the mutiny, Bundelcund was almost without a permanent road. Now there is an excellent road connecting Nowgong with Jhansi and Sipri to the west, with bifurcation to Gwalior and Agra; and great progress has been made in completing the trunk highway between Nowgong and Satna, 100 miles. When this work shall be done, there will be carriage communication right through Bundelcund from east to west, with various roads to Banda, Saugor, Srinuggur, Culpce, intersecting.

18. The present cantonments in Bundelcund connected with Central India are Jhansi, Nowgong, Nagode.

19. *Jhansi* has been under abandonment for some years. The fort and city belong to Scindia; and there is no reason, either military or political of which I am aware, to render its retention as a British cantonment desirable.

20. *Nowgong*, since the mutiny, has been fixed as the cantonment of Bundelcund for British troops; and suitable barracks are near completion. The climate, though hot, is not unhealthy, and the position for a great garrison seems well chosen; and when the road to the rail at Sutna, which pierces through several Native States, shall be finished, it will be thoroughly accessible. The time is probably not far distant when the rail will reach Gwalior from Agra. This done, it must quickly force its way by Jhansi through Bundelcund, and intersect the Jubbulpore line. As things stand, I would recommend that Nowgong shall be the one strong British garrison in the midst of the Native States of Bundelcund, and that Nagode be abandoned.

21. *Nagode*, on the Sutna and Nowgong road, the residence of the petty Chief of that name, is 16 miles from Sutna and 84 from Nowgong. It is now garrisoned by a regiment of Madras Native infantry, with a squadron of Native cavalry from Nowgong for six or eight months in the year.

22. I see no reason for retaining this petty garrison in such a place. I would leave a handful of cavalry from Nowgong and withdraw the Native infantry.

23. Having discussed the cantonments in Central India, I will now add a few words respecting the quality of our garrisons. Chiefs and Natives generally estimate our strength by our guns rather than by our bayonets. It is the precision and prestige of our artillery which strike awe and call forth admiration, whether in Scindia or from Jung Bahadur. It was owing to this superiority in days long past that success in every struggle was almost a certainty. It was the "electric fire" of the same power by which Havelock with his small body achieved victory after victory, dispersing thousands with heavy loss, almost untouched himself. On the other hand, it was the want of artillery which protracted the struggle at Delhi, and made each success ruinously costly to us. British batteries form bonds of cement between us and Native States, and prevent fears of the stability of our power from undermining the faith of our mercenary troops; and these batteries should be conspicuous in all our garrisons.

24. Whenever our next struggle comes, guns will play a prominent part against us. The superiority of our small arms will be ever more conspicuous than heretofore; but the number and weight of guns must always tell in a country in which the people may be hostile. Scindia's army, which we see composed of old Poorbeahs and discharged sepoys, indifferently armed, is to my mind a small matter; but the serviceable guns which he and Holkar could put into the field—probably not less than 300—few of which we see, is far from being a small matter. In Bundelcund there is hardly a big city in which the art of gun-making is unknown. Natives in this respect have not lost their cunning nor their taste. My views are that our garrison, especially in Native States, should be few and so strong as to be beyond question, and that we should leave the rest to the people themselves, with here and there local corps with selected officers living amongst them.

Statement showing the Cantonments in Central India, how garrisoned, and their present and proposed strength.

NAMES OF CANTONMENTS.	PRESENT STRENGTH.				PROPOSED STRENGTH.				REMARKS.		
	CAVALRY.		ARTILLERY.	INFANTRY.		CAVALRY.		ARTILLERY.		INFANTRY.	
	European.	Native.	No.	European.	Native.	European.	Native.	European.		Native.	European.
MHOW DIVISION.											
Mhow	1	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
Neemuch	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Mehilpur	...	Det., Central India Horse.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Angur	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Indore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Schore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Sindarpur	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
GHANIOR DISTRICT.											
Morar Fortress	...	1	4 batteries	1½	2	...	1	4 batteries	1½	2	If held, no reduction of strength would be politic.
Jhansi	...	1 squad.	...	Det. (head-quarters).	1	...	Nil	Nil	...	...	Will be abandoned.
Sipri	...	Detachment	...	...	Det.	...	Post	...	...	...	Cavalry post sufficient.
Goona	...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	Head-quarters, 1st Regiment, Central India Horse.
SAVNER DISTRICT.											
Nowgong	...	1	1 battery	Detachment	1	...	1	2 batteries	1	1	Cavalry post sufficient.
Nagode	...	Detachment	...	...	1	...	Post	...	...	...	Cavalry post sufficient.
Total	1	5	8	3 & 3 cos.	11	1	5	10 batteries	4½	8	

(Sd.) H. D. DALY, Major-General,  
 Agent, Governor-General for Central India.

CENTRAL INDIA AGENCY; }  
 CAMP KUCHNARA, }  
 The 5th January 1872. }

## G.—RAJPUTANA.

Memorandum supplying information called for in Government of India, Military Department, letter No. 205 S.B., dated 7th July 1879.

*(a) Strength of Native population.*

1. The population of the British district of Ajmere-Mhairwarra, exclusive of the troops quartered in it, is 392,836, and of the Native States in Rajputana 9,261,607, making a total of 9,654,443 souls, distributed throughout an area of 130,312 square miles.

*(b) Strength of European and Eurasian population (exclusive of army).*

2. The European and Eurasian population of Ajmere is about 200. The non-combatant population of Nusseerabad is about 270; and 45 or 50 Europeans are employed in various ways in the Native States. On the completion of the Western Rajputana Railway, there will probably be not less than 1,500 persons, of which about 800 will be adult males.

*(c) State of feeling.*

3. I may confidently assert that throughout the British district of Ajmere and the States of Rajputana, whether Rajput, Jat, or Muhammadan, a spirit of loyalty towards the British Government pervades all classes. Our connection with Rajputana has now lasted for more than sixty years; and during the whole of this period, though in the exercise of the varied responsibilities of our position, we have repeatedly been compelled to interfere by force of arms either to prevent the anarchy caused by mal-administration on the one hand, or unprovoked rebellion on the other, or to put an end to the forays of predatory tribes. In no one instance has there been any sign of disaffection towards ourselves, or any disposition to combine in resistance to our authority, on the part of the population of Rajputana. It would be too much to assume that the interference we have so often been forced to exercise has been welcome to those on whose behalf it has been required; but at any rate it has never been actively resented by any class. And this I believe to be due to the moderation we have invariably displayed in our dealings with these States, and to the prompt withdrawal of our forces on the attainment of the objects with which they were despatched. If to a Chief our intervention implies the necessity for reform in his administration, it also signifies protection against undue encroachments on his authority by a coalition of factious feudatories; and though it prevents the latter from asserting their claims by open violence, it affords them a remedy to which, in case of proved necessity, they can confidently have recourse. The confidence which the Chiefs and people of Rajputana have learnt to repose in the justice and magnanimity of the British Government, and the certainty they feel that we shall never place too strict and too literal an interpretation on the compacts which bind them to us, reconcile them to their subordinate position, and to acquiescence without demur in the restrictions we find it necessary from time to time to impose both on the authority of the Chiefs and on the pretensions of the nobles. But had this policy of protecting indifferently the rights of all not been followed, or had we allowed them to believe that their interests were made entirely subservient to our own, we should have failed to win their confidence; and the hearty assistance we received in Rajputana throughout the mutiny, when, at the commencement of the outbreak, there was not a single European soldier in the province to mark the reality of our power, would certainly have been denied us. So long, then, as we adhere to the principles that have hitherto guided us in our dealings with the Rajputana State, we may, I feel sure, count on the continued loyalty of their inhabitants; but if, abandoning these principles, we entered under any pretext on a policy of annexation, we should find all classes in the State sinking their differences in the common danger, ready to offer to the utmost of their power at least a tacit resistance. I am not prepared to say that, even under these circumstances, the feeling of discontent would take the form of active and united opposition, such as would necessitate any military intervention; but the defection which would inevitably result from such a change of policy would be highly embarrassing to us, in the event of any general rising in our own provinces or of serious complications on our external frontiers.

4. The above remarks apply to the state of feeling which I conceive to be common to the population of Rajputana generally, and to indicate an attachment to the British Government, which ill-judged action alone on our part could shake or convert into hostility. The motives which keep the different classes faithful to us may possibly vary; but it may be said of the people generally that they are wedded to old traditions, and free from the restlessness and love of change so characteristic of some other Indian races. Among the agricultural and commercial classes, whose pacific habits would make them shrink from joining any seditious movement, however indirectly, this conservative feeling probably does not rise above aversion from any change which might disturb the tranquillity they now enjoy; but it is not perhaps quixotic to believe that among the higher classes of Rajputs, properly so-called, it springs from an hereditary fidelity to the established order of things, and that we, as successors of the Mogul emperors, may confidently expect from the Rajputs of the present day the same cheerful and loyal submission to our rule that their ancestors, when once won over, so uniformly rendered to that of Akbar and his descendants. The question of the personal loyalty of the Chiefs of Rajputana has been often discussed, and it has been argued that their proneness to listen to the many idle and often mischievous rumours that so frequently find currency in the bazzars of their capitals indicates an uneasiness and a doubt as to the permanence of our rule, incompatible with steadfast loyalty to the British Government. But it may fairly be objected that this is the natural consequence of a life of comparative seclusion, in which anything novel is of interest, and is listened to with the curiosity which an imperfect acquaintance of what is really passing in the outside world naturally excites; and I believe that this imputation of disloyal credulity is wholly undeserved in the case of the Chiefs of Rajputana. It must also be remembered that, though government in Rajputana is personal, the individual predilections or dislikes of a Chief carry little weight, beyond his immediate circle of ministers or courtiers. Thus, though it might be quite possible for a political officer, by want of sympathy or cordiality, to make himself personally objectionable to a Chief, and so hinder rather than facilitate the latter's acquiescence in the orders of Government; or though, as another instance,

the policy on which Government had determined in any particular measure might be distasteful to a Chief personally, it by no means follows that this dissatisfaction would be reflected in the demeanour of the people generally, or be in any way an indication of the real feelings of the mass of his subjects.

5. In estimating the state of feeling in Rajputana, it must not be forgotten that there is in every State and in the British district of Ajmere a considerable Muhammadan population; and that in Tonk the governing class belongs exclusively to that faith. Dwelling, as they have dwelt for years past, in the midst of an alien race, the Muhammadans both in Tonk and in Rajputana generally have imbibed many of the feelings of those by whom they are surrounded, and, it may safely be asserted, are as well disposed towards us as is the main body of the population. In Ajmere, where there has always been a large colony of Muhammadans connected with the famous shrines of Khwaja Mayyind-din Chisti and Miran Husain, the utmost loyalty was displayed by both Sunnis and Shias during the mutiny of 1857; and the defence of the approaches to the hill fort of Taraghur and the occupation of the fort itself were entrusted to the custodians of these shrines, with the result that peace and order were effectively maintained by them.

(d) *Elements of danger.*

6. The first consideration naturally occurring to those not brought personally into contact with these Rajput States is, that there must be a danger of an effective combination of the Chiefs against us. The possibility of this has been repeatedly urged as a reason for maintaining a larger body of troops than would be necessary if this element of danger could be eliminated from our calculations. So far as Rajputana is concerned, I believe that it may be left out of consideration. I have alluded to the only circumstances which, in my opinion, could unite the conflicting interests of the different parties so invariably found in every State in Rajputana; but I can conceive no possible train of circumstances by which a treasonable movement, if set on foot in one State, would affect simultaneously any of the others. The jealousies which have for centuries existed, and still exist, between the various Durbars are so inveterate, that not even the proposed annexation of one State would rouse the others to arms in its defence; and so strong is my conviction that these causes would infallibly prevent any combined action against us, that in considering the military requirements of the province, such an eventuality need not be taken seriously into account. Granting however, for the sake of argument, that such a combination is possible, it follows that, for it to be successful, it must be supported by force of arms; and in that case it might fairly be asked whether the armies maintained by the States of Rajputana are not, or could not, become a source of danger to us. To this I would reply that there is no State in the whole province that has a body of men who would dare to take the field against a very much weaker detachment of disciplined troops.

It is true that on paper the numbers\* composing the armies of these States may appear formidable to those unfamiliar with their actual condition and component parts; and hence arises the widespread belief that we are compelled to maintain excessive armaments to overawe them. The idea is purely fallacious. Each State keeps up a small number of regular troops, so-called, in no case exceeding 3,000 men, whose organization, equipment, and discipline is so completely inefficient as to make them unworthy of being taken into account as an element of military strength against ourselves. These bodies of men are generally stationed at the capital, and are ordinarily employed in court ceremonials; but, being composed of foreigners, unconnected with the country, the Chief can, as a rule, depend upon them in the event of disputes with his feudatories. Inefficient as they are, however, when judged by our standard, a *prestige* for which it is difficult to account attaches to them as foreigners; and they are held in much respect by the indigenous fighting material of the country. The result of this fancied superiority has not unfrequently been a source of danger to their employers; and it has more than once happened that, owing to their pay having been allowed to fall into arrears, or some similar cause, they have broken out into revolt, which our troops have been called in to quell. The possibility of similar measures being again required must not be lost sight of in estimating the strength of the British force to be maintained in Rajputana. The main body of the army of a Rajput State is composed of irregular levies supplied by the different feudal nobles, and, if possible, more hopelessly inefficient than the so-called regulars. Like the latter, they, too, cannot always be counted upon as a support to the Chief; for their first duty being in their opinion to the Thakur in whose service they are, they would assuredly side with him in any dispute in which the Durbar decided on coercive measures against him or his kinsmen and connections. The terms in which I have spoken of the efficiency of these armies generally require some qualification if applied to Bhurtpore. There are in all 1,460 regular cavalry and 3,000 regular infantry in Bhurtpore of the tribe of which the Chief is the head; and their fidelity to him is consequently more assured than is the case with the bodies of men employed by the other Chiefs: their organization and discipline is also slightly better. The necessity for this force, comparatively small though it is, is not apparent; for the Chief has no troublesome Thakurs to deal with, and his territory lies in close proximity to British districts, so that it might well be reduced considerably below its present strength. In regard to what may perhaps be considered as the undue strength of these armies, it must be remembered that they undertake the whole work of police, escorts, &c., over extensive tracts of country; that they have to deal with a population as well armed as themselves; and that we expect them to keep in order the criminal tribes from whose depredations Rajputana is as yet by no means free. Taking all these facts into consideration, I do not consider that, as long as our political officers exercise a due degree of vigilance, the armies of Rajputana are, or could be, in any way formidable with the exception above mentioned, more particularly if the Arms Act is strictly enforced; or that they are at all in excess of what is absolutely necessary for the prevention of internal disturbance and for preserving the general peace of the country. The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that, as far as regards imperial interests, no real elements of danger exist in Rajputana, but that in a country where the whole population is armed, and the criminal tribes are still unreclaimed, we must always be prepared for sudden outbreaks on a small scale. Against such insignificant occurrences there is no necessity to make special provision.

(e) *Strength of police.*

7. Irrespective of the troops of the Native States, the police of the province consists of two bodies only, *viz.* the Rajputana State Railway Police and the Ajmere-Mhairwarra District Police, the strength of the former being 230, and of the latter 560 men.

*(f) Distribution of police.*

8. The Rajputana State Railway Police is distributed as follows: 13 men are retained for duty at head-quarters, 10 are detached for duty at Agra, 6 are train guard constables, and 20 form a reserve. The remainder of the force is distributed in nearly equal numbers at the different stations along the railway line, Agra being the only station necessarily requiring a somewhat larger number than any other. With the exception of a small reserve at head-quarters, and a few constables detached for duty at courts and offices, the Ajmere District Police is located at different stations and outposts in the district, the strength of the guards at each varying in accordance with the importance of the station. The following are the principal police stations in the district :—

Ajmere.	Todgarh.
Nusseerabad.	Umugliawas.
Goela-Ramsur.	Jawaja.
Kekri.	Ghegul.
Beawar.	Gungwana.
Bhinai.	Jesakhera.

*(g) Efficiency of police.*

9. The reorganization of the Rajputana State Railway Police is at present under consideration; but the men of both it and of the Ajmere District Police have performed their duties efficiently.

*(h) European and Eurasian population considered as—**(1) strength in combatant power and for the maintenance of order.*

10. If the estimate under head (b) be correct, there may be between 800 and 1,000 adult males who might, under certain circumstances, be considered effective as a combatant force in case of necessity. It is not probable that the number of adult males employed on the railway at the commencement of working the entire line will increase. The tendency appears to be rather to substitute trained Native labor whenever practicable; and there is reason to suppose that efficient Native labor will be more easily obtained on this line than in Southern India. Assuming, then, that such a possible combatant power existed along a line of, say, 600 miles, its utility would entirely depend on the arrangements which might be made for its effective disposition.

*(2) weakness in necessity for provision of safety of non-combatants, women and children.*

11. Supposing that all the adult males are possible combatants, the actual non-combatants might be upwards of 1,000 at the outset; and the number may be expected to increase. It has been proposed to provide for 600 in a fortified post at Nusseerabad; and it might be possible to make similar provision at Ahmedabad. Between Ahmedabad and Ajmere, about 300 miles, there is the sanitarium of Abu, which would always be available as a place of refuge, and which no doubt will be much resorted to on completion of the railway. This is in no sense a fortified post; but the buildings might easily be made secure against any force that is likely to be brought against it.

*(3) of possible greater utility than at present if organized for the maintenance of order in case of disturbance.*

12. Whether this population would be a source of weakness or strength in case of disturbance depends, first, upon the means provided for the security of the useless portion, and secondly, on the effective organization of the adult males for purposes of defence. The means for providing for the first has already been indicated: it remains to show how the second may be dealt with.

*(i) Compulsory enrolment.*

13. In favor of compulsory enrolment, *i.e.*, of enlisting our railway employes in the regular army, it may no doubt be said that it is easier to train a soldier than either a driver or mechanic. If it were considered desirable to keep up a reserve of European drivers, &c., such as would be sufficient for the railway management of an army in time of war, it would at first sight seem more desirable, and it would certainly be more effective for the particular purpose, to enrol the force of railway employes as soldiers than to train any portion of our army to perform the duties of railway staff. The efficiency thus gained for war purposes would, however, be attended with some disadvantages, in time of peace at all events, unless some system could be devised of ensuring a steady and industrious class; and it seems impossible to resist the conclusion that the ordinary railway working body should be civil. Moreover, as the normal condition is peace, the insurance against a possible emergency should not be too heavy.

*(j) Development of volunteer system.*

14. With regard to the development of the volunteer system, it seems extremely doubtful if, as at present constituted, any great advantage is likely to result from its extension. As yet the volunteer system can hardly be said to have taken root in India; and in this province it is only in its infancy. The success depends in a great measure on the support it receives from the Government, and, as it must be mainly composed of railway employes, the encouragement of the officers who may for the time being have the administrative control of the railway. Up to the present time it has probably not received sufficient encouragement from either of the above sources. At all events, it is not as popular as it should be to encourage the hope that its extension will be attended with any very beneficial results. Unless the volunteer system on a railway is sufficiently popular to induce all the sober, industrious class to join, it cannot become a really useful institution. Possibly the remedy may be found in some development of a system between that of compulsory enrolment as soldiers and the present volunteer system. It might be made a condition of service that every employe should become a volunteer, if after a specified term of probation he were considered fit to be one, unfitness resulting in discharge. On approval he might be compelled to serve for a term of years, precisely as many men are obliged to do in civil life, during which time he could neither resign his employ nor obtain his discharge as a volunteer. The details of such a scheme would no doubt require to be carefully thought out. They

cannot be treated provincially, nor be satisfactorily disposed of in a few hastily-written paragraphs. But, in combination with compulsory membership in a provident or insurance fund, it offers many of the advantages possessed by other systems without their practical defects.

15. Before proceeding to give my opinion on the general military requirements of the province under heads (a) and (b) of paragraph 3 of the Government letter, it may be as well that I should describe briefly the positions at present occupied by our troops in Rajputana, the strength in which they are respectively held, the objects with which they have been selected, and the duties which the troops, and especially the local corps, are, and have been, called upon to perform.

There are in Rajputana two cantonments, *viz.*, Nusseerabad and Deolee, in which troops of our regular army are quartered; and five, *viz.*, Deolee, Ajmere, Erinpoorah, Khairwarra, and Kotra, which are occupied by local forces. The following return gives the distribution of these troops:—

<i>Regular Force.</i>				
Nusseerabad	... 2nd Royal Artillery, E Battery.	1st Regiment, Bombay Light Cavalry (squadron).	5 Companies of 17th Regiment 2nd Battalion, British.	2nd Regiment, Native Infantry.
Deolee	...	4th Bengal Cavalry	...	...
<i>Local Corps.</i>				
Deolee	...	...	...	Deolee Irregular Force.
Ajmere	...	...	...	Mhairwarra Battalion.
Erinpoorah	...	...	...	Erinpoorah Irregular Force.
Khairwarra	...	...	...	5 Companies Meywar Bheel Corps.
Kotra	...	...	...	3 Companies Meywar Bheel Corps.

The cantonments of Neemuch and Deesa, though not, properly speaking, in Rajputana, are situated so close to its frontiers on the south-east and south-west respectively, and the troops stationed there have so frequently been made use of in operations undertaken in Rajputana, that they have always been considered in estimating our military resources in this province. The distribution of their garrisons is as follows:—

<i>Regular Force.</i>				
Neemuch	... 2nd Brigade, Royal Artillery, G Battery.	1st Regiment, Bombay Light Cavalry (2 squadrons).	3 Companies, 17th Regiment 2nd Battalion, British.	10th Regiment (Light), Native Infantry.
Deesa	... 1st Brigade, Royal Artillery, U Battery.	3rd Regiment, Bombay Light Cavalry (2 squadrons).	3 Companies, 15th Regiment 2nd Battalion.	26th Regiment, Native Infantry.

#### *Nusseerabad.*

16. Nusseerabad is the military cantonment of Ajmere, which is the capital of the British district of that name, and, from its central position, of Rajputana generally. It is fifteen miles from Ajmere, with which it is now connected by rail. The existence of Nusseerabad as a military cantonment dates from the year 1818, when its formation was necessary to protect the recently ceded district of Ajmere; and it then became the head-quarters of the reserve of the Rajputana Field Force under Sir David Ochterlony. I have been unable in the short time at my disposal to trace the various alterations in the strength of the garrison between 1818 and the mutiny of 1857; but in the latter year it consisted of one Native field battery, two regiments of Bengal Native infantry, and one regiment light cavalry. Till 1857 Nusseerabad was garrisoned chiefly by Bengal troops, but since that year Bombay regiments have been substituted, and it now forms a brigade of the Mhow division of the Bombay army. A glance at the map will show what a very important position Nusseerabad occupies from a military point of view. It is already connected by rail with Agra and Delhi, and will shortly be so with Ahmedabad, while the line to Neemuch will in a few years place it in direct communication with the large military station of Mhow. It is thus capable of easy reinforcement from several quarters, and, from its central position, affords the best possible position for undertaking operations in Rajputana.

#### *Deolee.*

17. The cantonment of Deolee is situated 56 miles south-east of Nusseerabad, at the junction of British Meywar, Jeypur, Tonk, and Bundi territory. The river Bunass runs between it and Nusseerabad, but can easily be crossed in the rainy season by a ferry which has recently been provided by



Government. The site was selected by Sir Henry Lawrence in 1855 as commanding the passes leading to Kotah and Bundi, and also the Kherar, a hilly tract formed of portions of Meywar, Jeypur, and Bundi extending some 13 miles eastward from Jehazpore, and the home of the Purriar branch of the Mina tribe, whose depredations in the surrounding country were long notorious. It was to overawe this tribe that Deolee was occupied in the first instance by the Kotah Contingent, the origin of which may be briefly described as follows. By the fifth article of the Treaty of 1838, Kotah was bound to maintain a contingent force, to be paid from its revenues; and by the sixth article of the same its liabilities on this account were restricted to three (and subsequently to two) lakhs of rupees per annum. Accordingly, in 1840, the Kotah Contingent was raised as a part of the general policy of calling upon those States with whom treaties in which there was a specific provision promising subordinate co-operation had been concluded to fulfil their part of the engagement. The corps was at first located in the vicinity of Kotah itself, but after various changes of station was finally quartered at Deolee, with the object above stated.

18. The force consisted of all three arms, *viz.*, 240 cavalry, 2 guns, and 640 infantry; and was kept up until 1857, when, on the outbreak of the mutiny, it was ordered to Agra, and, after being employed for some time in the Muttra district, mutinied in July of that year. To supply its loss, some 300 Minas, Jats, Gujars, and Rajputs were enlisted during the latter part of the same year on the responsibility of the Agent to the Governor-General; and this was the nucleus of the present Deolee Irregular Force, which, as originally constituted, consisted of 800 infantry and 320 cavalry, including Native officers and men of all ranks. In 1861 the strength of the infantry was assimilated to that of a regiment on the Bengal establishment; and in the following year the cavalry was reduced to two troops, which also were fixed on the same scale as that authorized for cavalry regiments in the Bengal army. Both infantry and cavalry have since remained at the above-named strength; and in 1868 the rates of pay sanctioned for the Native army were applied to them. The total cost of the corps amounts to Rs. 2,12,514-13. The infantry is principally recruited from the Purriar Minas, who thus become the means of their own reclamation. Minas, however, are not fitted to serve as cavalry; and this portion of the force, which was at first mainly composed of Sikhs of the old Khalsa army sent from the Punjab by Sir John Lawrence in 1857, has since been mainly recruited from the same class. On the reduction of the cavalry in 1862, strong representations were made by the then Agent to the Governor-General, General G. St. P. Lawrence, that the peace of the country was endangered by the weakness of that arm. A cavalry regiment on the Bengal establishment was therefore ordered to Deolee, and has since formed a part of the garrison of the cantonment. For some years one squadron was detached to Jhansi, though of late this has been recalled to head-quarters. The partial occupation of Deolee by regular troops is thus of comparatively recent date.

19. The Deolee Irregular Force was employed at the siege of Kotah in 1858; but though it has not since been called upon to undertake any military operations, it has played an important part in preserving the general tranquillity of the country, by offering an honest career in its ranks to the restless spirits of the Kherar.

#### *Ajmere.*

20. Ajmere is the head-quarters of the Mhairwarra Battalion, which has been in existence since 1822. When we obtained possession of the Ajmere district in 1818, the Mers, or inhabitants of the hilly tract which extends for 100 miles in length and 15 miles in breadth between Ajmere proper, Meywar, and Marwar, were notorious for their plundering habits. In reality they were completely independent of Udaipur and Jodhpur, though the claims advanced by both Durbars to the allegiance of the Mers were admitted by us when it became necessary to punish them for their depredations, and consequently their towns as reduced were made over to these States. The arrangement did not work well; and in 1821 it was found necessary to require that the Meywar and Marwar portions of Mhairwarra should be made over to British management for a term of years. With a view to affording due protection to life and property in this tract, it was determined to raise a local corps from the classes whose depredations had necessitated its formation; and as the restoration of order could not fail to be of equal benefit to the two adjoining States, they were required to make contributions towards the expense of the corps. These were fixed at Rs. 15,000 each.

21. The nucleus of the regiment thus raised was composed of drafts from the Rampura Local Battalion, which in its turn had been formed from the remnants of the army of the notorious Amir Khan. The total strength of the new battalion was fixed at eight companies, each company containing 1 subadar, 1 jemadar, 5 havildars, 5 naiks, and 70 privates; and its cost, including the civil allowance of the commandant, was Rs. 55,560 per annum. Vacancies for 340 Mer sepoys and a certain proportion of the commissioned and non-commissioned posts for those Mers who should soonest qualify themselves for promotion were reserved. The corps was cantoned near the old town of Beawar, about 30 miles south-west of Ajmere, but was subsequently moved to Nyanuggur, 4 miles south of Beawar. It was designated the Mhairwarra Local Battalion.

22. Owing to the severity of outpost duty, the battalion was augmented in 1825 by the addition of ten men per company, thus raising the strength to 670 of all ranks. It saw no active service until 1839, when it was sent with the Jodhpur Legion against some outlawed Thakurs of Marwar; and dislodged them from their stronghold of Kote at the entrance of the Dewair pass. It also formed part of the force which was sent against Jodhpur in the same year; but, owing to Maharaja Man Singh's submission, was not actively engaged. On the mutiny of the troops at Nusseerabad the magazine at Ajmere was occupied by a company from Beawar, and the battalion was subsequently employed in the operations against Ahwa. For its services all men serving with the battalion on the 1st July 1857 were rewarded with the grant of the pay and privileges as regards pensions of soldiers of the regular army.

23. In December 1857 the Government authorized the formation of a second Mer regiment to be stationed at Ajmere. The Mhairwarra Local Battalion was therefore reduced by two companies, which were drafted into the new regiment. The strength of both corps then amounted to 1,500 men; but for financial reasons it was found necessary in 1861 to effect reductions. The new corps was accordingly amalgamated with the old Mer battalion, the strength of which was raised to 1,000 men of all ranks,



divided into ten companies, and designated the Mhairwarra Police Battalion; and was placed under the North-Western Provinces Government, to assist the police on protective duties. By this measure the battalion did not enjoy the advantages in respect of pay and pension conferred afterwards on the other local corps of Rajputana; and the men were consequently discontented, while the regiment was practically useless for purposes of police. For these and for other reasons it was decided in 1870 to organize it into a purely military corps. The numbers were reduced to a total strength of 712 of all ranks, divided into eight companies. The pay was raised to that of the regular army; and the men were granted the same privileges as regards pension and allowances as the other local corps. The headquarters were at the same time transferred from Beawar to Ajmere. The present corps is composed of Mers and Merats, or Muhammadan Mers, and in composition is even more local than it was thirty years ago. Its duties, as defined by Government, are to furnish jail and treasury guards, to occupy the military posts in the district, supply escorts, supply such infantry guards as can be spared for the salt works of the Sambhar lake, and to perform all duties for which armed men are considered necessary, under the distinct understanding that the corps will be liable, when called on, to do general service throughout Rajputana, like other local corps. The Mhairwarra Battalion has just returned from active service in Afghanistan.

#### *Khairwarra and Kotra.*

24. The cantonments of Khairwarra and Kotra are situated respectively 40 miles south-west and south-east of Udaipur in the hilly tracts of Meywar. Khairwarra is garrisoned by five companies of the Meywar Bheel Corps, which was raised in 1840, consequent on the inability of the Udaipur State to keep its turbulent Bheel population in subjection. At Kotra, which was established as a separate post in 1841, are quartered three companies of the corps under the 2nd-in-command. The hilly tracts of Meywar are divided into three portions: (1) Chuppun to the south-east of Udaipur; (2) Jowass to the south-west of Chuppun; and (3) the Grassia chiefships, whose estates lie from the north of Jowass as far as Sirohi. Roughly speaking, they may be said to extend from the neighbourhood of Neemuch to the Aravalis, with an average breadth of 50 miles. The disordered state of these tracts existed previous to British interposition in Meywar affairs; and the depredations of the inhabitants did not cease with its introduction. A British force was employed against them in 1823; but though the operations were temporarily successful, no permanent good resulted; and in the course of time Bhil raids extended to Mahi Kanta and our own and the Gaekwar's territories in Guzerat. Our endeavours to restore order from Khairwarra with the assistance of Durbar troops were for some years unsuccessful; and eventually it was determined to organize a Bhil Corps composed as much as possible of the people of the country. After considerable delay, a force of 442 men of all ranks, at a cost of Rs. 40,000 per annum, was temporarily raised in 1840; and these were in the following year augmented to a strength of ten companies of 90 men each, with the usual proportion of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The cost was fixed at Rs. 1,20,000, of which the Meywar Durbar contributes Rs. 50,000. In 1861 the scale fixed for an infantry regiment of the Bengal establishment was made applicable to the Meywar Bhil Corps. It enjoys the benefits of pension, and has lately, *viz.*, in 1877, been granted the same rate of pay as that drawn by regiments of the regular Native army. The present annual cost amounts to Rs. 1,33,504, exclusive of compensation for dearthness of provisions, which may in years of scarcity amount to Rs. 7,000.

25. The Meywar Bhil Corps has been chiefly employed in coercing refractory Bhils and outlaws. In 1855 half the corps was employed under Sir Henry Lawrence against the Jehazpore Minas; and in 1858 it joined in the pursuit of Tantia Topi through the Banswara jungles. Since then the two principal operations on which it has been engaged are those against Maharaj Sohun Singh of Bagore in 1876, when the head-quarters and wing (231 rank and file) proceeded with the Meywar Durbar troops against his fort; and those against the Bhils of Mandwa-Bakel in 1876, when the detachment at Kotra supported and co-operated with the Durbar troops.

#### *Erinpura.*

26. Erinpura, the head-quarters of the irregular force of that name, is situated on the main road from Ajmere to Ahmedabad, 150 miles south-east of the former, and was originally occupied by the Jodhpur Legion, raised under the following circumstances. Under article viii of the Treaty with the British Government dated 6th January 1818, the State of Jodhpur was required to furnish a contingent of 1,500 horse for foreign service whenever called on by the British Government to do so. This force, however, was found to be inefficient, and, being composed wholly of Rajputs, was useless to act against the people of the country. Government accordingly accepted an application made by Maharaja Man Singh in 1835 to be released from his obligation to furnish this levy, on condition of an annual payment of Rs. 1,15,000, which was to be devoted to the maintenance of a body of horse and foot under European officers. Accordingly in the following year the Jodhpur Legion, consisting of 4 guns, 216 cavalry, and 610 infantry, principally Hindustanis, under British officers, was raised with a view to prevent depredations and outrage on the unsettled Marwar-Sirohi border, and to protect the trade passing along the trunk road from the western coast and Guzerat *via* Sirohi and Pali to Hindustan and the Punjab. The force was at first stationed at Burgong on the Godwar frontier, and afterwards moved to Erinpura.

27. In 1834 the Jodhpur Legion formed a part of the force moved against Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur, and in 1839 was similarly employed, having previously in the same year been engaged in conjunction with the Mhairwarra Battalion under Captain Dixon against the Marwar outlaw Chinum Singh of Kote. In 1857 the whole of the Jodhpur Legion mutinied, with the exception of a few sowars, two companies of Bhils, and a detachment of two Purbiah companies at Nusseerabad, who were disarmed for a season. These formed the nucleus of the present Erinpura Irregular Force. The Purbiahs, who remained staunch, were transferred to other existing local corps; and the new infantry regiment was composed of Rajputs, Mers, Minas, Bhils, Grassias, &c. The new cavalry corps comprised the remnant of the old regiment and 450 Sikh Horse which had been raised for service with the Maharaja of Jodhpur, but were taken on by the British Government. These were ultimately divided, and formed the basis of the present cavalry corps at Erinpura and Deolce. The organization of the

corps was completed on the scale already alluded to in the case of the Deolee Irregular Force ; and in 1861 the same reductions that had been carried out in that corps were effected in the Erinpura Irregular Force.

28. Detachments have often been employed in keeping open the main line of traffic between Deesa and Ajmere, and in suppressing outlaws. In July 1868 a large detachment of the force was sent against the famous outlaw Nathu Singh of Bhuttana; and in 1872 Colonel Carnell proceeded with a strong force against the recusant Thakur of Rewara, who was arrested without opposition.

*General military requirements for (a) garrison purposes and the maintenance of order.*

29. I now come to a consideration of the points mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Government letter. In regard to the requirements for garrison purposes, by which I understand the ordinary duties to be undertaken in time of peace, I may say at once that the force at present stationed in Rajputana is sufficient under ordinary circumstances for the protection of the positions it occupies both in British and foreign territory, and for the performance of the duties which fall to its share. In the case of the regular troops, these are confined to what may be termed garrison duty proper, as they are not employed beyond their own cantonments. The local corps, on the other hand, supply all the detachments for outpost or escort duty, and are employed in protecting the various salt sources and in guarding treasure. The accompanying return\* shows how scattered these detachments are. There can be no ques-

\* *Vide* appendix B.

tion that the local corps could not be so weakened but for the moral support which a regular force at Nusseerabad affords. The one is thus the complement of the other. The existence of the local corps, and the gradual leaven which their recruitment from among the wild predatory tribes has worked towards the general peace of the country, enables us to relieve our regular forces of the duties on which they would otherwise be scattered over its face, and to concentrate them at the most favorable points; while, on the other hand, by the presence of a small European force, able through the improvement of communications to move rapidly on any point, we can safely dispense with such comparatively large bodies of troops as were kept up before the mutiny. In an extensive province like Rajputana, where, from the nature of the country, so favorable for the operations of bodies, great and small, of light and predatory horse, and from the union and fellow-feeling which subsists amongst whole classes of its inhabitants opposed to their suzerain's power, disturbances of more or less magnitude must always be anticipated. The necessity for a small force centrally situated, as that at Nusseerabad is, to assist in their suppression is obvious. It remains to consider whether its present strength and that of the local forces with which it would co-operate is sufficient for the maintenance of order as distinguished from military operations on an extended scale within the provinces. The history of Rajputana since our interposition in 1818 shows that at first our regular troops were constantly engaged in restoring order, but that, with the formation of the various local corps, the occasions for their employment became gradually rarer; or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the cases with which the local corps were able to deal without assistance became more frequent. There are but few instances on record, and these belong rather to the division of the subject under head (b), in which a force exceeding that now stationed at Nusseerabad and in Rajputana was employed in the suppression of purely local disturbances. The following are examples in addition to those already mentioned of the employment of our troops in suppression of minor disturbances.

30. In March 1819 three battalions of infantry, some cavalry, and light guns carried by elephants were sent to check the insubordinate Mers; and in 1820 a still larger force was despatched against them. In 1823 a force, composed of the 2nd Regiment Native Infantry, one squadron regular cavalry, four local horse heavy battering trains, and one light field battery, moved against the Minas and Bhils of the hilly tracts. Four years later a small detachment (500) of Bombay infantry was sent into the hilly tracts; while the Bombay Government quartered troops in the Mahi Kanta to protect the feudatory Chiefs in that region from the depredations of the Bhils. In 1824 a squadron of Native cavalry, six companies of Native infantry, and a proportion of light artillery and pioneers, in addition to detachments of the Gakwar, Pahlunpur, and Sirohi troops, were despatched from Deesa for the punishment of the turbulent Thakurs and Minas of Sirohi, and were employed till May of that year. Coming to later times, in 1855 Sir Henry Lawrence visited the seats of some of the disaffected Thakurs of Meywar, taking with him three battering guns, a field battery, about 1,300 infantry, and 300 cavalry. In 1862 a disputed succession in Salumbar of Meywar rendered it likely that a military force would have to be employed, and a concentric movement from Neemuch, Deesa, and Nusseerabad was proposed; but the necessity for carrying it out did not arise.

31. It will be seen that the forces which have been employed on these occasions have not been in excess of our present military resources in Rajputana; and the conclusion to be drawn is that the requirements of the province in regard to the maintenance of internal order are satisfied by keeping the troops stationed in it at their present strength. But the present scale is the lowest at which this could be fixed, consistently with the performance of even ordinary peace duties. It must be remembered that we cannot measure exactly the amount of tranquillity secured by the presence of a given number of troops; and no doubt a great deal of the peace of the country is due to our *prestige*, and to the knowledge that we can, whenever necessary, amply support that *prestige*. But it would not be politic to risk its temporary loss by keeping a force too weak to maintain it by prompt action; and hence I would strongly urge the retention of the troops at least at their present strength.

32. There are, however, a few points which deserve attention, *viz.*, the want of a siege-train at Nusseerabad, a proposal lately made to me to withdraw the Bengal Irregular Cavalry regiment at Deolee, the future strength of the garrisons at Neemuch and Deesa, and the number of officers attached to local corps. In regard to the first, it may be remarked that Rajputana is studded with forts, many of them of considerable strength and impervious to the fire of light field-guns. It will not be disputed that, in the event of our troops being compelled to take the field against the owner of any such fort, they should be able to enforce compliance with the terms dictated. This would not always be possible without an adequate siege-train, as is shown by our failure before Ahwa in the mutiny; and it is only a few years ago that application had to be made to Agra for mortars and heavy guns when the possibility of our having to attack the small fort of Futtehghur in the Kishenghur State was

contemplated. With this view I would propose that the material of a siege-train should be located at Nusseerabad, but manned only when occasion for its service arises. The delay in its equipment and despatch even by rail is necessarily great; whereas, if it was on the spot, men to work the guns could be supplied in the course of a day or so. The possession of battering guns of a calibre sufficient to demolish a moderately strong fort would add considerably to our *prestige*, and probably be of itself sufficient to put an end to the resistance which for a time at least might now be offered with comparative impunity. As regards the second point, although the men of the Bengal Irregular Cavalry at Deolee take no part in the ordinary duties of the local corps, they are available on emergencies for which in their absence it would be difficult with the existing force of irregular cavalry there and at Erinpura to provide. It has already been stated that an irregular regiment on the Bengal establishment was supplied on the reduction of the Deolee and Erinpura Irregular Cavalry, but considerations of discipline and general efficiency prevented its division between Deolee and Erinpura. So far the Erinpura Cavalry has been sufficient to preserve the peace of the country; but should the garrison of Deesa be diminished on the completion of railway communication with Ahmedabad, a somewhat larger force of this arm on the western side of the Aravalis will be necessary, while the withdrawal of a regiment from Deolee will leave the force there weaker in cavalry than it has ever been. I do not advocate a restoration of these forces to their former strength in cavalry; but the number of sowars in each should, I consider, be increased to 200. I have said that the garrisons of Neemuch and Deesa have always been looked upon as supports to our troops in Rajputana; and so they must always be considered. But the improvement in communications now proceeding so rapidly throughout the province raises the question whether the retention of the European detachment at the former station and of the European regiment at the latter will be necessary on the completion of the connection between Nusseerabad and Ahmedabad and Neemuch. In replying at the close of last year to a reference received from the Government of India, I expressed an opinion that the detachment at Neemuch might rejoin its head-quarters at Nusseerabad on the opening of the railway connecting the two stations; and I consider that, so far as this province is concerned, the European regiment at Deesa might with safety be moved elsewhere, if such a step be considered desirable on other than political grounds, so soon as Nusseerabad and Ahmedabad are similarly connected. The sanitarium of Abu might then be garrisoned from Nusseerabad or Ahmedabad, instead of from Deesa. The officers attached to the local corps are unquestionably too few. Their numbers do not admit of their being employed away from head-quarters; and the result is, that the discipline of detachments, which, as before stated, are very numerous, inevitably suffers. Beside this, it is very desirable that there should be a succession of young officers becoming acquainted with the country and with the classes from amongst whom these regiments are enlisted, and ready to take the place of the older officers as these retire. With this view, I would propose that one squadron officer and one wing officer should be added to the Deolee and Erinpura Irregular Forces, one second-in-command and one wing officer to the Mhairwarra Battalion, and one wing officer to the Meywar Bhil Corps.

*General military requirements for (b) internal and external military purposes irrespective of (a).*

33. In dealing with the question of the force required for the maintenance of internal order, I have confined myself to the supposition that its strength should be sufficient to deal promptly with minor disturbances. Occasions have not been wanting, however, in which operations of an extended nature have been undertaken such as come more properly under this head. The following instances will illustrate my meaning and give an idea of the force thus employed.

34. The conduct of Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur in giving asylum to Appa Sahib, his disregard of all demands of the British Government, and numerous other causes, necessitated the assemblage of a field force at Ajmere in 1834; but on the Maharaja's agreeing to the bulk of the British demands within the time allowed him, it was not found necessary to remove these troops. Owing to the repeated aggressions of the Shekhawati free-booters upon our own territories, as well as on those of the neighbouring Native States, and the failure of all endeavours to obtain redress, it was found necessary in 1834 to despatch a considerable portion of the field force that had previously assembled for service at Jodhpur to reduce the country to order. The force consisted of about 3,000 regular troops, including two regiments of cavalry, strengthened by a corps of irregular horse and a large siege train for the purpose of dismantling the numerous forts and strongholds which afforded an easy retreat to the plunderers. On the completion of the object of the expedition, the troops were withdrawn; but a force consisting of two 18-pounder guns, two 18-inch mortars, Blair's Horse, and the 61st Regiment Native Infantry was retained in Shekhawati until the organization in the following year of the Shekhawati Brigade. In 1839 the widespread disorganization of the affairs of the Marwar State again necessitated the assemblage of a field force at Ajmere. It consisted of a troop of horse artillery, a light field battery, two companies of foot artillery, six squadrons of cavalry, six regiments of Native infantry, the Jodhpur Legion, the Shekhawati Brigade, the Mhairwarra Battalion, and the siege train of 24 battering guns and mortars. Of this, a regiment of cavalry, two regiments of infantry, a light field battery, the Shekhawati Brigade, the Jodhpur Legion, and the Mhairwarra Battalion, the whole force consisting of 1,000 cavalry, 3,000 infantry, and 12 field-guns, were concentrated at Bisulpur, within 12 miles of Jodhpur; while the main body of the army and the battery train was advancing from Ajmere in support. On the advance of the troops to the capital, no opposition was offered; and the fort was occupied by a company of the sappers and miners and two regiments of Native infantry.

35. To assemble these forces, it was necessary to summon troops and guns from Agra and other cantonments not connected with Rajputana; and under similar circumstances this same necessity would of course again arise; for no Government could be expected to maintain within any one province a sufficiently large army to meet every possible contingency; and the army of India must be taken as a whole affording support in whatever direction it may be most required. With the completion of the various lines of railway now under construction the collection of troops at Nusseerabad for any special duty in Rajputana will become so easy, that in a few days a force sufficient to meet any emergency could be assembled. I consider, therefore, that no special provision other than that already alluded to, *viz.*, the location of a siege train at Nusseerabad, need be made for the internal military requirements of the province as distinguished from those mentioned under head (a).

36. It only remains now to consider the assistance that might be furnished by the troops stationed in the province towards external military requirements; for such I understand to be the meaning of this portion of head (b). On this point I have only to remark that, in the event of the services of the regular troops being required elsewhere, a very small garrison at Nusseerabad would temporarily suffice for the maintenance of order in the British district of Ajmere; and we might also go so far under such circumstances, if the present loyal feeling in the Native States of Rajputana remains unchanged, as to depend with confidence on their willingness and ability to preserve order for the time being within their respective territories. This would set at liberty the larger portion of the infantry of the local corps; and as these are each enlisted from an entirely separate recruiting-ground as yet untroubled by any other corps in India, they could be augmented to almost any extent, their cantonments forming convenient depôts for the entertainment and instruction of recruits. In the event of it being necessary to increase the cavalry forces of the empire, Shekhawati and portions of Marwar would, under picked British officers, supply a body of splendid irregular cavalry. The service performed between the years 1835 and 1843 by the Shekhawati Brigade under Colonel Foster, in reducing to order the wild tract on the triple border of Marwar, Bikanir, and Jeypur, is well known. I can speak from personal experience of the soldier-like qualities of men of these tracts, as in 1853 a large number of them were enlisted in what is now the Central India Horse, and made excellent light cavalry. It might also be remarked that Rajputana affords an almost inexhaustible source of supply in camels and bullocks for transport service, provided we are ready to purchase, and do not expect to be able to obtain them on hire, as is possible in other parts of India.

ABU;  
The 17th August 1879. }

(Sd.) E. R. C. BRADFORD, Major,  
Agent, Governor-General, Rajputana.

### APPENDIX A.

Statement showing the military forces of the Native States in Rajputana.

In relation with	STATE.	MILITARY FORCES.									
		ARTILLERY.			CAVALRY.			INFANTRY.			Total of all arms.
		Total guns.	Total serviceable.	Gunners.	Regulars.	Feudal and Jaghirdar Horse and other irregulars.	Total.	Regulars.	Fort garrisons, Nagas, Minas, Tahsil sepoy, Nujibs, &c.	Total.	
Government of India, Rajputana Agency.	1. Oodeypore or Meywar...	203	269	1,338	800	5,940	6,210	1,200	13,000	15,100	22,678
	2. Jeypore ...	292	143	824	700	3,061	4,451	2,471	13,387	15,858	21,133
	3. Jodhpore or Marwar ...	330	274	280	1,219	1,854	3,103	2,065	3,223	6,293	8,970
	4. Kotah ...	146	63	121	215	585	930	900	5,410	7,691	7,691
	5. Bikanir ...	74	74	145	...	551	551	200	1,403	1,403	2,699
	6. Bundl ...	64	88	100	200	450	650	100	1,250	1,350	2,100
	7. Kerowlie ...	40	About 0	35	60	840	900	...	3,150	3,150	4,055
	8. Bhurtpore ...	38	About 13	220	1,460	1,460	1,460	3,000	5,500	8,500	10,210
	9. Tonk ...	63	63	117	450	...	510	1,300	1,050	2,350	2,877
	10. Kishenghur ...	49	36	100	200	350	550	...	3,500	3,500	4,150
	11. Ulwar ...	512	273	505	...	2,165	2,165	1,271	2,710	4,011	6,681
	12. Dholpore ...	36	14	60	63	500	625	632	1,537	2,219	2,033
	13. Jeyanmere ...	12	12	20	...	500	500	200	300	400	920
	14. Jhalawar ...	95	90	200	300	134	434	1,100	3,040	4,140	4,774
	15. Parlatgarh ...	12	12	40	...	275	275	...	950	950	1,205
	16. Hanswara ...	...	3	...	...	60	60	...	500	500	530
	17. Sirohi ...	2	...	1	...	375	375	...	350	350	728
	18. Dungarpore ...	4	...	...	...	400	400	...	1,000	1,000	1,400
	19. Shahpoora ...	23	12	20	...	212	212	35	320	355	687
	20. Lawa ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	TOTAL ...	1,893	1,466	4,505	5,313	10,478	21,701	14,374	58,995	70,869	106,186

### APPENDIX B.

Distribution Return of Local Corps in Rajputana.

	Duties performed by Infantry.			Duties performed by Cavalry.			Remarks.
Deoleo Irregular Force ...	Comd. at Jeypur	...	...	Comd. at Jeypur	...	...	
	" at Agra	...	...	" at Agra	...	...	
	" at Ulwar	...	...	" at Harroati and Tonk	...	...	
	" at Jhalawar	...	...	" at Sambhar	...	...	
	" at Kotah	...	...	...	...	...	
Erinpura Irregular Force ...	at Harroati and Tonk	...	...	...	...	...	
	at Sambhar	...	...	...	...	...	
	Half-mounting duty	...	...	...	...	...	
	Comd. at Sujangarh	...	...	Comd. at Sujangarh	...	...	
	" at Jodhpur	...	...	" at Jodhpur	...	...	
Meywar Bhil Corps ...	" at Abu	...	...	" at Sirohi	...	...	One of the corps furnishes the escort for the Agent to the Governor-General when on tour.
	" at Pachbudra	...	...	Escort duty	...	...	
	Escort duty	...	...	...	...	...	
	Comd. at Kotra	...	...	...	...	...	
	" at Meywar	...	...	...	...	...	
Mhairwarra Battalion ...	" at Banswara	...	...	...	...	...	
	Detached duty	...	...	...	...	...	
	Comd. at Sambhar	...	...	...	...	...	
	" at Beawar	...	...	...	...	...	
	" at Todgarh	...	...	...	...	...	
	" at Jussalhera	...	...	...	...	...	
	" at Dewair	...	...	...	...	...	
	" at Sarohi	...	...	...	...	...	
	" at Sawpura	...	...	...	...	...	
	On escort duty	...	...	...	...	...	

## H.—CENTRAL PROVINCES.

Reply by the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, to letter No. 2055B, dated 7th July, from the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

## (a) Strength of Native population.

1. The strength of the Native population in the Central Provinces was according to the census of 1872—

- (1) 8,176,419, exclusive of feudatory States.
- (2) 9,226,129, inclusive of feudatory States.

## (b) Strength of European and Eurasian population (exclusive of army).

2. The strength of the European and Eurasian population (exclusive of the army) was 2,025.

## 3. The questions which might be raised in endeavouring to discuss and illustrate "the state of feeling"

(c) State of feeling.

(d) Elements of danger.

will be contented on this point with a brief and very general statement of the character and condition of the different sections of the Central Provinces population, in so far as their circumstances may comprise inducements to breach of order. These two sections therefore—“(c) State of feeling,” and “(d) Elements of danger”—will be considered together.

## 4. The population of the Central Provinces is mostly agricultural, with an admixture of the commercial element not more than sufficient to carry off the produce of the land, and to provide for the wants of the overgrown agricultural and commercial villages, and

## Character of the Central Provinces population.

people. Many of the towns even are really contain but a small proportion of the floating class, which nominally looks to service as a profession, and really lives very much on others. It is thus free from one of the chief sources of disturbance in Upper India; and the agricultural community is not here, as in the North-Western Provinces, largely made up of proprietary brotherhoods, every member of which shares the independent spirit of the landlord class, and has a strong sense of his personal claims to consideration. The preponderance of this sturdy class in the rustic population must undoubtedly enhance the difficulty of dealing with a general rising in the North-Western Provinces.

5. In the Central Provinces the bulk of the people has settled down within comparatively recent times; and the proprietary families, who either led or benefited by the immigration of cultivators, have not yet split up and multiplied so as to create a large proprietary class. Thus the mass of the ordinary agricultural population has no ambitious family traditions, and is not tied together by a hereditary and territorial bond. The elements of disorder, in short, do not present themselves here in the same form as in the better known and longer settled country to the north. On the other hand, there is a large aboriginal or semi-aboriginal population, in a low state of civilization, which may easily be led astray by men of superior position; and they find leaders, not only in their own natural chiefs, but among the Hindu landlords, many of whom, belonging in their own country to peaceable and industrious castes, such as Lodhis, Ahirs, or Kurmis, have in Gondwana developed into petty Chiefs, commanding a considerable following, and often assembling it for their favorite amusement of shooting parties. Much of our trouble in the so-called “Bundela rebellion” of 1843, and in the insurrection of 1857-58, was derived from men of this class, particularly in the Saugor and Nerbudda territories.

## 6. The disturbances of 1842 commenced in the Bundela States on the northern frontier of the Central Provinces; but they rapidly spread through the Vindhyan districts of Saugor and Damoh to the Nerbudda valley, and for several months kept most of the Saugor and Nerbudda territories in constant disorder. To quell them it became necessary to collect troops from Bhopal, the North-Western Provinces, and Nagpur, for the purpose of reinforcing the garrisons at Saugor, Jubbulpore, and Hoshangabad. Eventually the insurrection was suppressed; but it was regarded by the Supreme Government in so serious a light as to require an entire change of the local administrative system and an infusion of new blood into the governing body.

## Bundela insurrection of 1842.

7. In 1857, the Saugor, Damoh, Jubbulpore, and Narsinghpur districts were overrun by petty Chiefs and landholders, chiefly of the Hindu agricultural races, but in some cases belonging to the aboriginal stock which furnished most of the insurgent rank and file. Damoh and Mandla were for a time actually abandoned, though afterwards recovered; and in Saugor and Jubbulpore the European residents had to confine themselves to fortified places at head-quarters. It must be added, however, that both at Saugor and at Jubbulpore there were mutinous sepoy regiments to be counted with; and Saugor was further exposed to the inroads of predatory Pathans from Bhopal and of Bundela Chiefs from Central India. Hoshangabad remained fairly quiet, except in the Nimawar pargana across the Nerbudda, which has since become part of Holkar's territory; and Nimar, though it passed through considerable excitement and danger, is said to have shown “no signs of disaffection.”

## Disturbances of 1857, Northern districts.

8. Leaving now the northern districts on the Vindhyan plateau (Saugor and Damoh), and in the Nerbudda valley (Mandla, Jubbulpore, Narsinghpur, Hoshangabad, and Nimar), and passing on southwards to Seoni, Chhindwara, and Betul, on the Satpura plateau, the records of 1857 become more favorable. The whole of this wide and often wild hill country remained quiet throughout the disturbances; though it comprises a large aboriginal population and several extensive chiefships. But I think that, in guarding against future disorder, these territories, with their half-educated Chiefs and uncivilized population, cannot be left altogether out of account. Though the Gonds and similar races may have on former occasions held themselves harmless; and though they are generally good-natured and law-abiding enough, this very submissive element in their character may be, and often is, turned against

## Central districts.

Gold population.

never occasions held themselves harmless; and though they are generally good-natured and law-abiding enough, this very submissive element in their character may be, and often is, turned against

the law by their Chiefs; and they might be more easily excited by local mismanagement or general contagion than the better educated and better provided agricultural settlers. In the days of Mahratta rule, these tribes were regarded as really formidable by the district authorities. Captain Blunt, who travelled from Benares to Rajahmundry in 1795, experienced the greatest difficulties and dangers in many of his followers were cut off and seen no more. The Gond Chiefs habitually authority; and Captain Blunt was regarded as most fortunate in having penetrated safely through their country, though he was often obliged to deviate from his route.\* Although they have since been thoroughly pacified by orderly administration, they have not emerged from their semi-savage ignorance, nor lost the stolid courage of their race. In Seoni, too, there is a large and influential body of Musalman landholders who, until of late years, were content to guide themselves as much or more by easy semi-Hindu local custom as by the uncompromising spirit of their law. But they have not escaped the general Musalman revival; and, in the event of future troubles, all of them at any rate could not be depended upon as proof against the fanatical propaganda to which they would certainly be subjected.

Musalman landholders of Seoni.

9. Below the Satpura hills lie the districts of the Nagpur province proper and the backward and remote Chhattisgarh division, with its large leaven of independent or partially controlled feudatory and other chiefships. From the settled population of these territories little danger need be anticipated. It is true Nagpur contains a large city population, the Musalman element in which gave cause for anxiety in 1857; and among its residents are the representatives of two former dynasties (Gond and Mahratta), who might possibly be used as levers of disaffection by intriguing persons, as actually happened with the heirs of the Gond line of Gurha Mandla at Jabulpore in 1857.† But as time goes on any risk of the kind will lessen; and I should be sorry to attach, even by implication, any imputation of disloyal feeling to the gentlemen who now represent the former Gond and Mahratta ruling families.

Nagpur province.

The country population, however, of the Central Nagpur plains showed no signs of sympathy with the insurrectionary spirit of the time; and the people of Chhattisgarh proper were, and are mostly, too poor and humble in spirit to create any apprehensions. But in some of the southern chiefships dividing the Chanda district of Nagpur from the Hyderabad State, a rebellious feeling was shown; and two European telegraph employes were murdered. So, too, one of the Chhattisgarh Chiefs rose against the Government. But, on the whole, this part of the country was far more orderly than might have been expected, considering the bad character which the outlying chiefships had once borne, and the wild nature and habits of much of their population.

Disturbances in Nagpur and Chhattisgarh.

10. In Sambalpur, however, to the extreme south-east, which was then attached to Lower Bengal, the British authorities had a far more difficult part to play; for disturbances continued on a greater or smaller scale and with more or less intermission from September 1857 until January 1864, when they were finally brought to an end by the apprehension of the insurgent Chief, Surendra Sa, who is now under detention as a State prisoner. Since then the province has remained quiet; though in 1876 there were disturbances in the Bastar Feudatory State, lying to the south-east of the Nagpur country, to suppress which it was thought necessary to call out troops; and, at the time of the present writing, the so-called "Rampa" disturbances have spread up into what was until 1874 part of the Upper Godavery district of these provinces, and it has been necessary to send troops and police from here to aid in restoring order.

Sambalpur rising.

11. To sum up. Except at the principal places,—*viz.*, Nagpur, population 84,441; Jabulpore, population 55,188; Kamptee, population 48,831; and Saugor, population 45,655,—where there are already, and

Bastar and Rampa disturbances.

always must be, troops, the urban population of the Central Provinces need not be taken into account as a serious element of disturbance. But out of a total population of some nine millions, at least two millions belong to the aboriginal races in various stages of advancement, but nowhere reaching a high standard of civilization. Throughout the north and centre of the province, but more particularly in the Satpura plateau, there are still many landholders who affect the status of petty Chiefs, and who at need could collect a considerable following. To the south there are large feudatory and other States, occupying a considerable area of wild country, and constituted on a footing which reserves to some a large measure of independence, to all more or less immunity from close supervision. The feudatory States alone cover an area of some 30,000 square miles, with a population exceeding a million in number; and the non-feudatory chiefships are also very extensive. Then, as to external relations, the province is almost surrounded either by foreign territory or by chiefships enjoying various degrees of independence. To the north the Central Provinces march with Holkar's possessions, Bhopal, Rewah, Hatta, and other Central India States, only touching British territory on the southern border of the Lalatur district. To the west Holkar is again a neighbour; and there is a point of contact with the Khandesh district of Bombay; but the greater part of the frontier joins Hyderabad territory. So much of the Nizam's dominions as is comprised in the Assigned Districts of Berar is, however, in point of order and security at least on a level with our own possessions. On the southern frontier, which is very short, as the Central Provinces here narrow down to a point, there is an outlying fragment of the (Madras) Godavery district, in which the Rampa disturbances are now going on. To the east the adjoining country, all more or less wild, consists of the Jeypur State, under Madras management, the Cuttack Tributary Mehals, and the south-western frontier agency of Bengal. Of a total external boundary of some 2,700 miles, 160 only march with regularly settled British territory. Thus, in estimating the risks to which the province may be exposed, sufficient allowance must be made for the chances

Conclusions.

External frontier.

\* Asiatic Researches, Vol. VII, page 142.  
† They were set up as leaders by mutinous sepoys and others, and were tried and blown away from guns.



of disorder in the neighbouring Native States, and for the unsettled character of the tribes which occupy most of the remaining frontier.

12. The constitution and location of the military force, by which the province is now protected, was finally determined by Sir R. Temple, in consultation with the military authorities and with his own official superiors and subordinates in 1866. A note by Mr. L. Neill "On the distribution of Madras troops in the Central Provinces," which is appended to this paper, will show how thoroughly the whole question was discussed, and how little room is left for its reconsideration. After reviewing all that has been written on the subject, and attempting to make my own independent estimate of the military wants of the province, I am unable to suggest with confidence any material reductions of the existing force; and the changes of distribution which I can recommend are but slight.

13. We have now full regiments of Madras Native infantry at Saugor, Jubbulpore, Kamptee, and Raipur; wings at Kamptee, Nagpur,\* Hoshangabad, and Sambalpur; and detachments at Sironeha (two companies) and Chanda (one company). The Chanda and Sironeha detachments are supplied by the regiment at Nagpur; and the Hoshangabad wing by the regiment at Kamptee; and the Sambalpur wing is furnished from Berhampore in the Madras presidency. There is further a British regiment of infantry at Jubbulpore, with a detachment of three companies at Saugor; a British infantry regiment at Kamptee, which sends a certain number of men annually to the Invalid Depot at Pachmarhi; two field batteries at Kamptee and one at Saugor; regiments of Madras cavalry at Kamptee and Saugor; and detachments from Indore, European and Native, in the fort of Asirgarh. In discussing the sufficiency of this force, I will leave out of account for the present the European troops, both because, owing to their value and the risk of exposing them to the climate during two-thirds at least of the year, they can only be employed in emergencies, and, having regard to the possibility of such emergencies, any tampering with their numbers would be admittedly dangerous. In any scheme of defence or protection, however, it cannot be forgotten that they are the ultimate security on which all else depends; and for such a purpose, over such an extent of country, two regiments are certainly not an excessive contingent. The Madras cavalry regiments would probably be more suitable for taking part in military expeditions on a comparatively extended scale than for isolated action in the suppression of disturbances. It is to the Madras infantry that the province must mainly look for armed force in operations not actually amounting to war, but beyond the grasp of the police.

14. Of these regiments, that at Saugor is an important charge and ample to keep up a force at Saugor; and on our own account treaty with Bhopal, we are bound the district must be guarded against the notoriously turbulent Bundela population on the north, and possible outbreaks of fanaticism or lawlessness in the usually well-ordered State of Bhopal to the west, whilst its own population is largely penetrated by the Bundela spirit, as was abundantly made manifest both in 1842 and in 1857. It will be observed from the reply to paragraph 3 that the Major-General Commanding at Jubbulpore considers the Saugor force not strong enough.

15. For the protection of Jubbulpore and the surrounding country I was at first inclined to think that a wing of Native infantry might be sufficient. But on reconsideration I doubt whether less than a whole regiment should be maintained there, at any rate in troubled times. Not less than four companies would be required at Jubbulpore itself, to guard the railway junction and the town, which is an important centre of commerce and of communication with the surrounding territories, Native and British, and to furnish armed force for small expeditions against local outbreaks. It would also be probably necessary to maintain a detachment of at least two companies at Seoni, 85 miles south of Jubbulpore and 80 north of Nagpur, to keep open communications on that important and central highway, running through a district where we might certainly anticipate some sympathy with any general tendency to disturbance. This would leave two companies only to detach in case of need for the protection of other neighbouring towns or districts, such as Mandla or Narsinghpur, or of the northern frontier, which marches with Native States, if it be held, as I assume to be the case, that we should not in future subject ourselves to the danger, loss, and discredit of abandoning British districts to disorder and plunder, and that our policy should be one rather of timely prevention than of disregard to immediate security in the certainty of eventual success.

16. If it were possible to rest satisfied that half a regiment would be enough for the wants of Jubbulpore and the surrounding country in times of trouble, then we might perhaps dispense with the wing which is now maintained at Hoshangabad in the Nerbudda valley, some 161 miles from Jubbulpore; for the second wing of the Jubbulpore regiment would be available, wherever emergency arose, for the duties now performed by the troops at Hoshangabad. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army has lately raised the question whether the cantonment at Hoshangabad may not be abolished, and the troops dispensed with; and certainly the completion of railway communication between Jubbulpore and Bombay materially alters the conditions of military protection in the Nerbudda valley. If troops could be spared at Jubbulpore, three or four companies might now be sent from there to Hoshangabad at a day's notice, whilst, when the existing distribution of military force was made, the march would have occupied at least ten days. On the other hand, it must be remembered that from Bombay to Jubbulpore, a distance of more than 600 miles, the only troops on or near the line of railway are at Hoshangabad, Asirgarh (in Nimar), and Malegaum (in Khandesh). The small garrison at Asirgarh could not be moved about; and thus the Hoshangabad wing is the only available force along a length of some 450 miles of railway. As now posted, it guards the line of the Nerbudda where it is intersected by the chief approach from the south to Bhopal; and though the rulers of that State have hitherto rendered a loyal support to the British power, they were not able to prevent excesses on the part of their subjects both in 1843 and in 1857, and there is always a risk that the accidents of succession may bring

\* At Nagpur there are five companies.

about a changed state of feeling in a Musulman State, among whose governing classes there is notoriously a strong infusion of religious zeal. Thus it seems very probable that, even if the Hoshangabad cantonment were abolished, any general disturbance in the feeling of the country would make it necessary to detach a wing for service at Hoshangabad, or some neighbouring place, for the purpose of guarding the railway, watching the line of the Nerbudda and the Bhopal and Indore frontier, and securing the district against local disturbances among the half-civilized population of the southern hill ranges. On the whole, therefore, I am not sure that much advantage would be gained by doing away with Hoshangabad as a military station. The strength of the Native infantry now maintained in the Nerbudda valley could not, I think, be safely reduced in times of difficulty, against which we must always be on our guard; and thus the only question to consider is one of distribution. If I am right in thinking that troops would be required at or near Hoshangabad in the event of general disturbances, it might be a pity to break up existing arrangements and send the wing elsewhere, with the prospect of having to bring it back to some place unprovided with accommodation for troops on the occurrence of the first serious emergency.

17. The Hoshangabad force is at present supplied from Kamptee, where there are now an entire regiment of Native infantry and the second wing of the Hoshangabad regiment. There is also the head-quarters of a Native infantry regiment at Nagpur, ten

Kamptee and Nagpur.

miles from Kamptee, which provides detachments of two companies for Seroncha, 217 miles south-east, and of one company for Chanda, 96 miles south of Nagpur. The regiment at Kamptee may be regarded as portion of the moveable column which is maintained there, and, as such, would ordinarily be available for active operations in the field. The remaining wing is no more than would be required to maintain the guards and perform other garrison duties at Kamptee. The five companies of Native infantry ordinarily stationed at Nagpur are certainly not too large a force to watch the city, and guard the head-quarters of the province, the terminus of the railway, the ordnance depôt, and the Sitabaldi hill fort.

18. With regard then to Nagpur and Kamptee, there will probably be little difference of opinion as to the suitability of the existing force; but it has been questioned whether there is the same need for maintaining detachments at Chanda and Seroncha.

Seroncha.

After giving my best consideration to all that has been advanced on the subject, whether when the existing distribution of troops was determined, or for the purposes of the present discussion, I am inclined to think that we might now perhaps dispense with the small garrison at Chanda, but that, unless it be considered undesirable on military grounds to maintain a detachment so far from its supports, Seroncha is a point which it is very desirable to hold by military force. It was ceded to the British Government in 1860 by His Highness the Nizam, and at that time the country was a prey to constant disorder and violence. Sir R. Temple thus writes of it in his report on the Navigation of the Godavery: "I may mention a few instances (of the lawlessness of the people). In May 1860 the Bhopalpatnam Chief attacked the Noogoor sub-division and plundered six villages. Early in the same year one of the Chiefs under Bastar robbed a caravan of traders, and carried off Rs. 2,500 worth of their property. In the same year the people of the Cherla and Bhadrachallam sub-divisions went on for some time plundering each others villages. In 1859 the Cherla Chief plundered two villages in the Bastar country, whereupon the Bastar people retaliated by plundering six villages in the Noogoor sub-division. In the same year a party from the Bastar country entered the Bhadrachallan sub-division, and forcibly drove off all the cattle. Again the Cherla Chief attacked a village near Dumagudium, tortured the headman, and took off Rs. 2,000 worth of jewels. These instances might be multiplied."—(page 47.)

19. The location of a small garrison at Seroncha was first advocated in 1863 by Colonel Taylor, Inspector-General of Police, on the grounds that the situation was naturally strong; that it commanded the river Pranhlita and its junction with the Godavery; that, lying between the Hyderabad territory and the feudatory chieftship of Bastar, it would be a convenient point whence to counteract disturbances in these States; and, lastly, that its isolated position laid it dangerously open to attacks from plundering bands of Rohillas. Sir Richard Temple, the then Chief Commissioner, in consideration "of the position (of Seroncha), the importance of the interests involved, and its remoteness from any aid in the time of need," strenuously maintained the necessity of garrisoning it, notwithstanding opposition from the Madras military authorities, who naturally objected to their regiments being broken up. Finally, Sir R. Temple's views were accepted, and two companies were detached to Seroncha in 1864. Since then they have twice been called out—once in 1876, to support the Deputy Commissioner in putting down a disturbance in Bastar; and at the present moment they are actually engaged in co-operating with troops from Madras for the suppression of the so-called Rampa riots. At the request of the Madras Government, the strength of the detachment has been increased to a wing, one company of which alone is retained at Seroncha, whilst the other three are to be posted at places along the left bank of the Godavery.

20. Thus, independently of the great weight which must be attached to the opinion of Sir R. Temple, I think events have shown the utility of strengthening Seroncha as a point for the maintenance of order among the wild population of Bastar and of our own territory lower down the river. The Hyderabad territory has for many years been well and strongly governed; and therefore the value of Seroncha as an outwork on that side has not yet been definitely tested. But we know, from the adventures of the Brahman dacoit leader recently captured in Hyderabad territory, that the Hyderabad population still comprises large numbers of hereditary freebooters, who are ready to raid and plunder in force on the first opportunity; and indeed it is understood that the insurgent bands on the Godavery are at the present moment largely incited and supported from the Hyderabad side. Colonel Glasford, who was for many years Deputy Commissioner and Settlement Officer at Seroncha, and who is probably better acquainted with the wants and condition of that part of the country than any other living European officer, is strongly in favor of retaining a garrison at Seroncha; and is of opinion that, if we had held it in 1857, the outbreak in the southern chiefships of the Chanda



district, by which two Europeans lost their lives, would never have occurred. He writes of Seroncha : " It may be said to be an advanced outpost of British authority occupying an important position both for attack and defence. Situated at the confluence of two large rivers, it looks out over a wild and outlying portion of the Nizam's territories; it out-flanks the most remote and inaccessible parts of the Chanda zemindaries, and it is situated on the best line of approach to the Bastar territory." Colonel Glasford's reasons, with the considerations above stated, seem to me conclusive in favor of the maintenance of a garrison at Seroncha; but, on the other hand, it must be admitted that the companies there are in an isolated position, the distance from Seroncha to Chanda being 120 miles by a mere track, mainly passing through His Highness the Nizam's dominions. Indeed, if troops are no longer to be kept at Chanda, the nearest supports to Seroncha would be at Nagpur, 100 miles further; and I have already said that I think the small detachment at Chanda might possibly be dispensed with.

21. Until lately it was undoubtedly very necessary to give military protection to Chanda. It is close to the Hyderabad frontier, and, in the words of Mr. C. Bernard, then Commissioner of the Nagpur

Chanda,

Division, "the whole of this border is somewhat remote from the head-quarters of the Hyderabad Government; and on one occasion at least within the last 30 years large bands of armed Arabs have appeared on our boundary, and burnt one village before their rulers could put any check upon them from Hyderabad. Twice at least during the past five years there have been rumours, with more or less of foundation, that armed bands were going to cross the Wardha and attack Chanda. These rumours were much credited by the Natives of these parts; and I am confident that they could be much oftener current if it were not for the Native infantry detachment. On the whole, I am myself of opinion that the decision was a wise one which placed a garrison at Chanda. I believe also that two companies is quite as small a body of men as could usefully be quartered at a place which is somewhat remote (at least six days) from support." Since Mr. Bernard wrote, just 10 years ago, a State railway has been completed from Wardha, on the Great Indian Peninsula line, to Warora, which is 28 miles only from Chanda, and thus, if it were threatened, it would be possible to bring troops from Nagpur in two or three days. If, therefore, the gain in point of discipline of abolishing a small outlying command be thought to counterbalance the advantages of maintaining a station of support for Seroncha, and of securing Chanda against the possibility of apprehension, Chanda might be deprived of its small garrison.

22. Lastly, I think no change can be recommended in the strength or distribution of the force which protects Chhattisgarh, viz., a regiment of Madras

Chhattisgarh.

Native infantry at Raipur and a wing at Sambalpur.

These garrisons were finally fixed at their present strength in 1866, after consideration of the facts stated as follows by Sir R. Temple :—

"He is now prepared to recommend that the permanent garrison should consist of an entire wing of a regiment. The experience of 1863 has shown Mr. Temple the extreme difficulty of sending reinforcements to this remote station during the rainy season—the period of the year when disturbances would probably occur if any were contemplated. This, coupled with the consideration of the unhealthiness of the climate and the proximity of troublesome neighbours, such as the Khonds and other homogeneous tribes, and the doubtful, though not actually disloyal, conduct of the Gurjhat States of late years, has led him to the conclusion that to ensure perfect safety the military force should not for the future be below a wing of a regiment.

"In the papers forwarded with the memorandum under reply, the Madras Government proposes to detach to Sambalpur a wing of the regiment stationed at Raipur, thus dividing the Raipur regiment between these two places. But the Chief Commissioner is not prepared to recommend that this arrangement should be carried out. Raipur is the head-quarters of the Commissioner of Chhattisgarh. It has a large central jail and a treasury. The nearest military station is Kamptee, at a distance of 200 miles. To the north and south there are immense tracts of country entirely without military posts. Although the Chief Commissioner does not apprehend any danger, still he is of opinion that to leave this large territory comprising many thousand square miles, occupied by so many independent and half-civilized States, and interspersed with tribes of uncertain temper, to the protection of so weak a force as the wing of a Native regiment, would, both from a political and from a military point of view, be imprudent. Furthermore, in the event of any trouble arising in Sambalpur, or in the neighbouring States, Raipur would be the only station from which reinforcements could be conveniently sent. With this view a full regiment should be kept at Raipur. A wing would not suffice to afford any sufficient reinforcement. Moreover, it is to be borne in mind that, with the present low numbers of a battalion of Native infantry, a wing does not give any considerable force of effective men for active service. Mr. Temple therefore believes it to be really necessary that an entire regiment of Native infantry should be stationed, as at present, at Raipur, and that a wing from the regiment at Cuttack, or from any other station of the Madras presidency which may be more convenient, should be placed permanently at Sambalpur; and he trusts the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council will be pleased to accede to this proposal.

"By these means there will be just enough force at Sambalpur to hold our own for a time in case of trouble, till reinforcements arrive, and just enough force at Raipur to afford such reinforcements. And this much of military force is essential for the security of British dominion in these parts."

23. The Chhattisgarh country is thus described by the present Commissioner, Colonel Lucie Smith :—

"The Chhattisgarh division has an area of 39,987 square miles, and contains 6,434 khalsa villages, 13 feudatory States, and 49 smaller chiefships, with a population, according to the census of 1872, of over 2½ millions of souls. The country may be described as having in the centre an open, well-cultivated plain, surrounded on all sides by a broad belt of forests and hills, which is especially difficult and extensive on the north-east and south. There is but one made road in the whole country, namely, that connecting Raipur with Nagpur and Kamptee; and during the rains and early winter months cart traffic is not possible for any distance, except on this one line. The races residing in the

plains are mostly of a quiet and law-abiding character; but the population of the hilly and forest tracts are wild Gonds and Khonds, not always easy to manage. The only troops stationed in the division are one Native infantry regiment at Raipur, and a wing of a second Native infantry regiment at Sambalpur; while the nearest military station to Raipur outside the division is Kamptee, some 175 miles distant. This force of 1½ regiments seems by no means large for an isolated tract of country, which is between one-fourth and one-third the size of the Madras presidency,\* and much of which is ruled by semi-independent chieftains, each with a following of sepoys of sorts, while a considerable proportion of the population are wild and uncivilized."

24. It must be remembered that, though the cultivating classes of Chhattisgarh proper are a submissive and law-abiding race, much of the territory comprised in the chiefships is of the wildest character, and is inhabited by uncivilized tribes, who, having nothing to lose, and no settled habits, may at any moment be roused into violence. As has been seen, the Sambalpur country was kept for years in a chronic state of disorder by the influence of one discontented Chief; and the government of the feudatories is often so capricious and irregular as to require from the district officers constant intercession in order to keep the peace between them and their subjects. A railway has now been commenced to Chhattisgarh; and, when it is completed, it may be possible to reduce the Raipur garrison to a wing. But till then, I think, the question of reduction of military force in Chhattisgarh is not even one open to discussion.

25. On the whole, if considerations of economy are to be treated as predominant, and there must

Reduction where least injurious.

be reduction somewhere, I think the Central Provinces could most easily spare the wing at Hoshangabad, which could then be transferred to Sambalpur, so as to set free the wing now furnished by the regiment from Berhampore in the Madras presidency. But having regard to the points which it would be necessary to guard and occupy in times of trouble, the force provided for the protection of the province seems to me by no means too large, and I could not conscientiously recommend that it should be permanently reduced by a single corps. If reductions are to be made, perhaps the Army Commission may be able to devise some means of lessening the number of men employed in times of peace, whilst maintaining the present number of cadres and providing for their being filled up at short notice to their full strength. Here, perhaps, there would be some difficulty. Native regiments, especially Madras corps, are called upon to serve at long distances from their homes, in to them foreign countries; and if their members were dispersed, it might be a work of time and trouble to bring them together again to their appointed station. In considering these questions, it will probably not be forgotten that reduction in the Native army will pretty certainly involve increase in the police; and in this connection questions may arise on which it will be advantageous that the Army Commission should express an opinion. Probably there is no reason why some of the work of protection, which is now done by the comparatively costly agency of sepoys, should not be undertaken by semi-military police or militia, trained to act together, but maintained in an inferior, and therefore less expensive, way. In that case it would be necessary to bear in mind that since a constabulary on the model of the Irish police was first introduced, it has (in this province at least) lost some of its original military character. District superintendents are now no longer drawn from the army; and owing to the increase of the ordinary duties of the police in consequence of the regular progression of the country, and the new calls made on their time by sanitation, vital statistic registration, and the like, the force has not much spare time for drill, and has but an inconsiderable trained reserve available for united action. As police charges are now provincial, and as provincial funds have to bear a continually increasing burden, there is a constant temptation, amounting indeed almost to a necessity, to keep down the cost of the police, as one of the heaviest items of provincial expenditure; and if the strength of the army be reduced, it may be advisable to guard against this tendency.

26. The strength of the police at the close of the year 1878-79 was 8,507 officers and men.

- (e) Strength of police.
- (f) Distribution of police.
- (g) Efficiency of police.

The distribution of the police (f) is shown in the annexed statement; and as regards the efficiency (g) of the police, it may suffice to note (1) that—

3,133 men are armed with carbines,

576 men are provided with swords and batons,

4,768 men are provided with batons only,

the remainder being recruits; and (2) that, generally speaking, the force suffices for the prevention and detection of crime in the several towns and districts and for the maintenance of a small reserve at the head-quarters of the several districts.

27. The European and Eurasian population in these provinces is very small, except at Nagpur

and Jabulpore. At the former place, if it is correctly computed, it amounts to 901, of which a large portion must consist of women, children, old men, or railway servants; for the strength of the Nagpur Volunteers after all that has been done by example and encouragement to swell the roll is 103 only. The male adults of the railway population cannot be taken into account, as they have a corps of their own. At Jabulpore, with

a recorded European and Eurasian population of 477, there are no general volunteers, and probably not enough men available to make up an independent body; but there is a railway company, with 53 effective members. The only other places where the numbers of Europeans and Eurasians are not absolutely insignificant are Khandwa (181), Harda (85), Saugor (89), and Kamptee (261). In the two latter the Europeans returned must mostly belong to the families of officials, though there are a certain number of clerks and pensioners.

\* The Madras presidency has an area of 139,698 square miles.

23. Volunteers, where they exist, being drawn almost exclusively from the Government and

(3) Development of volunteer system.

Railway services, can only be counted upon to set free regular troops for other duties in a few very exceptional cases. No doubt, a volunteer corps might be used to support Native troops in quelling a sudden and serious tumult; or it might be most valuable if the Native troops themselves showed signs of disaffection, and it became necessary to hold them in check till assistance came; or, if the project, once so much mooted, of providing each large European community with a fort of refuge for troubled times, had travelled beyond the stage of discussion, it is obvious that a body of men trained to act together would have greater facilities for defending themselves than a mere disjointed assemblage of clerks and other civil officials. Their volunteer training would double their strength as a garrison, and the security of their position behind walls would relieve them of immediate anxiety about their families, and so set them free for organized watch and ward. Here the case is supposed of disorder so complete and general as to confine the European population within more or less fortified enclosures at central stations, and to prevent them from going about their ordinary avocations; but, in a less extreme case, when the country is uneasy but we still retain our hold of it, most of the volunteers would be required to carry on their regular work, and would have little or no time for military duties. In seasons of trouble, as at other times—more indeed than at other times—the public business must be promptly and efficiently performed, trains must run, offenders must be tried, supplies must be collected, and the revenue must be got in. A volunteer force can thus only take the place of regular troops either in a moment of sudden danger, when its services are only momentarily required, or in the last extremity of all, when the ordinary machinery of society is suspended, and the only duty left is that of resisting extirpation. In these provinces at any rate we cannot hope that the volunteer force will ever be considerable enough to count much towards the protection of the country; but something will be gained if the present discussion should revive the schemes for enabling the scanty European population to make the most of its strength, in case of need, by the aid of fortified enclosures. Possibly, and indeed not improbably, such forts might be made the means of strengthening and concentrating the volunteer organization, by providing volunteers with a centre of interest and of duty, in which even the older and less robust members of the community might find a useful place, and even of enhancing their defensive power, by training all effective volunteers to the use of guns.

29. What I had to say on this point has been anticipated in my reply to paragraphs (c) and (d).

General military requirements of the province—

(a) for garrison purposes and the maintenance of order;

(b) for internal and external military purposes irrespective of (a).

The opinion of Major-General Browne, Commanding the Saugor District, is, however, appended, and will show that he thinks the force at Saugor hardly strong enough, and would reinforce it with a company of European infantry from Jubbulpore. Major-General

Walker, Commanding the Nagpur Force, considers the troops at Kamptee sufficient for all requirements.

The 9th August 1879.

(Sd.) C. GRANT,

Offg. Chief Commr., Central Provinces.

Statement showing the strength and distribution of the Police Force (district and municipal) in each district of the Central Provinces, including Railway Police.

District.	Inspector general.	District superintendents.	Assistant district superintendents.	Inspectors.	European constables.	Chief constables.	Head constables.	Constables.	Mounted police.	Total.
Nagpur ...	1	1	1	7	3	19	110	818	40	1,000
Bhandara ...	...	1	...	3	...	10	40	356	7	426
Chanda ...	...	1	...	5	1	16	70	515	10	627
Wardha ...	...	1	...	3	1	11	57	368	12	453
Balaghat ...	...	1	...	2	...	6	31	197	5	242
Jubbulpore ...	...	1	...	5	3	16	86	584	14	709
Saugor ...	...	1	...	5	1	19	75	625	14	740
Damoh ...	...	1	...	3	...	10	52	307	7	380
Seoni ...	...	1	...	2	...	7	37	257	8	312
Mandla ...	...	1	...	2	...	7	34	247	5	296
Narsinghpur ...	...	1	...	3	1	9	49	320	5	388
Chhindwara ...	...	1	...	3	...	9	39	320	5	383
Betul ...	...	1	...	3	...	8	45	278	5	340
Hoshangabad ...	...	1	...	4	1	12	73	503	10	604
Nimar ...	...	1	...	4	2	10	57	361	10	445
Raipur ...	...	1	1	3	...	15	56	398	18	492
Bilaspur ...	...	1	...	3	...	0	35	242	8	298
Sambalpur ...	...	1	...	2	...	0	45	206	10	363
Total ...	1	18	2	62	13	202	1,000	6,908	202	8,507

No. 1431, dated Jubbulpore, 3rd August 1879.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL H. R. BROWNE, Commanding Saugor District,  
To—The Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces.

I have the honor to acknowledge your letter No. 3224-175 of the 31st July 1879, requesting my opinion as to the general military requirements for garrison purposes and maintenance of order at Saugor and Jubbulpore.

2. The present garrisons are as follows :—

*Saugor.*

- 1 Field Battery Royal Artillery.
- 2 Squadrons Madras Cavalry.
- 3 Companies British Infantry.
- 1 Regiment Native Infantry.

*Jubbulpore.*

- 1 Squadron Madras Cavalry.
- 5 Companies British Infantry.
- 1 Regiment Native Infantry.

3. Each of these garrisons furnishes a moveable column, kept at all times in readiness for immediate service.

The Saugor Column consisting of—

- 1 Battery Royal Artillery,
- 2 Squadrons Madras Cavalry,
- 3 Companies British Infantry,
- 4 Companies Native Infantry,

and the Jubbulpore Column of—

- 1 Squadron Madras Cavalry,
- 2 Companies British Infantry,
- 2 Companies Native Infantry.

Transport for  $\frac{1}{2}$  battery Royal Artillery is also maintained for this Column, but at present guns are not available at the station.

So far as the maintenance of order is concerned at either station or in the extensive districts surrounding, I have no doubt that these columns are sufficient (but not more than sufficient) to meet any emergent requisition for aid from the civil authorities. When not specially employed, the troops composing these columns are available for, and take their share of, the ordinary duties of their respective garrisons.

4. The situation of either garrison in the absence on service of its moveable column must, however, be considered.

At Saugor there would remain—

- $\frac{1}{2}$  Battery Royal Artillery.
- 4 Companies Native Infantry.

At Jubbulpore—

- 3 Companies British Infantry.
- 6 Companies Native Infantry.

5. The position at Saugor would under such circumstances be decidedly critical ; for it is isolated, and at certain seasons not easy of access. I should not have the same anxiety as regards Jubbulpore, which has communication on the main lines of railway. Neither garrison, in the absence of its moveable column, could do more than to guard public property, and perhaps afford some check upon the population in the two cities adjacent to the cantonments.

6. Jubbulpore might look to Allahabad for the  $\frac{1}{2}$  battery Royal Artillery required to complete its moveable column; but, with that exception, these garrisons are the only reliable military aid in large areas of country. There is nothing nearer to Saugor than the garrison of Nowgong, itself isolated and distant 11 days' march. The nearest garrison to Jubbulpore (excepting Allahabad, which could hardly be in a position to spare troops) is Kamptee, distant 17 days' march.

7. As regards ordinary routine duties for guard and escort, these garrisons are about on a par with other stations in India.

The troops have a fair amount of relaxation, but not more than is necessary for health and efficiency in point of military training.

8. The only recommendation that I should feel justified in making for the consideration of the Government of the Central Provinces is, that the British regiment should be equally divided between Saugor and Jubbulpore, giving Saugor the advantage of an additional company, which would be a better distribution in every respect than at present.

No. 163, dated Kamptee, 2nd August 1879.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL M. WALKER, V. C., C. B., Commanding Nagpur Force,  
To—The Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces.

Referring to your letter No. 3224-175, dated 31st July 1879, I have the honor to state that in my opinion the force at Kamptee is ample for garrison purposes, as well as for the maintenance of order. The force is compact, and, being judiciously concentrated as it is, is capable of being drawn upon in case of any disturbance in the district.

*Note on the Distribution of Madras Troops in the Central Provinces.*

1. The question of the construction of new lines for the Madras troops located at Hoshangabad has lately been, and is still, under consideration, and the Major-General Commanding the Nagpur Force in a letter No. 163, dated 1st April 1879, to the Quarter-Master-General, Fort St. George, remarked: "It is impossible to obtain at Hoshangabad a site free from defects. The station is very old and dilapidated. I am unable to see the necessity for troops there."

A copy of the letter was forwarded to the Chief Commissioner with the Quarter-Master-General's No. 147—3153, dated 12th April 1879; and in this letter the Chief Commissioner's attention is asked to the general question of the location of troops in the Central Provinces. The location is the same now, it is said, as it has been for many years past; and the question is as to the necessity at the present day of maintaining the same distribution as was found expedient some fifteen years ago.

2. In the Quarter-Master-General's letter it is asked—

- (1) whether it is necessary to retain a wing of a Native regiment at Sambalpur;
- (2) if necessary, whether it would not be preferable to detach a wing from the regiment at Raipur rather than from the regiment at Berhampore;
- (3) whether a wing is required at Hoshangabad; or whether it would not be better to place a complete second Native regiment at Kamptee;
- (4) whether it is necessary to maintain military detachments at Chanda and Sironcha.

3. The Chief Commissioner having desired that a note should be put up after examination of the old records, these records were sent for. They were received in some eight bundles and were found to be greatly mixed up. A chronological arrangement was then made, and I have now arranged from 70 to 80 papers in orderly sequence. To each paper I have given a number in red ink; and when in the course of this note it is necessary to refer to such paper, it will be referred to by its red ink number.

4. In letter No. 181, dated 6th June 1862, (1) the Brigadier Commanding the Nagpur Force reported on the strength of the military force, which, in his opinion, was required for the Chanda district. He had with the Chief Commissioner gone to Chanda and talked the matter over with the Deputy Commissioner. He found that the military were apparently asked for on these grounds:

- (i) because of apprehensions of dacoits;
- (ii) because of dreaded attacks or incursions by Rohillas from the Nizam's country; and
- (iii) lest at any time there should be disturbances and an overthrow of the government at Hyderabad.

As to (i), the Brigadier thought the apprehensions unfounded, and that the police would be able to keep down dacoits. Similarly the fears as to (ii) seemed exaggerated; while there was nothing to warrant the fears on the third head. The Brigadier, however, thought 200 men needed for the defence of Chanda; and as he found it difficult to send them from the regiment at Kamptee, he proposed that the garrison at Chanda should be composed of men of the late 2nd Nagpur Regiment.

5. The Chief Commissioner replied in letter No. 2229, dated 14th June 1862, (3) from which I take the following extract:—

"In the joint-report recently presented by Colonel Elliot and the Officiating Chief Commissioner, it was indeed recommended that Chanda should be garrisoned by a frontier police of 400 men to be formed from the 2nd Regiment Nagpur Irregular Force. But since the submission of that report the arrangements made by the Resident of Hyderabad for the military occupation of the Wun district on the Wardha river, opposite Chanda, have rendered the Chanda district more secure than heretofore. And after a personal visit to Chanda made in conjunction with yourself, the Officiating Chief Commissioner is convinced that 200 men will now suffice. Being fortified by your opinion on the above point, the Officiating Chief Commissioner has now caused the 2nd Regiment Nagpur Irregular Force to be entirely broken up, and has ordered a police reserve of 200 trained and selected men to be placed at Chanda. For the present then the Officiating Chief Commissioner will not further press his request for any regular military force at Chanda."

6. The rest of the letter was taken up with matters regarding troops at Raipur and elsewhere; and paragraphs 3 to 11 are—

"(3) The Officiating Chief Commissioner fully appreciates all you say regarding the heavy duties devolving on the Madras Native infantry at Kamptee and Sitabaldi. Still, having regard to the position of Raipur and to the positive orders received from the Supreme Government regarding retrenchment of police expenditure, the Officiating Chief Commissioner was constrained to suggest to you demi-officially the desirability of despatching a wing of Madras Native infantry to Raipur by as early a date as might be conveniently practicable. In conveying to you the Officiating Chief Commissioner's cordial acknowledgments for your prompt compliance with this requisition, I am now to explain to you officially why a wing of Madras Native infantry is required at Raipur.

"(4) In a letter dated 30th September last, from the Supreme Government to the Chief Commissioner, it was laid down that the ultimate and entire reduction of the infantry of the Nagpur Irregular Force was to be kept steadily in view, and to be carried out as rapidly and effectually as might be safe and practicable. The same instructions then went on to prescribe that 'the place of the infantry regiments as they are reduced will be supplied by regular regiments of the Madras Native infantry; but it is expected that Chanda and Raipur will not each require a whole regiment for their garrison. A wing will probably hereafter be found ample.'

"(5) After that it was indeed proposed by Colonel Elliot and Mr. Temple to maintain at Raipur a frontier police battalion of 400 men to be formed out of the 1st Regiment Nagpur Irregular Force. But the recent orders already alluded to regarding further retrenchment of police expenditure rendered the Officiating Chief Commissioner desirous of reverting to the authority above cited for the breaking up of the 1st Regiment, provided that some military force could be obtained for Raipur. And further the recent addition to the Central Provinces, Sambalpur and its dependencies, which do, as you are aware, comprise a difficult frontier requiring military support, made Mr. Temple

still more desirous of securing a wing of Madras Native infantry at Raipur in the manner laid down by the Supreme Government. The Officiating Chief Commissioner now having received intimation of the despatch of a wing, is arranging for the breaking up of the 1st Regiment, and for the absorption into the police of those men who may elect to stay in the service.

"(6) The lines and buildings at Raipur recently occupied by the 1st Regiment Nagpur Irregular Force will be entirely available for the men of the Madras Native Infantry.

"(7) It will be in your recollection that the expediency of a wing of Madras Native infantry being stationed at Raipur was urged on the Officiating Chief Commissioner's notice by Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce, the Inspector-General of Police for India; and I am to add that the views expressed in preceding paragraphs are by that officer concurred in.

"(8) I am to take this opportunity of observing that the Officiating Chief Commissioner has already intimated that there is no longer any civil or political reason for retaining the detachments at Narsinghpur and Betul. These can, so far as this administration is concerned, be returned to their head-quarters at Hoshangabad, if that should be convenient to you. There will then be no detachment of Native infantry within the Kamptee military division, except those at Nagpur itself.

"(9) The Officiating Chief Commissioner is indeed aware that the Nagpur detachments (Sitabaldi) are numerous. But ultimately he trusts that the abolition of the arsenal at Sitabaldi will set free the greater part of these detachments. As you are aware, the above measure was recommended by Colonel Elliot and Mr. Temple; and recently, on a reference made by the Supreme Government, the Officiating Chief Commissioner reiterated that recommendation.

"(10) I am to add that, if after the return of the Narsinghpur and Betul detachments to Hoshangabad, you should think fit to call two or three companies from that regiment to Kamptee, there can apparently be no civil or political objection to that arrangement.

"(11) I am to take this opportunity of stating that the general arrangement and distribution of the mounted branch of the police in these provinces has been made on the supposition that there will be some regular cavalry maintained at Kamptee. There will be not more than 100 police sabres in the Nagpur district, of which there will not be more than 30 at Sitabaldi. None of the neighbouring districts, will have more, and most will have less. In the event of any emergency then, there will not be any police horse which could be placed at the disposal of the military authorities. This point will be immediately brought to the notice of the Supreme Government. The Officiating Chief Commissioner, however, believes that it is intended to station some cavalry, either regular or irregular, at Kamptee."

7. In order that the Madras Government might arrange for the permanent location of troops at Raipur, the Brigadier, in letter No. 193, dated 20th June 1862, (5), asked that the sanction of the Government of India might be procured. Letter No. 2493, dated 14th July 1862, (6), was then addressed to the Government of India in the Military department; and in it reference was made to a report submitted to the Home Department (not in the file) regarding the new organized constabulary.

8. In a letter No. 2521,\* dated 16th July 1862, to the Brigadier, the Chief Commissioner, referring to his letter noted on and quoted in paragraphs 5 and 6, explained officially the circumstances under which he had suggested the expediency of detaching two companies Madras Native infantry to Chanda. These circumstances were that as men of the 1st Nagpur Irregular Force at Raipur had elected to take their discharge with gratuity in preference to serving in the police, it was thought likely that their comrades who were to serve in Chanda would similarly elect. The anticipation was correct; and apparently two companies Madras Native infantry were at once sent off to Chanda. For the Chief Commissioner thanked the Brigadier for his promptitude in despatching them, and promised hereafter to communicate his suggestions as to whether the two companies should remain there, or whether Chanda should be garrisoned by men of a new police reserve.

9. In letter No. 2693, dated 6th August 1862, to the Home Department (No. 8), copy of which was forwarded to the Foreign Department, the Chief Commissioner detailed how the arrangements for garrisoning Chanda with men of the Nagpur Irregular Force, who were to be converted into reserve police, had fallen through, and he continued:—

"(5) The Chanda reserve having thus ceased to exist, the Officiating Chief Commissioner provided immediately for the garrison certainly required for that station, by moving the Brigadier Commanding the Nagpur Force at Kamptee to detach two companies of Madras Native infantry to Chanda. These troops are now there.

"(6) All things considered, Mr. Temple does not now recommend the formation of a new police reserve for Chanda. But he would revert to the arrangement sanctioned to be made in paragraph 25 of letter No. 5661\* of the 30th September 1861, from the Secretary to Government of India in the Foreign Department. By that arrangement, one wing of a Native infantry regiment would be stationed at Chanda and one at Raipur. He would propose that this be permanently carried out for the two stations.

\* \* \* \* \*

"(8) The stationing of a wing of Native infantry at Raipur and a wing at Chanda need not, in the Officiating Chief Commissioner's opinion, entail any increase to the regular Native troops in the Nagpur division. This force now consists of three regiments, two at Kamptee and one at Hoshangabad. An entire regiment is now at Hoshangabad, the detachments heretofore at Betul and Narsinghpur having rejoined their head-quarters. But, in point of fact, a wing furnishes ample force for Hoshangabad; and heretofore there has never been more than a wing at that station. In this case, then, a wing from Hoshangabad could be sent to Kamptee. And the force at Kamptee would thus be made up to 1½ regiments, even after the despatch of a regiment for Raipur and Chanda.

"(9) The past and proposed distribution may be thus compared :—

	Kamptee.	Hoshang- abad.	Narsingh- pur.	Betul.	Raipur.	Chanda.
Past ...	2 regts.	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0
Proposed ...	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	$\frac{1}{2}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$

"The Officiating Chief Commissioner is confident that in a military and political point of view the proposed distribution is preferable to the former one.

"(10) It might further be desirable to strengthen the force at Kamptee by an additional wing of Native infantry from Jubbulpore. It would be admitted on all hands that a wing (instead of a whole regiment as at present) would suffice for Jubbulpore. In that case the regiment at Jubbulpore could furnish a wing to Hoshangabad, which could be transferred to the Jubbulpore command; and the entire regiment at Hoshangabad could be transferred to Kamptee, which could then have two regiments."\*

\* Paras. 8, 9 were communicated to the Military Department.

10. The communication to the Military Department was in letter No. 2695, dated 6th August 1862\*; and in asking sanction to the permanent location of wings at Chanda and Raipur, the Chief Commissioner referred to the addition

of Sambalpur to the Central Provinces, and to Chanda being a frontier district. He also referred to the need of a squadron of cavalry at Kamptee.

The Government of India passed orders on this reference in letter No. 94, dated 4th October 1862, to the Government of Fort St. George, (10), copy of which was sent to the Chief Commissioner under endorsement No. 95; and the orders were—

"(2) The Governor-General in Council entirely concurs with the Government of Fort St. George in thinking that the Nagpur Irregular Force at Kamptee and Sitabaldi should be not less than two regiments; and the location of a complete corps of Native infantry at Raipur would be preferable to the unnecessary division of a regiment.

"(3) As, however, a wing is now required at Chanda also, His Lordship in Council considers it necessary to fix the Nagpur Irregular Force for the Nagpur province at four instead of three regiments; and these should be distributed as follows :—

Kamptee and Sitabaldi	...	...	...	2 regiments.
Hoshangabad	...	...	...	1 regiment.
Raipur and Chanda	...	...	...	1 "

The proposal of the Chief Commissioner to place a full regiment at Kamptee and a wing only at the other four stations would involve the permanent division into wings of two regiments, and would, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, be inexpedient on other grounds also.

"(4) In order to avoid the division of the regiment at the two remote stations of Raipur and Chanda for a longer period than one year, the corps so divided might be relieved annually from Kamptee, returning either to the latter station or to some other as may be most convenient.

"(5) With respect to the artillery, I am to state that it was far from the desire of the Government of India that the reduction of the remaining Native artillery should be expedited by any summary measures; and as it appears that the removal of a European battery from Kamptee would not facilitate the reduction (as was supposed at the time letter No. 605, dated 17th May, was written) while there is accommodation for it elsewhere, the battery must of course remain at Kamptee for the present. But the Governor-General in Council will be glad to know, as early as convenient, how the Government of Fort St. George proposes finally to distribute the batteries of artillery, the maintenance of which in the Madras presidency has now been decided on.

"(6) It will rest with the Government of India in the Financial Department to decide whether the cost of the wing of the light cavalry and the battery of artillery which will thus be located in the province in excess of its requirements should be debited to Nagpur."

11. The Chief Commissioner acknowledged this letter in his No. 3376, dated 17th October

† (11).

1862†; and, while observing that he had no remarks to make regarding the strength of the Native infantry regiments allotted to the province, four instead of three, said, in regard to its distribution, that the scheme of Government provided a whole regiment for Hoshangabad and half for Raipur. He thought the provision should be altered, half-regiment being assigned to Hoshangabad and one regiment to Raipur. He said :—

"(3) Hoshangabad has no elements of trouble in its immediate neighbourhood. To the north there is the friendly and well-ordered State of Bhopal. To the west the territory of Holkar is dominated by the large cantonment of Mhow. To the south-west Khandesh is securely held by Bombay troops. Of late years at least Hoshangabad has never had more than half a regiment. Its having a full one just now is merely owing to the withdrawal of detachments from neighbouring stations under the new police system. On the other hand, Raipur is the only support to the eastern frontier, which is in itself wild and troublesome, and adjoins petty Native States of indifferent character. It will be in the recollection of Government that a rebellion in Sambalpur has but recently been quelled; and none can be sure whether disturbance might not break out again in that quarter. Adjoining Sonpur (to the south of Sambalpur) there is Bond, an ill-conditioned tract; and below that again the turbulent Khond tribes, extending a considerable distance southwards. To meet all ordinary contingencies, perhaps the wing at Raipur, together with the organized police in that quarter, may suffice; but at the best it would be just sufficient and no more. On the other hand, support is distant, the nearest being Nagpur. Moreover, Raipur has been heretofore held by a full regiment of the Nagpur Irregular Force.

"(4) These considerations appear to the Officiating Chief Commissioner to show that if there be any reserve force disposable, a part at least should be at Raipur rather than at any other out-station.



The Officiating Chief Commissioner would, therefore, recommend the following distribution of Native infantry force now fixed by the Supreme Government:—

					Regiments.
Kamptee	...	...	...	...	2
Raipur	...	...	...	...	1
Hoshangabad	...	...	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$
Chanda	...	...	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$
Total					4

"(5) There would be no more difficulty in dividing a regiment between Chanda and Hoshangabad than between Chanda and Raipur. Indeed there would be less; for the communication between Chanda and Hoshangabad is fair, whereas between Chanda and Raipur it is bad."

12. This amended distribution proposed by the Chief Commissioner was sanctioned by the Government of India, Military Department, in letter No. 455, dated 15th November 1862, to the Government Fort St. George, sent to us under endorsement No. 456 (12), which enquired whether any extra expenditure would be incurred by this distribution. The Chief Commissioner replied in letter No. 3G., dated 13th December 1862, (13B), that the only extra expenditure would be in accommodation at Raipur, but that he felt sanguine that such expenditure would be small.

13. In a letter No. 583,\* dated 12th February 1863, to the Chief Commissioner, the Government of India, Military Department, asked if special circumstances rendered it necessary for Government to construct quarters for officers at Raipur and Chanda, as it was not usual to construct quarters for officers, especially at stations fixed on as permanent posts for regiments or wings.

The reply was (letter No. 202C., dated 11th March 1863, (27) ), that the accommodation for officers at these stations is exceeding by small, and that it was thought at one time that it might be necessary to address the Supreme Government on the subject. The necessity had, however, passed away.

14. After a visit to the Chhatisgarh division, the Chief Commissioner found it necessary to address the Government of India in the Military Department regarding troops for Sambalpur; and this he did in letter No. 205C., dated 11th March 1863 (28).

After adverting to the rebellion in Sambalpur, to its isolated position, the excitable nature of its inhabitants, and of the surrounding Native States, its distance from Raipur, and the overlapping on the line of road of the Phuljhar State, where a small force might keep a large one in check, it was said:—

"For the reasons above stated, the Officiating Chief Commissioner begs to recommend the following modifications of the present distribution of the Native troops in the province as recently sanctioned by the Supreme Government:—

- (1) A detachment of not less than two companies from the regiment at Raipur to be permanently located at Sambalpur.
- (2) The detachment of the Raipur regiment now at Chanda to be withdrawn from that station to its head-quarters.
- (3) Two companies or more up to a wing as already sanctioned, according to what for military purposes may be considered most advisable by the military authorities, to be detached to Chanda from the regiment at Hoshangabad.

"With these modifications, the Officiating Chief Commissioner believes the distribution of the Native troops will be such as entirely to meet the existing political requirements of the province."

15. On the 2nd September 1863, Colonel Taylor, the Inspector-General of Police, Central Provinces, forwarded to the Chief Commissioner a memorandum† on the Seroncha (Upper Godavery) district. He referred to a fort which commanded the upper and lower reaches of the river as well as the opposite or right bank, and to the medical opinion that the place when cleared would not be unhealthy; and then said:—

"As a strategic position, it appears to possess peculiar advantages. Some of these may be set forth as follows.

"The situation is naturally strong, and by artificial means might be made much more so. It commands the river Pranrita and its junction with the Godavery. It is the nearest point of the Central Provinces to the city of Hyderabad, to which there is a direct road from Seroncha by Chinoor. There is also another and somewhat longer road by Kulaishwar, Mahadepur, and Warangall. The latter is a large town in the Nizam's dominions and has a strong fort. If at any time military operations were to be undertaken from the Central Provinces in the Hyderabad country, an advance upon Hyderabad city could be more advantageously made by either of the roads from Seroncha than by the upper road which crosses the Wardha near Warora in the Chanda district or by the road from Chanda itself. A force if proceeding by the Warora road would have to pass over the hills north of Nirmull at the Mukulgunder Ghât (goat's pass), which is said to be a very strong position. It would also have to cross both the Painganga and the Godavery rivers at a considerable distance from our own frontier. If advancing by the Chanda road, it would have to cross the Godavery under similar conditions; and an enemy would doubtless take advantage of these crossings to offer a serious resistance. But on the road from Seroncha such difficulties would not be encountered. The Hyderabad road *via* Warangall, which is the most frequented and the one by which an invading force would advance, crosses the Godavery at Kulaishwar, which is only 2 miles from Seroncha and at the junction of the Godavery and Pranrita. On the first outbreak of hostilities, a detachment would naturally be at once thrown across the Pranrita and seize upon Chinoor and Kulaishwar. The former is 12 miles from Seroncha. This would give us the command of the small doab between the two rivers (Pranrita and Godavery) and possession of the high roads to Hyderabad and Warangall. The country through which the road from Seroncha passes is also preferable, from being through a more populous and cultivated country where supplies for an army could be more readily obtained.



"The distance to Hyderabad by each route is shown in the margin. In the event of disaster, the safe passage of the Pranhita by a retreating force would be secured by a battery on the Seroncha fort and a favorable position provided for a successful resistance. These advantages would not exist on either of the other roads unless previously prepared. Again, if hostilities were commenced

Warora to Hyderabad	... }	Miles. 310
Chanda "	...	
Seroncha "	...	170
" to Warangall	...	80

in the Hyderabad country, although no troops might be sent from the Central Provinces, still the occupation of Chinoor and Kukaishwar would be a politic measure, and one which would go far to prevent any aggression into our territories from beyond the Pranhita; but such occupation could only be made with promptitude from Seroncha. From there it could be effected at a day's notice by a party from the garrison; and the proximity of the main body at Seroncha, ready to reinforce the detachment if necessary, and the facility of furnishing it with supplies from the sudder station, would relieve the authorities of any anxiety on its account."

The Inspector-General also thought that its geographical position indicated Seroncha as a desirable military station; thus it lay between the Nizam's State and the feudatory chiefship of Bastar, and both these States would be kept in check by the presence of the military at Seroncha. Trade would also, by the presence of a military force, be attracted to Seroncha. Lastly, the Inspector-General dwelt upon the isolated position of the place, the small police force there, and its probable inability to resist any armed Rohilla bands bent upon plunder. The Inspector-General therefore recommended that, when a wing of a Native infantry regiment was located at Chanda, 200 men should be detached for duty at Seroncha. The memorandum was submitted to the Government of India in the Military Department with our No. 4010, dated 11th September 1863, (30), copy being sent to the Foreign Department; and the Chief Commissioner, without endorsing all the remarks of the Inspector-General, said:—

"The Officiating Chief Commissioner is constrained to admit that, considering its position, the importance of the interests involved, and its remoteness from any aid in a time of need, Seroncha is not sufficiently protected; and the Officiating Chief Commissioner would therefore recommend, for the consideration of the Government of India that a detachment of Native troops should be sent there.

"The Officiating Chief Commissioner had recently the honor to submit to the Government a proposal that one wing of the Native regiment stationed at Hoshangabad should be transferred to Chanda, to enable the military authorities to concentrate a full regiment at Raipur. The Officiating Chief Commissioner understands that this proposal, so far at least as regards the movement of the wing from Hoshangabad to Chanda, and the transfer of the detachment now at that station to Raipur, has been approved of. He would now recommend that of the wing to be so transferred to Chanda, two companies only should remain at that station, and the other two companies be moved on to Seroncha, and permanently cantoned there. The Officiating Chief Commissioner believes that if this arrangement were carried out, then two companies would suffice for Chanda, as the detachments there and at Seroncha would mutually support one another, while the general military defence of that portion of the Central Provinces frontier would be improved."

16. In a letter No. 4909, dated 5th November 1863, (31), the Officiating Chief Commissioner solicited the Military Department to pass early orders on his request for a transfer of a wing of the regiment at Hoshangabad to Chanda, and to the location of a full regiment at Raipur; and in letter No. 605, dated 26th idem, (32), the Military Department said that orders in the sense desired had issued to the Madras Government.

17. A reply to the proposal to sub-divide the wing proposed for Chanda and send two companies to Seroncha was made in Military Department letter No. 616, dated 27th November 1863, (33). The sub-division was on military grounds strongly objected to; and the belief was expressed that the Chief Commissioner would not for the sake of providing troops for Seroncha advocate the addition of a fifth regiment of the Nagpur Irregular Force in the Nagpur province.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Madras, had, however, expressed the following views:—  
"If troops must be at Chanda, and Seroncha is to be its outpost, His Excellency thinks that it is better far to send a regiment from the Northern Division to occupy those two places."

The Officiating Chief Commissioner, however, did not think it proper to allow the subject to drop, and dealt further with it in letter No. 5604B, dated 17th December 1863, to the Military Department (34A). In that letter he said:—

"(3) The sense of the importance of the subject which the Officiating Chief Commissioner previously entertained has not diminished. He therefore thinks that he would incur a grave responsibility if he did not again bring the matter under the notice of Government.

"(4) In my former letter it was proposed to detach two companies from the wing of a Native regiment which has been ordered to be located at Chanda. But this is now objected to by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army. And it is added that if troops are to be at Chanda, and Seroncha is to be an outpost, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief thinks it is better to send a regiment from the Northern Division to occupy those places.

"(5) The Officiating Chief Commissioner fully appreciates the objection to breaking up a regiment into small detachments. And he would now therefore submit that the measure suggested by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, or a measure similar thereto, should be carried into effect.

"(6) The measure which His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has suggested would have the effect of keeping a full regiment at Hoshangabad, instead of a wing there and a wing at Chanda. And it would be for the Supreme Government to decide whether that course should be adopted, or whether it would be more advisable to detach a wing only for Seroncha from one of the regiments stationed in the Northern Division, allowing the arrangements already made for Hoshangabad and Chanda to hold good.

"On this point it is only necessary for the Officiating Chief Commissioner to state that, while he considers a garrison necessary at Seroncha, and that if a smaller detachment than a wing cannot be allowed, then a wing should be stationed there, it would not, in his opinion, as previously reported,

be requisite, for local reasons, that Hoshangabad should be garrisoned by a larger force than a wing of a regiment. And what he would now solicit is, that a garrison be supplied for Seroncha from the Northern Division, and that if a smaller detachment than a wing cannot be allowed, then a wing be sent there from one of the stations of the Northern Division.

"(7) In regard to the observation in your letter with reference to the division into wings of two Native regiments, which has been already ordered in accordance with the Officiating Chief Commissioner's recommendations, the Officiating Chief Commissioner would desire to remark that, while this has been done in order to provide for the efficient defence of these provinces at points needing protection, the detachments which were formerly stationed at Damoh, Narsinghpur, and Betul have also, on the recommendation of the Officiating Chief Commissioner, been withdrawn. In regard to the limitation of the various garrisons to the bare strength which might be necessary for purposes of defence, the Officiating Chief Commissioner believes that this would be generally regulated according to the views of the Military Department. But the Chief Commissioner hopes he is correct in understanding his responsibility to be in pointing out the various localities which, so far as he might be able to judge, required means of military defence. And this view alone has guided him in the several recommendations which he has from time to time made. The general principle of those recommendations has been that there should be certain central military stations occupied in force partly on account of local, partly from strategical, reasons of a general or imperial kind. And that, besides these central garrisons, there should be smaller posts established at places at or near the frontier of these provinces where the necessity from prudential motives to have a military force at hand might exist. On these principles the central military cantonments of Kamptee, Jubbulpore, and Saugor are maintained; and the frontier posts of Hoshangabad, Chanda, and Sambalpur, supported by Raipur, have been either maintained or established under the Officiating Chief Commissioner's recommendations. It is on the same principle that he recommended the establishment of a garrison at Seroncha. And as it is in the Officiating Chief Commissioner's opinion certainly of equal importance as compared with the other frontier posts, he trusts that it may be sanctioned by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council."

18. There seems some *hiatus* in the correspondence; for the next letter in the file, (36), is No. 549, dated 3rd February 1864, from the Chief Commissioner to the Government of India in the Military Department, and has regard to the disturbances raised by Sorrunder Sahi in the Sambalpur district. The Sambalpur station had then been garrisoned by two companies from Cuttack; but these companies were fully occupied with guard and other duties at head-quarters, and could not, as was desired, accompany the district officer on a tour through the petty chieftaincies of Sambalpur. As such a tour seemed in itself desirable, the Brigadier Commanding the Nagpur Force, at the instance of the Chief Commissioner, ordered a company of infantry to proceed from Raipur to Sambalpur for this duty. The letter continued:—

"(7) Since then events have developed themselves still further in Sambalpur. Sorrunder Sahi and fourteen of his principal adherents have been arrested and sent to Raipur under a strong military escort; and for the time matters bear an improved appearance in the district. But the opinion of the local authorities points strongly to the advisability of the military force at Sambalpur consisting for some time to come of not less than four companies of Native infantry; and in this the Chief Commissioner concurs. The effect of the measures which have been carried out recently in Sambalpur is, it is true, repressive, and such as to strengthen, or to give hopes of still further strengthening, the hands of the local administration. But as it is possible that the surrounding Chiefs may be in some degree implicated in the designs of Sorrunder Sahi and his adherents, and as knowing this they may for some time to come remain in fear of ulterior measures being taken against themselves, it seems prudent to anticipate any reaction in the present tendency of affairs by strengthening the military garrison of Sambalpur, and maintaining it at such increased strength for a period of moderate duration, say at least one year.

"(8) Under this view the Chief Commissioner has, pending the orders of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, requested the Brigadier-General Commanding the Nagpore Force to detach another company from Raipur to Sambalpur, in addition to the company already detached as noted above (paragraph 6).

"9 I am now accordingly to submit, for the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the advisability of permitting the two companies thus detached from Raipur for service in the Sambalpur district to remain there as an addition to the existing garrison.

"(10) In conclusion, I am to observe that, as will be in the recollection of Government when the garrisoning of Sambalpur was first mooted, a year ago, it was decided that it would be better to garrison it by two companies from Cuttack than by a similar detachment from Raipur. If the Government should still be of opinion that a detachment should not be furnished from Raipur, then perhaps two additional companies could be furnished from the Northern Division of the Madras army. Or, if Government should accede to the proposal made in this office No. 5604B., dated 17th December 1863, for a wing of a Native infantry regiment to be sent from the Northern Division to garrison Seroncha, it might perhaps be a suitable plan to allow a full regiment being sent from the Northern Division to take the duties of both Seroncha and Chanda; the latter station being now garrisoned by a wing from Hoshangabad, which wing would then become available for Sambalpur, in lieu of making up to the quantity (?) of a wing by two companies from Hoshangabad and two companies from Raipur. There would thus be an accession of troops to the province. But perhaps, rather than injure the discipline of the troops by splitting up regiments into small detachments, it might seem to the Government better to adopt this course. It may, however, when considering this point, be remembered that the stationing of a wing from Hoshangabad at Chanda relieves the detachment of two companies of the Raipur regiment from that station, and therefore if the Government should sanction the proposal now made, and permit the two companies which have been provisionally detailed from Raipore to Sumbulpore by the Brigadier-General Commanding the Nagpore Force to remain at Sumbulpore, then matters will be, in point of discipline, no worse than before."

19. On the Chief Commissioner's proposal\* in regard to troops for garrisoning Chanda and Seroncha, the Government of India in the Military Department came to a decision in letter No. 153, dated

\* Paragraph 17 of this note.

6th February 1864, (40A) to the Government of Fort St. George. The decision was that, "whilst concurring generally in the opinion expressed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of Madras as to the inexpediency of unnecessarily multiplying detachments of troops, the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council is of opinion, after carefully considering the reasons adduced by the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, for the occupation of the place, and in view of the objections to the location in the Nagpur province of a fifth regiment or an additional wing, that it will be on the whole better to adopt the first suggestion, and divide the wing of Native infantry at first assigned to Chanda between that place and Seroncha."

Such being the orders in regard to the garrisoning of Chanda and Seroncha, the Government of India in letter No. 549, dated 18th February 1864, (38) to the Chief Commissioner, expressed its determination that the arrangement for completing the detachment at Sambalpur might be left to a wing of Native infantry from Cuttack.

20. The next letters in the file are connected with the provision of accommodation, &c., for the detachment posted to Seroncha; and their contents need not be further noticed.

21. In a letter No. 165, dated 10th October 1865, (No. 49) the Brigadier-General Commanding Nagpur Force enquired of the Chief Commissioner how long a military detachment would be required at Sambalpur, and if there was any objection to the men of the wing of the 11th Native Infantry under orders for that place taking their families with them. The reply was (No. 341, dated 17th October 1865, (49)) that the Officiating Chief Commissioner (Mr. Campbell) is of opinion that the military detachment should be located permanently at Sambalpur; and the men of 11th Native Infantry under orders for that station should therefore take their families with them.

22. Some uncertainty seemed still to exist as to whether the location of troops at Raipur and Sambalpur should be permanent; and the question was dealt with in the Madras Government Proceedings received with Fort St. George letter No. 4182, dated 11th November 1865. The following extract from the Controller of Military Accounts, Fort St. George, to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, puts the matter clearly. He requested "the sanction of Government to a wing being stationed permanently and without relief at Raipur and Sambalpur; also to a wing being stationed permanently at Hoshangabad and Chanda, the wing at the latter station furnishing the detachment of two companies at Seroncha; such detachment to be relieved every six months.

"These measures are recommended on the grounds that the necessity for a wing at Sambalpur and for detachments at Chanda and Seroncha is a permanent one, and that the distance from Raipur to Chanda and from Hoshangabad to Chanda and Seroncha are too great to admit of even annual relief of wings and detachments from regimental head-quarters."

The Governor of Madras in Council approved of the arrangements proposed in respect of Sambalpur and Chanda, but before issuing final orders forwarded the proceedings to the Government of India and to the Chief Commissioner. The Chief Commissioner briefly replied in letter No. 380, dated 28th November 1865, (51) that he considered the occupation of the stations of Chanda, Seroncha, and Raipur by military troops to be measures of permanent necessity.

23. The Government of India in the Military Department, in letter No. 109, \*dated 4th December 1865, to the Government of Fort St. George, (52), agreed to the arrangements in regard to Chanda and Seroncha, but said "a further communication will be made as regards Sambalpur when a reference has been made to the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces"; and the Chief Commissioner was accordingly asked whether the arrangement sanctioned in letter No. 549, dated 18th February 1864,† should

\* Received under endorsement No. 110, dated idem.

† Paragraph 19 *supra*.  
be continued, and if so, for what probable period.

24. The Inspector-General of Police, Central Provinces, Colonel Taylor, was then asked for an expression of his views regarding the need of troops at Raipur and Sambalpur; and he recorded a minute, No. 7515, dated 15th December 1868, (53), which is as follows:—

"Under existing arrangements there is an entire regiment of Native infantry at Raipur and a wing of a regiment at Sambalpur. The latter is furnished from Cuttack. The Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army proposes to withdraw the Cuttack troops from Sambalpur, and to replace them with a wing of the Raipur regiment. This arrangement would place an equal military force at Raipur and at Sambalpur. Considering the position and circumstances of the two districts, I certainly think that Raipur should have the strongest garrison. Raipur has a central gaol and treasury; Sambalpur has neither. Raipur has no police reserve. At Sambalpur there is a reserve which, under any circumstances of military occupation, must be maintained. At Raipur the jail and treasury guards are furnished by the military. If a wing of the regiment is withdrawn, these guards will have to be given by the police. And the present police force being quite inadequate for this duty, an increase will be required. At Sambalpur the lock-up guard is furnished by the military. If the Sambalpur detachment be reduced, this guard can be supplied by the police without any increase to their numbers.

"The circumstances of the Sambalpur district have materially altered since 1863, when the present garrison was placed there. From a state bordering on anarchy it has passed into one of profound quiet. During the last two years there has been less crime in Sambalpur than in any other district of the province. Crimes of violence have been almost unknown. Since the beginning of January 1864 there has been only one dacoity in the district; and murders have been very rare. Situated between Raipur and Cuttack, in the event of any serious disturbance Sambalpur could be reinforced simultaneously from both of these places.

"For the above reasons I think a permanent detachment of two companies would suffice for Sambalpur. This would leave six companies at Raipur—a force which would be sufficient for the ordinary requirements of the district. A detachment of two companies could be relieved every year, and thus the permanent division of a regiment, to which the military authorities have strong objections, would be obviated.

"As regards Chanda and Seroncha, there appears to be no good reason why Chanda should not be abandoned as a military station, and its detachment pushed on to Seroncha. This would give an entire

wing at the latter station. Chanda is only 100 miles from Nagpur; and there is a good metalled road by which troops could reach Chanda from Kamptee in four days. The adjoining districts of Berar are now occupied by Berar police, who have recently been reorganized; and there is probably as little crime in them as on our own side of the river. As a military position, Seroncha is of considerably greater importance; but as I stated my views fully in my memorandum forwarded with docket No. 2233,\* dated 2nd September 1863, it seems unnecessary to say more upon this subject now."

\* Paragraph 15 *supra*.

25. The Chief Commissioner replied to the Military Department letter noted in paragraph 23 in letter No. 139-397, dated 16th January 1866, (56); and after referring to matters already described in this note, said in regard to Sambalpur:—

"He is now prepared to recommend that the permanent garrison should consist of an entire wing of a regiment. The experience of 1863 has shown Mr. Temple the extreme difficulty of sending reinforcements to this remote station during the rainy season—the period of the year when disturbances would probably occur if any were contemplated. This, coupled with the consideration of the unhealthiness of the climate and the proximity of troublesome neighbours, such as the Khonds and other homogeneous tribes, and the doubtful, though not actually disloyal, conduct of the Gurjhat States of late years, has led him to the conclusion that to ensure perfect safety the military force should not for the future be below a wing of a regiment.

"In the papers forwarded with the memorandum under reply, the Madras Government proposes to detach to Sambalpur a wing of the regiment stationed at Raipur, thus dividing the Raipur regiment between these two places. But the Chief Commissioner is not prepared to recommend that this arrangement should be carried out. Raipur is the head-quarters of the Commissioner of Chhattisgarh. It has a large central jail and a treasury. The nearest military station is Kamptee, at a distance of 200 miles. To the north and south there are immense tracts of country entirely without military posts. Although the Chief Commissioner does not apprehend any danger, still he is of opinion that to leave this large territory, comprising many thousand square miles, and occupied by so many independent and half-civilized States, and interspersed with tribes of uncertain temper, to the protection of so weak a force as the wing of a Native regiment would, both from a political and from a military point of view, be imprudent. Furthermore, in the event of any trouble arising in Sambalpur, or in the neighbouring States, Raipur would be the only station from which reinforcements could be conveniently sent. With this view a full regiment should be kept at Raipur. A wing would not suffice to afford any sufficient reinforcement. Moreover, it is to be borne in mind that, with the present low numbers of a battalion of Native infantry, a wing does not give any considerable force of effective men for active service. Mr. Temple therefore believes it to be really necessary that an entire regiment of Native infantry should be stationed as at present at Raipur, and that a wing from the regiment at Cuttack, or from any other station of the Madras presidency which may be more convenient, should be placed permanently at Sambalpur; and he trusts the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council will be pleased to accede to this proposal.

"By these means there will be just enough force at Sambalpur to hold our own for a time in case of trouble till reinforcements arrived, and just enough force at Raipur to afford such reinforcements. And this much of military force is essential for the security of British dominion in these parts.

"The arrangements for the location of troops at Chanda and Seroncha have been already sanctioned by the Government of India; and as they were made at the solicitation of the Chief Commissioner, and are entirely in accordance with his views, no further remarks seems to be necessary regarding them."

26. The Government of India accepted the Chief Commissioner's views; and in a letter No. 273, dated 8th February 1866, (57), to the Government of Fort St. George, Sambalpur was made a permanent station for a wing of Native infantry. His Excellency in Council also considered it desirable to have a regiment at Raipur, and requested that the wing for Sambalpur might be furnished from Cuttack or Berhampore, or from any other convenient place.

In Madras Proceedings dated 15th March 1866, (58), it was decided to provide the wing for Sumbulpore from the regiment at Cuttack.

27. Some years seem to have passed without any correspondence relating to the location or strength of military troops; and the next reference was in letter No. 146, dated 26th March 1868, (60), from the Brigadier-General Commanding Nagpur Force, in which, setting forth the arduous duties required of the 36th Native Infantry at Sitabaldi, he asked if the Chief Commissioner would "consent to the withdrawal altogether of the Seroncha detachment; or, should this course be found undesirable, if you have any objection to the reduction of the detachments both at Chanda and Seroncha to the strength of one company each." In reply (letter No. 1051-100, dated 4th April 1868, (60A)), it was said that both Chanda and Seroncha are such important political posts on the frontier, that Mr. Campbell would not wish to take on himself to abandon them, and would express a hope that the means may be found of maintaining them at their present strength."

The Brigadier-General thereupon, in letter No. 162, dated 8th April 1868, (61), offered the following suggestion:—

"1st.—That on the arrival of the left wing of the 11th Regiment Native Infantry at Raipur, expected there on or about the 14th instant, two companies of that regiment be ordered to Sitabaldi for duty.

"2nd.—Or that the detachment at Seroncha be relieved by one of a similar strength, to be furnished from the force stationed at Secunderabad."

In letter No. 1225-115, dated 20th April 1868, (62), the Chief Commissioner replied that he doubted whether, in the face of Sir R. Temple's strongly expressed opinion that a full regiment was required at Raipur, two companies should be moved from there to Seroncha; that the garrisoning of Seroncha by companies from Secunderabad seemed a question for the consideration of the Madras Government; and finally, the Chief Commissioner asked whether, for the present at least, the wing at Sitabaldi could not carry on the duties as heretofore.

28. It appears that the difficulty of garrisoning Seroncha by companies of the 36th Regiment stationed at Sitabaldi was referred by the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army to the Government of Fort St. George; and the Brigadier was directed to obtain the Chief Commissioner's opinion on two alternative proposals.

These proposals can best be gathered from paragraphs 3 and 4 of a letter from the Quarter-Master-General, Fort St. George, to the Secretary to Government in the Military Department, forwarded to the Chief Commissioner with the Brigadier's letter No. 233, dated 18th June 1868, (63):—

"(3) It therefore appears to His Excellency that the best way of meeting the necessity will be to relieve the two companies of the 36th at Seroncha by two of the 11th from Raipur, the former rejoining regimental head-quarters at Sitabaldi, at which station, as well as at Raipur, there will then be the head-quarters and six companies of a regiment of Native infantry.

"(4) If this suggestion should not accord with the views of the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, and of the Government of India, the Commander-in-Chief would enquire whether the detachments at Chanda and Seroncha could not be reduced to one company each."

29. The Inspector-General of Police (Colonel Taylor) was then asked for his opinion; and in a (demi-official) letter, dated 19th June 1868,\* he wrote:—

"I would deprecate the withdrawal of a single man from Raipur. In the event of any disturbance in Seroncha or amongst the Gurjats, a whole regiment would probably be required to reinforce Seroncha and keep open the road; and although Raipur is only 180 miles from Kamptee, at some seasons of the year there would be difficulty in sending troops there. Neither would I diminish the garrison of Seroncha, which I look upon as a valuable strategical point for the defence of the Central Provinces. My reasons are fully stated in a memorandum dated 15th August 1863, of which a copy is in your office. But I think the Chanda garrison might safely be reduced by one company. There is a good metalled road to Chanda now; the distance is only 100 miles. The district is bordered to some way beyond Chanda towards the south by Berar, which is administered by British officers. The police on the Berar side are organized in the same way as our own. I do not therefore consider Chanda as of much value as a defensive position, except in so far as it becomes a support for Seroncha; and, except for the purpose of a support, I don't think it would be worth while keeping troops there at all. Considering how easily and quickly it could be reinforced from Kamptee, if additional troops should ever be required there, I think one company would be quite sufficient for the garrison. The transfer of one company to Sitabaldi would give considerable relief to the Native troops."

The above views were generally accepted, and were expressed in letter No. 1933-197, dated 20th June 1868,† to the Officer Commanding the Nagpur Force.

† (66).

By division orders dated 23rd June 1868 (67), the garrison at Chanda was accordingly reduced to one company. The Officer Commanding the Nagpur Force then enquired whether the reduction of the Chanda garrison might be considered temporary or permanent; and was told that it was permanent.

30. In a letter No. 118, dated 8th January 1869, (71), the Officiating Commissioner, Nagpur Division (Lieutenant-Colonel Maclean), represented that the Deputy Commissioner of Chanda (Captain Lucie Smith) urged that the strength of the Chanda garrison should be restored to two companies; but the Officiating Commissioner did not himself support the proposal. The Deputy Commissioner said:—

"Chanda, it will be recollected, is only 4 miles from the Hyderabad frontier, while the nearest British force is 94 miles distant. The city is of considerable extent and of some wealth; and the Government treasury has not unfrequently between two and three lakhs of rupees (in cash and stamps) in store.

"It is not impossible that plundering bands in the Hyderabad side may be encouraged to attempt outrages along the British border, if not on Chanda itself, by the weakness of the garrison maintained; and as the pressure of duty at Sitabaldi, which necessitated the reduction, may now have ceased, I beg to recommend that the company withdrawn may be ordered back to Chanda."

The Chief Commissioner asked the Commissioner (Mr. Bernard) for his opinion; and it was given in letter No. 1351, dated 8th March 1869, (73). It is:—

"When the garrison for the Central Provinces and its distribution was settled by the late Chief Commissioner, it was (I believe) held that some military force equal to the wing of a regiment ought to be placed along our border between Dumagudim and Warora. British territory marches with the Nizam's country for the whole of this distance, or about 220 miles. The whole of this border is somewhat remote from the head-quarters of the Hyderabad Government; and on one occasion at least within the last thirty years large bands of armed Arabs have appeared on our boundary and burnt one village before their own rulers could put any check upon them from Hyderabad. Twice at least during the past five years there have been rumours, with more or less of foundation, that armed bands were going to cross the Wardha and attack Chanda. These rumours were much credited by the Natives of these parts; and I am confident that they would be much oftener current if it were not for the Native infantry detachment. On the whole, I am myself of opinion that the decision was a wise one which placed a garrison at Chanda. I believe also that two companies is quite as small a body of men as could usefully be quartered at a place which is somewhat remote (at least six days) from support. If the Chanda detachment is to be of use in overawing evil-doers who might otherwise trouble our border, I think that two companies is not too large a force for the duty. This was the strength originally decided upon; and I think it should be allowed to remain.

"The temporary want of troops of Kamptee or Sitabaldi was (I believe) caused by the detachment of a regiment from these parts being sent to replace a corps which went to Abyssinia. As the ground for the withdrawal of one of the Chanda companies has ceased, perhaps the company might now be returned.

"I cannot say how far the quiet of the border will be affected by the death of the late Nizam. Most of us hope that under a strong regency at Hyderabad the Government will be at least as strong and as good as heretofore. But I certainly consider that, if ever the Hyderabad Government became

disorganized, or its hold upon its outlying subjects were weakened, Chanda is *the first* place where one should be liable to feel the ill effects of such disorganization."

On this letter there is the following endorsement\* by the Chief Commissioner: "No further orders at present. I may perhaps take the matter up again after talking it over with the Brigadier-General." As the file ends here,

\* 11th March 1869.

I do not think that the question was further pursued.

31. As far as I am aware, there has only been one occasion on which of late years troops have been called on to support the civil authorities; and the occasion was a disturbance in the Feudatory State of Bastar. It is unnecessary to notice the subject here, except for the purpose of quoting the remarks of the Deputy Commissioner of the Upper Godavery District regarding the military force. I take paragraph 44 of his letter No. 529, dated 22nd April 1876 :—

"44. I take this opportunity of making a few remarks on the number and strength of the force at Seroncha. There are nominally two companies of the 8th Madras Native Infantry of the usual strength and 69 police. Of these, there are generally only about 8 or 10 men at head-quarters available on an emergency, three sowars, and two boy-orderlies. In cases of the kind that have just occurred, the regular troops must always be called out; and if at the same time any incursion was apprehended at any time from the Nizam's territory, which is just across the Pranrita river, our means of attack would be *nil* and those of defence but small. There is but one company of regular troops at Chanda; our nearest point, and should the whole of our two companies here be at any time required, Chanda could not send any support worth speaking about. I have felt greatly the want of mounted men; a body of 30 or 40 would have been invaluable. I should have reached Jugdulpore in six instead of ten days (excluding the one day that I halted to enable the support to reach me); and in the majority of risings among these wild tribes, who are greatly in fear of a horse, this force alone would probably have sufficed. I really think another company of regular troops should be stationed at Chanda, and the mounted and foot police of the Seroncha district strengthened."

† Paragraph 9, letter No. 2004-  
82, dated 29th May 1876. The Chief Commissioner thus noticed† this passage in the Deputy Commissioner's report:—

"With reference to paragraph 44 of your report, the Chief Commissioner will consider the question of locating a larger military force at Seroncha; but he thinks recent events show that Bastar is more easily accessible to troops from the Madras than from the Seroncha side, and a larger force at Seroncha might therefore be unnecessary."

The rising in Bastar was not very serious, and was characterized by almost a total absence of violence. It was certainly on that occasion shown that troops could reach Bastar more rapidly from the Madras side than from the Central Provinces, and no action was consequently taken in either strengthening the Chanda or Seroncha garrisons.

32. Leaving out of consideration the garrisons maintained at the large central stations of Kamp-tee (with Sitabaldi), Jubbulpore, and Saugor, which are matters for imperial rather than provincial discussion, this note shows that for outposts in the Central Provinces the following strength was after much discussion fixed :—

1. Raipur	...	One full regiment.
2. Sambalpur	...	One wing to be furnished from Cuttack or Berhampore.
3. Hoshangabad	...	One wing.
4. Chanda	...	Two companies.
5. Seroncha	...	Two companies.

It will have been noticed that by some arrangement not very clearly brought out in the papers from which this note is compiled the detachments for Chanda, &c., came to be furnished from Sitabaldi; but probably it will be accepted that the civil authorities are only concerned in that the fixed strength should be kept up at the several posts, and that it may be left to the military authorities to determine how the regiments can most suitably be divided.

33. As the Chief Commissioner may care to consult Commissioners of divisions on the proposals or enquiries made in the Quarter-Master-General's letter (paragraph 2), I have made this note a lengthy one, for the records show that the original distribution of troops was made without special reference to Commissioners.

(Sd.) LINDSAY NEILL,

The 14th May 1879.

Offg. Secretary to Chief Commr., Central Provinces.

No. 3470-184, dated Nagpur, 14th August 1879.

From—A. H. L. FRASER, Esq., Asst. Secy. to the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces,

To—The President, Army Organization Commission.

With reference to paragraph 27 of the Chief Commissioner's reply to Military Department letter No. 205S.B., dated the 7th July last, I am directed to inform you that the Railway Volunteer Company of fifty-three members shown therein belongs to the Great Indian Peninsula Railway; and that the East Indian Railway has a separate company consisting of fifty men. This information has just come to hand, too late for incorporation in the reply already submitted.

## I.—MADRAS.

No. 4593, dated Ootacamund, 20th August 1879.

From—COLONEL J. MICHAEL, C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Dept.,

To—The President, Army Organization Commission.

I am directed to forward copies of minutes by the several Members of this Government, replying to the questions raised in letter to this Department from the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 204S.B., dated 7th July 1879.

2. The various points are briefly summarized hereunder in the order followed by the Government of India :—

- (a) Strength of Native population. (a) 31,556,993.  
 (b) Strength of European and Eurasian population (b) Europeans 14,505.  
 (exclusive of army). Eurasians 26,374.  
 (c) The bulk of the population is as loyal and well-disposed as can be expected of a conquered people. They recognize the British rule as the only possible one at present, and they recognize its general fairness and justice.

(c) State of feeling.

(d) Elements of danger.

2nd.—In the event of any European or Asiatic complications, which would range Christian and Muhammadan races on opposite sides, the Muhammadan population of Southern India would be naturally agitated, and might become turbulent or even hostile.

(c) Strength of police.

(c) 25,704.

(f) Distribution of police.

(f) Madras Town.	...	1,091
Northern Range	...	6,169
Central „	...	8,820
Southern „	...	9,609

But this includes police belonging to—

Salt Department	...	...	...	...	2,480
Jail guards	...	...	...	...	2,582
Land customs	...	...	...	...	195

5,257

which are not available for ordinary duty.

(g) Efficiency of police.

(g) Efficient for ordinary watching duty, but deficient in European officers and in strength, owing to reduction of the assignment in 1869.

(A) European and Eurasian population considered as—

(1) Strength in combatant power and for the maintenance of order.

(2) Weakness in necessity for provision of safety of non-combatants, women and children.

(3) Of possible greater utility than at present if organized for the maintenance of order in case of disturbance.

(i) Question of compulsory enrolment.

(j) Development of volunteer system.

(a) Besides providing suitable garrisons for Madras and Bellary, not less than ten Native

The general military requirements of the province—

(a) for garrison purposes and the maintenance of order;

(b) This Government, not being cognizant of the internal circumstances and arrangements in

(b) for internal and external military purposes irrespective of (a).

regards Travancore and Cochin, the obligations are ruled by treaties in force, under which the payments for the stipulated forces are made.

(4) (1) Except in Bellary, Chingleput (including Madras), and Malabar (including the Nilgiris), the numbers are wholly insufficient to be of any use as a combatant power. In the above-named places their strength is being utilized by enrolment as volunteers.

(2) The scantiness of this population, as above noted, prevents any necessity for provision of safety of non-combatants, women and children.

(3) The numbers are too small for organization, except the employes on railways, many of whom are enrolled as volunteers—the organization most suited to the classes in question.

(i) No compulsion is desirable.

(j) Development desirable.

police be established, two regiments of cavalry should be within the presidency proper, total sixteen infantry and two cavalry.

the Mysore and Hyderabad territories, give no opinion on the force therein necessary, nor for Burma. As

*Minute by His Grace the President, dated 15th August 1879.*

1. The answers to the Government of India's letter of the 7th July seem to me to be as follows :—

2. (a) Strength of Native population ... .. 31,556,993

(b) Strength of Europeans and Eurasians (exclusive of army)—

Europeans	...	...	...	14,505
Eurasians	...	...	...	26,374

40,879

I consider the large majority of the population passively loyal and contented. Speaking generally,

(c) State of feeling.

I do not think that active support on the part of the people is to be looked for in the case of disturbance, except on the part of active and influential zemindars, &c. I think that there are a considerable number of Hindus who look for the time when they can dispense with foreign rule and rule their own



land. That even they, however, at present recognize the British rule as in the main a just one, and one which they would wish, for the time at least, to continue.

(d) Elements of danger.

I think these may be considered in two classes :—

1st.—Those essential to the nature of the population.

2nd.—Those caused by measures of administration.

As regards the first class, I consider religious fanaticism causing feuds between the diverse races and sects to be the greatest; next I would place the Muhammadan element in the event of European or Asiatic complications in which the Muhammadan and Christian races were opposed; and finally, the large numbers of the population who recognize only the law of might, and are ever ready to gather round the scene of any local disturbance in the hope of plunder.

In the second class, I place measures of excessive taxation, measures giving too arbitrary powers, arrest without warrant, &c., to inferior police officers, and unnecessary interference with established customs and habits of the people as regards their tenures, cultivation, grazing rights, and fuel supply, &c.

As regards dangers from excessive taxation, I mean not only danger from actual resistance to the payment of taxes imposed, but dangers resulting from the comparisons which increasing taxation and increasing abstraction of resulting revenue from the province already induces Natives to draw between States remaining under Native rule, such as Travancore and Cochin, and the portion under British Government, as also with Ceylon. Such comparisons are already made, and will no doubt tend to lessen the value of British rule in the eyes of the Hindus.

They see in Travancore and Cochin a large surplus realized and spent or accumulated and retained within the State. The people of the Madras presidency have but little connection or sympathy with the people of other provinces, and naturally view the presidency as a distinct province; they note, therefore, with feelings of marked discontent a large and an increasing proportion of the revenue raised therefrom taken away from the province.

This is a dangerous feeling to exist and to be allowed to grow. It must not be overlooked that the misrule which British authority superseded does not exercise the influence on the present generation which it did on a former one. Present evils or hardships are far more prominent in the minds of the people than the benefits of a settled Government, of which they have never noticed the want.

As regards dangers from measures giving too arbitrary powers, such as arrest without warrant, to subordinates who are far from control, and where trustworthy supervision is remote—It is, of course, necessary that such power should exist and be exercised whenever criminals are found *flagrante delicto*; but to give it for suspicion and for minor offences is simply giving to the policeman a power of extortion which it will be impossible to check, and which will be for many years to come a means of cruel oppression.

The Forest Act VII of 1878 may be taken as an instance in which power is given to any police

Section 63 and section 25.

Section 25 (e).

Section 25 (g) and section 1.

officer to arrest without warrant in effect any person whom he chooses to suspect of having been concerned in any forest offence he chooses to suppose may have been committed, *e.g.*, removing leaves, alleged carelessness by

a laborer in his employment in felling a tree so as to damage others in falling, taking honey from a wild bees' nest, &c. European supervision, the only one reliable to prevent extortion, is far too small to allow such powers with safety for the people.

Such powers are demoralizing to the police, and will be found dangerous to the Government. However many criminals may escape by necessary delay in getting a warrant, no greater confidence and support will, in my opinion, ever be given to the law, and to the police as guardians of the law, than by the sure knowledge of the people that, except *flagrante delicto*, no person can be arrested on suspicion of a criminal act without intervention of a magistrate.

As regards dangers from interference with established customs respecting cultivation, fuel, &c.—Customs which are bad or conduce to evil must be repressed or abolished, and the action will be approved by the bulk of the people. But customs which do no harm, but are simply at variance with our views of what is best, cannot be traversed without dissatisfaction and without creating sympathy, tending to discontent. If touched, they must be handled with the greatest care.

The abolition of village service inams; the trenching on hereditary tenure of offices; the too free resort (without due consideration of individual objections) to compulsory process to obtain land for what are deemed public purposes, have, I am convinced, exerted a prejudicial influence without benefit.

Forest interference as regards minor produce is an exceedingly dangerous matter. A restriction on supply of fuel or implement wood comes home to every individual—in fact, far more so to the poor than to the rich; and the poor are the most numerous class.

Restriction on cultivation within the forests affects every hillman and every jungle tribe; and unless the greatest care be exercised to secure ample supplies of fuel and implement wood, bamboos, &c., according to custom, and to appropriate ample cultivating grounds for all the forest tribes, suitable to their lives and customs, and for which there is ample scope without any inconvenience to Government rights or forest conservancy, I feel well assured that from such limitations, which amount to direct additional taxation, will follow impatience of restriction, disregard of the law, degenerating into lawlessness, mischievous destruction of the forest, and open, if not active, disaffection to the Government.

I consider these dangers far more to be apprehended than those in the first class.

(e) The strength of the police is ... .. 25,704

(f) Distributed as under—

		Area in miles.	Population.
Madras Town	...	...	1,091
Northern Range	...	40,917	6,752,295 : 6,169
Central „	...	49,959	10,004,726 : 8,820
Southern „	...	47,415	14,094,095 : 9,609



This force includes salt, jail, and land customs guards, being respectively—

2,480
2,582
193
<hr/> 5,257

The force is controlled by—

Supervising staff	...	...	...	...	2
Superintendents	...	...	...	...	21
Assistant superintendents	...	...	...	...	22
					<hr/> 45

(g) The force is deficient in European officers, and would be much improved in efficiency, reliability, and general conduct by an increase of this staff. The force is also deficient of mounted men for which no provision was made; and this want has been fully proved in the case of the Kurnool raids during the famine, in the present troubles in Rampa, as well as in the pursuit of the strong armed dacoit gangs which existed in Salem and Bellary in the last twelve months, and in other cases.

The force as it exists is efficient for ordinary constable's duty, but not fitted by habit, training, or disposition of the men for coping with armed resistance; nor has it sufficient numerical strength to maintain any reserves for prolonged extra duty or unusual sickness. Its efficiency appears to have been much impaired by the reduction of grant ordered in 1869.

(h) (1) The European and Eurasian population is too few to have any strength for combatant power, except in—

Bellary, Chingleput and Madras,	Nilgiris, and Malabar.
In none of the districts of—	
Kurnool,	Canara,
Kistna,	Ganjam,
Cuddapah,	Coimbatore,
Nellore	Madura,
South Arcot,	Tinnevely,
	North Arcot,
	Trichinopoly,
	Vizagapatam,
	Tanjore, or
	Godavery,

do the number of Europeans of all ages and both sexes exceed 500. The Eurasian population similarly only exceeds 500 in the case of—

Tanjore	...	...	...	...	511
Trichinopoly	...	...	...	...	596
North Arcot	...	...	...	...	624
Vizagapatam	...	...	...	...	779
Nilgiris	...	...	...	...	789
Malabar	...	...	...	...	5,365
Bellary	...	...	...	...	951
Chingleput	...	...	...	...	1,537
Madras	...	...	...	...	11,852

Wherever this population exists, it will always enlist itself on the side of order.

(2) There does not appear to be any necessity to provide for safety of non-combatants.

(3) For the reasons above given, organization is not possible, except in the few districts named, in which many are enrolled as volunteers. Many also of those connected with railways in other districts are enrolled in Railway Volunteer Corps.

(i) I am of opinion no compulsion whatever should be attempted.

(j) I consider the volunteer system should be developed by encouragement and facility of drill and instruction, with effective European officers for each corps, and that volunteering in proper places, and under proper rules should be encouraged also amongst the Tamil and Telugu races, of whom mainly our army is composed, whenever offered.

3. (a) I consider that, besides the garrison of Madras, in which I include Palaveram, St. Thomas' Mount, and Vellore, and which I do not think ought to be less than—

Artillery	...	...	...	2 Batteries.
British Infantry	...	...	...	1 Regiment.
Native	...	...	...	4 Regiments.

and the garrison of Bellary not less than—

British Infantry	...	...	1 Regiment.
Native	...	...	2 Regiments.

the force for the maintenance of order should not be any thing less than ten regiments of Native infantry as at present organized; and that, unless the police be strengthened by mounted reserves, at least two regiments of cavalry or 600 troopers should be stationed within the presidency, one regiment in the Northern District, and one regiment in the Southern District.

(b) The treaty stipulations with Travancore and Cochin define the force we are bound and paid to maintain for those States. On the military requirements of Coorg, Mysore, and the Nizam's dominions, I here offer no opinion, it being dependent upon circumstances not wholly known to this Government.

(Sd.) BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

*Minute by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on questions referred by the Government of India to the Government of Fort St. George, dated Ootacamund, 8th August 1879.*

I consider that the state of feeling of the people of this presidency generally may be described as one of passive contentment. They and their fathers before them have been born and bred

(c) State of feeling.

under British rule; and so long as nothing be done by Government to arouse feelings of active discontent, they are not dissatisfied to remain as they are. Further, I apprehend that the proportion of low-caste people and Pariahs is large; whilst the proportion of Native Christians is greatly in excess of that to be found in the other presidencies.

2. Though the great mass of the people are ignorant of the history of their country, or of the means whereby British supremacy was established, they are aware that they have been for many generations a conquered race; and self-government is not thought of.

3. With all this ignorance, it is accepted that there is better security for life and property under the British Government than there was under previous rulers, or than could be expected were the British Government to be supplanted. In short, the strength and value of English law is understood by the people; and the more enlightened of them feel that they stand on an equality before the Courts, and that redress can be obtained for any injury.

4. The acts most likely to become elements of danger would be violent and uncalled-for interference on the part of Government with the religious usages or caste prejudices or customs of the people, or

(d) Elements of danger.

undue or vexatious taxation.

5. Acts of the kind might cause such a general feeling of discontent as to make the population ready to take part in a general revolt; for, peaceably disposed as is the mass of the population of this presidency, there are thousands of men who are ripe for disorder, and who are willing to risk their liberty or their lives if they see a chance of indulging their evil propensities. This desperate class is, however, powerless to influence the people, so long as the mass are not hostile to the Government.

6. Disturbances of a serious nature have often occurred, owing to the blunders or malpractices of subordinate officials; but these have been local, and the ill-feeling has given way to measures of redress.

7. The Mahomedan population, from being a comparatively united body, and from the recollection that they at one period exercised considerable power in this presidency, and indeed all over India, may also be looked upon as an element of danger; though I consider that there is little chance of combined action on their part, so long as they are not stirred up to revolt by indiscretion on the part of Government.

8. It is the custom to give great importance in this presidency to the fanaticism of the Moplah population, but I cannot help thinking that this is done without sufficient cause; for I believe that most of the fanatical outbreaks which have taken place in the Malabar District have been more or less provoked by these people having found themselves unable to obtain redress for injuries such as would be resented by most men.

9. No doubt they can, when exasperated, become troublesome fanatics; but their fanaticism is generally the result of the selfish prejudices of the Nairs, amongst whom they live, and who will grant them no concession, however reasonable—such as a convenient site for a mosque or a burying-ground—which cannot be forced from them in a court of law. Even with these provocations, I believe I am right in saying that hardly ever more than a score of men have been found to band together to sell their lives.

10. No special element of danger seems to exist in the condition of any of the Native States included in the presidency, or in any combination of all of them; though the large number of armed men retained by the various Chiefs in the Nizam's dominions must always give cause for some anxiety as being an element for disorder.

11. This Native army, like any other mercenary army, may always become a source of danger to the State; but I do not believe that it will ever become so in this presidency, provided its rights are respected, and that it is maintained in a proper state of discipline.

12. The possible danger to India from an invasion by a European power calls for no particular remark as regards this presidency, except that should the army of another European power appear on the north-west frontier with the avowed intention of invading India, there can be no doubt that the mind of this Native army and of the people would be stirred up thereby, and that their conduct would be influenced by the result.

13. I think that the Madras police may be considered as fairly efficient for the work ordinarily required of them; but, like the police all over India, they need very careful supervision, or they are sure to oppress the population by various kinds of extortion.

14. I consider, however, that no trust can be placed in the police, as now organized, for putting down armed resistance of a serious nature.

15. Judging by events which have occurred since I have been Commander-in-Chief, the number of police is not sufficient to do all the work to be expected of them; and further, I am of opinion that in some parts of the presidency it would be better to revert to the old semi-military force, termed "Sibandis." These men were of a better fighting class, and were sufficiently well armed and disciplined to meet armed insurrection.

16. The absence of any mounted police throughout the presidency is also a source of weakness; and, in my opinion, a body of the kind ought to be available for the protection of the people and for the suppression of disorder.

17. Up to the present time, the police have been well-officed by the officers of the army made supernumerary by the reductions carried out since 1857; but this source is now nearly dried up; and I question whether the army can be reckoned upon in the future to furnish officers for the police.

18. The European and Eurasian population of the presidency amounts to only 14,505 and 26,374 respectively. They are principally located at the presidency, the larger military stations, and in the Nilgiris; but of this number, it may be considered that not more than 3,000 Europeans and 5,000 Eurasians are fit to bear arms.

19. Reliance is to be placed on the loyalty of both classes; and they could be depended upon to assist Government in the maintenance of order, more particularly those who have received some military training as volunteers.

20. In this presidency the danger of a general rising appears to me so improbable, that the contingency of having to provide special protection for non-combatants, women and children, I think, be considered as a source of weakness; especially as (except in the hills, where the European element bears a much larger proportion to the Native population) the Europeans and Eurasians are principally located, as has been before stated, in the large stations. In the hill districts, the non-combatants would naturally find shelter at such centres as Ootacamund, Coonoor, Kotegherry, &c.

(2) Weakness in necessity for provision of safety of non-combatants, women and children. 21. Already a number of Eurasians and Europeans—about 16 per cent. of the adult male population—are trained as volunteers; and any measures which would tend to make popular the volunteer movement are strongly to be advocated, as giving strength to the Government.

(3) Of possible greater utility than at present if organized for the maintenance of order in case of disturbance.

Present strength of volunteers in the Madras presidency:—

Officers ...	...	46
Non-commissioned officers ...	...	176
Volunteers ..	...	1,111
Total	...	1,333

22. It is not clear whether the question of compulsory enrolment is intended to apply only to Europeans and Eurasians, or to the general population; but, whatever its intended purport, in my opinion

(1) Question of compulsory enrolment.

compulsion of any kind should be strictly avoided.

23. As regards Europeans and Eurasians, their services may always be counted upon, for they are as much interested in the preservation of peace as the Government itself; while any compulsory enrolment of Natives would be sure to defeat the object in view.

24. Every measure which would tend to develop the volunteer system is strongly to be advocated. The men are loyal, and are effective for all ordinary home duties; and, were they supported by Government more liberally than is at present the case, they would still be a very cheap auxiliary force.

(2) Development of the volunteer system.

25. In answering this question, it must be borne in mind that the civil and military limits of the Madras presidency are not coincident; and that the Madras army has had for many years past to furnish garrisons for provinces outside of the presidency proper, viz., for the Central Provinces, Bundelcund, Western Bengal, and British Burma. Further, the British Government is bound by treaty to maintain forces for the protection of the territories of His Highness the Nizam, the Maharaja of Mysore, and the Maharaja of Travancore; and these troops have invariably been furnished by the Madras army.

26. I will first deal with the Native infantry of the presidency as constituting the bulk of the army.

27. The accompanying comparative statement (marked A)\* shows the distribution of this branch as in operation for several years past, and also that which might be found to suffice in the future, having in view the very urgent demand now made for all possible reduction of military expenditure.

28. It will be seen that, by increasing the number of privates in each of the retained regiments from 600 to 800, the number of available privates is increased from 21,600 to 22,400, while the number of regiments is reduced from 36 to 28.†

29. The pecuniary saving effected by the reduction of the European and Native staff and of the Native officers of eight regiments, will be the main advantage to be gained by the change.

30. The total number of British officers‡ should, I think, remain the same as now; for the increase in the number of privates would seem to me to make it indispensable that the number of British officers per regiment should be increased from 7 to 9. As this increase would eventually be in the junior ranks, a considerable saving in pay and allowances would be the result in the future.

31. The number of non-commissioned officers in the augmented regiments ought, I think, to be increased from five havildars and five naiks per company to six havildars and six naiks: a total decrease of 96 of each rank would be the result.§

32. According to this distribution, five regiments are given to Burma; and, while the number of regiments will remain the same as at present, the strength of the troops garrisoning that province will be increased by a thousand privates.

33. For reasons which I explained to Government on a previous occasion, the regiments serving in Burma should be relieved every three years; and this tour of what is looked upon by the sepoys as a foreign service should not be imposed upon regiments at a less interval than fifteen years between each tour.

Vide my memorandum on the call made for a regiment to be sent to Cachar, forwarded with letter No 2335, dated 30th March 1878, from the Quarter-master General.

\* This statement does not include the regiments stationed in Bundelcund or in Western Bengal, except at Cuttack.

† This is exclusive of the troops in Bundelcund and Western Bengal.

‡ 36 Regiments with 7 officers = 252  
28 " " 9 " = 252

§ 36 Regts. with 40 havildars each = 1,440  
28 " " 48 " " = 1,344

Decrease havildars ... 96  
Naiks the same.

34. As the plan now offered for consideration provides for the retention of only twenty-three regiments in the presidency and in India proper, it becomes necessary that two more regiments should be maintained to provide for the Burma relief; and this will therefore raise the number of regiments required from twenty-eight to thirty.\*

\* Statement A shows how the Native infantry would stand if the regiments required for presidential purposes were reduced from forty to thirty.

35. These two regiments might be stationed, as now, at Saugor and Jubbulpore, or, as I have elsewhere suggested,† in the Southern Mahratta Country or it might be possible for them to take the duties at Calcutta; but if this be done, they must be allowed to take their families with them and be provided with suitable lines, or be granted special allowances.

† Vide my memorandum above quoted.

36. Further, one regiment of Madras Native infantry is now stationed at Dorunda, and another is divided between Banda and Nowgong. If these stations can be abandoned, or can be garrisoned by Bengal troops, the number of regiments of Madras infantry can, as above stated, be reduced to thirty. If, however, Madras infantry is to continue to furnish these garrisons, and also to continue to occupy some of the stations alluded to in the previous paragraph, I see no means of reducing the number of

‡ 40 × 600 = 24,000  
32 × 750 = 24,000  
30 × 800 = 24,000

stead of to 800.

37. The Madras sappers and miners should be allowed to remain as at present. They are a most useful body of men, and their services are always being required.

38. No reduction or redistribution of the Madras light cavalry seems to me to be practicable, unless Bengal troops are to occupy Saugor.

39. The reduction of a regiment would leave the whole of the presidency, including the Central Provinces, with only 900 Native troopers, inclusive of the Governor's Body-Guard; but this is not counting the cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent.

40. As regards the British force in this presidency, I am unable to recommend any reduction.

41. I would propose, however, that the battery of artillery and the detachment of British infantry now located at Trichinopoly be withdrawn, that station being in future held by Native troops only. The field battery now at Trichinopoly might be replaced by a garrison battery, to be stationed at St. Thomas' Mount, when it would become available for coast defence duty, or for employment with the presidency siege train.

42. The field battery now at Thayetmyo should be replaced by a garrison battery with mountain equipment.

43. If this proposal be accepted, the garrison battery at Cannanore need not be replaced.

44. I find it difficult to draw any marked distinction between the "requirements of the province for garrison purposes and the maintenance of order" and its "requirements for internal military purposes"; but I consider that what I have already said refers to and meets our requirements under both these headings.

45. As regards the requirements of this province for external military purposes, I consider that, as the Madras army finds the ordinary garrison for British Burma, it ought always to be in a position to meet a call to reinforce that province. Only recently a demand was suddenly made on this army for a British regiment and two regiments of Native infantry, besides a wing of Madras Native infantry, which was sent from Calcutta.

46. Again, consequent on the war in Afghanistan, this army was called upon to furnish two batteries of Royal artillery, a battalion of British infantry, three companies of sappers, and three regiments of Native infantry for the North-West Frontier, besides two regiments to garrison Calcutta.

47. These troops were sent for imperial purposes; and provision for a possible similar demand in the future appears hardly to come within the meaning of *provincial* requirements.

48. I have therefore not considered this contingency in calculating the troops necessary for this presidency; still I wish it to be understood that if the strength of the Native infantry, irrespective of the numbers of regiments, remain as it is, the presidency may be counted upon to render the same aid in the future it has done on previous occasions.

49. At the same time, such a requirement ought always to be borne in mind, or considerable risk is likely to be run; for it is not to be believed that the Supreme Government would hesitate, if the necessity arose, to make a similar call—when, if this army be unduly reduced, compliance might endanger the peace, if not the security, of the presidency.

50. As a matter of fact, whilst Madras troops have been employed on the Afghan frontier, and subsequent to the sudden demand to reinforce Burma, a call has been made to suppress a rising within the limits of the presidency; and owing to the physical nature of the country, and its extreme unhealthiness, it has not been found easy to provide the required infantry from the Madras army.

51. In 1876 this Government was called upon to report what troops could be spared from Madras in case an army was required for a foreign expedition; and I then gave it as my opinion that a force as shown in the attached statement (marked B) could be furnished.

52. That estimate could hereafter hold good as regards Native troops, notwithstanding the reduction in the number of regiments which I have stated I consider possible, provided the number of privates in each regiment be increased to 800 or 750, according as the number of regiments is reduced to 30 or 32.

53. I have already brought to the notice of Government§ that the Native infantry of this presidency has not of late obtained the required number of suitable recruits; and as I have been given to believe that this is not the only presidency in which this is found to be the case, the matter seems to me to be one which might with advantage be considered by the Commission about to sit at Simla.

§ My memorandum forwarded with Adjutant General's letter No 425, dated 28th July 1879.

54. I think I have now replied to all the questions referred to this Government by the Government of India; and it only remains for me to express the hope that, whatever conclusion may be arrived at, the necessity of preserving distinct the armies of the several presidencies may always be kept in view; and that if reductions must be carried out, this may be done, as far as practicable, proportionately in the several armies, and with due consideration for the grave individual interests which are involved.

OOTACAMUND;

The 8th August 1879.

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, *General*,*Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.*

## A

Table of ordinary and proposed garrisons, Madras Presidency.

Districts.	Stations.	ORDINARY GARRISONS.			PROPOSED GARRISONS.		
		Regiments.	Strength in privates.	Total strength in privates in each division.	Regiments.	Strength in privates.	Total strength in privates in each division.
Southern District ...	Trichinopoly ...	3	1,800	3,000	2	1,600	2,400
	Palamecottah ...	1	600			400	
	Quilon ...	1	600			400	
Centre District ...	Madras ...	3	1,800	3,000	3	2,400	3,200
	Pallaveram ...	1	600			400	
	Vellore ...	1	600			400	
Mysore Division ...	Bangalore ...	2	1,200	2,400	2	1,600	2,400
	French Rocks ...	1	600			400	
	Mercara ...	1	600			400	
Malabar and Canara {	Cannanore ...	2	1,200	1,800	1½	1,200	1,600
	Mangalore ...	1	600			400	
Ceded Districts ...	Bellary ...	2	1,200	1,200	2	1,600	1,600
Northern District ...	Vizagapatam ...	1	600	2,400	1½	800	2,400
	Vizianagram ...	1	600			400	
	Cuttack ...	1	600			800	
	Berhampore ...	1½	300			400	
	Sambalpur ...	1½	300			...	
Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.	Secunderabad ...	4	2,400	2,400	3	2,400	2,400
Nagpore Force ...	Kamptee ...	1½	900	2,400	1½	800	2,400
	Hoshungabad ...	1½	300			...	
	Sitabaldi ...	1	600			800	
	Raipur ...	1	600			400	
	Sambalpur ...	...	...			400	
British Burma Division.	Rangoon ...	1	600	3,000	1½	800	4,000
	Thayetmyo ...	1	600			1,200	
	Tonghoo ...	1½	900			1,200	
	Moulmein ...	1½	300			400	
	Andamans ...	1	600			400	
		36	21,600	21,600	28	22,400	22,400
Saugor District ...	Jubbulpore ...	1	600	1,800	1	800	1,600
	Saugor ...	1	600			800	
	Banda ...	1½	300			...	
	Nowgong ...	1½	300			...	
Presidency District, Bengal.	Dorunda ...	1	600	600	...	...	...
		40	24,000	24,000	30	24,000	24,000

## B

In memorandum by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, No. 196, dated 3rd July 1876, and submitted to Government, it was stated that the Madras army will be able to furnish the undermentioned troops for service in Burma, provided of course that there be no unexpected internal disturbance to make it undesirable thus to reduce the troops in the presidency :—

	Men.
2 Regiments of British infantry ... ..	1,200
6 Regiments of Native infantry ... ..	3,600
2 Light field batteries Royal Artillery (12 guns) ... ..	314
2 Companies of Sappers and Miners ... ..	282
Total ... ..	5,346

The above force gives two brigades, each composed of—

- 1 Light field battery, 6 guns.
- 1 Regiment of British infantry.
- 2 Regiments of Native infantry.
- 1 Company of Sappers and Miners.

The additional two Native infantry regiments may be considered as in reserve.

The proportion of guns is given at two per regiment.

A third light field battery or troop of horse artillery, or garrison battery, might possibly be spared on an emergency.

(Sd.) Sr. V. A. HAMMICK, *Captain,*  
*Acting Military Secretary.*

### *Minute upon the employment of a Regiment of Madras Native Infantry in Cachar.*

In the letter from the Quartermaster-General are shortly set forth the general objections to the employment of a Madras infantry regiment in Cachar; and to these I desire to state others which did not come within the scope of that communication, but which, in my opinion, call for full consideration.

2. This Native army has three kinds of duties ordinarily imposed upon it:—

I.—Service within the presidency—which may be considered as including the Nizam's dominions, the Mysore territory, and the province of Coorg.

II.—Service in other Provinces in India.

III.—Foreign service—under which heading is ordinarily included service in British Burma and the Andamans.

3. *I. Service within the presidency.*—There are at present serving within the presidency two regiments of light cavalry and twenty-six regiments of infantry, or half of the cavalry and about three-fifths of the infantry.

4. Annexed is a comparative statement of the troops of the Madras presidency since 1837, at intervals of twenty years. I select these periods because 1837 was the end of the long peace which preceded the Afghan war, 1857 was the year of the mutiny, and during the last twenty years our whole military system in India has been reorganized.

5. It will be seen from this statement how large have been the reductions in the strength of this Native army, and the relative decrease of home service as compared to service outside the limits of the presidency. Since 1862 the regiments of cavalry have been reduced from seven to four (a), and the regiments of infantry from fifty-two to forty; or, in other words, the cavalry by nearly one-half, and the infantry by nearly one-fourth. In 1837 and in 1857, seven out of eight of the cavalry regiments were serving within the presidency; now two out of four are serving outside of the presidency.

* Nagpur force	...	5
British Burma	...	12
Singapore	...	3

In 1837, forty-five regiments of Native infantry were serving within the presidency, and seven without. In 1857, thirty-two were serving within and twenty\* without. Now the proportion is twenty-six within to fourteen without.

6. It has to be remembered that from the regiments located within the presidency have to be met the demands for service in the other provinces of India and in Burma; and it cannot, I think, be expected that the Madras army should remain contented and efficient if the proportion of home service is only to be viewed as a fluctuating quantity, to be regulated by the necessities arising elsewhere.

(a) Note.—The 8th Light Cavalry was disbanded in 1857 for misconduct during the mutiny.

7. In 1857, this army had twelve of its battalions of infantry in Burma; the necessity may

\* The present strength is admittedly very low. An increase was lately recommended by the local authorities, both Civil and Military, but was negatived by the Government of India.

not to lose sight of its own responsibilities presidencies.

8. The physique of this Native army is far from being what it ought to be. The difficulty of obtaining suitable recruits for the infantry has been forcibly brought to my notice by almost every commanding officer I have come into contact with; and I lately felt myself called upon to publish a General Order prohibiting the enlistment of youths physically unfit to discharge the duties of a soldier. Such men are useless on field service; whilst with ordinary cantonment duties, they, in middle life, become a burthen upon the pension establishment. One of the causes assigned for the difficulty in recruiting from amongst the rural population is the loss of popularity of army service. This is said to

† 2nd Light Cavalry,	6 years.
3rd       "       "	18       "
5th Native Infantry,	6       "
8th       "       "	5       "
11th       "       "	11       "
20th       "       "	10       "
22nd       "       "	6       "
31st       "       "	6       "
35th       "       "	6       "

proceed partly because of the greatly increased proportion of foreign and Bengal to home service, and the long periods some regiments are kept out of their own presidency.† The Native army can only be kept efficient by drawing to its ranks an unfailing supply of the pick of the village lads; and whatever deters them from accepting military service is, to my mind, a subject worthy of the serious consideration of Government.

9. As some persons measure the efficiency and utility of the Madras army by comparing it with that of Bengal, I here say most distinctly that, do what we may, the Madras sepoy can never attain to the Bengal standard; whilst I believe it to be equally certain that the men of Southern India fall far short, as a race, in possessing the courage and military instincts of the men of Northern India. But I do believe that now, as heretofore, the Madrasi, properly selected and commanded, can be made into a very serviceable soldier; and further, I am convinced that, for many obvious reasons, no greater blunder could be committed than to allow him to lose his place in the military organization by which this empire is held, merely to let in a better man. Our homely adage of not trusting all our eggs in one basket ought ever to be borne in mind by the Government.

10. *II. Service in other provinces in India.*—The strength of this Native army has admittedly been regulated with reference to its partial employment in other provinces of India; but there are reasons why this system cannot be strained without injury to the army.

11. In 1837, out of an establishment

			Native cavalry.	Native infantry.
† Nagpur	...	...	1	4
Moulmein	...	...	1	1
Straits	...	...	2	2

§ In the same year the regiments serving in Burma show an increase from one to twelve, and in the Straits from two to three.

|| One at Dorunda, one at Cuttack. The latter station has since 1803 been frequently held by Madras troops, though it is really in Bengal proper.

of infantry. To fully appreciate the change wrought since 1837 in regard to the relative proportion of service within and without the presidency, it has to be remembered that in that year the only call for foreign service was one regiment at Moulmein and two in the Straits, and that, except the above and the regiments serving in the Nagpur territories, the whole Madras army was cantoned near the homes of the men within the presidency.

12. In fairness to this army, and having regard to its efficiency, its service out of the presidency ought, I think, to bear some proportion to that exacted from the armies of the other presidencies. To the Bengal army, service in Bengal proper has always been considered by the men as coming under the head of service in other provinces, and has always been distasteful to them; but there has been little of it, and regiments have been regularly relieved. In that army there is no ordinary foreign service. The Bombay army has Sind as its outlying field of service, with Aden as foreign service. The Madras army has a large proportion of outlying service; and five regiments of infantry always in the British Burma Division.

13. I have already alluded to the long time our regiments remain at stations in the Central Provinces, &c., &c. This, I believe, partly originated to save Government the heavy expense of a move, and partly because the men are so overwhelmed by their numerous relatives and hangers-on, that the order to march is known to every one in the presidency to carry with it the impoverishment of the regiment. However, if this army is to be considered mobile, the difficulty must be met; and I have instituted inquiries in view to the possible restriction of families. But the measure is a delicate one, needing careful handling; and to produce any lasting effect the Native officers and soldiers must themselves be taught to see that the object in view is for their own good. In my opinion, five years is the maximum limit which any regiment should be allowed to remain at one station. As matters now stand, there is the greatest difficulty in recruiting; whilst, to the injury of officers and men alike, single regiments and detachments are lost to sight, except for a few days during the annual inspection.

14. As regards the matter of cost of a Madras regiment when employed out of its own presidency, there seems to me room to doubt whether the financial result has ever been fully estimated.

Government has to pay the fare of the wives and children, as well as of the men, when moved by rail; if the regiment marches, the difference between actual cost and old rates of cart-hire. The regimental lines are far more costly than those of a Bengal regiment; whilst the lines of a Bengal regiment will not suit a Madras regiment, nor *vice versa*. Further, the compensation for the difference in the price of rations must be a considerable item; for it is calculated upon the Madras articles

\* Compensation is granted on the amount of rice sufficient for a man only, irrespective of the number of the family dependent on him.

of food, whilst the men generally live upon the grain of the country.\* Lastly, the clothing and equipment are furnished from Madras.

15. At the same time, my review of the conditions of such service would not be complete were I to omit to say that, but for the comparative cheapness of living (in ordinary years) in the Central Provinces, &c., &c., and the other advantages now derived by the men, a disinclination on the part of the sepoys for such service—which is not now the case—would probably be evinced.

16. No one can, I think, look at the disposition map of the Madras army without being struck by the anomalous distribution of its regiments. By degrees, to meet pressing calls, corps and detachments have been thrust into the Bengal presidency, until in the north they approach to Allahabad, and in the east stretch away to Chota Nagpore and Cuttack. Practically speaking, this is repeating on a small scale, but with less inflammable material, what was done with the Bengal army after the large annexations by Lord Dalhousie. Such a course seems to me hurtful to the interests of the State, as being likely to engender the notion of our being too largely dependent upon this Native army; whilst it is certainly injurious to discipline and military efficiency.

17. The request now comes to send another regiment of infantry to Cachar (to enable a Bengal regiment to be stationed in reserve at Jhelum), consequent upon the advance of one regiment to Quetta and the employment of another in the Simla hills. Speaking on behalf of the interests of this army, I feel called on to oppose the measure, not only on the general grounds already stated, but for other special reasons. Service in that province will be most unpopular. It will possess all the disadvantages of service in Burma without any of its advantages. I presume that no distinction is intended to be made as regards emoluments between service to the north-east of Calcutta at Cachar and service to the west of Calcutta at Dorunda. Unless it be so, the regiment must be accompanied by its families; suitable lines must be built; and the regiment can only be moved there at the commencement of the dry season, so as to be housed by the setting in of the rains. If the regiment is to be moved without its families, free quarters and rations, &c., must be furnished, as in Burma; but I do not see how this could be done without instituting a dangerous precedent as regards this army, and also creating an invidious distinction with respect to the Bengal regiments cantoned in that neighbourhood.

18. Rather than send a Madras regiment to be cantoned in a remote corner of the north-eastern frontier of Bengal, I would urge that this presidency occupy one of the southern stations of the Bombay army, whilst that army sends a regiment to occupy one of the southern stations of the Bengal presidency.

19. This suggestion leads up to the much larger one involving a partial redistribution of the Madras army and the Madras command. According to present arrangements, the regiments stationed

Bengal Presidency Division.

Dorunda.

Saugor District.

Jubbulpore.  
Saugor.

Banda.  
Nowgong.

of things to allow the Madras Native regiments to occupy Sholapur and all the stations south of that place, and transfer to Bombay, Kamptee, Jubbulpore, and all stations to its north. If such change be deemed advisable by this Government, I would suggest that the subject be referred to in the letter transmitting our reply to the Secretary to the Government of India.

20. *III. Foreign service.*—I have said that service in Burma and at the Andamans is what is considered in this presidency as foreign service. The men are housed and liberally rationed; and the widows of those who die whilst thus employed receive pensions. Before the regiment embarks, the families are either sent to their homes in the country, or to a dépôt formed at some suitable station: this is done at the public expense. Family tickets are given by the men to their families for such portion of their pay as they may desire. The period of such service is limited to three years, when the regiment returns to the presidency. For this duty the roster is kept as carefully as practicable; and from fifteen to seventeen years may be accepted as the time now intervening before the turn of a regiment comes round again.

21. There is no disinclination on the part of the men to embark on such service. They live well, besides saving some of their pay. A regiment returning from such service is proverbially in much better physique than when embarking. All that is needed with regard to such service is to bear in mind that the tour must not be made to come round too quickly. I believe fifteen years would be the safest average; but under no circumstances ought it to be less than twelve years. To preserve this ratio, of course the regiments in the presidency must be in relative proportion to those in Burma. Provided that attention be paid to this point, and that the three years' tour be not exceeded, I believe the Madras infantry soldier will always be found ready to obey the call to embark.

22. In conclusion, I regret the delay that has occurred in my taking up this case; but press of current work and other urgent calls have been the cause.

HEAD-QUARTERS, OOTACAMUND; }

The 30th May 1878.

(Sd.) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, General,

Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.



*Comparative statement of troops of Madras Presidency in 1837, 1857 and 1877.*

			1837.		1857.		1877.	
			Native cavalry.	Native infantry.	Native cavalry.	Native infantry.	Native cavalry.	Native infantry.
Northern District	...	...	...	14	...	7	...	4
Centre District	...	...	2	6	1	4	...	5
Southern District	...	...	1	6	1	6	...	5
Mysore Division	...	...	1	6	1	4	...	4
Malabar and Canara	...	...	1	3	...	4	...	3
Ceded Districts	...	...	1	3	1	2	1	2
Hyderabad Subsidiary Force	...	...	2	7	2	5	1	4
Nagpur Force	...	...	1	4	1	5	1	4
British Burma Division	...	...	...	1	...	12	...	5
Saugor District	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	3
Bengal Presidency	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1
Singapore, &c.	...	...	...	2	...	3	...	...
Bombay Presidency	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...
Total	...	...	8	52	8	52	4	40

(Sd.) GODFREY CLERK, *Colonel,*  
*Military Secretary.*

No. 2335, dated Madras, 30th March 1878.

From—BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. O'CONNELL, Quartermaster-General, Madras Army,  
 To—The Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department.

With reference to correspondence from the Government of India, referred to the Commander-in-Chief under your No. 1615 of the 28th instant, I have the honor by order to state that a regiment of Native infantry can be spared from the Madras presidency; but His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief considers that, before ordering one to Cachar, the objections to such a move should be fully represented and carefully considered.

2. Regiments of this presidency have their families with them, except on foreign service. If separated from them, the ordinary pay of the men is not sufficient to maintain themselves and their families. It will be necessary therefore that a regiment proceeding to Cachar should be accompanied by its families. The cost to Government of moving the large number of women and children will be great; and in addition suitable hutting lines will have to be provided at Cachar. The climate there is so unlike that of the Madras presidency, that there will probably be much sickness. Men will be granted sick certificate to their homes, and must take their families with them. The widows and children of those who die at Cachar will have to be sent back to the presidency at considerable cost. All this will cause much suffering and discontent, which, in the opinion of Sir Neville Chamberlain, may be avoided by a more judicious distribution of our Native troops in the three presidencies.

3. At present the Madras army has one regiment of Native cavalry and four of Native infantry serving out of the MADRAS COMMAND—in the Saugor district and at Dorunda. Whilst these regiments are at long distances from their own presidency, the Bombay army has troops far to the southward, in the Belgaum district, which is close to the homes of the Madras sepoys.

4. It was the intention of Sir Neville Chamberlain to prepare this summer a scheme, for submission to Government, on the redistribution of the Madras army, and he hopes still to do so. The present proposal has led to his views on the subject being now partially and briefly stated.

5. For active or foreign service, the Madras sepoy is ready and willing to go anywhere. He knows that during his absence his family is comfortable; for the rations and allowances granted are sufficient to provide for himself and family. He therefore willingly proceeds wherever he is ordered.

6. But it is different when, merely to garrison a place out of their own presidency, men are sent to an unknown and remote corner in Bengal, where the language, climate, and customs are strange, and where there is not the excitement of active service to occupy their minds. They then brood over the discomforts around them, and are unable to comprehend why they are thus expatriated.

7. In arranging our peace garrisons, His Excellency considers it is wise policy to keep troops near their homes and among their own people; and he is strongly of opinion that both for political and military reasons our three Native armies should be kept distinct.

8. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief thinks that his views on this subject should be placed before the Government of India for consideration; for he is of opinion that a much larger question than the mere move of a regiment is involved.

9. If it is still deemed necessary to call for a regiment of Madras Native infantry to be placed at Cachar, His Excellency would name the 19th Regiment Native Infantry, now at Trichinopoly. A regiment can best be spared from Trichinopoly. The 14th Regiment Native Infantry, which it was proposed to move next season from Vellore to Trichinopoly, can be sent to Cannanore in place of the 19th Native Infantry, which was put down for Cannanore. The force at Trichinopoly will then be reduced from three to two regiments of Native infantry.

*Minute by the Honorable W. HUDLESTON,—dated August 1879.*

*Army Organization.*—The Government of India ask for our opinion as to the military requirements of this Government in reference to—

- necessary garrisons,
- the immediate repression of internal disturbance or insurrection,
- and the maintenance of order;

and detail the several points to which attention is requested.

*Population.*—The Native population is probably now about thirty-one millions, allowing for loss by the recent famine mortality; and among them are scattered a European and Eurasian population of less than half a million, resident almost entirely in the large towns and at the hill stations.

The Government of India ask opinions as to these last as an element of strength in regard to the aid they could give in the maintenance of order now, or if organized, and as to the element of weakness from their non-combatant section; and suggest the question of compulsory enrolment for consideration.

I think there can be no doubt whatever that the European and Eurasian population do constitute an element of strength, so far as their effective numbers go, and in far larger proportion than their comparative numbers represent. As an aid in actual combatant strength, there can, I think, be no question that organization would add to their efficiency without objection, and that every possible encouragement should be offered for this end. Compulsory enrolment would, I think, be resented, except in case of palpable emergency, when it would be needless; for the inclination of all would be to proffer services. Previous training would, of course, render this infinitely more valuable, and would be attained by enrolment as volunteers in time of peace; but the interest in volunteer service needs to be fostered, if it is to be active, and every encouragement should be afforded by Government. There is not in this country the wealthy and leisurely section of society which does so much in England to promote the success of the movement; and all taking part in it have to make considerable sacrifice of time and convenience in this country, which deserves ample recognition.

The disposition which has in places been manifested by sections of the non-European or Eurasian community (*e.g.*, Parsis and some of the West Coast Natives) to take part in the movement is a somewhat difficult feature. I am averse from its repression absolutely, though I recognize the difficulties that it may produce. On the whole, I doubt whether it can be usefully developed.

The non-combatant section of the European and Eurasian community do not, in my opinion, constitute any exceptional element of weakness, situated as they are.

In all cases, their protection is one of the main purposes of the combatant section of the community; and I think that under our circumstances in this presidency there is no exceptional difficulty on this score in the particular section of the population.

As to the organized force of police and troops required for our needs within the presidency, I think that, excluding Mysore and Coorg (and of course Hyderabad territory), but including Travancore and Cochin, a force of about fourteen Native

Regts.

Southern Division, including Travancore and Cochin	...	...	3
Centre Division (Madras, Palaveiam, Vellore, &c.)	...	...	4
Malabar and Canara	...	...	2
Ceded Districts	...	...	2
Northern Division (including Sambalpur)	...	...	3
			14

have treaty obligations with Travancore and Cochin, which certainly have not resulted in excessive demands, but must be observed. We have a considerable tract of country on the north-east and north-west coasts which is not very accessible; and altogether we have an area of about 110,000 square miles to garrison.

At the present moment we are experiencing a certain amount of difficulty in providing the troops needed for

asserting the authority of Government against a somewhat numerous body of insurgents with whom the police were unable to cope; the circumstances being aggravated by the season and the extremely unhealthy character of the locality.

I have concurred in the suggested removal of European troops from Trichinopoly. I think this Government are unanimous in thinking that in the Northern Division too wide an area has been denuded of military force by the measures of concentration which were adopted a few years back.

Our force of mounted Native troops in the presidency has, I think, been reduced below what is desirable for purposes of effective administration. Of four regiments which constitute the entire force of Madras cavalry, we cannot count on having more than one within the presidency, and not certainly on that.

We have had to look to the Governor's small Body-guard as a resource for purposes for which it was never intended, and for which we should be independent of it.

I offer no remarks on the distribution of the Madras Native army beyond our own presidency, or on the strength proper to be maintained for the garrisons in other provinces and foreign territory (Native) and over-sea which are supplied from it, except that this strength should be adequate to ensure reliefs sufficiently often to prevent the foreign and over-sea service which falls exceptionally on the Madras army from becoming seriously burdensome on the men, involving as it does separation from their families for prolonged periods. Only I would strongly urge on consideration the ready loyal willingness with which the Madras troops have ever proceeded on any duty that has been required of them, the fidelity that they have exhibited under most trying circumstances, their orderly conduct and good discipline, their proved effectiveness whenever tried; and all this notwithstanding their experience of a somewhat marked measure of neglect and of scant justice. That most effective service can be relied on from Madras Natives the reputation of the Madras sappers furnishes irrefragable proof. There is no reason whatever why equally high reputation should not be earned by all the Madras Native army if fair opportunity be allowed to them. That it is eminently desirable on political grounds to have our Native Indian army recruited in due proportions from all the varying nationalities embraced in the empire, and that these several elements should be kept distinct, does not to my mind admit of question, on positive as well as negative grounds. The extreme importance of this last requirement has been urged repeatedly by the highest and most experienced authorities, from the Duke of Wellington downwards.

The other instrument in the hands of Government for maintaining order and authority is the police, which on 31st March 1879 numbered under 27,000 rank and file, composed of—

Constabulary (including village police)	...	...	...	20,491
Madras town police	...	...	...	1,222
Salt preventive force	...	...	...	2,480
Land customs force	...	...	...	195
Jail guards	...	...	...	2,582
				<hr/> 26,970 <hr/>

The proportion of police proper to population was 1 to 1,487. (In towns 1 to 536, in rural parts 1 to 1,637.) The proportion to area was 1 to 5 square miles. The population with which this force has to deal may, I think, be generally described as an orderly and law-abiding one.

Of exceptional elements of danger or difficulty there are few. The religious antagonism of the Nairs and Moplahs of Malabar is dangerous to one another rather than to Government authority. It is aggravated by the proverbial bigotry of converts on the side of the Moplahs, who are largely composed of converts from the lowest section of Hindus in the province and of their descendants, and by the inflated religious pride and exclusiveness of the Nairs, who are also generally in the position of hard landlords to the agricultural section of the Moplahs. The periodical and fatal outbreaks which have occurred in past years have seldom been suppressed without the use of troops. The Lubbay element in the population of the presidency is disorderly, but absorbed in money-making pursuits, greedy, and prosperous, and not likely to risk their opportunities of gain for any political object. The Mahomedans are naturally no more contented with their reduced position here than elsewhere in India; but while they are here probably more reduced, and at least equally dissatisfied, they are also more scattered and in smaller proportion to the rest of the population (under 2 millions out of 31½ millions by last census), and generally of less politically dangerous antecedents probably than in other provinces.

The Brahmin element here, as elsewhere, is the most able and ambitious, but is probably also the most competent to appreciate the advantages of British rule to themselves at least as much as to any other section of the community.

The comparatively large element of Native Christians in the population of the presidency is on the side of order.

The number of great towns, with their invariably large element of criminal and dangerous classes, is comparatively small.

The bulk of the population are, I think, fairly satisfied with the administration under which they live, and recognize in their rulers the best intentions at least to promote their well-being. Of active self-sacrificing loyal effort to uphold the Government, a foreign administration has no right to expect much from the indigenous population. That exceptionally little of patriotic effort is to be expected from the bulk of the population of India is notorious; but at the same time little of combined hostile action need be feared by a Government which strives intelligently to attain the object of good government. While material comfort is experienced by them, we need not anticipate any hostile feeling towards the Government on the part of the great bulk of the population of this presidency. We need only to abstain from oppressive or inconsiderate measures of administration; but from these we must carefully abstain, and we must guard ourselves from tendencies to force them on us from elsewhere. If we, at the same time, afford fair openings for reasonable ambition to rise, I think we may rely in this presidency on ruling over contented, though subject, races for a long time to come.

If this estimate of the position is fairly correct, it may be inferred that the police have no very difficult task to maintain order and security for life and property. Nor indeed do facts oppose the inference. Of organized lawlessness, there is very little as a rule. The abominable crime of dacoity, with its attendant cruelties and horrors, has been greatly reduced of late years. The murder of children for the sake of their jewels is painfully prevalent, but is a cowardly base form of crime, which is encouraged by the habits of the people, and can scarcely be said to involve lawless proclivities. Cattle thefts are seldom perpetrated with violence. In murders other than those of children for their ornaments, jealousy is the leading cause. Nothing of this offers any serious obstacle to the police; and there is reason to think that they are fairly efficient and not unacceptable to the people as a body. That they are capable of improvement as individuals is unquestionable; but I believe that abuse of authority has decidedly decreased of late years.

I am however compelled to admit that, in my opinion, the police administration of this presidency is not as good as it ought to be, or as it would have been, had the principles on which it was so ably organized by Sir W. Robinson been maintained in full force, or allowed their natural development. The great defect is inadequate strength, being the inevitable consequence of the limited means placed at the disposal of the Local Government for the maintenance of the force.

It is now some twenty years since it was organized, and in that time there has necessarily been a considerable increase of population; and the developed working of the department in all directions should naturally have led to some increase of force, even if improved efficiency in individuals had rendered the units composing it more valuable for its purpose. The facts are, however, as shown in the margin; and this notwithstanding that in the interval the army has

1862-63, Constabulary, including village police	...	30,733
1878-79, Constabulary, including village police	...	20,491

been materially reduced in strength.

The result is as might be expected. The men are over-worked, and discipline necessarily suffers. The reserves have been reduced till the force is inadequate to deal with an emergency. The reputation of the force suffers, and with it *esprit de corps* must be lost.

A further very serious difficulty results from the very reduced supply of military officers available and suitable for employment in the force. It has from the first been a leading principle in the force that it should not be allowed to acquire a semi-military character, but still the previous military experience of the original officers enabled them to establish and insist on a standard of discipline and efficiency which officers without that experience are not likely to aim at or attain.

In 1863-64 it was 1 in 1,084.  
In 1864-65 „ 1 in 1,167.

As above stated, the force on 31st March 1879 was in the proportion of 1 to 1,487 population.

By the latest return at my disposal, I find that in 1877 the proportion in other provinces was—

Bombay	...	...	...	1 in 950
North-Western Provinces and Oudh	...	...	...	1 in 1,261
Punjab	...	...	...	1 in 1,159
Central Provinces	...	...	...	1 in 941
Mysore	...	...	...	1 in 1,000
All India	...	...	...	1 in 1,096

Thus it may be said that Madras has only about two-thirds of the proportion of police to population that is deemed necessary on the average of India.

The charges against Madras for the service was thirty-six-and-a-half lakhs of rupees (exclusive of the village police).

In 1862-63, before the decentralization system of administration was adopted, under which some thirty-two lakhs net was assigned to Madras for this purpose from imperial revenues, the necessary provision for police in Madras was fixed by the Supreme Government at thirty-nine lakhs.

If it be argued that the necessary inference is that Madras should spend more on her police, I can only reply that Madras already spends on it more than she can afford out of the provincial assignment from imperial revenues for transferred services, and that if a more adequate police force is to be maintained, a more adequate grant must be made from imperial revenues. The Local Government has already, by recent legislation, imposed a considerable percentage of the charge for town police on municipalities, and cannot do more in this direction.

That a stronger force is needed for the effectual attainment of the object, and to allow legitimately of economy in the direction of military expenditure, does not, I think, admit of doubt.

(Sd.) W. HUDLESTON.

*Minute by the Honorable D. F. CARMICHAEL,—dated 9th August 1879.*

Letter from Government of India, Military, No. 201S.B, dated 7th July 1879.

The Madras army consists (1st July) of—

- (a) 2 Regiments British Cavalry.
- (b) 19 Batteries Artillery.
- (c) 1 Company British Engineers.
- (d) 10 Regiments British Infantry.
- (e) 10 Companies Native Sappers.
- (f) 4 Regiments Native Cavalry.
- (g) 40 Regiments Native Infantry.

The numbers are, by the last return (1st April 1878) at hand, British 11,613, Native 31,292. All but an insignificant portion of this force is serving outside the territorial limits of this presidency, *viz.*, in Mysore, Hyderabad, Nagpur, Saugor, Bengal, and British Burma. Within the presidency, we have no British cavalry, two regiments and three companies only of British infantry, four batteries, one regiment Native cavalry, and thirteen and a half regiments of Native infantry. The presidency area is 140,000 square miles, its population 31½ millions; besides Native States containing about 10,000 square miles, with a population of 3 millions. The state of feeling towards the Government and the elements of danger may be gauged by these figures. The general feeling is loyal, and the elements of danger next to nothing. Just now, in a remote and mountainous tract of country, where, owing to the crass negligence of local officials, injustice and oppression have run their length unchecked, the wild tribes have murdered policemen, burnt the stations, and are now carrying on a guerilla war with a detachment of troops; but this is an isolated case; it is not that the hillmen have revolted against our administration, rather they have not known it. When order is restored, and British authority made accessible to them, these people will soon be as contented with our system as the wilder tribes of Jeypore and Khondistan have long since become.

As to the efficiency of our police, it never was intended—and every approach to the contrary on the part of their officers has been rigidly suppressed—to have in any quarter of it a military or semi-military organization. The nature of the population amongst whom they move does not demand it; we have no conspiracies threatening political disturbances, no burning social questions, agrarian or otherwise, to evoke tumultuous breaches of the peace. The police is quite sufficient for the detection and repression of all ordinary crime in all ordinary times; and our times, as I have said, are very rarely otherwise. When they become so, I am for having the sepoys called in to the aid of the police, in preference to having a permanent military police in reserve for what seldom occurs. I have served for seven years where I soon got to learn what a curse the old military constabulary, maintained in those districts, soon became to the hillmen of Ganjam and Vizagapatam. I am speaking of what I know; and I say, remove their grievances and have British officers living among them, and the mountain tribes on our northern frontier are, with a little kindly management, as amenable to the ordinary procedure as are the people of any other part of the presidency. If, on the other hand, it is

not thought worth while to win their confidence, the result will be a series of petty insurrections, with inglorious but harassing campaigns. What does Colonel Rammell, Commanding the troops, say in his very last letter?—"Military measures alone will not put down this rising; long-standing complaints must be heard and relieved."

(Sd.) DAVID F. CARMICHAEL.

## J.—HYDERABAD.

No. 90, dated Hyderabad, 23rd August 1879.

From—COLONEL SIR R. J. MEADE, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., Resident at Hyderabad,

To—The President, Army Organization Commission, Simla.

Under instructions from the Government of India in the Military Department, as conveyed in letter No. 205 S.B., dated the 7th ultimo, from Colonel Burne, I beg to address you on the subject of the military requirements of the Hyderabad administration.

2. Before giving expression to my views in the above matter, I will, in the first place, endeavour to afford the information called for in the 2nd paragraph of the letter quoted above.

3. As the Government of India is aware, the territory designated the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, forming the northern portion of Hyderabad, has been ceded, under treaty, by His Highness the Nizam to the British Government for the maintenance of the Hyderabad Contingent. This territory, which bears the name of Berar, and which will hereinafter be alluded to under that designation, forms the province of the Hyderabad administration, the area whereof may be reckoned at 17,600 square miles.

4. The information called for, it would seem, had reference primarily to Berar and the stations where forces under this administration are located; but as the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and the Hyderabad Contingent (two separate forces) have been maintained with the definite object of preserving the tranquillity of His Highness the Nizam's dominions, otherwise called Hyderabad, a report drawn up under present injunctions would, it is considered, be incomplete unless it included the latter. I will, therefore, proceed to give the required information under two separate heads, *viz.*, Berar and Hyderabad.

5. *Firstly, Berar.*—The strength of the Native population of Berar may be stated at about 2,300,000, and the extent of the country at about 150 miles in length from east to west and 140 in breadth at the average. The population for the most part is agricultural, and is in easy circumstances. Only 7.5 per cent. is Muhammadan, and the rest are Hindus, &c.

6. The strength of the European and Eurasian population (exclusive of the army) may be stated at 600 souls, a very small figure indeed, compared with that of the Native population; but this is easily accounted for by the fact that the British have only since the year 1854 undertaken the administration of this province, and that most of the European and Eurasian residents consist of persons who subsequent to that date have taken up employment in the Government service in Berar.

7. The state of feeling of the Native population in Berar, and especially with the agricultural classes, is predominantly favorable towards the British. The people themselves are mostly a peaceable race, and appreciate the protection they enjoy under British administration.

8. The elements of danger in Berar may be safely put down as *nil*, *i.e.*, referring to any probable warlike demonstration on the part of the people of the province. At the period of the mutiny of 1857-58, some anxiety prevailed in regard to the feeling of the large Muhammadan population of Ellichpur, and British ladies were advised to leave the province by the then Deputy Commissioner of the district, Mr. Bullock. The persons who then composed the population have since mostly died out, or been admitted into the provincial service, or obtained employment under the Nizam's Government. The cause of their bad feeling was chiefly due to what they considered the ill-treatment of the family of the Nawab of Ellichpur, which had rendered good service to Colonels Wellesley and Stevenson during the Mahratta war. The Nawab's jagir of the value of 8½ lakhs per annum was included in the ceded territory, and after petitioning at Hyderabad for many years for redress, he ultimately had an estate conferred on him amounting to about Rs. 50,000 a year in the Oodgher district in Hyderabad. His adherents and relatives naturally felt the hardship inflicted on the family by this arrangement.

9. Political feeling may be said to be non-existent in Berar; and should it ever arise with the progress of education, it will probably be swayed by currents from Bombay, as the influential inhabitants are mostly of the same class—Maharattas. The people generally are Kunbis, though speaking Marathi. The standard of education is very low at present in Berar. The few vernacular papers that exist there breathe little of discontent. The capabilities of Berar in producing cotton, for which it is chiefly famous, have resulted in an extraordinary growth of commerce during the last 15 years, and this, it may be hoped, will promote peaceful tendencies within its borders.

(e) Strength of police.		10. The strength of the police in Berar is as follows :—			
Inspector-General of Police	...	...	...	...	1
District Superintendents	...	...	...	...	6
Assistant Superintendent	...	...	...	...	1

Total ... 8

Regular Police	...	...	...	...	2,304
Railway Police	...	...	...	...	63
Municipal Police	...	...	...	...	302

Total ... 2,669

(f) Distribution of police.

11. The distribution of the police is as follows :—

District.						Regular.	Railway.	Municipal.	Total.
Amraoti	...	...	...	...	...	467	26	90	583
Ellichpur	...	...	...	...	...	209	...	53	262
Wun	...	...	...	...	...	420	...	17	437
Akola	...	...	...	...	...	433	37	77	547
Buldana	...	...	...	...	...	413	...	36	449
Basim	...	...	...	...	...	862	...	29	391
Total						2,304	63	302	2,669

12. The distribution of the Berar Police according to the work on which they are engaged is as follows :—

Guards at district, central, or subsidiary jails	...	...	18
„ over lock-ups and treasuries or escort to prisoners or treasure	...	...	208
On town or municipal duty	...	...	289
In civil stations	...	...	22
On ordinary police duty	...	...	2,132
Total		...	2,669

13. As above stated, Berar is occupied by a peaceable race, rendered so, I may say, by our own vigorous and conciliatory administration of the country. The police are quite efficient for the work for which they are maintained. Beyond being called upon sometimes to trace or apprehend dacoits, occasion has never arisen for their employment against armed disturbers of the peace. There is one policeman to every 6 square miles and to every 816 persons in the province.

14. The strength of the European and Eurasian population (mostly servants of the State) has just reached a number that has admitted of the formation of two companies of volunteers. One of 44 members at Akola, and another of 60 members at Amraoti, the two sudder stations in Berar; and as these companies are not likely to be called on to contend with other than local disturbers of the peace, who themselves cannot but be wanting in discipline, they would doubtless suffice for the maintenance of order at these stations in any case of simple local disturbance.

15. Except in the event of a general rising of the Native population or of foreign invasion, the weakness of the European and Eurasian population is not such as to cause anxiety for the safety of non-combatants, women and children, or to call for special arrangements for their protection, beyond what is already at hand, as noted in parts (a) and (b) of this report in reply to paragraph 3 of Colonel Burne's letter.

(2) weakness in necessity for provision of safety of non-combatants, women and children; (3) of possible greater utility than at present if afforded for the maintenance of order in case of disturbance.

17. The compulsory enrolment of Europeans and Eurasians in Berar in a volunteer corps would appear to be unnecessary, as there are no settlers in the province, and as a fair proportion of the residents of this class, who are mostly Government servants, have already, of their own accord, enrolled themselves in the volunteer companies above referred to.

18. The volunteer system has only lately been introduced into Berar. The information above afforded gives a general idea of the manner in which the British residents have responded to the proposal for enrolment; and I have little doubt but that, with the necessary encouragement, the system will in due course develop itself beyond the point at which it now stands. Much cannot, however, be expected in this respect in a province where European and Eurasian population is so sparse, as is the case in Berar.

## 19. Turning, now, to the information

Military requirements in Berar—

(a) for garrison purposes and the maintenance of order.

* 1 Regiment infantry, 7 companies	Strength	705
1 Troop cavalry	...	59
1 Battery artillery, 4 guns	...	123
	Total	887

† At Amraoti—

One company from regiment, Ellichpur ... 110

At Akola—

A detachment from the regiment at Hingoli 155

## 20. For internal military purposes, this

(b) for internal and external military purposes irrespective of (a).

my views in reference to the Hyderabad Contingent and the general military requirements of this administration. I will merely add here that we have at stations bordering on the province of Berar, *viz.*, Aurangabad, Jalna, and Hingoli, an available force of contingent troops of 3,500 men and 8 guns, which answers the double purpose of being in a position to render service in Berar by co-operating there if necessary, as well as operating against insurgents in the Nizam's country.

21. I will now revert to the second head under which I propose to furnish the information required for the Commission, *viz.* :—

*Hyderabad.*

## (a) Strength of Native population.

Aurangabad	...	4,532
Bolarum	...	6,000
Hingoli	...	4,800
Jalna	...	7,000
Lingsugur	...	2,237
Mominabad	...	2,957
Shahabad	...	2,000
Secunderabad	...	42,959
	Total	72,485

## 23. There are no European or Eurasian residents in the interior of this country, except

(b) Strength of European and Eurasian population.

of government and at the several stations occupied by the Subsidiary and Contingent forces, there is small number of Europeans and Eurasians, mostly in employment under the State; and there are also a few at other places occupied by the Nizam's troops or by the Nizam's engineering establishments. The strength of the European and Eurasian male adult population, exclusive of those in the army, is estimated to be as follows :—

## (1) Not employed in the army.

In His Highness the Nizam's dominions	...	200
In Secunderabad	...	151
In the Hyderabad Residency bazaras	...	25
At Bolarum and other stations of the Hyderabad Contingent	...	50
		426

## (2) Employed in the Nizam's army.

In His Highness the Nizam's army of this class there are about	...	121
Making a total of	...	547

24. The above statement as to the number of Europeans and Eurasians in His Highness the Nizam's dominions is only an estimate, as there are no reliable returns, except those of Europeans in His Highness' service, from which to extract the required information; and His Highness the Nizam's Minister has intimated his inability to furnish an accurate list without much delay. The figure 200 given above as the strength of the male adult European and Eurasian population in His Highness the Nizam's dominions has been made up as follows :—

Number in civil employ under the Nizam's Government	...	...	112
Employés of the Resident's office	...	...	60
Number engaged in trades and professions	...	...	28
	Total	...	200

25. The state of feeling of the people in His Highness the Nizam's dominions may be considered under two heads, *viz.*, in regard to its bearing

(1) towards the Nizam's Government, and (2) towards the British Government, the relations between which are so close and intimate, in consequence of the long-standing and still existing treaty engagements between the two Governments.

26. On this subject I would premise by stating that so lately as 25 years ago Hyderabad was a most turbulent country, rendered so by, among other evils, the system that then, and for many years previously, existed of farming out to contractors, saukars, Arabs, &c., the collection of the revenue, partly in payment of their own dues, and partly on behalf of the State. These collectors frequently sublet their contracts or entrusted their working to naibs, who, for the maintenance of their own position, and for the purpose of enforcing their demands, employed armed foreigners.



Zemindars, and other wealthy owners of property, again, for their own protection, also employed mercenaries. Disputes often arose between the people and the troops, or between zemindars themselves, or sometimes these latter became refractory; and it was hence found necessary on the part of the State to coerce them, or otherwise to quell disturbances that arose from these causes. The Nizam's Government frequently was unable to do this, and called on the Resident to assist with the Contingent troops, which were employed on the duty after the Resident had first satisfied himself that such was warranted by the facts of the case. In this manner, the people of the country became familiar with the use of arms; and being at liberty to move about armed at all times, they gained for themselves the reputation of being a class who were always ready to fight. They continue still to carry arms as they did at the period here referred to; and there is thus at the capital and throughout the Nizamat a large class of men used to arms, and in case of disturbance the element for feeding the same will not be found wanting.

27. The agricultural classes, as distinguished from the armed class described above, are a peace-loving people, who have been much oppressed by the unprincipled and grasping officials who have been put in authority over them. They appear to chafe much under the present system, which has given employment to a large number of strangers from other parts of India, who are generally personally unpopular, and against whose proceedings many complaints are made. Most of the districts are managed by persons of this class, who are said to fill all subordinate offices with their own relations and friends, and there is much discontent in consequence.

28. The Nizam, while still a vassal of the Mogul empire, and before he assumed independence, had created a class of nobles and sirdars in Hyderabad, upon whom he conferred grants of land or the State revenues for their own support and the maintenance of their retainers, on conditions which generally conveyed to them hereditary rights in such grants. Any interference with these rights in after-years was invariably resisted by the grantees; and where such interference was persisted in, disturbance and bloodshed were the result.

29. The zemindars and hereditary landholders are described as being in some cases much dissatisfied with the course His Highness' Government has for some time past taken towards certain persons of their own class. These classes are much connected by intermarriages; and individual grievances are commented on by many, far and near. The contrast between Berar and Hyderabad in the treatment of the rights of hereditary landholders is much discussed amongst them. The British Government does not interfere with the internal administration of Hyderabad, and the grievances of these classes have not as yet been put forward in a way to demand its notice; but they are the cause of much complaint and dissatisfaction.

30. The trading classes are generally well-disposed towards the British Government, but not equally so towards the Nizam's—especially the bankers at Hyderabad, who have large unsettled claims against His Highness' Government. Every description of article comprising the home trade finds its way into the Hyderabad country. The exports are limited. No oppression is exercised towards traders; but they find some difficulty in recovering their dues from the nobles and others at the capital, as they receive very little assistance from the courts.

31. In regard to the more wealthy class mentioned above as dissatisfied—*viz.*, the bankers—the Nizam's Government has from time to time borrowed large sums from numerous firms at Hyderabad which have remained unpaid for years, to the ruin of the bankers, who have thereby in many instances been reduced from wealth to bankruptcy. The nobles and others have followed the example of Government; and while decrees are often given in favor of complainants against such persons by the courts, no adequate assistance is rendered in obtaining execution of the same, and the decrees are thus in many cases of no use whatever.

32. These remarks will explain the ground for the opinion I entertain that the state of feeling of the people throughout the Hyderabad territory cannot be described as one of contentment and good-will towards His Highness' Government; and where the feeling is not one of discontent, it may perhaps be best described as one of indifference.

33. This feeling has to some extent extended itself towards British officers, to whom in the interior ill-will is occasionally shown, the slightest provocation on the part of a European being apt to be immediately, and sometimes violently, resented. It is, at the same time, a fact that persons of all classes, who are discontented with the existing system and state of things, appear to look for relief from the action sooner or later of the British Government.

34. While expressing myself thus freely on this point, I do not question the existence, amongst certain classes and persons, of good feeling towards the Executive. Those who are exceptionally well treated, or who compose or are connected with those in power, and may be termed the ministerial party, are well content. These, however, are, as a rule, cordially disliked by the more influential of the court or Hyderabad party. Their ranks are filled from Hindustan; and the Nizam's own subjects are naturally indignant at seeing the State favors in a large degree allotted to, and almost appropriated by, persons whom they consider to have no claims thereto.

35. Surrounded as Hyderabad is by British territory, no immediate external elements of danger exist. The internal elements of danger, I regret to say, are more serious. Apart from the sources of evil mentioned above, wherein exists the nucleus of future possible trouble, the condition and character of the armed forces of the State are, and must always continue to be, a subject of anxiety, so long as they are maintained as at present.

36. Besides the two British forces called the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and Hyderabad Contingent, which are maintained under treaty for all military purposes in the Hyderabad country, large State forces and levies are kept up, the greater part of which are located in the city of Hyderabad and its suburbs. One of these is the force termed the "Reformed Troops," the cost of which must be greatly in excess of the services it renders, at present at all events. This force has a political significance, to which I shall refer by and bye.

37. Another element of insecurity is to be found in the system permitted at Hyderabad by which almost every nobleman maintains a set of armed retainers at the expense of the State, who are so



attached to the person of their master as to forget the allegiance and obedience they owe to the head of the Government, against whom they would probably not hesitate to act, if prompted to do so by their immediate superior.

38. Possible trouble might also be found to spring from the free admission into Hyderabad of foreigners from Hindustan, who, in the event of any *émeute* occurring from religious or other causes, would probably sympathize with and join in the same. As long as the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force is located at Secunderabad, and the Hyderabad Contingent garrisons Bolarum and other stations in the Nizam's country, no serious danger from this cause need however, it is thought, be apprehended. The British troops of these forces at the capital are quite sufficient to cope with the armed rabble of the city, even if it were joined by the Nizam's reformed troops, who are mostly recruited from Hindustanis. Should, however, a *general rising* take place in the city against His Highness' Government, in which the Arabs and other levies took part, the case would no doubt be one of much gravity. In such event, the rebels would at once secure the persons of the Nizam and his chief nobles, whose residences surround the palace, and hold them and His Highness' family as hostages; and the operations of the British force against the city under such circumstances would be attended with much difficulty and risk, as there would be fully 25,000 armed men to oppose it in any attempt to suppress the outbreak and rescue the Chief.

39. The chief portion of the troops and levies which compose the Nizam's army is located at Hyderabad, the greater part of them being within the city walls. This arrangement, which is of long standing, is, for obvious reasons, a most objectionable one, the capital being at all times filled with armed men who have little real duty to occupy them, and who are ever at hand and ready to join in any trouble that may break out.

40. The strength of the Nizam's armed forces of all descriptions located in and around the city is about as follows:—

				Strength.
1. Reformed troops	...	...	{ Infantry	2,471
			{ Cavalry	920
			{ Artillery, 14 guns...	298
			Total	3,689
2. Reformed city troops	...	...	}	2,317
3. Miserim regiment	...	...		
4. Other city troops and levies	...	...		5,823
5. Surfi Khas troops	...	...	...	4,815
6. Minister's troops	...	...	...	534
7. Arab Jamaats	...	...	...	4,484
8. Other levies of all sorts, Sikhs, Rohillas, &c.	...	...	...	3,789
9. Pagah	...	...	...	7,315
				<hr/>
				29,077
Total combatants				<hr/>
				32,766

41. Of these forces, the reformed troops, which have several European and Eurasian officers in their ranks, are the best disciplined.

42. The reorganized city troops and the Arab and Rohilla regiment at Miserim (Jamaat Nizam-i-Myboob) are next in this respect.

43. The other troops and levies are little disciplined; but the Arabs and Rohillas amongst them would be no contemptible foe to expel from the city in the event of such becoming necessary.

44. The history of the reformed troops, and of the circumstances under which they were raised, was fully reported to the Government of India in despatch from the Resident to Foreign Secretary, No. 136A. of 11th March 1876. This force was, as is well known, brought up to its present strength with the object of becoming a substitute for the Hyderabad Contingent, which it is, however, quite unfitted to replace. Its maintenance is a heavy charge on the State revenues, for which it cannot be said to give a corresponding return, as the Contingent is available to do, as it has done for the last sixty years, most of the work for which it has been raised. The reformed force is viewed by the influential court party, and probably other classes at Hyderabad, with disfavor; and some of the highest among the nobles regard it with distrust, and as an element of future danger in the event of troubles occurring. The Minister does not share this feeling; but it is doubtful if he has much confidence in the efficiency of the force as a military body. As already stated, the force is chiefly recruited from Hindustanis; but it is believed that many discharged men from the Madras army and the Hyderabad Contingent are to be found in its ranks.

45. I have always been of opinion that this force, as at present constituted, was raised in a manner and is maintained for purposes obnoxious to the object of the treaty of 1853. This has been in a way avowed by the Minister, Sir Salar Jung, who, in his last application for the restoration of Berar, demanded the abolition of the contingent, which he deemed to be no longer required, consequent on the existence of the reformed troops.

46. On this subject I have no hesitation in recording my firm belief that the maintenance of order throughout the Hyderabad territory is largely dependent on the contingent, and that the reformed troops would not adequately supply its place in this respect. I have further to remark that this force has been raised, not by His Highness the Nizam, but by the Minister, for a special purpose, viz., to furnish ground for setting aside a treaty between the two Governments which was solemnly agreed to and executed by the Nizam himself.

47. I have submitted to Government that this force may be suffered to remain as at present, on the condition that its strength does not exceed a fixed complement; and this has been sanctioned, and has been agreed to by His Highness' Government. But should the question arise of the necessity of breaking up it or the contingent, I could have no hesitation in recommending the retention of the latter, and the reduction of the reformed troops to such strength as would suffice for the duties for which a small force of the sort is really required.

48. A description of the Nizam's army may perhaps not be out of place. The Nizam's regular troops, known as the reformed troops, I have described as a disciplined force, which is trained in parade and field manœuvres on the same principle as that of the British Native army.

The total strength of this force and of the reformed city troops, which are also included under the head of regular troops, is given at 5,099 combatants of all ranks, the greater portion of which is located at Hyderabad. The Miserim regiment of Arabs and Rohillas, which was stated in the return furnished in October 1878 to muster 1,268 men of all ranks, is now described as having only 907 combatants. This regiment is not included in the regular troops; but it and the latter make up a force of 6,006 combatants that are more or less trained and disciplined. The Miserim regiment is cantoned 20 miles from the city, and is commanded by an officer who is a native of Algiers, and has many Turks as well as Arabs and Rohillas in its ranks.

49. The other portions of the Nizam's army are composed of Africans, Arabs, country-born Arabs, Sikhs, Rohillas, Afghans, Sindhis, and Hydrabadis, and are under the command of several officers, all independent of each other; some of whom instruct their men in drill, while others do but little in this respect. These perform all the guard duties of the Nizam's Minister's and other high nobles' palaces and at treasuries, jails, &c., in the districts. Their number is given at close on 46,592 combatants of all ranks, a large proportion of whom may be termed mercenaries.

50. Since the above was written, His Highness the Nizam's Minister has furnished a return showing that the Nizam's army amounts to 52,598 men. The distribution in the districts of a portion of this force is as stated in the margin, and exhibits, as will be seen, a total of ... 10,493

*Dewani troops in the districts.*

Nandair	...	...	1,167
Beder	...	...	630
Nuldrug	...	...	547
Gungakheir	...	...	150
Raichore	...	...	19
Shorapore	...	...	1,223
Gulburgah	...	...	797
Aurangabad	...	...	950
Beerd	...	...	389
Purbunny	...	...	495
Indore	...	...	858
Maiduck	...	...	832
Elgundul	...	...	565
Surpoor Tandoor	...	...	97
Kummum	...	...	446
Nulgoondah	...	...	272
Naggur Kurnool	...	...	584
At customs posts in different talukas	...	...	50
On guard duty at sudder treasuries	...	...	67
			10,138

The rest of the troops are stationed in and about the city of Hyderabad, as here detailed, viz. :—

*I.—Dewani troops.*

(1) Present for duty, on guard duty, &c.	...	17,200
(2) On guard duty at Government offices, courts, treasuries, &c.	...	8,375
(3) On duty at the Minister's palace	...	744
Total		26,319

*II.—Surfi Khas troops.*

(4) Present for duty, on guard duty, &c.	...	1,823
(5) On guard duty at Government offices, courts, treasuries, &c.	...	5,250
Total		7,073

*III.—Pagah troops.*

(6) Present for duty, on guard duty, &c.	...	8,693
--	-----	-------

Making a grand total of ... 52,598

*Surfi Khas troops in the districts.*

On guard duty at judicial courts, Government offices, treasuries, &c.	...	355
Total	...	10,493

51. Of these, the mounted troops are as follows—

Dewani troops	...	...	10,600
Surfi Khas troops	...	...	736
Pagah troops	...	...	2,153
			13,489

and footmen and infantry as follows—

Dewani troops	...	...	25,877
Surfi Khas troops	...	...	6,692
Pagah troops	...	...	6,540

making a total as shown of ... 52,598

52. The strength and character of the reformed and other troops in His Highness the Nizam's service, and the reported reorganization and armament of His Highness' forces, have been the subject of full report by the Resident to Government in the marginally noted despatches; to the first of which I have already referred, and copies of all of which could doubtless, if desired, be furnished to the Commission by the Foreign Office.

Addressed to the Secretary to Government, Foreign Department—

- (1) No. 136A. of the 14th March 1876.
- (2) No. 58A. of the 3rd August 1877.
- (3) No. 65P. of the 15th August 1877.
- (4) No. 127A. of the 4th October 1877.

\* NOTE.—The reformed troops, &c., shown above under heads 1 and 2 in para. 40, are included in this number.

(e) Strength of police.  
(f) Distribution of police.

53. The strength and distribution of His Highness the Nizam's police is as follows:—

In the city and suburbs	...	...	...	4,606
Aurangabad	...	...	...	867
Beerd	...	...	...	526
Purbunny	...	...	...	571
Beder	...	...	...	631
Nandair	...	...	...	796
Nuldrug	...	...	...	526
Kummum	...	...	...	901
Nulgoondah	...	...	...	676
Nagur Kurnool	...	...	...	931
Goolburgah	...	...	...	661
Shorapore	...	...	...	436
Raichore	...	...	...	451
Lingsugur	...	...	...	436
Indore	...	...	...	1,246
Elgundul	...	...	...	751
Maiduck	...	...	...	603
Total				15,615

This force is mostly armed with swords and firearms.

54. Their mode of carrying on their duties is generally slovenly and wanting in smartness, though a proportion of those employed at the capital are better in this respect. They cannot be described as

(g) Efficiency of police.

efficient in the sense applicable to British police, and are quite incapable of acting against the armed mercenaries of His Highness the Nizam's troops. Their arms to a considerable extent, as is the case with those of the reformed troops, have been manufactured in military workshops at Hyderabad, where the ammunition for them has also been made up, and in regard to which I have already submitted special reports in the letters as per margin.

(1) Letter No. 13, dated 3rd August 1877.

(2) Letter No. 14, dated 15th August 1877.

55. The police in the Hyderabad territory, which is under the control of British officers, consists of—

(1) The Railway Police of the Nizam's State Railway and that portion of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway that runs through Hyderabad territory, about	...	250
(2) The Residency Bazaar Police	...	112
(3) The Secunderabad Cantonment Police	...	246
(4) The police of the six Hyderabad Contingent stations	...	110
Total		718

56. As the duties of these several bodies of police are purely local, it is unnecessary to give any further account of them; but I may remark that the railway police are active and efficient, and that the Secunderabad cantonment police is also fairly trained.

57. The strength of the able-bodied members of the European and Eurasian population considered at Secunderabad and Hyderabad not belonging to the British or Nizam's force is sufficient to form perhaps two companies of volunteers.

58. In their present state, in the absence of all military organization amongst them, they cannot but be viewed as a weak body requiring protection for themselves and their families in case of an outbreak.

(2) Weakness in necessity for provision of safety of non-combatants, women and children.

Those who live in the immediate vicinity of the Hyderabad Residency would, in such case, find protection there, as the Resident has a guard of 200 men from the Subsidiary Force on duty at the Residency. Non-combatants in Secunderabad residing sufficiently near the entrenchment in the European part of the military station at Trimulgherry would find shelter in it; but for the rest of the large population of this class there would be no protection in case of a serious disturbance.

59. Within the Residency limits and in the adjoining suburbs of Chadarghat the male adults of the European and Eurasian population would be sufficient to admit of the organization from it of a small volunteer force; but as the greater number of these persons are either in, or are connected with, the Nizam's service, and are residing within His Highness' jurisdiction, it is not clear how such a force could be enrolled.

(3) Of possible greater utility if organized.

60. Compulsory enrolment under such circumstances is, of course, out of the question, so far as the Nizam's employes are concerned; but the Residency European and Eurasian employes might be required to form a volunteer company.

(c) Compulsory enrolment.

61. The Nizam's State Railway officials have organized themselves into a volunteer company in connection with those of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway; but the State Railway line is so short, and the officials so few, that further development amongst the latter need not be expected.

(f) Development of volunteer system.

Military requirements—

(a) For garrison purposes and the maintenance of order.

\* Subsidiary Force—

Men	...	...	.. (a) 4,980
Guns	...	...	...
Hyderabad Contingent—			
Men	...	...	7,520
Guns	...	...	16

includes a large portion of European troops is located at Secunderabad, five miles from the Residency, and six from the city.

64. The head-quarters and a portion† of the Contingent are stationed at Bolarum, 10 miles from the Residency. There is thus a total British force of 6,480 men and 22 guns in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital and at hand to meet any emergency that may arise at it.

65. The rest of the Contingent is cantoned at six stations, one in Berar, and five in Hyderabad, which have been selected as the best located for the military requirements of the territory and the general maintenance of order therein.

66. The Subsidiary Force has hitherto answered a two-fold purpose, viz., (1) the protection of the Nizam against internal foes, and (2) the upholding of British prestige at Hyderabad. This force is not stronger than is necessary for these purposes, with reference to the large number of armed men collected at the capital and the vast population of the latter and the suburbs, stated to amount, with that of the cantonment of Secunderabad, to 450,000 souls. Except under absolute necessity, no considerable portion of the Subsidiary Force should, I consider, be employed away from the capital—certainly not for any length of time—as such a measure might be attended with an unsettlement of public feeling in the city and consequent risk.

67. The Hyderabad Contingent, which is a perfectly equipped and efficient force, composed wholly of Native troop, is quite adapted for external as well as internal military purposes; and a considerable portion of it might be regarded as always available for the former, with the concurrence of His Highness' Government, when the condition of affairs in Hyderabad does not specially require the presence of the whole force within its limits.

68. The military requirements of this administration, including Berar, are, in my opinion, sufficiently provided for by the Subsidiary Force and the Contingent.

69. The former is composed of troops of the Madras army, and, as a division of that army, is under the command of the Commander-in-Chief at Madras, while its services are at the disposal of the Resident, if occasion should arise for his requiring them.

70. The Hyderabad Contingent is a local force raised, recruited, and located within the territories of His Highness the Nizam, and maintained for service primarily in these territories. It was originally part of the Nizam's army, which was gradually reorganized and officered by European officers chiefly from the Hon'ble Company's army. Under the provisions of the Treaty of 1853 it became a British "auxiliary force," and its control was vested in the Resident.

71. Both these forces are political forces, maintained under treaty engagements. Article II of the Treaty of 21st May 1853 provides, (1) that the Subsidiary Force shall consist of not less than 8 battalions of sepoys and 2 regiments of cavalry, with their requisite complement of guns and European artillerymen, fully equipped, &c.; and (2) that, unless with the Nizam's express consent, there shall never be less than 5 regiments of infantry and 1 of cavalry, with a due proportion of artillery, of the Subsidiary Force stationed within His Highness' territory, and that the residue of the force shall at all times be brought into the latter without delay on His Highness' making requisition therefor.

72. The payment of this force was provided for by the cession in perpetuity by the Nizam to the British Government, under Article V of the Treaty of 12th October 1800, of all the territories acquired by His Highness under the Treaties of Srirangapatam of 18th March 1792 and of Mysore of 22nd June 1799.

73. Any economy that can be effected in the charges of the Subsidiary Force, without reducing it below the strength as above specified in the treaty, will be a saving to the British Government.

74. The only arm in which the Subsidiary Force is at present in excess of its treaty strength is in the cavalry, of which there are one European and one Native regiment, whereas the treaty specifies two (Native) regiments. As one European regiment is in such cases deemed to be equal to two Native, the present strength of the cavalry represents three Native regiments. Looking, however, at the actual number of men of this arm now with the Subsidiary Force, viz., 737 of all ranks, excluding officers, I do not think that any reduction in it would be prudent.

(a) NOTE.—One field battery of the force was moved to Mooltan in December 1878, and has not been replaced, and 3 companies European infantry (271 men) are on duty at Madras. These are not included in the strength shown here.

75. For many years past, a large annual charge has been incurred at Secunderabad for military works for the European portion of the force, which have been extremely costly; but these are now approaching completion, and this heavy item connected with the maintenance of the force will, I trust, soon cease to appear in the annual charges.

76. As regards the Hyderabad Contingent, Article III. of the Treaty of 21st May 1858 provides that it shall consist of not less than 5,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, with 4 field batteries of artillery. Article VI of the same treaty provides that for the payment of the Contingent certain districts, of which there was a subsequent readjustment under Articles V to VII of the Treaty of 26th December 1860, should be assigned to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being, while Article VI of the latter treaty states that the districts assigned for the purpose, as so readjusted, shall be held for it, in trust, by the British Government.

77. The strength of the cavalry and infantry of the Contingent was somewhat in excess of that provided for in the treaty up to 1877, when certain reductions were sanctioned to admit of new charges for increase of pay and other items being met from the savings so effected. These reductions brought the aggregate strength of these arms down to 2,204 cavalry and 5,112 infantry, of all ranks, exclusive of European officers, at which it now stands.

78. The revenues of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts have largely increased during the last 10 or 12 years, and are ordinarily considerably in excess of the amount required for the payment of the Contingent, the annual surplus being duly handed over to His Highness' Government, as provided for in Article IV of the Treaty of 26th December 1860.

79. During the last two years the charges of the force have been quite abnormal, owing to the disbursement of compensation for dearness of food and some other minor causes, and the surplus payable to His Highness' Government has been much reduced in consequence. These causes are, however, only temporary; and with a couple of good seasons the charges will doubtless fall again, and return to their ordinary figure.

80. It may be noted that there has been a considerable increase of charge in the Contingent (1) by the abolition in 1864 of the rule previously in force under which all officers were removed from it on attaining the rank of regimental major, and (2) by a more recent order under which the Berar revenues are charged with a proportion of the pensions or pay of the European officers who may retire or succeed to colonel's allowances according to their service with the Contingent.

81. The only opening for reducing the ordinary charges of the Contingent somewhat would be by fixing the strength at the figures specified in the treaty including European officers and all other ranks, and allowing all in excess of those figures to be absorbed. This measure would effect a saving of about Rs. 80,000 annually.

82. In former discussions on this subject, any such reduction has been deprecated on the score of its being intended that the figures recorded in the treaty "meant rank and file" only, and did not include officers and non-commissioned officers. This view may certainly be correct; but in the absence of any record to show that it is so, I am of opinion that it is quite open to Government to act as it pleases in the matter.

83. The force, with a strength of 2,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry of all ranks and grades, and with 4 batteries of artillery (strength 520), would be quite strong enough for the duties it has to perform; and looking at the increase that has unavoidably taken place in the charges during the last 15 years, from the causes mentioned above and in other ways, I think there are good grounds for reducing it to that strength, if Government sees no objection to that course on the score that it might be open to question for the reason stated above. I feel sure that His Highness' Government would, if consulted, readily concur in the measure.

84. In closing this report, it may be as well that I should bring to notice that the matter of the military establishments maintained in Hyderabad and the expenditure incurred therefor was made the subject of consideration by a Commission appointed by the Government of India for the purpose, in Financial Resolution No. 6737, dated 8th June 1861, whose report, completed on the 10th August of that year at Hyderabad, affords full information on many points discussed in my present letter.

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No. 129, dated Hyderabad, 27th October 1879.

From--COLONEL SIR R. J. MEADE, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., Resident at Hyderabad,  
To--The Secretary to the Army Organization Commission, Simla.

The figures showing the strength of the Nizam's troops given in paragraphs 40 and 48 to 51, inclusive of my letter No. 90, dated the 23rd August last, have been the subject of reference to His Highness' Government since that letter was written, as it was found impossible to reconcile them with the returns previously furnished by it; and as it now appears that they are seriously incorrect, I beg to forward an amended return of the Hyderabad forces which has been furnished by the Nizam's Government after the fullest inquiry possible, and the accuracy of which, the Minister assures me, is quite reliable.

2. In addition to minor errors in the previous returns, it appears that from some mistake the horses were shown in the columns for men, and their number was added up with that of the latter.

3. I regret this mistake extremely.

*Abstract return of the strength of His Highness the Nizam's Troops for 1879.*

Detail of Troops.	MEN OF ALL GRADES.			CATTLE.		Remarks.
	Combatants.	Non-combatants.	Total.	Horses.	Buffaloes.	
I.—DEWANI TROOPS.						
(1) <i>Reformed Regular Troops.</i>						
(a) Cavalry (4 regiments) ... ..	1,263	444	1,707	1,227	...	
(b) Artillery (3 batteries) ... ..	351	170	521	140	53	
(c) Infantry (3 regiments) ... ..	2,297	218	2,515	...	...	
Total (1) ... ..	3,911	832	4,743	1,367	53	
(2) <i>Reformed City Troops.</i>						
(d) Infantry (2 regiments) ... ..	1,458	128	1,586	...	...	
(e) His Highness the Nizam's own regiment of Arabs and Rohillas or Jamait Nizam-i-Myboob ... ..	935	179	1,114	...	...	
Total (2) ... ..	2,393	307	2,700	...	...	
Total (1) and (2) ... ..	6,304	1,139	7,443	1,367	53	
(3) <i>Irregular Troops.</i>						
(f) Cavalry ... ..	3,604	292	3,896	3,616	...	
(g) Dismounted cavalry ( <i>Bargheers</i> ) ... ..	136	330	466	3	...	
(h) Arabs ... ..	5,835	727	6,562	82	...	
(i) Rohillas, Sindis, Turks, and Beluchis ... ..	1,444	47	1,491	...	...	
(j) Sikhs ... ..	906	46	952	5	...	
(k) Rathore, Burkundanz, and Bar-Jowan... ..	8,924	540	9,464	12	...	
(l) Loda, Aligole, and Carnatic ... ..	161	10	171	...	...	
Total (3) ... ..	21,010	1,992	23,002	3,718	...	
I.—Grand Total Dewani Troops (1), (2) and (3) ... ..	27,314	3,131	30,445	5,085	53	
II.—Surfi Khas Troops ... ..	5,307	1,753	7,060	338	76	
III.—Pagah Troops ... ..	7,315	...	7,315	1,378	73	
IV.—Minister's Troops ... ..	601	159	760	51	...	
Grand Total ... ..	40,537	5,043	45,580	6,852	202	

HYDERABAD RESIDENCY; }  
*The 27th October 1879.* }

R. J. MEADE,  
*Resident.*

**K.—MYSORE.**

No. 3814-51, dated Bangalore, 5th August 1879.

From—W. J. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Mysore,  
 To—The President, Army Organization Commission, Simla.

I am directed by the Chief Commissioner of Mysore and Coorg to reply to the letter No. 204 S.B., dated 7th July, on organization, asking for full particulars on the points therein specified.

2. According to the census taken in 1871, the Native population of Mysore numbers 5,047,841.

(a) Strength of the Native population.

Since that census was taken, the population has been considerably reduced by the late severe famine, but to what extent it is not possible to say more accurately than that it is now probably between 4 and 5 million souls. The Native population of Coorg at the same time numbered 167,902.

The numbers, according to the census, of the European and Eurasian population will be nearer the truth at the present day than in the case of the Native population. They were for Mysore 4,374 of the civil population, and 1,399 women and children belonging to the military. In Coorg there were only 410 Europeans and Eurasians.

The population of Mysore is singularly peaceable and well-disposed. For many years past, there has been no cause for anxiety; and so long as the administration is fairly carried on, and justice impartially

(c) State of feeling. administered, there will not, Mr. Gordon thinks, be any probability of cause for anxiety. In Coorg the same may be said. The Coorgs are a fine and martial race, who are well disposed to British rule, and whose interests are identical with ours.

The above remarks will indicate that, in Mr. Gordon's opinion, the province of Mysore is particularly free from danger arising from within, unless the opposition of the people is aroused, as it has been before now, by maladministration. In Coorg, the Coorgs themselves are in a minority; and should the aliens push the advantages which greater wealth, higher education, and wider enterprise give them to the impoverishment or ejection of the Coorgs, that warlike race might display its resentment in overt acts of violence. This is not probable. Neither the laws nor the customs favor the possibility of such an eventuality; but the possibility is merely mentioned.

The strength of the Mysore police, according to the report for 1878, was 4,661 officers and men.

(d) Elements of danger. In Coorg an organized police force only exists in municipal towns, and to the number of five officers and forty-nine men. Every "jamma ryot," that is Coorg occupant of Coorg land on the feudal tenure peculiar to the country, is liable for military service in times of emergency, for police duties of escort, custody of prisoners, and so forth.

(f) Distribution of police.

The following statement gives the distribution of the Mysore police:—

DISTRICTS.	ON DISTRICT.				Town or municipal duty and cantonments.
	Guards over lock-ups and treasuries or as escort to prisoners and treasure.		Other duties.		
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
Bangalore ... ..	...	23	93	474	427
Kolar ... ..	...	30	67	348	18
Tumkur ... ..	6	48	66	377	14
Mysore ... ..	6	26	75	499	239
Hassan ... ..	...	20	61	371	11
Shimoga ... ..	8	32	63	355	35
Kadur ... ..	6	18	44	256	16
Chitaldroog ... ..	4	55	62	383	16
	30	252	531	3,063	495

The Coorg jamma ryots are, as is to be inferred from the nature of their occupations, scattered all over the country; but there are fewer of them proportionally to the population in North Coorg.

Mr. Gordon can confidently report that the improvement in efficiency in the Mysore police of late years has been great, and that they are fairly efficient as a repressive force. In Coorg the police are more efficient than on consideration of the constitution of the force one would imagine; but there is room for improvement.

3. The European and Eurasian population of Mysore could under no circumstances be of much strength as a combatant power. There were only, according to the census, 978 adult males. They are dispersed (though the majority are in Bangalore) through all the districts of the province, and in the west as well as in Coorg are scattered on different detached coffee estates. Their women and children would, in case of disturbance, be always a source of much embarrassment; and no special measures have anywhere been devised for their safety. In Bangalore, the fort, which is perhaps the only place where non-combatants could be collected and guarded, is situated so that the Native town intervenes between it and the European garrison. That they would be of possible greater utility than at present if organized for the maintenance of order in case of disturbance cannot be controverted; but the consideration of the means of so organizing them cannot, in Mr. Gordon's opinion, be separated from the question of the development of the volunteer system. Neither in Mysore nor Coorg does he consider that compulsory enrolment is possible, or to be desired; but on the development and encouragement of the volunteer system he would lay the greatest stress, and he directs me to invite attention in connection with this subject to my letter No. 2456-39M., dated 18th June 1879, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. There is a volunteer corps in Bangalore, with a company stationed at Mysore; and by the most recent returns it numbers 13 officers, 38 non-commissioned officers, and 116 effective volunteers and 49 cadets.

4. With regard to the opinion asked for in paragraph 3 of the letter under reference, on the general military requirements of the province, I am to state that the situation of Mysore is somewhat peculiar. A Native State itself is bound by treaty to maintain a force of cavalry, which by recent reductions now numbers little over 1,000 sabres. There is also a local infantry consisting of three regiments, each of 500 rank and file, who are employed almost exclusively on jail and treasury guards. By treaty Mysore is guaranteed military protection. The position, accessibility, and good climate of Bangalore render it a suitable place for a considerable garrison not only with regard to the actual requirements of the province itself, but for military purposes of the British power. And the

interior garrison at the French Rocks has been found sufficient for the rest of the province, especially when it is taken into consideration that at Mercara in Coorg, on the western frontier of Mysore, there is a small garrison of Native infantry. For Coorg itself the garrison of one regiment is believed to be sufficient, but not more than enough, since its reduction this year, owing to troops being sent on active service, appears to have reduced the garrison below what is actually necessary for guards. At Bangalore there would, on the grounds above referred to, always be a considerable garrison of British troops. What the strength of that garrison should be, must depend on considerations other than the wants and interests of Mysore; and Mr. Gordon therefore refrains from expressing any opinion on that point.

No. 480-77, dated Bangalore, 13th August 1879.

From—W. J. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Coorg,  
To—The President, Army Organization Commission, Simla.

In continuation of my letter to your address No. 3814-51, dated the 5th instant, reporting on the military requirements of Mysore and Coorg, I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to forward copies of correspondence with the Madras Government on the subject of the Mercara garrison; and to report in connection therewith that, in Mr. Gordon's opinion, it would be less expensive and on other grounds preferable if, instead of keeping a wing of a Native infantry regiment at Mercara, a company of the European regiment stationed not far off, at Cannanore, were placed in detachment at Mercara.

Letter No. 3720, dated 11th July 1879, from the Secretary to the Madras Government, Military Department.  
Letter No. 383-3, dated 17th July 1879, to the Secretary to the Madras Government, Military Department, with enclosure.  
Letter No. 4242, dated 4th August 1879, from the Secretary to the Madras Government, Military Department.  
Letter No. 4298, dated 7th August 1879, from the Secretary to the Madras Government, Military Department.

2. The military being relieved of the present guard duties at the jail and treasury, a company of Europeans would, Mr. Gordon believes, be amply sufficient for all military purposes; and whereas the climate of Mercara is unsuitable to the Natives of the plains, and causes sickness and dissatisfaction among the sepoy, to the European soldiers stationed in the enervating climate of the western coast an occasional change to Mercara would be exceedingly acceptable and beneficial. The existing accommodation would probably amply suffice for one company of Europeans.

3. If it should also be determined to reduce the French Rocks garrison to a wing of a Native regiment, which Mr. Gordon believes is quite sufficient, the detachment could as easily now be supplied from Bangalore, and more easily hereafter when the State railway to Mysore is open.

No. 3720, dated Ootacamund, 11th July 1879.

From—The Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department,  
To—The Chief Commissioner of Coorg.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief having brought to the notice of this Government the severity of guard duty imposed on the men of the wing 40th Regiment Native Infantry at Mercara, I am desired by His Grace the Governor in Council to request that you will be good enough to take the matter into consideration, and cause early steps to be taken to relieve the sepoy guards at the jail and treasury by police or any other means that may be practicable.

No. 383-3, dated Bangalore, 17th July 1879.

From—The Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Coorg,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department.

I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 3720, dated 11th July 1879, on the subject of the severity of guard duty imposed on the men of the wing 40th Regiment Native Infantry at Mercara, and in reply to state that the subject having already been brought under the consideration of the Chief Commissioner by Major-General Payn, Commanding Mysore Division, I addressed to him, under the Chief Commissioner's instructions, a letter, copy of which I have the honor to enclose, explanatory of the circumstances of the Coorg province, which render it impossible to relieve the military guards without going to considerable expense and obtaining the previous sanction of the Government of India.

2. I am desired to enquire whether, after perusal of the enclosed letter, His Grace in Council still wishes steps to be taken to increase the police at Mercara with a view to relieving the military of guard duty.

No. 308-3, dated Bangalore, 1st July 1879.

From—The Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Coorg,  
To—MAJOR-GENERAL W. PAYN, C.B., Commanding Mysore Division.

In continuation of my letter No. 198-1, dated 31st May 1879, I am directed to explain the peculiar circumstances of the Coorg province, in which it is not practicable to furnish a police guard over the Mercara jail to relieve the guard of the 40th M. N. I.



2. Most of the ordinary police duties in Coorg are performed by "jamma ryots" who hold their lands on a species of feudal tenure which requires their assistance in arresting and escorting prisoners; but they could not be called out for permanent duty, such as guarding the jail, without special arrangements being made for pay and batta. In Mercara the regular police force only numbers 3 officers and 14 men.

3. It is manifest, therefore, that, in order to supply a jail guard, the entertainment of a special extra police force would be necessary; and the Chief Commissioner is precluded by the recent orders of the Government of India from making any proposition involving an increase of expenditure, unless the same can be shown to be absolutely unavoidable.

4. Mr. Gordon does not know how far it would be considered expedient by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to withdraw part of the detachment stationed at the French Rocks for the purpose of strengthening the Mercara garrison; but I am desired to say that if that measure would afford a solution of the present difficulty, the Chief Commissioner will have no objection on his part to urge against it.

No. 4242, dated Ootacamund, 4th August 1879.

From—The Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department,

To—The Chief Commissioner of Coorg.

In reply to your letter No. 883-3, dated 17th July 1879, I am directed by His Grace the Governor in Council to state that, as there is now only a wing of Native infantry at Mercara, the guard duty at the jail and treasury cannot any longer be taken by Madras troops.

2. This Government do not consider that there is any military reason for increasing the present garrison of the station, nor do they think it expedient to withdraw any portion of the detachment at the French Rocks (which has to provide for guard duty at Mysore) for ordinary jail duties at Mercara. Such a course would necessitate the maintenance of additional quarters, and, not being for military but for civil purposes, would probably be more expensive to the province than the provision of the necessary police or other guards.

3. As the health of the men is suffering, and the necessity for relieving them of the guard duty urgent, I am desired to request that you will again take this matter into early consideration.

No. 4298, dated Ootacamund, 7th August 1879.

From—The Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department,

To—The Chief Commissioner of Coorg.

In forwarding for your information the annexed copy of a letter\* from the Quarter Master

\* No. 1068, dated 26th July 1879.

General, I am directed to request that His Grace the Governor in Council may be favored with an expression of your views on His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's proposal to reduce the permanent garrison of Mercara to a force not exceeding a wing of Native infantry.

2. I am to remark that ordinary jail and treasury guards, which form the only duty apparently calling for a larger force, are throughout the Madras presidency taken by police.

No. 1068, dated 26th July 1879.

From—The Quarter Master General, Madras Army,

To—The Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department.

With reference to paragraph 2 of G. O., 23rd June 1879, No. 8344, I have the honor by order to state that, in the opinion of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a wing of a Native regiment is sufficient to occupy Mercara; and to request that the Government of India may be addressed with the view of deciding that a wing shall be the permanent garrison of that post.

2. The climate of Mercara is not suited for the Natives of the plains. The men suffer from the extreme humidity and the feverishness of the place.

3. On military grounds, there seems no reason for keeping a whole regiment at Mercara. At present the guard duty is severe for a wing; but that is in consequence of the jail guard, Mercara, being taken by the military. This might be remedied. Such guards should be taken by the police; and His Excellency recommends that the Government of India be requested to direct this to be done at Mercara, in conformity with the practice elsewhere.

4. A Native infantry regiment can be divided between Mercara and the French Rocks, a wing at each place.

## L.—BURMA.

No.—,dated Rangoon,—August 1879.

From—G. D. BURGESS, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, British Burma,

To—The President, Army Organization Commission, Simla.

I am directed by the Chief Commissioner, in compliance with the instructions contained in the letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department No. 205 S.B., dated 7th July 1879, to submit the information required by the Army Organization Commission, together with the Chief Commissioner's opinion on the military requirements of this province. Statistics in regard to (1) the strength of the Native population, (2) the strength of the European and Eurasian population (exclusive of the army), and (3) the strength and distribution of the police, are given in the tables appended to this letter.

2. In estimating the state of feeling among the people of this province, regard must of course be had mainly to the Burmese, who form, in round numbers, 2,591,240 of the population. These for the most part inhabit the valley of the Irrawaddy, and have, of all sections of the population, the closest and most active connection with Upper Burma. The Arakanese, the Mons, or Talains of the Pegu plains, the Karens of Pegu and Tenasserim, and the Thai or Shan races may be considered as in some respects a counterpoise to the Burmans.

3. The Arakanese are content with our rule. Although excitable, their indolence and the absence of influential leaders render it unlikely that they would join in any serious disturbance. They still retain a recollection of the cruelties practised on them by the Burmese, which would prevent them from uniting in any general movement with that race. The Talains and Karens are universally well affected to the British Government. The antagonism between all these tribes and the Burmese, arising out of their past history, is gradually softening down under our rule, the tendency of which is to obliterate race distinctions. The separation of the Karens from the Burmese is likely to last longest. In the history of Burma, as of China, the Karens everywhere appear as a subject and oppressed people. In Burma they owe their rights and liberties to the British Government alone; and their attachment to our rule is proportionately strong. As the result of the labors of the American missionaries, there is also a large Christian element among the Karens, upon which some reliance may be placed.

4. Among the pure Burmese the majority of the respectable classes are at least satisfied with our Government, and would be unwilling to have it disturbed. Their preference is, however, founded to a great extent on the supposition of its stability and absolute power to protect life and property. If this belief were once shaken by attack from without, or by serious internal disturbances, the adherence of the Burmese to our Government could not be reckoned on. To some extent also the contentment of the Burmese is to be ascribed to the material prosperity of British Burma, and the extraordinary increase of wealth which during the last few years has been distributed among the agricultural population. Long-continued depression of trade or ill-judged measures of taxation, or any sudden and serious check on the prosperity of the province, might produce a revulsion of feeling.

5. The chief internal element of danger to our rule lies in the unsteady excitable character of the people. Their history has accustomed them to sudden and extreme changes of political fortune. They are an ignorant and superstitious people, with a surprising recklessness of temperament, which is encouraged by the popular literature. They have a thorough faith in *minlouns*, or persons who give themselves out as princes; and the appearance of one of these impostors is always sufficient to create excitement, and sometimes to secure a large following. Deeds of adventure have a charm and fascination for men even of good character, which to many prove irresistible in spite of the criminality and the punishment which follows sooner or later.

6. These are elements of danger upon which evil-disposed persons in our own territories occasionally work and which an enemy would not neglect. In the event of troubles with the Court of Ava, the King, who, from his position as the temporal head of Burmese Buddhism, necessarily exercises a very potent influence over the religious and superstitious feelings of the people, would doubtless appeal to these sentiments. The prestige of the King is great. Although there are no powerful aristocratic houses in British Burma, there are a few families of the old official classes, especially in the Thonkwa and Bassein districts, whose sympathies are more with Native than British rule, and who would require to be looked after in time of trouble. Moreover, although the people are, on the whole, contented with us and wish for no change, it would be a mistake to assume any enthusiasm on their part for British rule.

7. In the town of Rangoon there is a considerable population of Upper Burmans, many of them bad characters and ripe for mischief. The commercial intercourse between Rangoon and Mandalay affords facilities to these classes for the concoction of plots. The inflammable character of the houses in Rangoon, as indeed in all towns in Burma, makes it easy for one or two ruffians to excite conflagration in several quarters. At any time of unusual disquietude therefore, such as has prevailed since the beginning of the present year, exceptional precautions are necessary. But under ordinary circumstances, when there are no political complications at Mandalay, there is no quieter or more peaceful quarter of Her Majesty's Eastern dominions than the province of British Burma.

8. Unless in the event of a European war, we have nothing to fear by way of the sea; and when the defences of the seaport towns now under construction are completed, every necessary precaution in that direction will have been taken. On the land side we have a frontier of over 1,000 miles, which in some parts, and especially to the north of the Pegu division, is everything that a frontier should not be. We are exposed to attack from Upper Burma in all three divisions of the province; and

to secure ourselves in the event of hostilities, we ought to be prepared to strike a quick and heavy blow by the valley of the Irrawaddy. The Burmese army is, as an army, contemptible, and quite incapable of opposing us in regular operations in the field; but it would be capable of causing an immense deal of mischief if we were to show any disposition to be inactive. Portions of it could penetrate far into our territory on every side, sacking the villages and slaughtering the people, or compelling them to join their forces. This would expose our authority to a severe shock. To stand on the defensive in such an emergency would be suicidal; and the most effectual step that we could take would be to invade Upper Burma in force.

9. On the Arakan side there are wild tribes, such as the Looshais, Shandoos and Khyengs, which might on occasion enter our territories. It is not probable, however, that they would penetrate to any great distance; and it is believed that the police force would be strong enough to repel their raids.

On the borders of Tenasserim live the Karennees, Yahains, and other tribes of a lawless disposition from whom a certain amount of danger is always to be apprehended. These people visit our territories in considerable numbers. They are able to form extensive combinations without detection; but their schemes and enterprises generally take the form of dacoities and local raids.

10. To these forms of danger may be added the minor one of Chinese riots, which are liable to break out with suddenness and violence, but which under ordinary circumstances are not beyond the power of the police force to deal with.

11. The police force contains 7,313 men, distributed as shown in the annexed statement. The statement in the margin exhibits the proportion of the force employed on what may be called frontier duty.			
<i>Arakan Division—</i>		Men.	
Akyab	...	...	32
Kyauik-hpyoo	...	...	64
Sandoway	...	...	30
Arakan Hill Tracts	...	...	195
<i>Pegu Division—</i>			
Thayetmyo	...	...	473
<i>Tenasserim Division—</i>			
Amherst	...	...	89
Mergui	...	...	20
Shwe-gyeen	...	...	16
Toungoo	...	...	135
Salween	...	...	200
Total	...	...	1,244

Annual cost, including clothing ... Rs. 2,30,140

ing the Toungthoo and Karennee marauders against whom they have had to act. The northern frontiers are protected by outposts of Burmese police, containing from 10 to 20 men each, and situated about 10 miles apart. These outposts have been found to be able to repel bodies of dacoits; and if massed together and commanded by their European officers, they might be depended upon to act successfully against considerably larger numbers of Upper Burmans. Care is taken to enlist men only whose ties lie in our territories; and the force is believed to be thoroughly loyal.

12. The police force is fairly efficient in treating ordinary crime. The pay of the men in the lower grades has recently been raised; and a scheme has been devised for supplementing the regular force with a rural police, so that there are well-founded hopes that its character and general efficiency will be much improved in the future.

13. Except in the larger towns, the number of Europeans and Eurasians is quite insignificant; and they would rather be an element of weakness than of strength, as they would require protection if any commotion should take place. In the larger towns they would be useful, if properly trained.

The total number of Europeans and Eurasians in the province is returned at 7,734. The male adults are reckoned at 4,466; and of this number the non-combatants may be taken to form about 10 per cent. The combatants would then amount to 4,020, leaving 3,714 non-combatants and women and children to be cared for. In the seaport towns this part of the population could be transferred to the shipping in case of necessity; and in Thayetmyo, Toungoo, Bassein, and Shwe-gyeen it would find protection in the forts. Elsewhere there would be no refuge, except in flight or in the protection of a force specially despatched for the purpose. By organization the Europeans and Eurasians, where they live together in any numbers, might perhaps be rendered of more utility for purposes of local defence than they are at present; but their services would be quite inappreciable for the general protection of the province.

14. It is understood that the question of compulsory enrolment, on which the Chief Commissioner's opinion is asked, applies to Europeans and Eurasians only. The measure may be at once pronounced impracticable so far as British Burma is concerned. Not only, as already observed, are the numbers of Europeans and Eurasians so small that (except perhaps in Rangoon and Moulmein) such a measure would be of inappreciable benefit, but the conditions under which men of these races work in this country would make it impracticable as well as unadvisable. Any attempt to make military service compulsory would put a check on commerce, tend to drive capital and European enterprise away from the country, and seriously retard the progress of this province.

15. There now exist in Burma a corps of volunteers at Rangoon, a corps at Moulmein, a Railway corps, and corps at Prome and Akyab. The number of men enrolled is small; and it is with difficulty that a small proportion even of those enrolled can be mustered on special occasions. It would seem to be requisite to hold out stronger inducements than at present to join the volunteer force, and to bring official influence to bear in support of the movement. Many would probably be willing to join if led, but do not care to do so when their enlisting or not is regarded as a matter of indifference.

16. The last subject on which the Chief Commissioner's opinion is asked is the general military requirements of the province—

(a) for garrison purposes and the maintenance of order ;

(b) for internal and external military purposes, irrespective of (a).

17. When the forces in Pegu were reduced, the proportion of troops assigned represented a force numerically much stronger than the present, as the cadre of regiments has now been greatly diminished. On the other hand, the population, the wealth, and the trade of Burma have largely increased, while the necessity for protection has at least not decreased. With the exception of the construction of the railway from Rangoon to Prome, there has been little, if any, improvement in communications ; and it is still as important as, if not more important than, ever to maintain an effective force at the various military stations of the province.

18. At present troops are located at Rangoon, which is the head-quarters for the province, Thayetmyo, Toungoo, Moulmein, and Shwe-gyeen ; and detachments, owing to exceptional circumstances, have been temporarily placed at Bassein and Thambhula. The garrison at Rangoon is as small as it is consistent with safety to allow it to be. The force recommended by the Major-General Commanding is—

one and a half batteries of garrison artillery ;

one company of sappers ;

one battalion of European infantry ; and

two battalions of Native infantry.

The Major-General, a copy of whose letter is attached, speaks of furnishing a detachment to Port Blair, and a wing or two companies of Native infantry to Moulmein. It would appear worthy of consideration, however, whether the detachment to Port Blair could not be more conveniently supplied either from Calcutta or Madras ; while, as it is proposed to garrison Shwe-gyeen from Rangoon, the wing or companies to Moulmein could hardly be spared. The two companies spoken of should be detached to Shwe-gyeen. The force required at Thayetmyo is estimated by the Major-General to be—

one mountain battery organized with elephants, half on the right and half on the left bank of the Irrawaddy ;

one mountain battery with guns carried by coolies or by mules ;

half a battery of garrison artillery ;

one company of sappers ;

one battalion of European infantry ; and

two battalions of Native infantry.

The garrison at Toungoo should apparently be of the same strength. At Moulmein there should be a wing of Native infantry, and at Shwe-gyeen two companies.

19. The Chief Commissioner was in hopes that it might have been possible to dispense with detachments at Moulmein and Shwe-gyeen ; but further consideration has induced him to alter his opinion. The necessity for troops at Moulmein and Shwe-gyeen lies in the possibility of an organized attack by Karennees or some other of the wild tribes on our borders. It is believed that one such attack was not long ago planned on Moulmein, and that nothing but the fear of the regular troops stationed there prevented the enterprise from being carried into execution. If no military force were maintained at these places, apprehensions would perhaps be roused among the Native population, and an encouragement and a temptation might be held out to their savage neighbours to plunder both towns. There would be little hope of effectually resisting such an attack ; and there would be no possibility of punishing it before the authors had retired in safety beyond our frontiers.

20. The arrangements suggested for Thayetmyo and Toungoo are only of a temporary nature, because as soon as the railway is completed to Alanmyo, and the Sittang Valley Railway is opened to Toungoo, both Toungoo and Thayetmyo can be treated as outposts, to be garrisoned from Rangoon, where the great body of troops will be concentrated. To complete the position of defence, a good road is required between the two frontier posts. Early provision should be made for the railway extension to Alanmyo and the construction of the railway from Rangoon to Toungoo. Revised estimates for the latter project will be submitted to the Government of India in a few days.

21. Beyond the purposes mentioned in section (a) of paragraph 3 of the letter under reply, there do not appear to be any military requirements for internal purposes. For external purposes a military force would probably be required only against Upper Burma, and possibly against Karennee. In case of a rupture with the former country, an addition of one company of sappers and a regiment of European and one of Native infantry would probably be all that would be necessary. If any disturbance in the latter required our interference, the ordinary garrison of the province, if placed on the footing detailed above, could supply all that would be wanted. A rupture with Burma, however, would no doubt be followed by a redistribution of our forces with a view to the permanent maintenance of peace and good order, which would probably reduce Thayetmyo to a position of less importance than it must necessarily hold at present. These considerations, however, appear to be beyond the scope of the present reference.

22. It is a matter for consideration whether British Burma should not be garrisoned from the Bengal army instead of from Madras. The administrative connection of the province in all other respects is with Bengal ; and there is an obvious inconvenience in having military matters directed from a different quarter. The Chief Commissioner believes it would in many ways be convenient if the troops for service in Burma were supplied from Bengal.

Statement No. 1 showing the strength of the Native population of Arakan with the number of adult males in 1878.

Race.					Males 18 years of age and upwards.	Total number.
1.	Arakanese and Burmese	...	...	...	113,223	387,491
2.	Karens	...	...	...	43	155
3.	Khyengs	...	...	...	5,652	20,393
4.	Chinese	...	...	...	235	274
5.	Madrasis	...	...	...	214	263
6.	Bengalis	...	...	...	13,359	44,651
7.	Native Muhammadans	...	...	...	7,627	25,672
8.	Khwamis	...	...	...	4,116	18,066
9.	Khyoungthas	...	...	...	3,377	11,491
10.	Mroongs	...	...	...	69	297
11.	Mroos	...	...	...	1,854	7,256
12.	Shans	...	...	...	68	127
13.	Daignets	...	...	...	581	1,917
14.	Anoos	...	...	...	11	43
15.	Kyaws	...	...	...	50	219
16.	Shandoos	...	...	...	10	50
17.	Khoons	...	...	...	20	100
Total					150,509	518,405

Statement No. 2 showing the strength of the Native population of Pegu with the number of adult males in 1878.

Race.					Males 18 years of age and upwards.	Total number.
1.	Burmese and Arakanese	...	...	...	514,862	1,289,112
2.	Talaings	...	...	...		255,068
3.	Karens	...	...	...		192,118
4.	Khyengs	...	...	...		32,155
5.	Shans	...	...	...		31,114
6.	Yabaings	...	...	...		8,163
7.	Chinese	...	...	...		6,085
8.	Kways	...	...	...		633
9.	Muhammadans	...	...	...		17,608
10.	Hindus	...	...	...	6,952	17,248
11.	Armenians, Africans, &c.	...	...	...	9,827	30,703
12.	Parsis, Jews and others	...	...	...	1,637	2,391
Total					543,106	1,882,398

Statement No. 3 showing the strength of the Native population of Tenasserim with the number of adult males in 1878.

Race.					Males 18 years of age and upwards.	Total number.
1.	Burmese and Talaings	...	...	...	195,171*	389,301
2.	Karens	...	...	...	60,985	175,635
3.	Toungthoos	...	...	...	9,972	28,718
4.	Shans	...	...	...	7,774	22,339
5.	Bengalis	...	...	...	3,424	9,861
6.	Muhammadans	...	...	...	3,013	3,677
8.	Madrasis	...	...	...	6,951	20,019
9.	Chinese	...	...	...	3,752	10,802
10.	Siamese	...	...	...	1,849	5,326
11.	Other nationalities	...	...	...	3,298	9,497
Total					236,189	680,225

\* These figures have been worked out assuming the proportion to be as in the other two divisions, viz., 1 in 2·88 of the total number of population.

*Statement No. 4 showing the strength of the Native population of British Burma with the number of adult males in 1878.*

Race.				Males 18 years of age and upwards.	Total number.
1. Burmese, including Talaings and Arakanese	...	...	...	763,256	2,591,240
2. Hindus and Muhammadans	...	...	...	51,154	143,736
3. Karens, Shans, Tounghthoos, hillmen, Chinese and Siamese	...	...	...	100,632	303,461
4. Other nationalities	...	...	...	14,762	42,591
Total				929,804	3,081,028

*Statement No. 5 showing the European and Eurasian population of British Burma (excluding foreigners).*

						Male adults.	Total number.
Arakan	...	...	...	...	..	145	336
Pegu	...	...	...	...	...	3,304	5,668
Tenasserim	...	...	...	...	...	1,017	1,730
Total						4,466	7,734

From the foregoing statement it will be seen that the proportion of European and Eurasian male adults to the European and Eurasian population is 1 in 1.73.

*Statement No. 6 showing designation and distribution of police in the districts of the province of British Burma.*

District.	Inspector-General.	Superintendents.	Assistant Superintendents.	Chief Inspectors.	Inspectors.	Head-constables.	Sergeants.	Constables.	River Police.	Total.
Head-quarters	1	...	...	1	1	2	...	...	...	5
Akyab district	...	1	...	...	2	5	20	339	13	380
Kyauk-hpyoo district	...	1	...	...	3	5	14	320	25	368
Sandoway district	...	...	1	...	2	3	12	200	8	226
Hill Tracts, Arakan	...	...	1	...	2	2	10	248	8	271
Akyab town	...	...	...	...	2	...	3	67	...	72
Rangoon district	...	1	1	...	7	4	42	462	50	567
Thonkwa district	...	1	...	...	3	5	17	210	42	278
Bassein district	...	1	...	...	4	6	25	399	42	477
Henzada district	...	1	...	1	2	3	21	296	5	329
Tharrawaddy district	...	...	1	1	2	4	20	221	5	254
Prome district	...	1	...	...	5	8	32	435	15	496
Thayetmyo district	...	1	1	...	3	12	34	759	5	845
Rangoon town	...	1	...	2	4	4	17	261	17	306
Amherst district	...	1	1	...	4	14	49	614	36	719
Tavoy district	...	1	...	...	2	4	14	168	10	199
Mergui district	...	1	...	...	2	5	14	191	5	221
Shwe-gyee district	...	1	...	...	3	7	23	325	33	392
Toungoo district	...	1	...	...	4	6	30	422	...	463
Salween district	...	...	...	1	2	5	12	229	12	261
Moulmein town	...	...	1	...	3	6	7	138	11	166
Railway Police	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	22	...	23
Total British Burma	1	14	7	7	62	110	416	6,359	342	7,318

No. 1059, dated 5th August 1879.

From—The Assistant Quarter Master General, British Burma Division,

To—The Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, British Burma.

I have the honor by order to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, Military Department, No. 941-98 of the 26th ultimo, addressed to the Assistant Adjutant General, British Burma Division, and which has been transferred to my department, giving cover to a copy of a letter No. 205 S.B. of the 7th ultimo, from the Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, British Burma, in which certain information is called for, and parts of which the Chief Commissioner desires to be furnished by the Major-General Commanding the division. These portions are apparently as follows :—

## I. Particulars regarding the European and Eurasian population viewed as—

- (a) a source of strength in combatant power and for the maintenance of order ;
- (b) a source of weakness in necessity for the provision of the safety of non-combatants, women and children ;
- (c) to the possible means of rendering them of greater utility than at present if organized for the maintenance of order in case of disturbance.

## II.—Question of compulsory enrolment.

## III.—Development of the volunteer system.

## IV.—Expression of opinion on the general military requirements of the province—

- (a) for garrison purposes and the maintenance of order ;
- (b) for internal and external military purposes, irrespective of (a).

2. With reference to paragraph I and its sub-divisions (a), (b), and (c), attention is invited to the following tabular statement, taken from the latest accessible statistics, giving the population, European and Eurasian, of the different districts throughout British Burma, and irrespective of the military :—

District.						CHRISTIANS.	
						Europeans.	Eurasians and mixed classes.
Rangoon	...	...	...	...	...	628	3,342
Rangoon District	...	...	...	...	...	4	10
Moulmein	...	...	...	...	...	269	1,010
Akyab	...	...	...	...	...	116	160
Bassein	...	...	...	...	...	114	123
Prome	...	...	...	...	...	61	250
Henzada	...	...	...	...	...	53	157
Thayetmyo	...	...	...	...	...	15	36
Mergui	...	...	...	...	...	14	182
Tavoy	...	...	...	...	...	10	73
Shwe-gyeen	...	...	...	...	...	10	50
Amherst	...	...	...	...	...	10	45
Thonkwa	...	...	...	...	...	10	7
Sandoway	...	...	...	...	...	6	12
Toungoo	...	...	...	...	...	6	8
North Arakan	...	...	...	...	...	6	...
Kyauk-phyoo	...	...	...	...	...	4	32
Salween	...	...	...	...	...	3	...
Total						1,839	5,497

3. It will be observed from this table that, with the exception of Rangoon and Moulmein, and Akyab and Bassein to a much minor extent, and Prome and Henzada to a still less, the population of British Burma, viewed under the two-fold aspect above designated, can only be considered under (a), (b), and (c) in the light of weakness, not of strength.

4. As regards the districts of Rangoon and Moulmein, any element for the constitution of a combatant force that exists should be absorbed, were inducements of a more encouraging character held out, in the volunteer corps established at Rangoon and Moulmein respectively.

5. In reference to Akyab and Bassein, the materials for defence are so sparse as to give, for the present at least, small hope of anything of practical defensive utility being evolved from them.

6. The remaining eleven districts, with an average of less than 9 Europeans and about 40 Eurasians, are outside the pale of consideration, inasmuch as they would have probably to be protected in time of trouble, instead of rendering any assistance.

7. As to paragraph II, viewing the question as bearing solely on Europeans and Eurasians, it is very questionable, even were the materials sufficiently abundant, to invite the experiment, whether compulsory enrolment would be expedient ; and, unless in the districts of Rangoon and Moulmein, it would afford practically no benefit, and at Akyab, Bassein, Prome, and Henzada, where the result would be insignificant.

8. Regarding paragraph III, much might be done at Rangoon and Moulmein to develop the volunteer system, but not under the existing regulations, which are rather deterrent than inviting ; where, as in Burma, the expense of existence is so considerable, and the pressing business avocations of the

people are such as at all events to withhold from joining the movement those calculated to influence others to do so. This will appear clear when, as in Rangoon, out of 638 Europeans and 3,342 Eurasians, only some 260 are found enrolled in the volunteers; and it is with difficulty that more than 135 can be mustered, even on special occasions. In the case of Moulmein, a total strength of about 137 has been reached, out of 269 Europeans and 1,010 Eurasians.

9. To impart an element of popularity to the volunteer system, the capitation grant should be increased, and pecuniary rewards distributed to those who attend drill regularly, and evince efficiency and zeal; or other inducements of a practical nature held out to them to join. The proposed administrative battalion, composed of the Rangoon volunteers, the partially-formed Railway corps, and the corps not yet started at Akyab, would appear a good idea to develop, as conducing to emulation, and ensuring at the same time a more searching and comprehensive system of inspection than is feasible under mere local supervision.

10. Lastly (paragraph IV), with reference to the general military requirements of the province, the Major-General recently conveyed his ideas in full on this subject to Madras Army Headquarters in his letter No. 127G. of the 7th of last June, of which a copy was transmitted to the Chief Commissioner for information; and although that letter viewed the question on the supposition of affairs being unsettled, yet the Major-General considers the force therein detailed should constitute, if possible, the permanent garrison for some years of British Burma, and thus obviate the necessity of calling for assistance in a hurry, whenever any disturbing influence might arise. It will be observed that the distribution detailed in the above-quoted letter aims especially to apportioning entire units as far as practicable to the different stations, which is a matter of material consideration, so far as efficiency of corps and compactness of commands are concerned; and in Burma particularly, where the climate is enervating, and much of the year unsuited, either through intense heat or persistent rain, for out-of-door exercise, the temptations to relaxation of discipline are very great, and the *morale* of the troops becomes affected. A glance at the crime-list of the garrison of Burma will render apparent the truth of these remarks. It will be seen in the general order by His Excellency the Governor-General of India, No. 20A. of 1861, that the infantry detailed for Thayetmyo as the minimum for efficiency was one battalion of Europeans and two battalions of Natives, which in those days represented a force numerically far stronger than now, when the cadre of regiments has been so much diminished. The reduction of the forces in Pegu (the term then used) was made at a time when an enduring quiet seemed settled over the province, and was the result of much deliberation. The Commission had the benefit of the experience of Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick Grant, K.C.B., whose advice was, as stated by the Supreme Government, of material assistance in "combining a scheme of reduced military expenditure with efficiency." Since those days the population and importance of British Burma have, certainly in the latter particular, vastly increased, and, with them, the responsibility of the trust has materially augmented. Thus to be on the safe side, and to avert risk to the interests of the empire, as well as to secure for the future confidence in the imperial sway, an efficient garrison at each of the important stations of Rangoon, Thayetmyo, and Toungoo should be maintained, as specified in the Major-General's letter referred to. As to (b), paragraph IV, *viz.*, the internal and external military purposes of the garrison, I am desired to say that the Major-General considers the principles advocated in No. 3982, Proceedings of Military Finance Department, Calcutta, 21st February 1861, should obtain to the utmost in this province—namely, that the maintenance of internal order should be assigned to the civil constabulary, and the troops solely employed on military services, such as repelling armed aggression, whether proceeding from external or internal sources.

## M.—ANDAMANS.

No. 384-394G., dated Port Blair, 15th August 1879.

From—LIEUT.-GENERAL C. A. BARWELL, C.B., Chief Commissioner and Supdt., Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

To—The President, Army Organization Commission, Simla.

In accordance with the instructions given in letter No. 205 S.B., dated Simla, July 7th, 1879, from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, I have the honor to furnish the following information.

	Convicts.	Port Blair.	Nicobars.
Male ...	...	8,957	187
Female ...	...	935	...
Total	...	9,912	187
<i>Con released Convicts.</i>			
Male ...	...	196	...
Female ...	...	39	...
Total	...	235	...

### *Strength of Native population.*

The Native population consists almost entirely of convicts and conditionally released convicts, the numbers of which are marginally given. The free Native population, exclusive of army, is too insignificant to require any consideration in this report.

### *Strength of European and Eurasian population (exclusive of army).*

Is composed entirely of Government officials; few in number.

### *State of feeling and elements of danger.*

With so large a number of convicts, in an isolated situation, the elements of danger must always be considerable. Hitherto, however, there have been no outbreaks, excepting with the view to escape, and the parties concerned have been speedily arrested.



*Strength of police.*  
*Distribution of police.*  
*Efficiency of police.*

The strength and distribution of the police are shown in tabular statement marked A. As an armed force, for general protective purposes, I consider it to be efficient and trustworthy.

2. As regards the general military requirements of the Settlements, the present force consists of—

A detachment of European Infantry	...	...	...	140
A regiment of Madras Native Infantry	...	...	...	709

Total of all ranks.

which is quite sufficient.

These troops are kept as a reserve, in readiness to be called out in case of emergency; but they take no duties other than regimental, excepting the following:—

N. C. O. Privates.				
European infantry	...	1	9	On Ross Island. { Main guard, giving sentries at Chief Commissioner's house and office.* Guard over Commissariat store godowns. Guard over treasury.†
Native infantry	...	1	9	
Native infantry	...	1	6	

N.B.—A small sum of money is kept here, the bulk of the money amounting to about one lakh of rupees being kept in a strong room attached to the Chief Commissioner's office, guarded by the European sentries above referred to.\*

3. The whole of the duties therefore, such as the provision of jetty guards for the protection of boats, settlement officers' guards, and orderlies, escorts, &c., devolve on the police, who have also during eight months of the year to guard the transportation prisoners of the season *en route* from Calcutta to Port Blair.

4. The police are in fact perpetually on duty, whilst the troops lead a life of comparative ease.

5. In order to remedy this, and to lessen very considerably the heavy cost of the present establishment, I have the honor to make the following proposals:—

(a) Ross Island (the head-quarters of the Port Blair Settlement) should retain its present garrison of European and Native infantry, which would furnish the guards it now does and be available as a reserve for use in any other part of the Settlement in case of need.

(b) At all other stations I would have police only, who, in addition to performing their present duties, should have a sufficiently large reserve to occupy the positions now held by the several detachments of Native infantry.

6. Statement A gives detailed particulars of the present and proposed distribution of the military and police forces for the Settlements at Port Blair and the Nicobars.

Statement B the present and proposed strength and cost of the police force.

Statement C the saving that could be effected by garrisoning the Settlements at Port Blair and the Nicobars with two companies of a Native infantry regiment and an increased police force, instead of with a whole Native regiment and the present force of police, amounting to about one lakh and twenty-seven thousand rupees per annum.

There would also be a further saving in the cost of the clothing for the Native infantry and the expenses connected with its periodical relief.

7. After very careful consideration and inquiry, I am satisfied that, with the small military reserve which I propose to retain, and a well-organized police force of the strength recommended, under an experienced district superintendent (who should be a military officer), due provision will be made for the safety of these Settlements.

*Statement A showing the present and proposed distribution of the military and police forces for Port Blair and the Nicobars.*

Station.	PRESENT.					PROPOSED.					Remarks.	
	European infantry.	Native infantry.	Police officers.	Police sergeants.	Police constables.	European infantry.	Native infantry.	Police officers.	Police sergeants.	Police constables.		
Ross	...	140	210	1	2	79	140	2 com- panies.	1	3	80	* Under a Euro- pean officer.
Aberdeen	...	...	269	1	1	42	...	...	3	8	173	
Haddo	...	...	...	3	9	86	...	...	3	7	104	
Navy Bay	...	...	35	...	1	16	...	...	1	3	50	
Mount Harriet	...	...	27	...	...	...	...	...	1	2	24	
Chatham	...	...	...	...	1	23	...	...	...	1	23	
Port Mount	...	...	...	...	1	10	...	...	...	2	20	
Viper	...	...	121	...	2	55	...	...	1	4	100	
Hope Town & Phoenix Bay	...	...	...	...	2	19	...	...	...	2	19	
Nicobars	...	...	47	...	2	24	...	...	1	5	50	
On leave	...	...	†	...	1	23	...	...	1	3	50	† Only those who require change for the benefit of their health.
Total	...	140	709	5	22	333	140	2 com- panies.	12	40	693	

N.B.—In the numbers given under the headings of European and Native infantry, all ranks are included.

*Statement B showing present and proposed strength and cost of the Andaman and Nicobar Police.*

	District Superintendent on Rs. 800.	Inspectors on Rs. 100.	Sub-Inspector on Rs. 110.	Sub-Inspector on Rs. 100.	Chief Constable on Rs. 95.	Chief Constable on Rs. 85.	Chief Constable on Rs. 60.	Sergeants on Rs. 40.	Sergeants on Rs. 30.	Sergeants on Rs. 25.	Constables on Rs. 20.	Constables on Rs. 15.	Constables on Rs. 12.	Total monthly cost.	Total annual cost.	Contingent charges per annum.	Clothing charges per annum.	Grand total annual cost.	Remarks.
Present ...	...	1	1	1	1	1	...	11	11	..	*33	350	..	7,220 0	80,940 0	†1,350 0	5,600 0	93,820 0	* Includes the Chief Commissioner's boat's crew.
Proposed ...	1	2	1	1	1	2	5	10	10	20	*13	300	350	12,395 0	1,48,740 0	†1,050 0	10,995 0	1,61,715 0	† Includes rations supplied to Chief Commissioner's boat's crew

*N.B.*—A Native doctor and an armourer should also be provided for. This only occurred to me after the statement had been prepared.

*Statement C showing proposed saving by garrisoning Port Blair and the Nicobars with two companies of a Native infantry regiment and an increased police force, instead of with a Native regiment and the present force of police.*

	Pay and allowances of all ranks of the Native Infantry per annum.	Value of rations supplied to the Native Infantry per annum.	Cost of police per annum, inclusive of all charges.	Total annual cost.	Proposed saving	Remarks.
	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	
Present ...	1,80,633 12 0	62,496 12 4	93,820 0 0	2,36,949 8 4	...	The cost of clothing of the Native Infantry and the expenses of relief are not shown, as the information is not obtainable.
Proposed ...	* 32,580 14 0	15,621 11 1	1,61,715 0 0	2,09,917 9 1	1,27,022 15 3	

\* Includes the pay of one European officer.

C. A. BARWELL, *Lieut.-Genl.,*  
*Chief Commr. and Supdt., Andaman and Nicobar Islands.*

### APPENDIX III.

Replies and Opinions of the Commanders-in-Chief in India, Madras, and Bombay, the Governor of Bombay, and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to the questions proposed by the Commission.\*

#### I.

##### ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION.

Replies by His Excellency General Sir Fred. P. Haines, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E., Commander-in-Chief in India.

##### QUESTIONS.

##### ANSWERS.

1. What, in your Excellency's opinion, should be the full war establishment of the army of India, calculated under the two heads—

- (a) The number of troops that India ought to be able to place and maintain in the field for service wherever required?  
 (b) The garrisons and reserves to be maintained?

1. (a) About 65,000 men should be available for field service and for the reserve. The Commission no doubt has before it Lord Napier of Magdala's memorandum on our military position in India, and the arrangements that would seem necessary under certain specified circumstances. These circumstances we have yet to face. The Afghan campaign of 1878-9 has not lessened the gravity of the situation to such an extent as to enable us to say that a smaller force than that contemplated by His Lordship would enable us to deal with it.

(b) I have recently submitted to Government a scheme for the redistribution of the Bengal army. I can think of no other which will provide equally well for cantoning our troops in time of peace or for holding them in readiness for mobilization in time of emergency, viewed with reference to existing accommodation for troops.

\* Files of the questions proposed by the Commission to the Commanders-in-Chief were also sent to all Governments and Administrations, but the above alone have replied.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

2. What, in your Excellency's opinion, should be the organization of the army of India? Is it necessary, in the present circumstances of the country, to maintain the three presidential armies under three separate Governments and three Commanders-in-Chief, with three large staffs and separate departments?

3. Could not all the advantages of separate armies be secured with a great increase of efficiency and economy by forming the entire army of India into one army, under one Commander-in-Chief, and dividing it into four army-corps; each army-corps to be under the command of a lieutenant-general, and to be entirely complete and self-contained in respect of organization, arms and equipment?

The lieutenant-general to be vested with complete powers of control and to be responsible for the appointment of all regimental officers, subject only to the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief for India in respect to the nomination of officers commanding regiments.

The officers of all the army-corps to be equally eligible for service on the staff of the army.

The army-corps to be territorial and localized—one in the north, one in the south, one in the east, and one in the west. The army-corps of the south and west to be, as far as practicable, recruited from the districts from which the present armies of Madras and Bombay are now recruited, thus maintaining four armies distinct in race, religion, and language, but so organized as to be practically in a state of thorough efficiency and readiness for action in any direction in which the army of India may be called upon to undertake separate or combined operations under the Commander-in-Chief of India.

What should be the strength of each army-corps?

6. Setting aside historical sentiment, and looking to the relative importance, the population, and the wealth of the various local Governments of India, is there any more reason why the armies of Madras and Bombay should at the present time be under the local Governments of Madras and Bombay and under local Commanders-in-Chief, with separate departments for every branch of military administration, than there is that the same system should be followed in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab?

2. I consider that the three armies as they stand, separate and distinct the one from the other, should be maintained under the three separate Governments and three Commanders-in-Chief; each army complete in itself as to its staff and departments.

3. I do not consider that either economy or increased efficiency would be secured by the establishment of four army-corps, each under a lieutenant-general. Being distinctly opposed to any such organization, I shall not discuss the subjects in questions 4 and 5, which can only be usefully answered by those who are prepared to accept the establishment of four armies instead of three. But I would wish to state that three armies under their separate Governments and Commanders-in-Chief are now, and always have been, as much at the disposal of the Government of India and the Commander-in-Chief as they could possibly have been if they had the organization now proposed. Each army is complete in itself and self-contained in respect of organization, arms, equipments, and supply of all military stores and munitions of war. For these purposes, I consider that decentralization is carried far enough, and that to increase the sub-division of centres of armament and administration from three parts to four is quite unnecessary, and not in my mind calculated to insure increased efficiency. The three armies are at all times in a state of thorough efficiency and readiness for action in any direction, whether separate or combined. That is to say, ready so far as armies can be said to be ready when so small a proportion of transport is maintained, when the commissariat and ordnance establishments are kept so low as barely to suffice for the performance of duties in time of peace.

6. In this question I am asked to set aside historical sentiment. How far this can be done depends upon the idiosyncrasy of the individual; but in any case we cannot put aside historical facts or the impressions they create. The armies of India have grown with the growth of our Empire. That of Bengal had the larger growth. It has been impelled by force of circumstances to leave the cradle of its birth, and to advance step by step northward, until it now stands in the Khyber, on the crests of the Shutar Gardan and of the Khojak. There has never been a question of an army for the province of Bengal; and I do not see how it can arise. As long as it could, the Bengal army provided for the wants of that province. It is now mainly, and I think fitly, held by Madras troops. The population, scathing though it be as to numbers, is singularly unwarlike. The communications with our great military centres are so good, that all possible demands can easily be met. I think therefore that the question as put has no very practical bearing on military efficiency. Bengal, the North-West, and the Punjab are modern expressions as local Governments, the establishment of which, we may hope, will turn out a comparatively perfect system of civil administration. They are the outcome of peace; with war they have no concern. The Madras and Bombay armies have had no small share in creating the Empire of British India, and, like that of Bengal, have spread over immense tracts of country. The magnitude of their military charge is not to be measured by the square mileage of their own provinces, by the density of their population, or by the amount of revenue collected. That of Madras, for instance, has within its military area, though excluded from that of its civil administration, Mysore, the territories of the Nizam, and the Central Provinces. It is assumed that the population of Madras is essentially peaceful; but this is not the case even within its own provinces. The Polygars of the south are not to be implicitly relied on; the Moplas of Malabar are extremely dangerous, constantly giving rise to coercive measures; that the Northern Circars require troops and are beyond police control we have present evidence. The Ceded Districts also have elements of trouble within them. The Mysore territory has its turbulent population,

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

especially in Nuggur: in this province arose the disturbances which ended in the assumption by the British of the administration of the country. Mysore is about to be restored to Native rule—an experiment which requires to be watched. Coorg also has an armed population. But the sorest spot within the limit of Madras military government is Hyderabad in the Deccan. This is notoriously the resort of outlaws and desperadoes of all sorts. In addition to this semi-criminal class, there is a large body of partially organized troops and irregular bands of Arabs, Rohillas, and Sikhs in the pay both of the Nizam and of his nobles. This is a hotbed of mischief: however we may despise even the best organized of these armed men, they require a large force to watch them. The military demands from the Central Provinces are not excessive.

The scope of action of the Madras army does not march with the civil administration, and therefore the force necessary to be maintained and its *raison d'être* cannot in reason be referred to the population, revenue, or extent of the provinces of Madras Proper. But it is clear to my mind that these extraneous matters are better dealt with by that army, which has in the course of time grown up in their midst, than by any other means. The Madras administrators who have advocated reduction have always excluded from their calculations these foreign demands, giving the discussion an unpractical turn; for the Madras military liability ranges from Cape Comorin to Cuttack on the east coast, to North Canara on the west, and skirting the Bombay boundary to Nagpore to the north. This under ordinary circumstances: for many years Saugor has been added to its liabilities.

It must be remembered that we hold the Berars, and have in old days received other territories as payment for the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and for the Contingent; that we receive a subsidy from Mysore for the maintenance of the troops in that province; and I believe some slight payment from the Maharaja of Travancore for the regiment at Quilon, so that the military burdens imposed upon us by those States are by no means so heavy as a calculation of the cost of so many regiments and batteries would imply; but no credits on account of these transactions appear in the military budgets.

I am altogether in favor of retaining the armies of Madras and Bombay on their present footing: they have stood the test of time, and have been found equal to every strain. No doubt the existence of these separate Governments having under them armies separate and distinct from that of Bengal as to race, religion, customs, and interests has proved the strongest element of safety to the empire, and may do so again. I am specially opposed to the formation of a localized and a locally-recruited army-corps for the Punjab, which I infer No. 4 army-corps would be. It would be an impolitic arrangement to have the Punjab element predominant in the north. Then, again, it would tend to localize the Hindustani element too much in its own home districts; it would lessen the general range of relief—an objection in a sanitary as well as in a political point of view. I trust no step will be taken towards forming two army-corps out of the Bengal army.

7. As a matter of fact, if a large reserve for the northern armies is to be maintained, is it not the duty of Government to see that this reserve is formed of the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure and to maintain with due regard to the admitted necessity of keeping up armies of different races and religions and with due regard to the safety of the Empire?

Does your Excellency look upon the Madras and Bombay armies in their present organization as constituting the most efficient reserve for the armies of Upper India?

7. Madras has ever been spoken of as the army of reserve, and rightly so; but it must always be remembered that Madras has a front of her own on which Bengal and Bombay must be considered as her support. She must always be called upon to furnish the main force for eventualities in the Eastern Seas, Burma, China, and the Straits. Now less than ever can Bengal troops be made available on those fields. To Madras this zone of operations must be confided; and that army must, in my opinion, be maintained at such a strength as to enable it to take this responsibility on itself and to enable the local Government to provide for the comparatively heavy calls for foreign service its troops have to meet in ordinary times.

Bombay likewise has a front of its own, notably the Western Seas, the Persian Gulf, and Sind as regards the Kandahar line, where her troops, conjointly with those of Bengal, must inevitably be employed should emergency

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

arise. It is incorrect to look upon these armies as merely armies of reserve; but as such I would say that India cannot be supplied with a safer or more efficient army of reserve. Distinct in race, language, and interests from the more numerous army of Bengal, it is, in my opinion, eminently politic and wise to maintain these armies as a counterpoise to it; and I would on no account diminish their strength in order that a reserve composed of what is called "the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure" may be established. If by this it is meant to replace the sepoys of Madras and Bombay by a reserve of men passed through the ranks of the Bengal army, and composed of the same classes of which it is formed, I would say that anything more unwise or more impolitic could hardly be conceived.

It has been customary to declare that the Madras army is composed of men physically inferior to those of the Bengal army; and if stature alone be taken into consideration, this is true. It is also said that by the force of circumstances the martial feeling and the characteristics necessary to the real soldier are no longer to be found in its ranks. I feel bound to reject the above assertions and others which ascribe comparative inefficiency to the Madras troops. It is true that in recent years they have seen but little service; for, with the exception of the sappers, they have been specially excluded from all participation in work in the field. I cannot admit for one moment that anything has occurred to disclose the fact that the Madras sepoy is inferior as a fighting man. The facts of history warrant us in assuming the contrary. In drill, training, and discipline the Madras sepoy is inferior to none; while in point of health, as exhibited by returns, he compares favorably with his neighbours. This has been manifested by the sappers and their followers in the Khyber; and the sappers are of the same race as the sepoys. I have no doubt all I have said for Madras may be urged equally justly for Bombay. I therefore have no hesitation in saying that the Madras and Bombay armies form the safest and most efficient reserves for the army of Upper India.

8. What is the feeling of the <sup>Madras</sup> <sup>Bombay</sup> army in respect to employment in other presidencies in India in times of peace? For instance, at the present time 26 regiments of the Madras army are employed within their own presidency and no less than 14 outside its limits, some of them at distant stations in Bengal. Is this service popular with the army? Are the Madras regiments more efficient than the Bengal regiments, or are they when on this duty cheaper, the cost of relief, transport, of clothing, equipments, and compensation for food being taken into account? If they are neither cheaper nor more efficient, is there any object in garrisoning Bengal and Burma partly from the Madras army?

8. I have no reason to suppose that the employment of the Madras army in other presidencies or abroad in Burma, or for purposes of field service in any part of the world, is in any way unpopular with them. From the desire always evinced by these men to see service, by the alacrity with which men from the three armies embarked for the somewhat mysterious expedition despatched from Bombay in May 1878, and from the enthusiasm displayed in Madras and Bombay when their regiments were recently required to join their comrades of Bengal in the North-West, I would say that this class of service is eminently popular in those armies. I take it that these manifestations of spirit go some way to refute the assertion that martial feeling and characteristics necessary to the real soldier are no longer to be found in the ranks of those armies.

I claim no superior efficiency for the Madras army over that of Bengal in the performance of any duty; but it is most fortunate that we have Madras regiments available for the performance of garrison duty in Saugor and Bengal, now that the Bengal army is not strong enough to take it.

The remainder of question 8 refers to figures, which experts will more readily supply.

9. Is your Excellency aware of any difficulty in obtaining recruits for the army of a good class of healthy strong young men of the agricultural population physically qualified to perform the duties of a soldier?

10. Has it ever been asserted that a difficulty in obtaining efficient recruits is attributable to the unpopularity of the service of the local army beyond the limits of its own presidency in times of peace?

11. If your Excellency is of opinion that the army-corps should be formed territorially, and as far as possible localized within its territorial area, what alteration would you propose in the strength of the various armies to render them fit for their home duties, and to place them in a position to take part in any war going on in India by the detachment of a force of all arms?

9 & 10. The system of recruiting is strictly regimental. Some regiments are more successful than others; but I do not think that any extraordinary difficulty exists in getting a good class of recruits, beyond that which has been created by the construction of railway and other large public works. As in England, competition for labor has a somewhat adverse effect on recruiting. I would refer for figures and for precise information on this head to Major-General Sir Peter Lumsden, Adjutant-General, a member of the Commission.

11. On No. 11 I have nothing to say, being opposed to the whole scheme.

## QUESTIONS.

12. Could not the duties of the Native army be very materially decreased by a general concentration of troops in large centres in the neighbourhood of railways, thus abolishing all small cantonments and outlying and isolated stations?

14. Recognizing the fact that India cannot afford to maintain the most perfect army which could be devised in which economy did not enter, and that large reductions of army expenditure are absolutely essential, what changes and alterations would your Excellency be prepared to recommend in the organization and administration of the army?

15. Are you in favor of amalgamating the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General's departments under a Chief of the Staff, so that, as in other armies, the staff of the army shall consist of certain grades of staff officers, the work being apportioned as may be desirable, but without a division, as at present, into two distinct departments?

## ANSWERS.

12. No doubt the duties of the Native army might be materially decreased by a general concentration of troops in large centres; but I imagine that the enormous outlay which would be caused by the construction of barracks and the large amount of subsidiary buildings which are required to complete the accommodation of a British regiment must, once for all, be held to negative any attempt to carry out such a measure, notwithstanding many advantages which would undoubtedly be derived from it. It appears to me that the existing accommodation, on which such an enormous sum of money has been expended, ties us down somewhat to the scheme of distribution of the army as it now stands. Some trifling alterations of detachments and of the smaller cantonments may be found feasible when the recommendations of the Commission are placed before Government; but, as at present informed, I can suggest none which will materially affect the strength or disposition of the army.

14. The fact which I recognize more clearly and distinctly than any other is this—that the strength of our armies in India is not in any way greater than that which our foreign and domestic liabilities require us to keep up. Without large reductions in strength, I see no source from which economies can be effected. I am prepared with no scheme for reorganization and administration of the army in this sense. Indeed, such modifications as I should be prepared to recommend would have the effect of increasing the expenditure, to wit, an increase of British officers to Native regiments.

15. I am greatly in favor of retaining the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General's departments separate and distinct, as at present. Personally, I consider this method far preferable for the transaction of current work to the system which amalgamation would create. There are extremely few points on which joint action of the departments is necessary; and these are so evident that it can seldom happen that the departments would fail to communicate with each other, and the Commander-in-Chief fail to see the necessity of bringing them together.

In the prosecution of a campaign it is necessary that the Commander-in-Chief should daily see the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General together; for on such an occasion almost everything that occurs affects both departments. One of these officers naturally becomes the Commander-in-Chief's most confidential adviser, and thus becomes Chief of the Staff, not by virtue of any special appointment, but by force of character, knowledge, and general ability; and this I consider to be far preferable to the appointment of a Chief of the Staff, for either he becomes the fifth wheel of the coach, as was the case in Spain, when it was sought to impose a Chief of the Staff on the Duke of Wellington, but with whom he positively refused to act, or the Commander-in-Chief is in the opinion of the army relegated to that most undesirable position.

There is another reason why I greatly prefer to work with two departments unbracketed by a Chief of the Staff. All correspondence from England reaches me in that form; and it is more convenient to issue the necessary orders in the same channel as that from which it reaches me. Custom may have much to say to the formation of this predilection; but the business of the army flows so smoothly and evenly through these channels from and to the Commander-in-Chief, that I should regret the intervention between him and them of any other authority: I could even say obstruction, for I believe by the creation of a Chief of the Staff business would be rather obstructed than facilitated.

The business as now must be prepared departmentally, but will be submitted first to the Chief of the Staff, then to the Commander-in-Chief, introducing a third action where two are amply sufficient. If it is said the Chief of the Staff can dispose of much that now comes before the Commander-in-Chief, I would say that it will be done in supersession of the Commander-in-Chief; for the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General now have full power to dispose of matters

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

16. If the army were divided into army-corps, and power given to the lieutenant-generals commanding to dispose of many questions which are now referred to superior authority, so that important matters only were treated of by the central military authority at head-quarters, would not a staff of about the following strength be sufficient:—

*Head-Quarters.*

- 1 Chief of the Staff.
- 4 Officers of the General Staff.
- 3 Officers of the General Staff for intelligence duties.

1 Officer of the General Staff for Royal Artillery to be Inspector General of Artillery, with two staff officers.

1 Officer of the General Staff for Royal Engineers.

1 Officer of the General Staff for Musketry Inspection, &c.

1 Judge Advocate General.

*Army-Corps.*

1 Chief of the Staff.

2 Officers of the General Staff.

1 Staff Officer of Royal Artillery.

1 Staff Officer of Royal Engineers to be Deputy Inspector General of Engineers, Military Works and Fortifications.

1 Deputy Judge Advocate General.

Departmental staff officers in addition to be under the Chief of the Staff of the Army-Corps.

17. If your Excellency does not approve of this arrangement either in strength of personnel or nomenclature, what would your Excellency propose?

SIMLA;

The 31st August 1879. }

of detail and those on which previous rulings have been given. I require no further relief in this direction.

A Commission is now sitting in England: if it be decided so to alter the military administration of the army as to supersede in the exercise of their present high functions the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, the change must of necessity be made here. The system adopted in the Horse Guards should govern us in this respect.

16. I have nothing to say under this head; objecting to the army-corps system.

17. I have nothing to say under this head, objecting to the army-corps system.

(Sd.) FRED. HAINES, *Genl.*,  
Commander-in-Chief in India.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

18. Does Your Excellency consider that it would be advisable to place the administration of the Royal Artillery in India more directly under the Adjutant General or Chief of the Staff, as is the case with the other arms, the Adjutant General being provided with assistance in special artillery questions or technical subjects in the person of the Inspector General of Artillery?

19. Would it not be in all respects a more efficient arrangement if the Inspector General of Artillery acted as the Artillery adviser of the Commander-in-Chief, the Inspector General having two staff officers to assist him, one of whom should carry out the duties now performed by the present Deputy Adjutant General of Royal Artillery in India; or, in other words, the amalgamation of the offices of Inspector General of Royal Artillery and Deputy Adjutant General of Royal Artillery effected, making the former the head Staff Officer of Artillery in India, and associating with him two staff officers of Artillery in India, who would carry on the work under him.

18. The administration of the Royal Artillery is directly under the Adjutant General of the Army now. The Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery, is head of a branch of the Adjutant General's Department, the work of which is kept separate and distinct from that of other branches, except in matters of discipline. It is essential that it should be so maintained.

19. When present at head-quarters, the Inspector General's advice is always available; and he is frequently referred to with advantage. But I do not think it would be found advantageous to the service that he should be drafted into the Adjutant General's Department as part of that establishment. The duties of the Inspector General of Artillery are those of inspection. In the performance of this duty, he ranges from Aden to Toulou, involving long and uncertain periods of absence from head-quarters. His duty is of the most important kind, and its results are most valuable, as his inspection is of so minute a nature as to detect the slightest deviation from regulation in all points of equipment such as might easily escape the eye of an infantry or cavalry general. It is calculated to curb the introduction by divisional commanders of royal artillery of pet methods of packing wagons, adjusting harness, allotment of ammunition, &c., which they, having advocated before committees or by report, and failed to secure their adoption, might still like to see introduced in their own little circle, to the destruction of that perfect uniformity which must be insisted on. If

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## ANSWERS.

20. In your relations as Commander-in-Chief with the Military Department of Government, does your experience suggest any modifications of procedure or other matter tending to facilitate business, reduce expenditure, or add to general efficiency of administration?

21. Does your Excellency think that the departments of Ordnance, Military Works, Commissariat, and Military Accounts should be brought more *en rapport* with the Commander-in-Chief; and if so, will you suggest the mode of giving effect to your views?

22. Does your Excellency consider it an advantage or otherwise to have three separate departments of Commissariat, Ordnance, Medical, Clothing, &c., for the work of the army of India?

any part of the duties of the Adjutant General's office be entrusted to him, it can only be for six months, another system prevailing during the remainder of the year. This, I hold, would be a most inconvenient method of carrying on the Artillery branch of the Adjutant General's office, as it would give it an uncertain and inconstant head. Greatly as I value the privilege of resorting to the Inspector General of Royal Artillery for advice, and valuable as it certainly is, I value his work in his own substantive duties of inspection at a still higher rate. There seems to be no question of economy involved. I prefer things as they are to any possible modification of them which has as yet suggested itself to my mind or to that indicated by the question.

20. On this I have nothing to say as to the routine of departmental office work. What I may have to say outside of it I shall record when the report of the Commission comes up for review.

21. The Ordnance, Commissariat, and Military Works are the great spending departments of the army. The department of Military Accounts is that which controls and accounts for the expenditure under the above and other heads. For the transaction of ordinary business, I do not think it advisable that these branches of the service should be placed more directly under the Commander-in-Chief. Concerning all matters relating to construction of vehicles, armament, and equipment of artillery, the Commander-in-Chief is in close communication with the Inspector General of Ordnance. The factories must always be matters of deep interest to him, but the control over them should rest in the hands of Government. It is the same with the Commissariat. The Commander-in-Chief has thought general officers commanding divisions and districts sufficient control over the rationing and comfort of the troops.

In time of war the staff of these departments deputed for service should be absolutely under the control of the Commander-in-Chief through the officers commanding forces in the field.

There is no necessity for the Commander-in-Chief's interference with the Military Accounts Branch.

The modifications I propose in the working of these departments are so slight as to require no special organization. They apply only to a time of war, and will be best carried out by the abstention from all interference on the part of Government with their working in the field.

22. I consider that the separate departments of supply of munitions of war as existing in connection with the three separate armies in India are sources of power and security the value of which cannot be overrated. I would ever retain them in their integrity.

The Commissariat should be kept absolutely distinct. Each department has as much on its hands as it can well manage. The most ordinary intellect and capacity for organization would suggest the free interchange of information regarding surplus and wants which would render the one available for the supply of the other; and that is all that is necessary.

It is almost the same thing as regards the Ordnance, except in this. The annual indents for ordnance supplies should be submitted to the Government of India through the Inspector General of Ordnance in Bengal; and this is not for the purpose of picking small holes in the demand for the various items and the quantities demanded, but in order that he may assure himself that the wants of one presidency cannot be supplied from the surplus stock of the other without resort to the British market at all. But, outside of this class of supervision to be exercised by the Inspector General of Bengal under the authority of the Government of India, the Government of each presidency should be responsible for the supply of munitions of war and for the maintenance of the allotments under each head for its own army. The department in each case should be kept absolutely distinct; but so much of supervision on the part of the Bengal establishment seems to be necessary to the more perfect working of the whole. The



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annual indents are most complicated documents, including demands for articles varying in importance and value from a tin-tack to a 9-ton gun, from a grindstone to machinery of enormous value. It is impossible that due supervision can be given to such demands except by experts. It is understood that these papers go through the Military Department now; but, as far as Madras and Bombay are concerned, do not come before the Inspector General of Ordnance for revision in the above sense. It might be interesting to the President and members of the Commission were copies of the annual ordnance indents placed before them for inspection. A glance would show that a professional review of documents such as these can alone deal with them satisfactorily.

This is the only point at which centralization appears to be at all necessary with regard to the ordnance establishments in India. It is no more wise to-day to place all our eggs in one basket than it was when our admirable military organization in India was first established.

It has been said that, with a concentration of these departments of supply, the resources of one presidency would be at the disposal of the other:—when has it been otherwise? In 1857, when Delhi, our chief arsenal in the North-West, Fatehgarh, the gun-carriage factory, Cawnpore, the leather and harness factory, were all in the hands of the mutineers, Madras supplied fourteen lakhs worth of military stores for the use of the troops in Bengal (the amount of this supply is far greater than the same sum would now represent). Communications were interrupted, except by sea; and Madras became in a measure the base for operations against Cawnpore and Lucknow. Could more prompt or efficient aid have been rendered under a more completely centralized system of organization than that rendered by Madras in her independence?

True the system of railways has been greatly extended since then. But is it not true that an outburst similar to that which occurred in 1857 would inevitably cause a similar dislocation of our military system, of our means of communication, whether as regards locomotion or transmission of intelligence? Most of the arguments in favor of army reduction and of centralization of departments of supply are grounded on our possession and enjoyment of these improved conditions of life and of their perpetuity. Is it safe to indulge in the hope that they will remain to us under all possible circumstances in which we may find ourselves? It is not for me to say that the internal condition of India forbids the idea that history may repeat itself, or that it suggests the possibility of a recurrence of most deplorable events. But this I would affirm, that our separate armies are water-tight compartments, which should be maintained in strength and in integrity; and that the separate establishments adverted to in question 22 are essential to the complete efficiency of those armies. Further, that as in days past they may again become main factors in maintaining our power in India.

These separate présidences, even though isolated the one from the other by rebellion or mutiny, and consequent disturbance of lines of communication, may be looked upon as separate sources of power and independent action from which safety may spring in the face of almost desperate circumstances.

23. The British force now serving in this country is, in my opinion, suitable to the work it may have to perform. It is not capable of reduction in any branch that is in a sense worthy of the consideration of the Commission. A few changes in the composition of the artillery are now about to take place; they will result in some saving, but not of any very great moment. I say this without reference to the larger savings which have recently been effected in the cost of the administration of the artillery branch of the service in India, amounting to between four and five lakhs of rupees.

24. The British cavalry regiments are, as they stand, too weak in rank and file for complete efficiency in the field, being mere cadres capable of expansion: hence the discrepancy in cost between officers and men; but I would retain them as they stand, for I deem it right that, at this point especially, fair consideration should be given to the share India should take in support of the general maintenance of the British empire.

23. In your Excellency of opinion that any reduction can be made in the number or class of British troops serving in India? Could India dispense, for instance, with any regiments of infantry or cavalry or any batteries of artillery; or could garrison batteries at any station safely take the place of field batteries, or field batteries take the place of horse artillery?

24. Bearing in mind the fact that the annual cost of officers to men is as follow:—

	For a regiment, British cavalry. Rs.	For a regiment, British infantry. Rs.
Officers ...	1,16,797	1,43,793
Non-commissioned officers and men ...	1,14,051	1,76,126

is your Excellency of opinion that any change

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## ANSWERS.

in the organization of regiments is possible, so as to maintain the fighting strength of the British force in India and at the same time diminish the relative cost of officers to men?

25. In your opinion is it desirable, on the score of economy and efficiency, to substitute for Indian service a local British force in place of a portion of the home army?

26. In your Excellency's opinion would it be advisable, apart from the question of reduction of the strength of the army, to modify the present proportion of British to Native troops?

27. Reviewing the Enlistment Act of 1870, together with the Regulations issued under that Act, War Office Circulars, clauses 36 and 189 of 1878, especially as applicable to India, are you of opinion that, in the event of a local force not being employed, any further modifications of existing Acts should be made?

28. Can you suggest any means by which the present cost of supplying British soldiers for service in India can be reduced without decreasing in any way their efficiency? In discussing this subject, a fair consideration must be given to the share India should take in support of the general maintenance of the British Empire.

29. There is a large staff of assistant adjutant generals and deputy assistant adjutant generals for musketry, regimental instructors, and assistant instructors of musketry, throughout India. Does not your Excellency consider that regimental instruction in musketry can be carried on by company officers as part of their ordinary military duty, and that the staff for musketry inspection can be largely reduced, the duty of inspection being carried on by generals and their staff, assisted if absolutely necessary by a specially trained officer?

30. Is any reduction in the Judge Advocate General's Department practicable by the concentration of work at head-quarters, courts-

25. I would on no account revive the local army. No one who remembers the closing scenes of the old local force could, I think, wish to see it revived. I say this with a vivid recollection of the admirable service performed by the splendid batteries and regiments of which it was composed; but I am constrained to say that, whilst their appearance and efficiency were on parade and in the field magnificent and undoubted, their discipline in quarters was not up to the mark.

26. I should not ask for additional British troops were it decided to increase the Native army to the moderate extent I deem to be necessary under the altered relations established with Afghanistan and on our north-western frontier; but under no circumstances would I reduce a man of the British army serving in India. I hold this opinion on general military grounds, irrespective of the proportions which it may be deemed necessary to maintain as between British and Native troops. I am not disposed to keep a very exact account under this head, so long as the present proportion of races is maintained in the Bengal army, and the separate armies of Madras and Bombay are maintained intact.

27. The measure which introduced limited service in lieu of enlistment for an unlimited period is one among the changes which have been introduced under the guise of military reorganization and reform which commends itself to my judgment as a manifest improvement both as regards the soldier's relation with the service and that of Government with the soldier. For Indian purposes, the nearer the conditions of service can be brought back to those contemplated by the original limited Enlistment Act the better. India has certainly no interest whatever in the modifications which have recently been introduced with a view to favoring the formation of a reserve. Her interests are mainly served by being supplied with fully-trained and mature soldiers, so that a regiment should at all times be able to take the field, reduced only by such casualties from sickness as might be expected to prevail among a body of seasoned men. The present system increases the rate enormously; for it gives us a vast proportion of immature lads to deal with. As regards re-enlistment after the first period of service, we have the working of that in our hands. It should perhaps be sparingly resorted to; but its judicious use would enable commanding officers to maintain a supply of more efficient and trustworthy non-commissioned officers than can at present be procured.

28. I believe the above measures would tend to this desirable result more than any others; for they are calculated to secure a longer period of service in India on the part of the individual soldier, thereby reducing the transport charges and also a higher standard of health, entailing a reduction in the charges for men who become non-effective from sickness. But, to derive full value in this last respect, no man should be permitted to embark for India under 21 years of age.

29. Some modification may, I think, be made in the musketry staff of the army. There is a considerable portion of the year during which their active intervention is not required; but for the musketry course, I don't think any portion of the staff can be reduced.

In the Native army there is no special musketry officer. I am clearly of opinion that the duty of instruction and independent supervision of practice cannot be intrusted to the Native officers commanding companies. Nor do I think this duty could be entirely intrusted to company officers in a British regiment, as many of them do not and cannot attain to that stage of proficiency in this important branch of military training which the rôle of instructor demands. Any change in this respect applied to British regiments should be initiated from the Horse Guards, whence is derived the whole regimental system.

30. A great deal of work in this department must of necessity come up to head-quarters; but if it is to be con-

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## ANSWERS.

martial being conducted by officers with the usual allowance for the discharge of this duty, and in very special cases by an officer deputed from head-quarters?

centrated, then great inconvenience and delay in the transaction of court-martial business cannot fail to be the result. Such a measure would be distinctly opposed to the line of action I have adopted, which has been one of decentralization. It is of immense advantage that crime should be dealt with promptly, and with as little correspondence as possible. In furtherance of this view, powers which can be delegated have been conferred without limit on officers commanding divisions and districts, who are in a position to deal promptly with cases which in former days were subject to reference to head-quarters. Work is now carried on with a minimum of correspondence, and with great relief to the post office in the matter of transmission backwards and forwards of extremely bulky packets.

The circles in which judge advocates perform their duties are extremely large; and I do not consider that they can be well reduced, having in view the perfect efficiency of the department. It is frequently found necessary to depute officers not in the department to conduct proceedings of courts-martial. The contingent expenses arising out of this are not insignificant; and were the principle suggested by the question adopted, they would become very large. I am entirely opposed to it, as likely to entail delay, to increase correspondence uselessly, to throw a huge mass of needless labor on the post office, and to decrease the power and responsibility of officers commanding divisions and districts regarding the punishment of crime with which it is their special province to deal up to a certain point.

SIMLA ;  
The 1st October 1879. }

(Sd.) FRED. P. HAINES, *Genl.*,  
*Commander-in-Chief in India.*

NOTE.—Owing to pressure of work, His Excellency was unable to reply to any more of the questions proposed to him by the Commission.

## I.

## ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION.

Replies by His Excellency General Sir Neville Chamberlain, G. C. B., G. C. S. I., Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

1. What, in your Excellency's opinion, should be the full war establishment of the army of India calculated under the two heads—  
(a) the number of troops that India ought to be able to place and maintain in the field for service wherever required?

1. I am not able to give any definite answer to this question, not being in possession of information, without which my opinion is of no value.

The answer to (a) must depend upon whether India is to be expected to give aid to England in the event of her being engaged in an European war, or whether such aid is to be confined to Asia.

As regards an European war, it would seem to me that nothing short of 20,000 men would be of any avail, except to occupy an island, or some position where the command of the sea would secure the control of the communications.

The answer to (b) must depend upon various considerations,—

(1) on our relations with the neighbouring independent States:

(2) on the amount of interference exercised by Russia or Persia in Afghan affairs, such a contingency being beyond present calculation and control:

(3) on the extent of territory we occupy; for as we hold advanced positions on the North-West frontier, such as Jundi Kotal, Peiwar, Vitakri, Quetta, so we ought to have proportionate reserves within supporting distance:

(4) on the completion of the strategical system of railways:

(5) on the mobility of the troops after they quit the railways:

(6) on the political condition and military strength of the Feudatory States:

(7) on the administration of the country, and the state of feeling of the population:

(8) on the number and efficiency of the police.

(b) the garrisons and reserves to be maintained?

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## ANSWERS.

2. What, in your Excellency's opinion, should be the organization of the army of India? Is it necessary, in the present circumstances of the country, to maintain the three presidential armies under three separate Governments and three Commanders-in-Chief, with three large staffs and separate departments.

I consider that the army of India is not larger than is required under existing conditions, and to meet contingencies which may any day arise.

2. I believe it to be advisable to maintain separate Governments, with separate armies under separate Commanders.

The political necessity of keeping distinct the three armies cannot, I think, be overestimated; and I look on the separate Governments and separate Commands as guarantees towards that end. The local Governments naturally take an interest in the welfare of their own armies, and may be looked to to support their interests and their well-being; whereas without such countenance and support the army is not likely to receive the same attention and consideration. A very marked distinction exists between the people occupying the countries termed the "Madras presidency" and those occupying the other two presidencies.

This distinction is, in my opinion, of great political value; and it can best be maintained by the continuance of the separation of the Governments and of the armies. Owing to the existing means of rapid travelling, the vast size of India is apt to be forgotten. Its provinces are equal in extent and in population to European countries; and they differ as much in religion, race, and customs.

Although the three Native armies may in regard to the great principle of military organization be considered as homogeneous, still they differ greatly as to caste-prejudices and local customs, which can only be understood and controlled by local Governments and local officers intimately acquainted with their peculiarities.

If you remove this safeguard, the supreme military controlling authority will, with rare exceptions, be unable to appreciate such distinctions; and though the armies may nominally be distinct, still the tendency will always be towards uniformity; and that tendency will in the end prevail.

The Commander-in-Chief in India, even though not commanding an army-corps, will by force of circumstances pass the greater portion of his time in the northern part of India, and, as is even the case with the Viceroy, will naturally become better acquainted with, and take a greater interest in, the Northern armies than in the officers and men, whom he will be able to see but very rarely throughout his tour of service. The number of men to be visited and the distances to be compassed are too great to permit of anything more than a casual inspection; and, as above said, the Commander-in-Chief in India will naturally look to, and most consider, those with whom he is best acquainted.

Outside the question of prescribed military organization and routine, numberless questions, and especially all those bearing on expense not absolutely sanctioned by regulation but coming within their spirit, have now to be referred for the decision of the local Government; and if this court of appeal be swept away, either the decision on all such points must rest with the lieutenant-general in command of the army-corps, or every question must be referred for the decision of the Government of India.

In the provinces not included in the Madras presidency proper\* but garrisoned by Madras troops, such matters are referred to, and disposed of by, the Madras Government.

Already the Government of India has to deal with all questions connected with the whole of the Bengal army; and the minor Governments have to refer to it all matters beyond their disposal. Centralization to a certain extent is no doubt needful for the sake of preserving uniformity and to promote economy; but it cannot be wise to strain this principle by throwing upon the Supreme Government more duty than it can possibly discharge, whereby indeed the decision upon most of the references must be left in the hands of the subordinates of the department.

References of the kind require attention and occupy time; and speaking from my own experience, I should be adverse to entrusting the authority for their disposal to the general in command, being certain that much money is saved to the

\* Travancore, Cochin, Mysore, Hyderabad, the Central Province, parts of Bengal, and the North-West Provinces occupied by Madras troops, British Burma.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

3 Could not all the advantages of separate armies be secured with a great increase of efficiency and economy by forming the entire army of India into one army under one Commander-in-Chief, and dividing it into four army-corps? Each army-corps to be under the command of a Lieutenant-general, and to be entirely complete and self-contained in respect of organization, arms, and equipment.

The Lieutenant-general to be vested with complete powers of control and to be responsible for the appointment of all regimental officers, subject only to the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief in India in respect to the nomination of officers commanding regiments.

The officers of all the army-corps to be equally eligible for service on the staff of the army.

The army-corps to be territorial and localized—one in the north, one in the south, one in the east, and one in the west. The army-corps of the south and west to be, as far as practicable recruited from the districts from which the present armies of Madras and Bombay are now recruited, thus maintaining four armies distinct in race, religion, and language, but so organized as to be practically in a state of thorough efficiency and readiness for action in any direction in which the army of India may be called upon to undertake separate or combined operations under the Commander-in-Chief of India.

What should be the strength of each army-

State by the present system of supervision. It may be cumbersome and it may be tedious; but it is a safeguard, and it checks waste.

I wish it, however, to be understood that I advocate the retention of a local administrative supervision, independent of the question as to whether it should be exercised by a Governor or a Lieutenant-Governor, with or without a Council.

3. I understand that, under existing conditions, the army of India is practically under the command of the Commander-in-Chief in India. It is certainly so as regards the British forces; and though the Commander-in-Chief in India is debarred from interfering with the details of the administration of the Native troops of the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, still in all matters of importance uniformity prevails; and, even in regard to minor details, recommendations made by the Commander-in-Chief in India are constantly, under the orders of the Government of India, being made applicable to the three presidencies.

When standing orders are published by the Commander-in-Chief in India, but are not thus made applicable, it is customary for the Commanders-in-Chief of the minor presidencies to republish them, if suitable, to their own armies; whilst, if involving increased expenditure, they are referred for the sanction of the Local Governments.

I cannot see how the efficiency of the Madras and Bombay armies can be affected by changing their names to the South and West Army-Corps; though of course economy might result from reducing the salary of the officers in command, and effecting some minor reductions in the army staff, to which allusion will be made in the answer to the next question.

I have always, on political as well as military grounds, been in favor of dividing what is now called the Bengal army into two distinct portions—one to consist of the races of the north of India; the other to be drawn from the North-West Provinces and from Bengal. I do not, however, see why the Northern Army-Corps should not remain under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief in India. If His Excellency be relieved of any command of the kind, and the officers commanding the four army-corps are vested with full powers, it would seem to me that the head of the army would have little occupation, except during the cold weather, when carrying on his inspections. If it were considered desirable to relieve him of the duties of such a command during his tours of inspection, it would be possible to nominate a *locum tenens* to command during his absence.

If the four army-corps are to be distinct, and the officers commanding them be vested with full powers, I cannot see what advantage could be gained by referring nominations to the command of regiments to the Commander-in-Chief. His personal knowledge of the officers could be but small; and he must either be guided by the recommendation of the officer commanding the corps, or set his recommendation at naught.

I can see no object in throwing open the staff of the several army-corps to the whole army. There would be sufficient field for selection in each army-corps; and I think it would be better to restrict it to that, so as to ensure local knowledge and experience.

If the Hyderabad Contingent, the Central India Horse, and the Punjab and Sind Frontier Forces are kept distinct, as at present, the officers for them might be drawn from the army generally.

The Madras and Bombay armies are already territorial and local; and if the present Bengal army be divided into two, there will be four army-corps, each recruited from different provinces, and distinct in race, religion, and language. I do not, however, see how this division is of itself necessarily to create the thorough state of efficiency and readiness for action contemplated in the latter portion of this question.

As regards Madras, I have already in another paper given my views. As regards the Punjab, Bombay, and the North-West Provinces, I am unable to express an opinion, for the reasons given in my answer to the first question.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

4. If such a formation of the army were adopted, would it not, in your Excellency's opinion, be possible to carry out a very material reduction in the staffs and departments, placing at the same time at the disposal of the lieutenant-general commanding army-corps a staff so efficient and complete as to enable him to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of India of much unimportant work which now comes before him.

5. Supposing such an organization to be adopted, what proportion of each army-corps should be prepared for mobilization and maintained in a state of readiness to take the field at short notice? What should be the relative proportion of each arm of the service in such active portion of each army-corps?

6. Setting aside historical sentiment, and looking to the relative importance, the population, and the wealth of the various local Governments of India, is there any more reason why the armies of Madras and Bombay should at the present time be under the local Governments of Madras and Bombay and under local Commanders-in-Chief with separate departments for every branch of military administration than there is that the same system should be followed in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab?

7. As a matter of fact, if a large reserve for the Northern armies be maintained, is it not the duty of Government to see that this reserve is formed of the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure and to maintain, with due regard to the admitted necessity of keeping up armies of different races and religions, and with due regard to the safety of the empire?

4. Some reductions might possibly be carried out; but I do not believe it would be possible to carry out a very material reduction in the staff and departments, that is to say, after placing at the disposal of the generals commanding the army-corps an efficient staff.

In this presidency I have already recommended the abolition of two district commands with their staff; and I would further propose that the general staff of the brigades named in the margin should be reduced to one officer each. If this reduction be carried out, I would allow the general officer an aide-de-camp. The State would save the difference between the staff salary of an assistant quarter master general and an aide-de-camp for each brigade.

5. I am under the impression that the existing army in India is prepared for mobilization and ready to take the field at short notice, provided that it be found with carriage and supplies.

\* *Bangalore.*

- 2 Guns.
- 1 Troop British cavalry.
- 2 Companies British infantry.
- 2 Companies Native infantry.

*Bellary.*

- 2 Guns.
- 1 Troop Madras light cavalry.
- 3 Companies British infantry.
- 1 Wing Native infantry.

*Secunderabad.*

- 1 Field battery.
- 1 Heavy battery.
- 1 Squadron British cavalry.
- 1 Squadron Native cavalry.
- 1 British infantry.
- 1 Regiment Native infantry.

*Kamptee.*

- 2 Guns.
- 1 Troop Native cavalry.
- 1 Wing British infantry.
- 1 Wing Native infantry.

6. The Madras and Bombay armies hold the same position towards their local Governments as does the Bengal army towards the Government of India. The other local Governments mentioned in the question have been of comparatively late creations, having their origin in view to relieve the Government of India from details of administration which the growth of the empire and the elaboration of the system of government made it impossible for it to continue to discharge.

When, however, these lieutenant-governorships were formed, the Government of India retained in its own hands the decision of all matters affecting military control and military expenditure. No difference therefore exists in the system of control exercised by the Civil Government over the armies of the three presidencies. If the existing Bengal army be divided into two army-corps, a similar power of control to that now exercised by the Governments of Madras and Bombay might, I think, with advantage be conferred on the Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab and the North-Western Provinces.

I have shown that the anomalies inferred by this question do not exist; and, as previously stated by me, I can find no real difference whether the Commanders of the Madras and Bombay armies be styled Commanders-in-Chief or Commanders of Army-Corps; but, whatever be their titles, I believe it will be best to let them have separate departments for every branch of military administration. In this presidency the wants of some 40,000 men have to be provided for. The territory is large and the distances are great. The only change that I can recommend is, that the Ordnance Department throughout India should be placed under one general head.

7. As a measure tending towards the peace of the country and security of British rule, it seems to me expedient that the general reserve should be proportionally maintained in the three armies, and therefore that it is undesirable to give undue preference to the races possessing the most efficient fighting power. For this reason I consider that the Madras and Bombay armies should provide their share of the reserve

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

Does your Excellency look upon the Madras and Bombay armies in their present organization as constituting the most efficient reserve for the armies of Upper India?

8. What is the feeling of the <sup>Madras</sup> <sup>Bombay</sup> army in respect to employment in other presidencies in India in times of peace? For instance, at the present time 26 regiments of the Madras army are employed within their own presidency and no less than 14 outside its limits, some of them at distant stations in Bengal. Is this service popular with the army? Are the Madras regiments more efficient than the Bengal regiments; or are they when on this duty cheaper, the cost of relief, transport of clothing, equipment, and compensation for food being taken into account. If they are neither cheaper nor more efficient, is there any object in garrisoning Bengal and Burma partly from the Madras army?

9. Is your Excellency aware of any difficulty in obtaining recruits for the army of a good class of healthy, strong young men of the agricultural population physically qualified to perform the duties of a soldier?

10. Has it ever been asserted that a difficulty in obtaining efficient recruits is attributable to the unpopularity of the service of the local army beyond the limits of its own presidency in times of peace?

11. If your Excellency is of opinion that the army-corps should be formed territorially, and as far as possible localized within its territorial area, what alteration would you propose in the strength of the various armies to render them fit for their home duties, and to place them in a position to take part in any war going on in India by the detachment of a force of all arms?

12. Could not the duties of the Native army be very materially decreased by a general concentration of troops in large centres in the neighbourhood of railways, thus abolishing all small cantonments and outlying and isolated stations?

13. Would not this arrangement enable the officers commanding army-corps to make a much larger number of men available for service, and justify a very considerable reduction of troops in some parts of the country; and would it not enable the discipline, exercise, and instruction of the troops to be more effectively carried on, and render the formation of camps of exercise more feasible?

14. Recognizing the fact that India could not afford to maintain the most perfect army which could be devised in which economy did not enter, and that large reductions of army expenditure are absolutely essential, what changes and alterations would your Excellency be prepared to recommend in the organization and administration of the army?

for the armies of Upper India. I will give further reasons in detail for entertaining this opinion when replying to questions 5 and 6 in the paper headed III, Madras.

8. The Madras sepoy is not unwilling to be employed in other presidencies in time of peace, provided that the advantages now given him for so doing are continued, and that he be not kept too long out of the presidency. I do not consider a Madras regiment to be more efficient than a Bengal one; but I am of opinion that the loyalty of the Madras army towards the Government is less likely to be influenced by causes of a political or military character which might have their origin in the Bengal presidency, and influence the feeling and conduct of that army.

Taking into consideration cost of relief and compensation for dearness of rice, I believe it would be cheaper to garrison

\* Jubbulpore.  
Saugor.  
Banda.  
Nowgong.  
Dorunda.

† My Minute, dated 8th August 1879, in reply to questions referred by the Government of India to the Government of Fort St. George.

Minute on the employment of a regiment of Madras Native infantry in Cachar, dated 30th May 1878.

9. Yes; I brought the ment in my memorandum.

† Memorandum by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to accompany the confidential reports on Native regiments for the year 1878-79, dated 14th July 1879.

10. See the papers above quoted in the margin.

11. Yes, I think the army-corps should be formed territorially and be localized as much as possible; but I see no objection to troops being employed out of their own territory, provided the amount of duty thus imposed on them is moderate. When troops are required for active service, each army-corps should be fairly represented. I am unable to give

My Minute, dated 8th August, in reply to the questions addressed to the Government of Fort St. George by the Government of India.

12. I strongly advocate the concentration of troops at large stations as far as may be practicable; but I do not believe it would be politic, or even safe, to abolish all small cantonments and isolated and outlying stations. I will enter more into this subject in dealing with question 7 of the Madras paper.

13. The concentration of troops must of course make a larger number of men available for service by reducing the number of stations to be protected and the duties to be taken. It would also enable the discipline and instruction of the troops to be more efficiently carried out; but I do not believe that any concentration would justify any large reduction of troops.

14. I fully admit the urgency of reducing all military expenditure to the uttermost; and I believe that considerable reduction is feasible by a more careful control of all expenditure and by a more accurate and just distribution of charges in the various departments under the control of the Civil Government; but I do not believe in the propriety of largely reducing the rank and file of the army; for I consider that the maintenance of our position in India depends on the existence of a sufficient military force, and its being loyal and content and kept in a state of efficiency. I am not prepared

with Bengal or Bombay regiments the stations noted in the margin\* now occupied by Madras troops. The object of garrisoning Burma with Madras troops will be entered upon when replying to question 2 of the paper headed III, Madras. I would also beg to refer to what I have already said on this subject in my Minutes quoted in the margin.†

subject to the notice of Government dated 28th July 1879, on the subject of recruiting. I beg to invite attention to that paper, and also to my memorandum† which accompanied the inspection reports.

This I have given in the paper noted in the margin.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

15. Are you in favor of amalgamating the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General's departments under a Chief of the staff, so that, as in other armies, the Staff of the Army shall consist of certain grades of staff officers, the work being apportioned as may be desirable, but without a division, as at present, into two distinct departments?

to recommend any radical changes in the organization and administration of the army; but I will refer to these subjects more in detail when replying to subsequent questions.

15. I can see no advantage in amalgamating the two departments. At the head-quarters of a presidency, or of an army-corps, or of a division, the duties of each department require the services of one or more officers; and they could not therefore be amalgamated either with advantage to the despatch of business or to economy. In the smaller brigade commands where there is now an officer for each department,

\* See reply to Question 4. one officer might be able to discharge both duties; and I have suggested that this be done.\*

For an army-corps in the field, where the general's attention must be taken up with every matter bearing on the interests of his army and the larger duties he is called upon to fulfil, a Chief of the Staff would be a very useful appointment; as to him the general in command could entrust the authority to issue in his name orders on all matters of detail. But in peace time and in quarters the general officer commanding an army-corps has ample time to attend to all matters of detail; and it seems to me to be a simpler and preferable arrangement that he should transact his business direct with the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General than that he should do so through a Chief of the Staff, who would have to re-communicate the orders to each of the departments. India has never yet placed 40,000 men in the field as an united body acting under one authority, and is never likely to do so, unless it be to oppose invasion by a European power. Lord Clyde had a Chief of the Staff when in command in the field in the suppression of the mutiny, and when several columns were acting under his orders. That arrangement may have been a very suitable one, and under exceptional circumstances could again be adopted.

It has, I think, to be borne in mind that, in considering such matters as regards the Indian army, there is little or no analogy between its circumstances and those of armies in Europe. In India we have a vast peninsula to occupy under exceptional conditions, which necessitate the troops being scattered, and which make it difficult to get even 10,000 men suddenly together at one spot; whereas in Europe the armies hold a perfectly different position, and in proportion to the extent of country occupied are vastly superior in numbers.

16. If the army were divided into army-corps, and power given to the lieutenant-generals commanding to dispose of many questions which are now referred to superior authority, so that important matters only were treated of by the central military authority at head-quarters, would not a staff of about the following strength be sufficient:—

*Head-quarters.*

- 1 Chief of the Staff.
- 4 Officers of the General Staff
- 3 Officers of the General Staff for Intelligence duties.

1 Officer of the General Staff for Royal Artillery to be Inspector General of Artillery, with two staff officers.

1 Officer of the General Staff for Royal Engineers.

1 Officer of the General Staff for Musketry Inspection, &c.

1 Judge Advocate General.

*Army-corps.*

- 1 Chief of the Staff.
- 2 Officers of the General Staff.
- 1 Staff Officer of Royal Artillery.
- 1 Staff Officer of Royal Engineers, to be Deputy Inspector General of Engineers, Military Works, and Fortifications.
- 1 Deputy Judge Advocate General.

Departmental staff officers in addition to be under the Chief of the Staff of the Army-Corps.

16. If the lieutenant-generals commanding army-corps be invested with such authority as is now possessed by the Commanders-in-Chief of the minor presidencies, and the command of an army-corps be not imposed upon the Commander-in-Chief in India, then I think that a staff less numerous than that proposed in this question might suffice for head-quarters. There at present exists, in my opinion, a great deal of unnecessary correspondence, from having to refer to the Commander-in-Chief in India many matters which could equally well be decided by the Commander-in-Chief of the presidency, or which are only referred to the Commander-in-Chief in India to be passed on to the Horse Guards for the decision of the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief. Either the provincial Commander-in-Chief is capable of deciding them, or he is unfit for his position.

Until I am aware of what the exact function of the Commander-in-Chief in India is to be, I am unable to say what staff he would require in time of peace. In time of war it would depend on whether His Excellency was to command the army in person, or on the nature of the operations of which he had the general direction.



## QUESTIONS.

17. If your Excellency does not approve of this arrangement either in strength of *personnel* or nomenclature, what would your Excellency propose?

18. Does your Excellency consider that it would be advisable to place the administration of the Royal Artillery in India more directly under the Adjutant General or Chief of the Staff, as is the case with the other arms, the Adjutant General being provided with assistance in special Artillery questions or technical subjects in the person of the Inspector General of Artillery.

19. Would it not be in all respects a more efficient arrangement if the Inspector General of Artillery acted as the Artillery adviser of the Commander-in-Chief; the Inspector General having two staff officers to assist him, one of whom should carry out the duties now performed by the present Deputy Adjutant General of Royal Artillery in India? Or, in other words, the amalgamation of the offices of Inspector General of Royal Artillery and Deputy Adjutant General of Royal Artillery effected, making the former the head Staff Officer of Artillery in India, and associating with him two staff officers who would carry on the work under him?

20. In your relations as Commander-in-Chief with the Military Department of Government, does your experience suggest any modifications of procedure or other matter tending to facilitate business, reduce expenditure, or add to general efficiency of administration?

21. Does your Excellency think that the departments of Ordnance, Military Works, Commissariat, and Military Accounts should be brought more *en rapport* with the Commander-in-Chief; and if so, will you suggest the mode of giving effect to your views?

22. Does your Excellency consider it an advantage or otherwise to have three separate departments of Commissariat, Ordnance, Medical, Clothing, &c., &c., for the work of the army of India?

## ANSWERS.

17. As regards the staff required for an army-corps, I consider that the Madras army requires one Adjutant General, one Deputy Adjutant General, one Quartermaster General, one Deputy Quartermaster General, one Judge Advocate General, and one officer of the Royal Artillery, who, besides carrying on the duties connected with the Artillery, might give his services in the Adjutant General's office.

At present there is an Assistant Adjutant General in addition; this appointment might be abolished. Since 1861 the Quartermaster General's Department at head-quarters has been reduced by two officers.

18. I cannot see that any good would be derived from such a change. According to the existing organization of the Royal Artillery, the duties of that branch of the service and those of the Adjutant General are, as a rule, distinct. The artillery staff officer's duties are mainly confined to questions of regimental detail; and these are more easily and quickly disposed of by direct communication with the Commander-in-Chief than would be the case if they had to go through the Adjutant General. Only questions of general importance, such as those affecting the discipline and efficiency of the army, need to go through the Adjutant General. This is the course followed in this presidency, and I believe in the other presidencies of India.

19. The Commander-in-Chief in India always has the means of consulting the Inspector General of Artillery. I am not aware of any reason why the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery, should not conduct his duties in communication with, and in subordination to, that officer; or the Inspector General of Artillery might, as suggested, be the principal Staff Officer of Artillery, and the Deputy Adjutant General be merely his assistant to carry out orders. The drawback to this arrangement is, that the Inspector General of Artillery ought to be away from head-quarters for months, carrying on his inspections, when all the duties connected with the Royal Artillery must devolve on his subordinate.

20. I cannot suggest any modification of procedure or other matter tending to facilitate business, reduce expenditure, or add to the general efficiency of administration. The present system, I think, works well, and is on the whole, I believe, conducive to economy. Either the treasury and departments of military supply must be authorized to meet all demands and pass all charges which receive the approval and sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, or such authority must continue to rest, as now, with the Civil Government. I consider the existing system the proper one. In case of emergency, when there is not time to go through the regular forms, I have never experienced any difficulty in having the wants of the army met in anticipation of the necessary sanction.

21. I have experienced no difficulty under the existing system in obtaining all required information from, or in conducting my duties with, the departments referred to in the question.

22. I consider it an advantage to have separate departments for the three presidential armies. To amalgamate them would, I believe, be creative of a vast amount of unnecessary correspondence, would weaken supervision and control, and, whilst hindering the despatch of business and reducing efficiency, would add to expense. If the Bengal army be divided into two army-corps, I would then have separate departments for each of them, one having Calcutta for its base of supply, and the other Kurrachee. According as the amount of work to be done is reduced, so may each of the establishments and salaries be proportionately reduced.

The Ordnance is the only department which, I think, can with advantage be unified under one Inspector General, with Deputies under him to carry on the duties appertaining to each presidency or army-corps. The stores in this department are of a totally different nature to those of the other branches of supply; and misappropriation or dishonesty in regard to them is less easy. They are, as a rule, received direct from England; and all that is required is to see that

## QUESTIONS.

23. Is your Excellency of opinion that any reduction can be made in the number or class of British troops serving in India? Could India dispense, for instance, with any regiments of infantry or cavalry or any batteries of artillery; or could garrison batteries at any station safely take the place of field batteries, or field batteries take the place of horse artillery?

24. Bearing in mind the fact that the annual cost of officers to men is as follows—

	For a regiment of British cavalry.	For a regiment of British infantry.
	Rs.	Rs.
Officers ...	1,46,797	1,43,793
Non-commissioned officers and men ...	1,14,061	1,76,126

is your Excellency of opinion that any change in the organization of regiments is possible, so as to maintain the fighting strength of the British force in India and at the same time diminish the relative cost of officers to men?

25. In your opinion is it desirable, on the score of economy and efficiency, to substitute for Indian service a local British force in place of a portion of the Home army?

26. In your Excellency's opinion would it be advisable, apart from the question of reduction of the strength of the army, to modify the present proportion of British to Native troops?

27. Reviewing the Enlistment Act of 1870, together with the Regulations issued under that Act, War Office Circulars, clauses 36 and 189 of 1878, especially as applicable to India, are you of opinion that, in the event of a local force not being employed, any further modifications of existing Acts should be made?

28. Can you suggest any means by which the present cost of supplying British soldiers for service in India can be reduced without decreasing in any way their efficiency?

In discussing this subject, a fair consideration must be given to the share India should take in support of the general maintenance of the British empire.

## ANSWERS.

they exist in proper quality and quantity at the proper arsenals and magazines, and that they are issued in accordance with regulations.

23. I have answered\* this question as regards the Madras army, and I am not now possessed of the necessary information to enable me to do so as regards the other presidencies. I would, however, urge the importance of not reducing this backbone of our power, except after the most careful consideration.

24. The statement upon which this question is framed seems to me misleading. The calculation is evidently based on the pay of each grade; but whereas the pay of the officers covers all their expense to the State, that of the men does not include the cost of their barracks, the commissariat charges, their clothing, their arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, &c., &c. If account be taken of these charges, and of the Indian allowances saved of the officers who are absent from India, the disproportion is not as represented in the question.

As far as my experience goes, I have never found a superfluity of officers with British regiments; whilst I have had to bring to the notice of superior authority that, from some cause or another, the number of officers necessary for the efficient discharge of the duty were not present. I do not believe it practicable to reduce the proportion of officers without impairing the fighting strength of regiments. The value of the men depends upon their being well-officered.

25. I am opposed to the introduction of a local British army. Any force of the kind now introduced would, in my opinion, not be held in the same estimation as the British regiments taking their ordinary tour of Indian service; consequently it would, I fear, not possess the same feeling of self-respect and *esprit de corps*. If a local force be determined upon, it might perhaps best be furnished by the second battalions of the required number of regiments being located in India; the officers being allowed to exchange, and the soldiers being, at their wish, transferred to the home battalion after a fixed period of Indian service. A system of the kind would probably best meet the disadvantages I have referred to, and also, by keeping up the home connection and feeling, lessen the risk of unpleasant consequences likely to arise out of purely local service. Economy would no doubt be obtained were a portion of the British force localized; but I think that economy had better be sought through other means.

26. Taking into consideration that the artillery in India is manned by British artillerymen, I consider that the existing proportion of one British infantry regiment to two Native infantry regiments—that is to say, the proportion of one man to two—is a suitable one. Under this condition, I think the cavalry may remain in the proportion of one British trooper to four of Native cavalry.

27. The Enlistment Act of 1870 already gives Government the power to enlist soldiers for twelve years. It seems, therefore, that there is no necessity to change the terms of the Act. All that seems necessary is, that Government should hold out sufficient inducement to the men to prolong their service on coming to India to the full period sanctioned by the terms of their engagement, and to agree to serve a certain number of years in India.

According to existing Regulations, India is called on to pay for an Imperial reserve, from which no benefit can be expected, and the cost of which her finances are unable to meet.

28. I am unable to think of any other measure than that suggested by me in my answer to the last question; unless a saving could be effected by British regiments, and drafts being conveyed to and from India in private steamers, instead of in Government troopships.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

29. There is a large staff of assistant adjutant generals and deputy assistant adjutant generals for musketry, regimental instructors and assistant instructors of musketry, throughout India.

Does not your Excellency consider that *regimental instruction in musketry* can be carried on by company officers as part of their ordinary military duty, and that the staff for musketry inspection can be largely reduced, the duty of inspection being carried on by generals and their staff, assisted, if absolutely necessary, by a specially trained officer?

30. Is any reduction in the Judge Advocate General's Department practicable by the concentration of work at head-quarters, courts-martial being conducted by officers with the usual allowance for the discharge of this duty, and in very special cases by an officer deputed from head-quarters?

31. Is it necessary to retain the allowance now passed to interpreters of British cavalry and infantry regiments? No such allowance is found necessary for batteries of artillery with large Native establishments.

32. Does your Excellency see any objection to the assimilation of the scale of syces allowed to British cavalry? Excluding the horses of the non-commissioned officers, for which one syce each is allowed, the present scale is in Bengal one to two, in Madras one to four, and in Bombay one to three, horses: which of these scales would your Excellency adopt?

33. Might not bazaar sergeants be abolished?

34. (a) Does not your Excellency consider that the present expenditure on punkah-pulling is excessive; are not large reductions possible; and would it not be feasible to reduce the cost of punkah-pulling by resorting to the old system of a fixed allowance per company, &c.?

29. I attach great importance to musketry instruction, and I do not believe that it would be carried on in a thoroughly satisfactory manner in British regiments if entirely entrusted to company officers. Without the supervision exercised by the musketry instructor under the orders of the commanding officer, uniformity of practice would not be insured.

I am so impressed with the importance of a proper training in musketry, that I recommend the addition of a musketry instructor to the staff of each regiment of Native infantry. The duties, however, of the quartermaster in a Native infantry regiment are not heavy; and that officer might, I think, with advantage be also required to discharge the duties of musketry instructor.

Bearing in mind the urgent call for retrenchment, the staff salary of the musketry instructor of a British regiment might be reduced from Rs. 150 to Rs. 100 a month. I also look on the duties performed by the superintending musketry staff as very important for purposes of general supervision and for checking returns, more especially in Native regiments, who have now no officers specially entrusted with musketry instruction.

It might, however, be practicable to reduce one of the staff officers of musketry in this presidency; though, in that case, it might prove impossible for every out-station to be visited in each year.

30. Considerable reductions have taken place of late years in the Judge Advocate's Department in this presidency; but it might still be possible to reduce one deputy by amalgamating Nos. 1 and 2 Circles, and adding the Ceded District to No. 3 Circle. If this arrangement were carried out, an additional Rs. 50 office allowance might fairly be added to the combined Nos. 1 and 2 Circles.

I consider it very desirable that general courts-martial, and especially those held under the 101st Article of War, should be conducted by a trained and experienced officer of the Judge Advocate's Department; or courts will be likely to go astray. An officer who had merely passed the garrison course test in military law would not be likely to have the necessary experience, nor would his advice be likely to have sufficient weight with the court. I also consider that the present system, which ensures the proceedings of all district courts being reviewed by an officer of the Judge Advocate's Department before they are submitted to the confirming officer, is a good one, preventing, as it does, illegal proceedings from being confirmed, and protecting all concerned from the penalties attached to wrongful imprisonment.

31. I think that the allowance now passed to interpreters of British cavalry and infantry regiments may be considered unnecessary, provided a qualified Native munshi be attached to each regiment.

32. I am not aware of any objection to the assimilation of the scale of syces allowed to British cavalry. As the scale in force in the Madras presidency is found to suffice, I see no reason why it should not be made applicable to the other presidencies.

33. There are no bazaar sergeants in this presidency; and therefore I don't see why they should be maintained in other presidencies.

34. (a) I am unable to answer this question with any authority. In this presidency the necessity for punkahs varies much according to the climate at different stations, and to the variations of the seasons. I believe that the present allotment does not exceed what is required. Punkahs are brought into use and discontinued under the orders of the officers in command, guided by the recommendation of the medical officers.

As to the comparative economy of the present system and the old system of a fixed allowance per company, I think that

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(b) Would the abolition of khush-khush tatties, except in hospitals, cause any discomfort or risk to the health of the troops?

(c) Can your Excellency suggest any way of reducing the very heavy expenditure annually incurred in the purchase (or manufacture) and repair of barrack furniture, barrack bedding, &c.?

35. Does your Excellency consider it necessary to maintain any reserve of Government horses; and if so, how many; and on what basis should the reserve be calculated?

Should this reserve be attached to corps and batteries, or to one or more depôts?

is a question which might be well referred to a committee of officers empowered to investigate all the details.

(2) In this presidency khush-khush tatties are only used in barracks and hospitals at Kamptee and Trichinopoly, and in hospitals only at Bellary. As it is intended to withdraw British troops from Trichinopoly, Kamptee will be the only station where there can be any question as to their continuance. I think the decision during each hot season should rest with the general officer in command, in communication with the medical authorities. At the same time I consider that the habits of soldiers make it very difficult to turn khush-khush tatties to their proper account.

(c) Since I have been in the service, the system has many times been changed backwards and forwards, in view to reducing expenditure and to facilitate supply; and I can only recommend that the question be referred to a committee of officers specially acquainted with such details.

35. I consider it necessary that a reserve of remounts should be maintained. I divide this reserve into two headings—first, to supply the annual average casualties from horses cast; and secondly, to provide a small additional percentage to meet unexpected demands, such as caused by the outbreak of an epidemic or a war. As regards the latter reserve in this presidency, it has been customary to maintain 150 horses; but I am of opinion that 100 would suffice, and I shall now address Government to that effect.

In this and the Bengal presidency most of the remounts are Australians. They are brought to India in the cold season; and they require to be kept for some months before they are fit for work; that is to say, until the following September or October, when the mounted branches are reduced in strength by the number of horses cast, and the animals purchased during the preceding cold season have become fit to join the ranks. After these have been distributed, there should still remain at the depôt, as above referred to, a small percentage sufficient to meet emergencies. The horses which from any reason have not become fit for distribution fall under this heading, and are kept for another year.

I am strongly in favor of the remounts or the reserve being kept at a depôt. Young horses are better looked after and trained there than when attached to corps or batteries. Of course, the success of a depôt depends on its being entrusted to a really competent and experienced officer, and to the management and the accounts being carefully watched over by the Commander-in-Chief and the local Government.

I consider that the remount depôt at Oosoor is based on an excellent system, which might with advantage be followed in the other presidencies. On this subject I would beg to refer to my remarks on the annual reports of that establishment for the past three years, and to a report in 1878 by Brigadier-General Gaye, Inspector General of Royal Artillery in India.

36. I would have a depôt at some suitable place in each presidency or for each army-corps. I believe it to be preferable both for efficiency and economy to have separate depôts, as it is impossible for any single man to properly look after more than a limited number of horses; whilst the expense depends more on the number of horses than the number of establishments.

37. Would your Excellency approve of the reduction of the establishment of horses for horse and field batteries to the war scale laid down in Army Circular No. 186 of 1877, deducting such carts as in India are drawn by bullocks?

38. Can your Excellency suggest any improvements in the constitution and working of the Commissariat Department?

The points which would appear to require notice are—

(a) The large supervising staff of the department.

37. I approve of the establishment of horses for horse and field batteries being reduced to the war scale laid down in Army Circular No. 186 of 1877. If this establishment is sufficient in Europe, it must be so in India, where the enemy's field artillery is so inferior and immobile in comparison to our own.

38. I think the question of the constitution and working of the Commissariat had best be considered by a committee of experienced officers. As regards (f), however, I am convinced that it is desirable to maintain three separate departments for India; though it may be possible to reduce some of the large supervising and office staffs.

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## ANSWERS.

(b) The number of senior officers of high rank, and with high pay, doing comparatively subordinate and unimportant work.

(c) The large office establishment kept up with each executive officer in consequence of a want of simplification and unification in the examination of accounts.

(d) Relative advantages of the contract and agency system of supply.

(e) Expense of the movement of commissariat stores owing to want of supervision and system.

(f) As to the advisability of having three separate departments for India, each with its own large supervising and office staff.

(g) The advisability of bringing commissariat duties more within the knowledge and control of the general officer commanding both in peace and war.

(h) Whether it would not be advisable to confine the operations of the Commissariat Department entirely to the issue of consumable stores, taking from it the issue of such things as line-gear, bedding, &c., which do not seem to appertain to it, and which would seem more appropriately to belong to equipment?

39. What are your Excellency's views generally regarding the organization of the transport for the army in India?

The following points suggest themselves—

(a) As to whether the transport should be under the Commissariat, or organized as a separate department?

(b) What are the arrangements which your Excellency would propose should be carried out for the formation of a nucleus of a transport Department, by utilizing existing carriage such as moveable columns, and without adding to the present cost of these?

How could a system of regimental transport be organized?

(c) As to the most effectual means of securing the speedy collection of transport in the event of a war.

If the supply of the whole of India was entrusted to one department, it would, I believe, be too unwieldy to be efficiently controlled by one head; and such centralization would be productive of friction, want of supervision, and waste; and further, I believe that there would be more opportunity for contractors to combine against the Government.

The countries occupied by the three local armies differ so much as regards climate, produce, customs, and means of communication, that for the Commissariat to be in a position to make the most of local resources, it seems to me to be imperative that it should be worked and supervised by officers of local experience.

As regards (g), my experience is that the general officer commanding has at present, both in peace and war, sufficient opportunities for controlling commissariat duties. If he fails to do this, it is the fault not of the system but of the officer in command. My experience is certainly in favor of the efficiency of the department, inasmuch as when reasonable warning has been given, it has always proved itself able to supply the wants of the troops.

39. I am not aware of any cattle being now kept up for the army in time of peace in India which can be considered as coming under the head of transport, except those maintained for the moveable columns, or for the ordinary wants of the Commissariat Department in cantonments. Such animals are, I consider, more cheaply maintained if kept under the orders of commissariat officers than they would be if handed over to a separate department acting independently. I have already stated that the animals attached to the moveable columns are ordinarily employed in the larger stations on the daily current duties of the Commissariat; and that when the columns move out, none are left in the station for routine work. When war breaks out, and the number of animals has to be very largely increased, then it becomes necessary to have a special establishment to look after them. Such an establishment should be worked, I consider, as a branch of the Commissariat, and act under the orders of the senior commissariat officer.

(b) I don't think the moveable column carriage should be touched; it ought to be always available, and as such must be considered as purely local. The moveable columns are the safeguards for the immediate suppression of any outbreak; and if their mobility be impaired, the military are deprived of their means of acting.

To create a transport department without incurring additional expenditure is beyond my comprehension.

I admit the advantage of having the nucleus of a transport department always ready, and especially on the North-West Frontier; but if it is to be ready on the outbreak of a war, it must be kept up in peace; and to do this must cost money.

A regimental system of transport has always existed in the Punjab Frontier Force, and with the best results in securing mobility and economy; but the condition of this force must be considered exceptional; and it would be impossible to extend the system generally without a large outlay.

(c) Unless transport be systematically kept up in peace, I don't see how it is to be ready in time of war. If not maintained in peace time, I see no alternative but the existing system; that is to say, that it be collected when required by the Commissariat through the agency of the district authorities. I feel assured that any attempt to keep a regular public register of all cattle in a district would be viewed by the inhabitants with great distrust and dissatisfaction, as implying some intention on the part of the Government to tax or to interfere with the animals. Such a register would never be accurately or fairly kept by the heads of villages or by the police. Those able to bribe would do so to prevent

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(d) Whether it would not be advisable to endeavour to introduce a better and lighter description of cart into India, with a view to the substitution when possible of wheeled for pack carriage?

(e) Whether your Excellency thinks anything can be done to increase the supply and improve the breed of mules?

(f) Looking to the fact that the supply of camels is believed to be steadily decreasing, can you suggest any means by which that supply can be kept up? Could not elephants be largely dispensed with as army transport?

(g) Which do you consider it most advisable to use on service,—Government or hired transport?

(h) Whether you think that, in the event of a Government nucleus being kept up, much of the cost could not be saved by its utilization for the relief of troops and the carriage of Commissariat and other stores?

their cattle appearing in the register; and the demand for their use whenever made would fall principally, as is now the case, on those least able to prevent their cattle from being taken because they are not able to bribe the subordinate Native officials. Further, an efficient district officer is now always able to tell about how many cattle his district can produce, without injuring the agricultural and trading interests of the country. I have myself known the carters burn their carts rather than allow their cattle to be taken against their will; and I have even known them to desert their cattle.

War in India and war in Europe bear no analogy to each other. In India it is altogether a Government affair, in which the people feel no concern. The Native army and the contractors are the only persons who take interest in it.

(d) I quite think so. On the outbreak of the late Afghan war, when I was at Simla, I brought this to the notice of the Commissary General, and suggested that the carts with high wheels in ordinary use in the Madras presidency were much more adapted for military transport than those of Upper India. They are very economical of draught power, and two bullocks can draw a heavy load. Probably the pattern is still susceptible of improvement.

(e) The Madras Government, at my instigation, has taken steps to introduce mule-breeding in this presidency. I consider a mule to be the most hardy, long-lived, and economical transport animal procurable, and think that their breeding should be encouraged throughout India. I am under the impression that if any inducement was held out to the colonists of Australia to breed mules, that that country could produce them to any extent, and that the traffic would be equally profitable to India and that colony.

(f) The only course that I can suggest to check the decrease in the supply of camels is for Government not to employ and use up the females. When a war takes place, thousands of females are destroyed; and thus not only the existing stock, but the source of future supply, is cut off. It took many years for India to recover from the first Afghan war; and the war of last year will be followed by the same results. Further, recent legislation, which gives greater weight to proprietary rights, makes it more difficult to forage camels. At the same time, I believe it to be much cheaper for Government to purchase or to hire camels than to breed them. The introduction of fairs and the gift of prizes, which has proved successful in the Punjab in encouraging horse-breeding, might be found to have the same result in the case of camels.

I am opposed to the employment of elephants as transport animals in war. They require a large grain ration, and it is difficult in many parts of India to forage them, and still more so when beyond the frontier. I believe they were originally introduced to carry large tents not transportable by camels; but, now that our camp equipage is so reduced in size, there can be no necessity for their retention. They are always more or less a danger in camp, being liable to sudden alarms and intractable under fire.

(g) If it were possible to consult efficiency alone regardless of economy, I should give the preference to Government transport; but as it is impossible to overlook financial considerations, it seems to me that hired transport is the only resource. When Government goes into the market to purchase, it always has to do so at the highest price; and when it wants to sell, the market becomes glutted and the animals fetch little.

(h) At stations where moveable columns exist, the carriage kept for them is at present utilized in carrying on the ordinary station duties. If Government is prepared to incur the expense of purchasing carriage for general purposes, and for forming the nucleus of a transport corps, no doubt some of its cost would be recovered by employing it in the relief of troops and in the carriage of Commissariat and other stores. But troops are ordinarily only moved in the cold season, during four months of the year at most, and

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(2) What should be the organization of a division of transport in war, i.e., as to number of animals, officers, supervising staff, drivers, artificers, and veterinarians?

40. Does your Excellency consider that the Military Works Branch of the Department Public Works should be brought more directly under the military authorities than at present, and could not its . . . as to make the efficient for war . . . Works Branch be abolished, the ordinary works being constructed and maintained by the ordinary Public Works staff, a special establishment being appointed under the Military Department for any large works requiring peculiar knowledge or skill?

41. In what way can your Excellency suggest the reduction of the expenditure of the Military Works Branch, Public Works Department?

(a) Could not the expenditure for each year be limited to a fixed annual grant, and the completion of the works necessary for the accommodation of troops and the defence of the empire be distributed over a series of years?

(b) What is your Excellency's opinion of the barrack accommodation in India generally? Are not many of the barracks constructed in late years designed on a most extravagant scale? Are these new barracks any more comfortable or conducive to the health of the occupants than many of the older and cheaper single-storeyed barracks?

(c) Might not many of the barracks throughout India be constructed in a more economical style; and might not many of the troops on the hills be housed for many years to come in cheap huts or cottage barracks?

(d) Could not the ordinary repairs of completed barracks, and the construction of barracks on standard plans, be well left to the Local Governments, subject to inspection by officers employed under the Government of India?

(e) Might not European soldiers be more frequently employed in Public Works, especially in the construction of their own barracks on the hills and the roads leading to them?

42. Do you consider that a clearer and more appropriate classification of the subjects dealt with in each department of the staff and the army could be adopted; and if so, would it not add to efficiency, and tend to the reduction of labor?

43. Do you consider that the amount of correspondence and returns in the army could be reduced; and would you approve of a committee to consider this question?

the greater portion of them travel by rail, in order to avoid delay and expense; whilst their transit helps to pay the guaranteed interest.

(2) The answer to this question depends on so many and various circumstances, that I am unable to express an opinion on it.

40. The Military Works Branch of the Department of Public Works had best, I think, be left under the control of the civil authorities. All plans and estimates for works of a military nature are now submitted for the consideration and approval of the military authorities. In time of peace there is little employment for the military engineer officer on what may be termed military works; consequently, for the sake of economy, Government avails itself of his services in the Public Works Department. But I can see no necessity for keeping up a larger number of military engineer officers than might be looked upon as required to meet military demands in case of emergency; and the more especially as the system of examination for all staff officers makes it obligatory for them to have some theoretical knowledge of attack and defence.

I am not aware of any large military works at present going on or in contemplation in India which require any peculiar knowledge or skill. As far as my experience goes, I have not found military engineers deficient in military knowledge when called into the field from civil employ. Some may have become so; but Government has always had the right, and has exercised it, of demanding the services of the most capable engineers for military employ. Further, if the sappers and miners of the three presidencies are kept up to a proper standard of efficiency, the officers attached to them ought to go far towards providing a staff to carry out such purely military works in the field as we are likely to require.

41.

(a) I understand that the system proposed by this question is already in existence. Everything is budgeted for in advance, and, save under most exceptional circumstances, no money is spent except under such a grant.

(b) I think that many of the barracks recently constructed were designed on a most extravagant scale; and that they are not more comfortable and healthy than single-storeyed barracks. The British soldier certainly prefers the latter.

(c) I have no doubt it might be so.

(d) Yes, I think it would be best to leave such work to the Local Governments.

(e) I consider it advisable to employ British soldiers on such works as much as possible, provided their military training does not suffer thereby. If this course has not been followed, I presume it has been due to its having been found cheaper to employ Native labor than to give the soldiers working pay.

42. I have not experienced any difficulty from any want of clearness in the classification of the subjects dealt with in each department of the staff. I have already stated that I see no reason for amalgamating the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General's departments.

43. I believe there is a considerable field for reduction in the amount of correspondence and returns in the army. Much time and paper is, I believe, at present wasted. Some letters might be avoided altogether, and many might well be replaced by memoranda; and a simple countersignature might

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## ANSWERS.

44. Do you consider that the system of payment, audit, and army account is susceptible of improvement, and what alterations would your Excellency suggest?

45. Is your Excellency in favor of station (or general) hospitals in large cantonments, and field and base (or general) hospitals in the field, in place of regimental hospitals?

46. Do you think it desirable that the power formally granted to commanding officers of Native regiments to dismiss men of bad character or inefficient for service should be restored?

47. (a) What changes, if any, would your Excellency recommend in the constitution, organization, and equipment of the Native cavalry and infantry?

in many cases do the work of a letter or memorandum. The number of returns might also, I think, be reduced without injury to the service; and a committee might well be employed in going into this question.

44. I consider that a great improvement has taken place in this department of late years, as the system has been simplified and audits have been much expedited. I daresay, however, that a committee of qualified departmental officers might still suggest simplification and improvements.

45. I am in favor of regimental hospitals in cantonments—

1st.—I believe the men are better cared for by their own regimental medical officers; and because there is, as a rule, sufficient employment regimentally for the medical officers attached to regiments.

2nd.—Because in a large cantonment the distances between the barracks and the general hospital would be inconveniently great.

3rd.—Because buildings for regimental hospitals already exist in regimental lines.

4th.—Because I do not believe that in India it is good to bring a great number of sick together under one roof.

My experience has been that no difficulty has been found in the field in providing field and base hospitals from regimental establishments. It has only been necessary for the general in command to give the order to the senior medical officer, and instruct him to carry out the necessary details.

The army in India is so limited in numbers, that no analogy can, I think, be drawn between its condition and requirements and those of a European army. The medical arrangements which might be best for a limited number of men might be unadvisable, if not impracticable, when thousands had to be provided for and attended to in the place of hundreds.

46. I am inclined to think that it is preferable not to allow summary dismissals without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the presidential army, or of the general of the army-corps. The rule that such a matter should be referred to superior authority is, I consider, a salutary safeguard against a too hasty decision or an act of injustice; whilst an application for the dismissal of a sepoy would not be likely to be refused by superior authority on insufficient grounds.

47. (a) The number of privates in each battalion of infantry might with advantage be increased from 600 to 800, with a proportionate increase in the number of non-commissioned officers. The former number is too small to admit of an effective number being taken into the field, after deducting the sick and non-effective. By this arrangement the number of battalions could, if need be, be proportionally reduced, without diminishing the fighting power of the army.

I should prefer to see each infantry battalion organized on the German system, in four double companies, with a British officer at the head of each of these divisions, and Native officers in command of the companies.

This organization is well adapted for the tactics demanded by the arms of the day, and would enable the British officer in command of each double-company to become thoroughly acquainted with, and to have a personal influence over, every individual man under his orders.

As it would be impossible for a young officer on first joining the regiment to be equal to the command of a double-

company, and as there must be a reserve of British officers to take the place of those sick or on leave or of casualties, a certain number of junior officers must be attached to each battalion. I give in the margin the establishment of the officers I would recommend for each battalion.

1 Commandant.

1 Second-in-command and double-company commanders.

3 Double-company commanders.

3 Subalterns.

1 Adjutant.

1 Quartermaster and musketry instructor.



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## ANSWERS.

As regards equipment, I think that a proportion of light entrenching tools should be a part of each regiment's equipment to be carried by the men, in addition to the ordinary tools of the kind. Further, I consider that every Native soldier should be provided by Government with his regimental turban, his great-coat, and with a pair of good shoes or ankle-boots.

Military service no longer occupies the same attractive position as compared with other pursuits; and I would prefer to supply the Native soldier with these indispensable articles of clothing, and thereby put him on a par with the British soldier, than to increase his pay. Nothing the sepoy dislikes more than having his pay stopped, even to the most trifling extent, to pay for articles of uniform or clothing which he is, as a soldier, required to be possessed of.

(B) Is your Excellency in favor of the substitution of pioneer regiments for line regiments, and could more Goorkha regiments be raised?

(B) I believe the two pioneer regiments now in Bengal may be sufficient to provide for the wants of that presidency; but I would raise the establishment of privates to 800, and organize them on the same system as I have advocated for the infantry.

I think that one regiment of pioneers might with advantage be substituted for a regiment of Native infantry, both in this and the Bombay presidency; but it has to be remembered that, with the pioneer regiments as with the sappers and miners, it is the "working pay" which makes that branch attractive, and induces good men to work as laborers, and that therefore in time of peace useful occupation must be provided for these regiments. I have already recommended to Government the substitution of a regiment of pioneers in this presidency in place of a regiment of Native infantry.

I am not able to answer authoritatively the question as to Goorkha regiments. I am however under the impression that the five existing Goorkha regiments are not recruited without some difficulty from the right sort of men. Further, there used to be a disinclination on the part of the Nepalese Government to allow Goorkhas to quit the country to take service under the British Government. To allow each of the present regiments to increase their establishment to 800 would be equivalent to increasing them by 1,000 men. This would be cheaper than raising additional regiments.

48. In the ryotwari districts or in other parts of India would grants of waste lands, revenue-free for their lives, be acceptable to Native officers and soldiers in lieu of part of their pension?

48. The grant of waste lands to Native officers in addition to pension is highly prized, and is a suitable reward at the disposal of Government for very distinguished service. No doubt many of the non-commissioned officers and rank and file would accept a grant of the kind *in addition to pension*; but I do not think it would be looked on with any favor as a *substitute*; and further, I believe, the arrangements necessary for testing any scheme of the kind would, as regards the Native army at large, result in vexatious trouble and correspondence.

Under special conditions, as when the regimental headquarters are permanently fixed—such as is the case with the Goorkhas and Muzbee pioneer regiments—some arrangement of the kind might be practicable. These regiments being recruited from one class, and the men living with their families in the lines, the regimental tie is at all times stronger, and is not necessarily severed by the soldier taking his pension. Such corps, in effect, become a military colony; and the pensioners would no doubt willingly settle down on the land, provided that they be allowed to do so by regiments. My brother, the late Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Chamberlain, C.B., Commanding the 23rd Pioneer Regiment, brought a scheme of the kind before Government.

49. Would it not be desirable to alter the designations of *se-aldars*, *ressaidars*, and *subaidars* of the Native army, who now command troops and companies, to that of captain, and *joumdars* to that of lieutenant?

49. I am adverse to any alteration of the kind. We adopted the existing designations from the Natives; and until the time comes when the Native officers are fit to take the place of the British officers, I think it preferable that the present distinction should exist. I am however strongly in favor of making Native officers of very meritorious or highly distinguished service eligible for the grant of the rank of lieutenant, captain, or major, &c., &c. I should be glad to see our organization admit of such men being placed in superior and independent command. I hold that such a step

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50. For the education of cadets of good family for direct commissions as Native officers, would it not be desirable to afford them the means of instruction in military schools, say one at Koorkee for Eastern, and one at Poona for Western India, where the fees should be sufficiently high to ensure only gentlemen of a superior class entering their sons, and to which nominations should be made by the Viceroy?

51. To what extent would you recommend the grant of commissions otherwise than by promotion from the ranks, and what should be the attainments qualifying for such nominations?

52. With reference to the comparative small amount of pension to pay of Native officers, and to afford them greater inducements to retire, would it be desirable and acceptable to them to establish a system of deferred pay by a deduction of a small percentage, say 5 per cent., from the pay of all Native officers hereafter promoted to amass to individual credit, with interest, say, at 4½ per cent. The sum to be handed over on retirement, or to his heirs at any time in case of his death, and to be inalienable by any authority except by being confiscated to the State in case of cashiering?

53. Has your Excellency any suggestions to make with a view to alter or improve the terms on which Native officers and soldiers can obtain pension, or to alter the periods after which Native officers and soldiers can obtain pension on medical certificate or otherwise?

54. Do you consider that under a proper system of concentration and distribution at important centres, the strength of the present Native army in India can be reduced, should it be resolved to create a system of reserves supplying extra men to meet a call for service, say to an extent equal to half the strength of the present Native army?

55. Would it be advantageous in your Excellency's opinion to establish such reserves; and if so, on what principle?

56. Do you consider that the home or any continental system of reserve force could, with alterations, be adapted to the Native armies of India?

would tend towards the loyalty of the Native army; whilst no one who knows anything of Natives can question the ability of the Native army to provide men fit to hold such positions.

50. I think the scheme proposed would have its advantages; but Native gentlemen thus educated and trained would not, I think, be satisfied to obtain appointments merely as jemadar or subadar. They would be above the work required of them; and, if young men of parts, their ambition would not be satisfied unless they were allowed to take their place among the British officers, by entering the service as "attached officers," with the prospect of rising, if qualified, to the highest ranks. I am not opposed to such a system; but it should only be open, at all events in the first instance, to young men of promise. The pay of such officers might be placed on the same footing as that lately ruled for Native gentlemen in civil employ.

51. I think the proportion should be very limited, so as not to diminish materially the prospect of deserving men in the ranks from rising to the commissioned grade.

The cadets from the proposed colleges should, I think, be required to have a knowledge of English as well as of the vernacular, and pass an examination in the ordinary military subjects.

52. Such a scheme might be desirable; but it can only apply to future promotions, except with the consent of the Native officers themselves. I am however doubtful if the plan would have much influence in inducing earlier retirement. Further, I do not believe it to be advisable to hold out to the Native officers too great encouragement to retire whilst they remain capable of efficiently performing their duties. Government can always get rid of an inefficient officer; whilst it is undesirable to needlessly burden the already overgrown pension list.

53. The late alterations in the pension rules have, I think, done all that is now needed. The only alteration I can recommend is, that the present rule which entitles a Native soldier to the full rate of pension if invalidated after 15 years' service shall be modified. I believe that the present rule encourages malingering, and throws an useless burden on the State. The British officer can only claim pension after 20 years' service; and British soldiers can only claim their full pension after 21 years. I would therefore advocate that no pension be ordinarily granted to a Native soldier under 20 years' service; and that up to that period only a gratuity proportionate to his length of service should be given. Whenever any very exceptional circumstances existed, they might be considered as special cases.

54. I question the propriety of reducing the strength of the Native army, even though a system of reserves be introduced; but I am unable to answer the question definitively until aware of the details of the system on which reserves are proposed to be established.

55. No doubt the establishment of an efficient and inexpensive reserve, which could be relied on to suppress internal disorder, or to take the field whenever required, would be an advantage; but I confess my inability to propose a measure which shall fulfil these conditions. Proposals of the kind have come to my notice; but it appears to me that none of them are suitable to the nature of the people, or to our position in India; and that, while they must prove costly, they would be unreliable.

56. I do not consider that they could be adapted. The position of the Government of India is dissimilar to that of any European Government. Here the Government is alien. It consists of a body of British officers, whose authority is upheld by British troops, supported by a mercenary Native army.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

57. If you object generally to the creation of extra reserve forces of Native troops (but having regard to the fact that annually a large number of men are transferred to the pension list, and that the cost for the total number of pensioners, *viz.*, 63,178, is Rs. 46,08,539 per annum), do you see any reason why the present system of invalid pensioning after 15 years' service should not be abolished, and a limited number of effective men be passed to a reserve on reserve pay after say not less than 8 years' service, non-effectives being at all times examined by a medical board, and struck off with gratuities equal to one month's pay for regimental or reserve service, as the case may be, for every year's service.

In such an organization the men of the reserve could be retained under the immediate control of their own regimental officers, and be liable during a fixed period to be called out at any time in case of war to join their own regiments and for one month's annual training at the dépôt, after which period they might pass into a second reserve, liable only to be called out for garrison duty in case of war, until entitled to reserve pension.

On the score of efficiency and economy, and to afford the means of maintaining regimental dépôts and such reserves as have been proposed above, might it not be advisable to increase regimental strength from 600 to 800 sepoys, with a corresponding reduction of the number of battalions in the proportion of 4 to 3?

58. Would it be possible to utilize the men of the sappers and miners and the pioneer corps, who may have passed to the reserve, in arsenals, dépôts, railways, and other workshops?

59. Would you in like manner approve of the conversion of Native cavalry corps into regiments of 4 instead of 3 squadrons, with a corresponding decrease in number of regiments from 4 to 3, a squadron commander and officer being added to each corps?

60. Should the Punjab and Sind Frontier Forces be placed wholly or entirely under the Commander-in-Chief in India?

61. What are the communications, the construction of which appears to be of the first moment from a military point of view?

57. To create a reserve of the kind would, in my opinion, be to add to the insecurity of our position in India. Being opposed to a reserve on political grounds, I need not reply to the first portion of the question. I have already advocated the increase of the establishment of battalions of infantry from 600 to 800, with a corresponding decrease in the number of battalions.

58. I do not consider it would be advisable to introduce Native soldiers, either from the active army or from a reserve, into arsenals, dépôts, railways, and other public workshops. I think, on the contrary, that the more the employes of such establishments can be kept distinct from the Native army the better.

59. In my opinion a regiment of cavalry is more easily handled and more efficient for field service when it consists of 3 squadrons and of about 400 sabres than when it consists of 4 squadrons and a larger number of sabres; but if, for financial reasons, this consideration must be overborne, then the number of squadrons in cavalry regiments might be increased from 3 to 4, and the number of regiments be reduced.

60. For my reply to this question, I beg to refer to my memoranda dated 22nd of May 1879.

61. In my opinion the railways at present most urgently needed in a military point of view are—

I. From Jhelum to Rawal Pindi, and thence to Peshawar and to the Kuram Valley.

II. From the Indus towards Quetta by the route considered to be best, after a full consideration of all the several requirements and difficulties. I say this supposing Quetta to be occupied by troops.

(Sd.) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, *General,*  
*Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.*

OOTACAMUND; }  
The 3rd September 1879. }

## II.

## STAFF CORPS.

Replies by His Excellency General Sir Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.

1. What is your Excellency's opinion of the working of the staff corps system?

1. The staff corps system has, I think, been creative of great expense to Government, and has resulted in anomalies and difficulties injurious to the efficiency of the Native army.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

2. Beyond meeting the grievances of certain officers of the army who in consequence of reductions, came to be in excess of requirements, has its formation been beneficial or mischievous to the army?

3. Has it not thrown upon the State an enormous expenditure with little or no corresponding result; and has it not encumbered the army with field officers far in excess of all conceivable wants?

4. Is it not demoralizing to an army that all the officers of that army shall be entitled to regular promotion, grade by grade, to the highest ranks of the army by mere expiry of a certain number of years in each rank or grade, and without any reference to merit or efficiency?

5. The three staff corps contain, exclusive of general officers and lieutenant-colonels in receipt of allowances, 1,961 officers: of these no less than 494 are in civil employ. Many of these officers have not done any military work, others have had no connection with the work of the army for very many years; yet they all of them, under the rules of the staff corps, are qualifying by the passage of time for promotion to the highest rank in the army, and for colonel's allowances. If they hold on to their appointments long enough, they will receive a pension double the pension of the highest civil officers in the country, though they have from their first appointment been receiving precisely the same pay as civilians in the department to which they belong. Is not this in your Excellency's opinion a very serious blot on the system?

6. Out of the 1,467 officers who remain after deducting officers on civil employ, 1,187 are employed as regimental officers, and only 201 are employed on the military and departmental staff. Was it not an entire reversal of the proper order of things to form nearly the

2. The introduction of the staff corps has, in my opinion, been mischievous to the army, though beneficial to individuals, having secured to them promotion and increased pay after fixed periods of service.

3. I consider the State has not received corresponding results, and that the number of field officers is far in excess of all conceivable requirements.

At the same time it has to be borne in mind that, consequent on the reduction and reorganization of the Native army, a great number of officers became supernumerary whom it was necessary to absorb. It was impossible to deny them all promotion; and had the staff corps not been formed, the cadres of all the regiments must have been maintained, promotion must have gone on in them, and the same number of supernumerary officers would have been dependent upon the State for the pay of their regimental rank. The loss or gain to Government has, therefore, been the difference between the pay the officers have received under staff corps rules and what they would have received had they gone on gaining promotion in their old cadres.

The result of the reduction and the re-organization of the Madras army was to reduce the number of Native cavalry regiments by one-half, and the number of Native infantry regiments by nearly one-fourth; and to reduce the number of officers in each regiment by one-half in the cavalry and by two-thirds in the infantry; thus making supernumerary about 84 cavalry and 894 infantry officers. This number includes those who were on military or civil staff employ.

4. I cannot view it as necessarily demoralizing to an army that its officers should be entitled to promotion by mere expiry of a certain number of years in each rank, independent of merit or efficiency; because whatever system of promotion be adopted, unless every promotion be made by SELECTION, it is impossible to prevent an officer from rising, though he may not possess positive merit or efficiency.

In every army there are numbers of officers who could not with propriety be classed as possessing special merit or efficiency, but who nevertheless discharge their duties decently well, and whom it would be impossible to pass over or to get rid of because of want of merit or efficiency.

Taking into consideration the drawbacks inseparable from Indian service, I do not consider that promotion up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel is gained under the regulations of the staff corps more rapidly than it should be.

As regards the attainment of colonel's allowances, it has to be remembered that officers who joined the staff

\* 8th August 1866. corps after a certain date\* will only succeed to them as vacancies occur on a fixed establishment, so that eventually the number of officers in receipt of them will be much reduced.

5. Yes; I consider the present rule under which military officers qualify for promotion while in civil employ is one of the mistakes of the staff corps system.

In the summer of 1878 I brought this to the notice of the Madras Government; and the question was submitted to the Government of India. If the several branches of civil employ were taken into consideration, I believe the estimate given in this question of the number of officers thus withdrawn from military duty is much below the mark. The same system prevails throughout the civil departments of the administration; and it cannot, I think, be gained that the military budget has continuously been unjustly burthened by the payment of pensions to large numbers of officers and subordinates who have been employed for long periods in the civil administration; and by what other charges besides pensions I am unable to say.

6. Yes, it was an inversion of the ordinary conditions of staff and regimental service. Since I have held command of the Madras army, it has been my constant endeavour to reintroduce the regimental system of promotion, and to make officers look to their regiments as their military home.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

whole of the officers of the army into a staff corps when the number of staff appointments bore so small a relation to the number of regimental appointments?

7. Is there any other army in the world in which the regimental officers of an army of 120,000 men would be taken entirely from the staff?

8. Is it not better that the staff should be officered from regiments, so that as many regimental officers as possible may acquire a knowledge of staff duties, than that the regiments should be officered from the staff?

9. If your Excellency admits that the staff corps organization has been mischievous, would your Excellency leave it as it is, in consideration of the difficulties of establishing a fresh organization, or would your Excellency propose to abolish it?

10. Several schemes for re-classifying the officers of the army for the purposes of promotion have been suggested?

(1) That the classification should be entirely regimental, and that for this purpose several battalions should be linked into one regiment, and promotion up to the rank of second-in-command should go regimentally: command to go by selection. The regimental cadre to include a certain percentage of officers in excess of regimental requirements in order that the necessary number of officers may be withdrawn from the staff.

(2) That the whole of the officers of the three armies should be formed into one general list; that army promotion should go either by length of service in each rank or by seniority on the occurrence of vacancies in the rank above, the regimental promotion being confined to the officers of the regiment.

Would your Excellency be in favor of any such change in respect to officers joining the Indian army for the future?

11. Would your Excellency be in favor of calling upon all military officers now on civil employ to elect within a certain time between civil and military employment, and if they elect to remain in civil employ, to be prepared to give up the advantages of promotion in military rank and all claims to colonel's allowances, substituting for these privileges a pension calculated on the pension rules of civil servants?

12. Under the staff corps system, is your Excellency in a position to retard or refuse the promotion of an inefficient or incapable officer, or to accelerate the promotion of officers of distinguished merit and ability?

7. Not that I am aware of.

8. Certainly so.\*

9. I would propose to abolish it, and to name a committee of experienced officers to consider the terms under which it could best be replaced.

10.

(1) I do not believe that the Native army can be efficient without a regimental classification; and if, considering the small number of British officers attached to each of the present regiments, promotion cannot be fairly equalized by adopting a purely battalion system, I would recommend that three battalions be linked to form one regiment, and that promotion in it up to second-in-command should go regimentally, the command being filled by selection.

Of course, the establishment of each regiment must contain a percentage of officers in excess of ordinary regimental requirements, in order to replace officers withdrawn for staff employ.

To prevent the possibility of too rapid promotion, a minimum qualifying service could be fixed for each grade, as in the British army.

(2) I am certainly opposed to the whole of the officers of the three armies being formed into one general list. Such an organization would, in my opinion, form an unmanageable mass of officers devoid of cohesion, and be destructive of all *esprit de corps*.

11. As the number of senior officers is much in excess of the requirements of the service, I do not see what would be gained by calling on military officers in civil employ to elect between civil and military employ and pension. It is to be remembered that, if called upon to make a choice, it would be, as a rule, the senior officers, who have the prospect of soon being able to claim their military pension, who would elect to return to military duty, and for whom no suitable employment could be found.

At the same time, steps should, I think, at once be taken for calling on junior officers in civil employ to elect within a certain time between civil and military employment, and should they choose the former, to be prepared to give up the advantages of military rank and all claims to military pensions. I also think that, in fairness to the military budget, early steps should be taken for a fair share of the pensions of all officers now employed in civil departments falling on the civil budget. An actuary could easily determine what proportion of pension, having regard to civil and military service, should be charged to the civil and military accounts respectively.

12. If this question refers, as I presume it does, to regimental preferment, I have exercised such authority, though, owing to the difficulties at present of doing so, not to the extent I could have wished.

I consider that it would be for the good of the army to give the Commander-in-Chief considerable latitude as regards regimental preferment, merely requiring him to report to Government in detail his reasons for passing over an officer.

\* See copies of my Minutes, dated 6th June and 7th July 1878, on the employment of military officer in civil branches of the administration.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

13. When an officer is considered to be personally undeserving of further promotion, should it not be in the power of Government, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, to place him on half-pay, or to call upon him, if he is entitled to pension, to take the pension of his rank?

13. Yes, I consider it very advisable that some rule of the kind should be framed. I have, I admit, induced several inefficient officers to accept retirement, in preference to having their cases reported to Government; but at the same time I have felt that if these officers had not accepted my opinion as to their disqualifications, and had refused the alternative offered to them, I might have had some difficulty in ridding the service of their presence. I consider that the Commander-in-Chief should receive the support of Government in all such cases.

14. Should not the pension of officers in the army be fixed for the future on a scale, the object of which should be to secure the services of officers during their prime of life, and at the same time not to offer them inducements to drag on their service in hopes of an increased pension after they have ceased to be efficient?

14. I think it would be very desirable if such a scale of pension could be framed as would not hold out inducements to an officer to prolong his service in hopes of an increased pension after he has ceased to be efficient; while at the same time it ought not to offer him a temptation to retire while he is still capable of rendering efficient service to the Government.

In framing such a scale the financial bearing must be well considered; for the State cannot afford to pay an unlimited amount of pension.

To prevent undue claims of the kind in the future, Government might require officers hereafter entering the Indian army to accept the condition that they were amenable to any alterations in the pension rules which Government might think it proper to introduce.

15. At what period of service should the maximum pension be obtainable, and what should this maximum be?

15. I feel great diffidence in expressing any opinion in answer to this question; but it occurs to me to suggest that the maximum pension might be obtainable in thirty-two years instead of, as at present, at the end of thirty-eight years, and that the maximum pension should be half the present colonel's allowances, or £562-10. This calculation would give an Indian officer about £100 a year more than an officer of the British army who may have passed the greater portion of his service in Europe, and about £120 more than the English pay of an unemployed general officer.

16. If this principle be adopted, may not the system of colonel's allowances, which really amounts to giving a very high special pension, not to the most meritorious or most distinguished, but to the longest lived officers of the army, cease?

16. Yes, I think it should. I would however recommend that there should be a fixed establishment of officers in receipt of colonel's allowances, as there is now in the royal (late Indian) artillery and engineers; but I would make promotion to that establishment by selection as the reward for meritorious service, and not as the result of pure seniority; in short, as is now done in regiments of British cavalry and infantry.

17. Should all staff and departmental appointments, whether under your Excellency or under Government, be tenable for a limited period? What should this period be? and would it be advisable to vest the Governor General in Council with authority to extend the period on the special recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief when, on public grounds, it is undesirable that an officer should vacate his office?

17. I consider that, as far as the staff of the army is concerned, it is desirable that officers should only hold their appointments for a limited period, except in the case of the Judge Advocate's and the Commissariat Departments, the duties of which require special training which does not fit an officer for the discharge of other military duties.

I would limit the tenure of staff appointments to five years; but I would give Government the power to extend this period, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, for another two years, in cases where an officer had proved himself exceptionally fitted for a position, or where the interests of the public would suffer by an officer having to vacate at the end of the regulated period.

18. When an officer is passed over for command by his junior in the army, should he not be called upon to retire after a certain period of service?

18. I am of opinion that an officer who has been passed over for command because of unfitness, should be considered as disqualified for remaining on the active list, and that he should be called upon to retire or be placed upon half-pay. The training and experience attached to the position of second-in-command ought to fit its holder to succeed to a command. If it fails to do this, the officer's services can be no longer of any use to the State.

19. Should not officers after five years' tenure of regimental command vacate their commands, subject to their being re-appointed at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief up to 51 years' service?

19. I strongly advocate the introduction of a rule which shall limit the tenure of the command of a regiment to five years; except under exceptional circumstances, when I would sanction, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, the extension of this period for two more years, where a commandant has proved himself exceptionally fitted

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

for his position. I have on various occasions brought the want of such a rule to the notice of Government.

I am not quite clear as to the meaning of the latter part of this question. My experience, however, leads me to conclude that it is the man that you have to deal with, and that you cannot judge by the number of years an officer has been in the service whether or not he is fit to command a regiment. Of late years in this presidency an officer has seldom succeeded to a command before he has had 31 years' service; and, as a rule, commanding officers have had to vacate the command of their regiments on attaining to colonel's allowances before they have commanded them for five years. At the same time I am bound to say I could name many officers of such length of service who are in every respect excellent commandants.

20. I am certainly of opinion that an officer who has been thus passed over should be required to return to England. No use can be made of his services in India, and it is undesirable that he should be allowed to remain there.

21. I am unable to suggest to Government any plan which would provide a reserve of officers, either for regiments or for military or departmental staff, for times of war, unless they be kept up in times of peace. Of course, battalions doing cantonment duty could afford some temporary help to battalions in the field; but such aid can hardly be looked upon as a reserve in the true sense of the word.

(Sd.) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, *General,*  
*Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.*

OOTACAMUND; }  
The 3rd September 1879. }

## III.

## MADRAS.

Replies by His Excellency General Sir Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

1. It has been proposed at various times by Sir Charles Trevelyan, Lord Napier of Ettrick, and other authorities, greatly to reduce the number of military stations of the Madras army, and consequently the number of troops on service within the limits of the presidency proper. What reduction of stations would your Excellency suggest with a view of concentrating the troops at obligatory and strategic positions; and what reduction of Native troops would your Excellency propose in consequence of the reduction of stations and of the withdrawal of Madras troops from Bengal stations?

1. I submit that concurrent authority was unanimously opposed to the sweeping reduction of stations and regiments of Native infantry as recommended by Sir Charles Trevelyan and Lord Napier of Ettrick;\* and in my opinion it is most unadvisable now to adopt such a course.

Although I most heartily accept the principle of concentrating the troops as far as possible at obligatory and strategic positions, and of reducing the number of single or out-stations to the uttermost, still I am deeply impressed with the circumstance that the number of our Native troops is small as compared to the area to be occupied, and to the duties they may any day be called upon to discharge; and that consequently, do what we may, after having met all local requirements only a small force remains at our disposal for concentration. The utility or the absolute necessity for the presence of troops may not be recognizable so long as they are present; but I venture to affirm that if this necessity be neglected or ignored, local disturbance will soon arise to prove that large areas of conquered territory cannot be peaceably held, save by the presence of troops, ready, if need be, to act in support of order.

On the above grounds I cannot recommend to Government the abandonment of Berhampore, or any reduction in the strength of the troops in the Northern District.

I am unable to assent to the theory urged by Lord Napier of Ettrick, that because the Khonds have been quiet for a time, that therefore the presence of the military is no longer required at Berhampore.

Vizianagram might, I think, be abandoned, and the two regiments with advantage be located together at Vizagapatam. But against this unification in a financial point of

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

*view* is the circumstance that lines and public buildings now exist at the former place, whilst new ones for a second regiment would have to be constructed at Vizagapatam.

During the three-and-a-half years that I have held command of the Madras army, two calls have been made on the troops in the Northern district—first, in April 1876 to suppress a rising in the Bastar country; and now to suppress one of a more serious nature in the Rampa and neighbouring territories, extending over an area of some two hundred miles of mountains and densely-wooded country, devoid of roads and stricken with fever.

In 1857 these same people, hearing of the mutiny, rose in rebellion, and they did so again in 1862; but on this latter occasion, as on the present one, their rising was to be attributed to acts of oppression on the part of the Native officials.

It is, I consider, beyond question that, but for the presence of the troops on the present occasion, the insurgents would have devastated all the villages along the border, as the police, as a body, proved themselves quite incapable of meeting armed resistance; and had it not been for the good conduct of the Jeypur police, who are well recruited, disciplined and armed, all signs of the authority of Government pending the arrival of troops would have disappeared within the hills.

Lord Napier of Ettrick favors the retention of a regiment at Waltair on the grounds that it is a healthy and agreeable station; but I would add that it is one of the principal ports and best anchorages between Calcutta and Madras. It is the district head-quarters; is a large town containing a numerous Christian population; and in the event of war with a maritime nation, it is one of the points that ought to be carefully guarded.

Since the construction of the extensive irrigation works by Sir Arthur Cotton, the Godavery district has become the granary of the east coast; and instead of its being left without troops, I have concurred with the Local Government in thinking that a detachment of Native infantry should be located either at Samalcottah or at Rajahmundry. The former place has now the preference, because of the existence of the old public buildings and of bungalows for officers; whereas at Rajahmundry everything would have to be created.

In considering the question of the military defence of the northern part of the coast between Calcutta and Madras, it has to be remembered that, since the introduction of steam, our line of communication is by sea, and that no speedier means is ever likely to be called into existence.

Cuttack I would still continue to hold by a Madras regiment, for reasons which I will more fully detail in my answer to the next question.

I last year recommended to Government the abolition of what was called the Northern command; and the question is still before the Government of India.

I feel unable to concur with Lord Napier in his proposal to abandon the stations of Vellore, Palamcottah, and Quilon.

The Port of Vellore\* is a place of considerable historical importance in Southern India, and in the Native opinion is possessed of considerable strength.

It is within easy reach of Madras by rail, and, in the event of any serious disturbance in Southern India, is a post which ought to be occupied. Further, throughout the whole of Southern India the only forts now in a fit state for occupation against a Native enemy are those of Madras, Vellore, Bangalore, and Cannanore.

Supposing Vellore is to be abandoned, then the fort must be destroyed; and this is a work which could not be accomplished without a considerable outlay of money.

The Native troops in the vicinity of Madras cannot in my opinion be reduced; and as an additional reason for the retention of Vellore, has to be urged the financial consideration that lines and buildings now exist there, whereas, if the regiment is sent elsewhere, new ones will have to be built at a large cost.

\* See Mr. Sim's Minute, dated the 6th January 1872.



## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

I have already recommended\* that the battery of artill-

\* See my Minute, dated 8th August, on questions referred by the Government of India.

lery and two companies of British infantry be withdrawn from Trichinopoly, and that the garrison of that station be reduced to two

regiments of Native infantry.

Although, as stated by Lord Napier of Ettrick, the extreme part of Southern India seems to have settled down, still dacoity on a considerable scale is not unknown, and but for the presence of troops to act, if need be, in support of the police, disturbance of a severe nature might easily arise.

As to Lord Napier's remark as to there being no necessity to retain a regiment at Quilon, I would draw attention to the fact that we are bound by treaty obligations to have four battalions of Native infantry within the territory of the Maharaja of Travancore, or in its neighbourhood. And though I admit that the introduction of railroads gives us the means of acting within the spirit of that treaty without placing them actually on the frontier or within the territory of the Maharaja, still I do not believe that he would willingly assent to the extreme south of India being left without troops; nor do I think that such a measure would be advisable. From Palamcottah there is rail communication to Tuticorin, which is the most southern port on the east coast of the presidency, and one of some importance.

I have in another paper recommended† that a half-battalion should be located at Palamcottah and the other half at Quilon. If Quilon be abandoned, there will be no troops on the west coast from Cape Comorin to Cannanore, a distance of some 240 miles; and, in the event of war with a maritime power, all the backwaters by which the trade of the country is carried on throughout Travancore and Cochin would be at the mercy of the enemy.

As regards Lord Napier's proposal for the abandonment of Mangalore, I feel I cannot concur; and in my view I know I have the strongest support of the Civil Government. It is a port of some commercial importance, and the district contains a large Musalman population. It is also the judicial and district head-quarters. It is not easily accessible from the land side; whilst during the south-west monsoon the communication by sea may be considered as very uncertain, if not at times completely cut off. Between Mangalore and Bombay there is no military station on the coast, a distance of 360 miles; and if Quilon be also abandoned, there will be only one station for a coast line nearly 700 miles long.

I have already recommended to Government the abolition of a separate command for the Southern district, whereby a considerable saving in money will be effected.

As regards the abandonment proposed by Lord Napier of the French Rocks and of Mercara, I think that if at the former place the presence of troops is not needed by the Maharaja for duty at Mysore, the cantonment at the French Rocks might well be abandoned, and the regiment be added to the garrison of Bangalore. But here, again, I beg to bring to notice that, in a financial point of view, lines and buildings are at present in existence at the French Rocks, whilst new ones would have to be constructed at Bangalore.

I have long brought to notice the unadvisability of retaining a whole regiment of Native infantry at Mercara. The duty there is most distasteful to the sepoy, because of the cold, the deluge of rain which falls during the monsoon, and the dearth of provisions. If Native infantry be retained there, a wing of a regiment ought to suffice, or it might be occupied by a detachment of British troops; when hereafter it might become a sanitarium for the British garrison of Cannanore, and, when the rail is completed to Mysore, perhaps also for the troops at Bangalore.

Information has already been called for by me as to the suitability of the existing buildings for the accommodation for 100 British troops, and of their state of repair; but from what I saw of the place, I am afraid that it could not be made a suitable quarter for British troops without considerable outlay.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

2. Would your Excellency propose to continue to garrison Burma with Madras troops; or should it be entirely or partially garrisoned from Bengal and Bombay?

In my paper previously alluded to, I have recommended that one wing of a regiment of Native infantry be at the French Rocks, and the other at Mercara; and these should, I consider, relieve each other so as not to keep Natives at Mercara for a whole tour of three years and upwards.

I am unable to recommend any reduction in the number of sepoy within the presidency; and as regards the employment of Madras troops outside the presidency, I would beg to refer to the opinions expressed by me in my paper previously alluded to.

2. I would continue to garrison Burma with Madras Native troops only.

The Madras sepoy is content to serve in that province, and to remain there separated from his family for a period of three years, in consideration of the advantages\* now granted to him for such service. All that has to be guarded against is that the tour of such service shall not come round too rapidly. I am of opinion that every regiment should, if possible, have fifteen years in India before being again ordered on that service; and that, under no circumstances, should a tour of such service come round at a less period than twelve years. To ensure that this rule shall not be broken, some margin must be allowed; for our relations with the Court of Burma are not, and are not likely to be, of a nature to enable us to count for a certainty as to the exact number of regiments we may at all times find it necessary to locate on the Burmese frontier.

The men of Southern India are better able to stand the climate of Burma than men drawn from the Bengal or Bombay presidencies; and I further consider that such a tour of service is a good training for any service beyond seas which circumstances may require of the Native army.

The Madras army, consisting as it does of men of very modified caste-prejudices, and who are for the most part recruited from districts bordering on the sea, it is no more a hardship for them to embark on boardship than it is for the British soldier. Whereas to the high-caste man, and to the man who from his infancy has only heard of the sea as a place of punishment, the bare idea of having to take ship is a subject of dread.

The Madras troops have always been ready to serve in the Straits, or in China, or on the Burmese coast; and the Government has been able to feel that their attachment to the service and their loyalty have not been shaken by the imposition of a fair amount of such duty. On the other hand, it is equally certain that Bengal troops have never willingly taken to such service; and that while it had to be performed by them, even in the smallest degree, difficulties were constantly arising which were prejudicial to discipline, and tended to weaken the attachment of the sepoy to the service. Even the Bengal regiments which were styled volunteers, and which by their recognized constitution were bound to serve WHERESOEVER required, never, in their hearts, willingly accepted the beyond-sea condition of service; and whenever they were called upon to go on boardship, for even a few days, they never embarked without feeling dissatisfied, if not angered, at having to fulfil this article of their bond. It was not infrequent to hear them describe their condition as that of compulsory volunteers (*zabardusti balanteers*); and what officer bearing in mind such facts could now recommend to Government the reimposition of such a condition of service.

I admit that the dread of such service may be less than it was forty or fifty years ago, and it may become still less as the men become better educated and travel more by rail. I further admit that Bengal regiments have volunteered to cross the seas to go on foreign service; and I believe that, so long as regiments are efficiently commanded and led by their British officers, they will be found willing to volunteer. But these were exceptional circumstances, and they must continue to be looked upon as such; whilst the question I am

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now answering has reference to the provision of a continuous relief of a number of regiments for garrison duty out of India and across the sea.

The men of the Bengal army live on flour; while the staple food of all the coast stations in the eastern seas is rice. Men cannot change the food they have been accustomed to from their infancy without suffering. This was partly the cause why the Bengal sepoys suffered so in health when required to serve on the coast; and further the change to a damp, rainy climate from the dry heat of the Upper Provinces aggravated the evil.

Every officer who is conversant with the feelings of the Bengal sepoy is well aware of the dislike with which he serves even in Calcutta, or anywhere in Bengal proper; the causes being mainly those which I have mentioned as operating to their disadvantage if required to serve on the coast.

\* About April of this year I believe compensation for dearthness of food was being given as follows:—

	Rs A. P.		
To Bengal regiments in the Punjab for flour	1	9	5
Madras regiments at Rawal Pindi for rice	...	8	9 5
Ditto Mooltan ditto	6	7	4
Bengal regiment at Calcutta for flour	...	5	4 6
Madras ditto for rice	...	5	0 7

The dearthness of rice at Rawal Pindi and Mooltan was due to the Punjab being a corn-growing country. The dearthness of flour at Calcutta was due to the cost of carriage of flour to Calcutta—Bengal producing rice. The dearthness of rice at Calcutta was due to previous rice-famine and general scarcity in South-east and Western India.

Whether the advantages now derived by the Madras troops going to Burma, or elsewhere beyond sea, are greater than are indispensable to secure their willing service may be open to consideration. But although I admit that the benefits are considerable, I should be sorry to see any change introduced; for to do so now must have the effect of shaking the men's faith in the reliance to be placed upon the orders of Government, and it might lessen their willingness to embark on such service.

It is just one of those matters in which I consider liberality to be the best policy; for when a Government has to haggle with its army as to whether or not its conditions are acceptable, then that army—and the more especially a purely mercenary one—is on the high road to becoming its own master.

8. I have, for reasons given in another paper, stated my opinion that the Madras army is at present not larger than is necessary to meet the wants of the presidency, and for duty in Burma and in the other territories not included in the presidency proper; but, as therein stated by me, it may be possible to reduce the number of regiments of infantry, whilst increasing the proportion of privates in the regiments maintained to 750 or 800, according to the number of regiments reduced.

I am of opinion that it is advisable to maintain the Madras Native army at its present strength as a general reserve for the army of India, and as a counterpoise to the armies of the other presidencies.

I believe it to be of importance never to forget that the Madras presidency embraces a very large extent of territory and a population amounting to thirty-one and-a-half millions, exclusive of the population of Cochin, Travancore, Mysore, and Hyderabad.

I have further in my other paper shown that if the Madras infantry is to continue to furnish the Native portion of the garrison of Burma, it will not be practicable for it to do so with a less number of regiments than thirty, and with the complement of privates increased to 800,

3. If, as has been frequently stated, the present Madras army is larger than is necessary for the wants of the presidency, does your Excellency believe that it should be maintained at its present strength as a general reserve for the army of India?

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4. As a matter of fact, does the surplus of regiments maintained under your Excellency's command in excess of requirements for local purposes form a thoroughly efficient reserve in case of danger, or in the event of necessity arising from the active employment of troops either for foreign service or service within the presidency?

There are but four regiments of Madras light cavalry, numbering altogether 1,200 troopers, of which one only is in the presidency proper, the others being stationed in a foreign State or in other provinces of India. The service is popular, and the men ride well. One regiment did good service in the North-West Provinces during the mutiny.

4. I consider that the surplus of regiments maintained in this presidency in excess of requirements for local purposes ought to form an efficient reserve in case of danger, either for foreign service or for service within the presidency. If it does not do so, it is not because the Madras sepoy cannot be made an efficient soldier. The cause would be attributable to want of proper teaching and proper leading on the part of the British officers, and to neglect on the part of the Commander-in-Chief and Government in failing to require the efficient discharge of this duty.

In proof of the possible efficiency of the Madras sepoy, I may say that only lately, on the inspection of the 36th Native Infantry at Rawal Pindi by Major-General Bright, that officer expressed himself\* in most complimentary terms of the regiment. The 30th Regiment inspected at Mooltan was very highly spoken of by the inspecting general; whilst the conduct of one of the subadars, Shaik Daood, was specially brought to notice by the head transport officer at Dadur, as having brought a convoy of 400 camels to that place without any loss, being the first instance of a convoy having arrived without leaving several loads behind. Again, the appearance and drill of the 25th Native Infantry at Malta was highly commended by the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief.

At the same time I admit that some Madras infantry regiments do not come up to the proper standard; but this is not because of any inherent deficiency or defect in the material available. It has been because of the regiments being badly commanded, partly arising from a rigid adherence to the claims of seniority, partly to the British officers having been constantly changed, and partly to a loss of feeling of *esprit de corps*, created by large reductions and a flood of supernumeraries, and partly because the army has not had its fair chance of field service.

5. I consider that it is not possible to recruit the reserve of the Indian army altogether from those parts of the country which are said to produce the best soldiers, without giving undue strength and prominence to the races and religions of those countries.

I admit that the men of Southern India are not as physically strong, nor are they now by instinct as warlike, as the men of the north. But this presidency can produce men of sufficient stamina to discharge all the calls made upon the Native soldier; and I believe I am justified in saying that the marching powers of the Madras sepoy have not been found wanting. That he is a good shot is established by the musketry returns of the army.

The value of a Madras reserve was fully realized in 1857; and it does not seem to me to be prudent to discard such experience. History is apt to repeat itself; and undue reliance on one body of a mercenary army is the way to hasten on such a repetition.

6. As I have above stated, I do not consider that the Madras army, as at present maintained, is in excess of the wants of the presidency; or that the races from which it can be recruited are effete and unsuited to make good soldiers; and therefore I cannot consider that the tax-payer is called upon to support an overgrown and useless army for the sake of sentiment, or in the interests of the people of the presidency. As a matter of fact, I believe the population of the Madras presidency largely contributes towards the expenses of the soldiers of the other presidencies, after paying for their own army.

5. If an efficient and available reserve of the Indian army is considered necessary for the safety of the empire, should it not be recruited and maintained from those parts of the country which give us our best soldiers, rather than amongst the weakest and least warlike races of India, due regard of course being had to the necessity of not giving too great strength or prominence to any particular races or religions?

6. Is it not unjust to the people of India to tax them heavily for the maintenance of a force which has been declared by the highest authorities in the Madras presidency to be far in excess of the wants of the province, and which, from its expense and from the nature of the races from which it is recruited, has been deliberately and officially declared to be unsuitable as a reserve for the main army of India? Have not the tax-payers of India a right to demand that the army for which they are called upon to pay shall be organized on the most efficient possible basis,

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and formed of the best procurable material, without regard to sentiment or the interests of the people of any particular province?

7. Even if sentiment be admitted as a proper element in the decision of this question, have the people of Madras any greater claim to ask to have an army maintained for their employment than the other southern races of an unwarlike character, such as the people of the Lower Provinces of Bengal have?

8. Is it not the case that from long custom the people of Madras have forgotten and abandoned the use of arms, and have settled down to agriculture and peaceable pursuits? Is it not the case that employment in the army is becoming distasteful to them; and that the reduction of regiments with the payment of a gratuity, calculated on length of service, would be looked upon as a great relief and boon by those allowed to return to their homes?

7. If I believed that the races of the Madras presidency were as unfitted for the duties of a soldier as those which people the province of Bengal proper, I should be no advocate for their employment as a matter of sentiment; nor do I believe that the Bengalis have any desire to serve as soldiers.

8. No doubt the people of Madras have from a long continuance of peace largely abandoned the use of arms, and have willingly settled down to agricultural and peaceable pursuits; but it would be an error to suppose that amongst so large a population there are not thousands who would willingly take up arms if the opportunity offered.

The police records establish beyond dispute that a desire of anarchy is not altogether dead; and to-morrow the bold and the unscrupulous would defy the law if they thought they had the power to do so.

Although the number of suitable recruits for the Native army has not been forthcoming of late, I do not believe this circumstance to have arisen from any backwardness on the part of the population generally to enter the army because of their aversion to a military career, but rather to the fact that the advantages of military service compared with those offered by other professions are not as proportionately favorable as they were in times past; that the duties imposed on the sepoy are much heavier than they used to be; and that

\* See my memorandum, dated 25th July, on the subject of he has to serve during a longer portion of his service outside the presidency.\*

So far from the reduction of regiments or relief from the service being looked upon by the officers, non-commissioned officers, or sepoys as a boon, the contrary would be the case; and in no army in the world are the men less inclined to give up the service either on receipt of a gratuity or of a pension. A man once enlisted, his regiment becomes his home; he marries; his family accompanies the regiment (save on foreign service); and he and his wife and children are entirely dependent on the State for their living.

An order for reduction to the Madras army means, to every man reduced, social degradation and reduction to poverty; and it is certain that this very question is now occupying the minds of the whole of this Native army.

9. If the number of regiments and men in the Madras army was reduced, would it not be possible to make the remaining regiments far more efficient, and to secure the services of really useful able-bodied young men?

9. The number of recruits required for the existing Madras army is not more than the population can give, and therefore the reduction of the number of regiments would not, in my opinion, be likely to influence the quality of the recruits for the future. Indeed, reduction is rather likely to prove injurious than beneficial to recruiting, as it would shake the faith of the people in the stability of the service, and in the advantages they may hope to attain in it.

10. It has been asserted that the men of the Madras sappers and miners are a far finer and more useful set of men than the men of the Madras Native infantry. Is your Excellency aware of any reason for this difference?

10. The Madras sappers and miners are perhaps a finer and more useful set of men than those of the Madras Native infantry; but still they are recruited entirely from within the presidency, and from the same class as the sepoys of the Native infantry. I attribute their superiority mainly to the circumstance that the men are able to earn working pay in addition to their ordinary wage, and that this difference enables the men and their families to fare better than their brothers in the Native infantry. Further, this branch of the service is cantoned only at the favorite stations of the army; it has proportionately no guard duties to perform; and only one company out of the ten is ordinarily serving in British Burma. Also, this regiment is possessed of a high feeling of *esprit de corps*, consequent on its always having been allowed to have its fair share of active service; whereas the Native infantry, during the last half century, has not always been treated justly in this respect.

11. Would it be possible and desirable to increase the number of regiments organized and raised as the sappers and miners now are?

11. In my opinion the existing regiment of sappers and miners is sufficient to meet all the requirements of the

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OOTACAMUND ;  
The 3rd September 1879. }

presidency, and to afford, when necessary, some companies for active service. I am therefore adverse to their being increased.

(Sd.) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, *General*,  
*Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.*

[Confidential.]

No. 2835, dated Madras, 30th March 1878.

From—BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. O'CONNELL, Quarter Master General, Madras Army,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department.

With reference to correspondence from the Government of India, referred to the Commander-in-Chief under your No. 1615 of the 28th instant, I have the honor by order to state that a regiment of Native infantry can be spared from the Madras presidency; but His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief considers that, before ordering one to Cachar, the objections to such a move should be fully represented and carefully considered.

2. Regiments of this presidency have their families with them, except on foreign service. If separated from them, the ordinary pay of the men is not sufficient to maintain themselves and their families. It will be necessary therefore that a regiment, proceeding to Cachar should be accompanied by its families. The cost to Government of moving the large number of women and children will be great; and in addition suitable hutting lines will have to be provided at Cachar. The climate there is so unlike that of the Madras presidency, that there will probably be much sickness. Men will be granted sick certificate to their homes, and must take their families with them. The widows and children of those who die at Cachar will have to be sent back to the presidency at considerable cost. All this will cause much suffering and discontent, which, in the opinion of Sir Neville Chamberlain, may be avoided by a more judicious distribution of our Native troops in the three presidencies.

3. At present the Madras army has one regiment of Native cavalry and four of Native infantry serving out of THE MADRAS COMMAND: in the Saugor District and at Dorunda. Whilst these regiments are at long distances from their own presidency, the Bombay army has troops far to the southward in the Belgaum District, which is close to the homes of the Madras sepoys.

4. It was the intention of Sir Neville Chamberlain to prepare this summer a scheme, for submission to Government, on the re-distribution of the Madras army, and he hopes still to do so. The present proposal has led to his views on the subject being now partially and briefly stated.

5. For active or foreign service the Madras sepoy is ready and willing to go anywhere. He knows that during his absence his family is comfortable, for the rations and allowances granted are sufficient to provide for himself and family. He therefore willingly proceeds wherever he is ordered.

6. But it is different when, merely to garrison a place out of their own presidency, men are sent to an unknown and remote corner in Bengal, where the language, climate, and customs are strange, and where there is not the excitement of active service to occupy their minds. They then brood over the discomforts around them, and are unable to comprehend why they are thus expatriated.

7. In arranging our peace garrisons, His Excellency considers it is wise policy to keep troops near their homes and among their own people; and he is strongly of opinion that both for political and military reasons our three Native armies should be kept distinct.

8. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief thinks that his views on this subject should be placed before the Government of India for consideration, for he is of opinion that a much larger question than the mere move of a regiment is involved.

9. If it is still deemed necessary to call for a regiment of Madras Native infantry to be placed at Cachar, His Excellency would name the 19th Regiment Native Infantry now at Trichinopoly. A regiment can best be spared from Trichinopoly. The 14th Regiment Native Infantry, which it was proposed to move next season from Vellore to Trichinopoly, can be sent to Cannanore in place of the 19th Native Infantry which was put down for Cannanore. The force at Trichinopoly will then be reduced from three to two regiments of Native infantry.

[Confidential.]

*Minute upon the employment of a Regiment of Madras Native Infantry in Cachar.*

In the letter from the Quarter Master General are shortly set forth the general objections to the employment of a Madras infantry regiment in Cachar; and to these I desire to state others which did not come within the scope of that communication, but which, in my opinion, call for full consideration.

2. This Native army has three kinds of duties ordinarily imposed upon it—

I.—Service within the presidency—which may be considered as including the Nizam's dominions, the Mysore territory, and the province of Coorg.

II.—Service in other provinces in India.

III.—Foreign service—under which heading is ordinarily included service in British Burma and the Andamans.

3. I.—SERVICE WITHIN THE PRESIDENCY.—There are at present serving within the presidency two regiments of light cavalry and twenty-six regiments of infantry, or half of the cavalry and about three-fifths of the infantry.

4. Annexed is a comparative statement of the troops of the Madras presidency since 1837, at intervals of twenty years. I select these periods because 1837 was the end of the long peace which preceded the Afghan War; 1857 was the year of the mutiny; and during the last twenty years our whole military system in India has been reorganized.

5. It will be seen from this statement how large have been the reductions in the strength of this Native army, and the relative decrease of home service as compared to service outside the limits of the presidency. Since 1862 the regiments of cavalry have been reduced from seven to four (a), and the regiments of infantry from fifty-two to forty; or, in other words, the cavalry by nearly one-half, and the infantry by nearly one-fourth. In 1837 and in 1857 seven out of eight of the cavalry regiments were serving within the presidency; now two out of four are serving outside of the presidency.

* Nagpore Force	...	...	...	6
British Burma	...	...	...	12
Singapore	...	...	...	3

In 1837 forty-five regiments of Native infantry were serving within the presidency, and seven without. In 1857 thirty-two were serving within and twenty\* without. Now the proportion is twenty-six within to fourteen without.

6. It has to be remembered that from the regiments located within the presidency have to be met the demands for service in the other provinces of India and in Burmah; and it cannot, I think, be expected that the Madras army should remain contented and efficient if the proportion of home service is only to be viewed as a fluctuating quantity to be regulated by the necessities arising elsewhere.

7. In 1857 this army had twelve of its battalions of infantry in Burmah; the necessity may any day arise for largely increasing the present strength of that division.† Without a reserve of regiments within the presidency that demand could not be met; and it seems to me to be the duty of this Government not to lose sight of its own responsibilities in its desire to meet calls made upon it by other presidencies.

8. The physique of this Native army is far from being what it ought to be. The difficulty of obtaining suitable recruits for the infantry has been forcibly brought to my notice by almost every Commanding Officer I have come into contact with; and I lately felt myself called upon to publish a General Order prohibiting the enlistment of youths physically unfit to discharge the duties of a soldier. Such men are useless on field service; whilst with ordinary cantonment duties they, in middle-life, become a burthen upon the Pension Establishment. One of the causes assigned for the difficulty in recruiting from amongst the rural population is the loss of popularity of army service; this is said to proceed partly because of the greatly increased proportion of foreign and Bengal to home service, and the long periods some regiments are kept out of their own presidency.‡ The Native army can only be kept efficient by drawing to its ranks an unfailing supply of the pick of the village lads; and whatever deters them from accepting military service is, to my mind, a subject worthy of the serious consideration of Government.

‡ 2nd Light Cavalry	...	...	6 years.
3rd "	...	...	10 "
5th Native Infantry	...	...	6 "
8th "	...	...	5 "
11th "	...	...	11 "
20th "	...	...	10 "
22nd "	...	...	5 "
31st "	...	...	5 "
35th "	...	...	6 "

9. As some persons measure the efficiency and utility of the Madras army by comparing it with that of Bengal, I here say most distinctly that, do what we may, the Madras sepoy can never attain to the Bengal standard, whilst I believe it to be equally certain that the men of Southern India fall far short, as a race, in possessing the courage and military instincts of the men of Northern India; but I do believe that now, as heretofore, the Madrassee, properly selected and commanded, can be made into a very serviceable soldier; and further I am convinced that, for many obvious reasons, no greater blunder could be committed than to allow him to lose his place in the military organization by which this Empire is held, merely to let in a better man. Our homely adage of not trusting all our eggs in one basket ought ever to be borne in mind by the Government.

10. II.—SERVICE IN OTHER PROVINCES IN INDIA.—The strength of this Native army has admittedly been regulated with reference to its partial employment in other provinces of India; but there are reasons why this system cannot be strained without injury to the army.

	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.
5 Nagpore	...	...
Moulmein	...	...
Straits	...	...

¶ In the same year the regiments serving in Burmah show an increase from one to twelve, and in the Straits from two to three.

¶ One at Doranda.  
One at Cuttack.

The latter station has since 1803 been frequently held by Madras troops, though it is really in Bengal Proper.

regard to the relative proportion of service within and without the presidency, it has to be remembered that in that year the only call for foreign service was one regiment at Moulmein and two in the Straits, and that, except the above and the regiments serving in the Nagpore territories, the whole Madras army was cantoned near the homes of the men within the presidency.

(a) NOTE.—The 5th Light Cavalry was disbanded in 1857 for misconduct during the mutiny.

12. In fairness to this army, and having regard to its efficiency, its service out of the presidency ought, I think, to bear some proportion to that exacted from the armies of the other presidencies. To the Bengal army, service in Bengal Proper has always been considered by the men as coming under the head of service in other provinces, and has always been distasteful to them; but there has been little of it; and regiments have been regularly relieved. In that army there is no ordinary foreign service. The Bombay army has Scinde as its outlying field of service, with Aden as foreign service. The Madras army has a large proportion of outlying service, and five regiments of infantry always in the British Burma Division.

13. I have already alluded to the long time our regiments remain at stations in the Central Provinces, &c., &c. This I believe partly originated to save Government the heavy expense of a move, and partly because the men are so overwhelmed by their numerous relatives and hangers-on, that the order to march is known to every one in the presidency to carry with it the impoverishment of the regiment. However, if this army is to be considered mobile, the difficulty must be met, and I have instituted inquiries in view to the possible restriction of families; but the measure is a delicate one needing careful handling; and to produce any lasting effect the Native officers and soldiers must themselves be taught to see that the object in view is for their own good. In my opinion five years is the maximum limit which any regiment should be allowed to remain at one station. As matters now stand, there is the greatest difficulty in recruiting; whilst to the injury of officers and men alike, single regiments and detachments are lost to sight except for a few days during the annual inspection.

14. As regards the matter of cost of a Madras regiment when employed out of its own presidency, there seems to me room to doubt whether the financial result has ever been fully estimated. Government has to pay the fare of the wives and children, as well as of the men, when moved by rail; if the regiment marches, the difference between actual cost and old rates of cart-hire. The regimental lines are far more costly than those of a Bengal regiment; whilst the lines of a Bengal regiment will not suit a Madras regiment; nor *vice versa*. Further, the compensation for the difference in the price of rations must be a considerable item; for it is calculated upon the Madras articles of

\* Compensation is granted on the amount of rice sufficient for a man only, irrespective of the number of the family dependent on him.

food, whilst the men generally live upon the grain of the country.\* Lastly, the clothing and equipment are furnished from Madras.

15. At the same time my review of the conditions of such service would not be complete were I to omit to say that but for the comparative cheapness of living (in ordinary years) in the Central Provinces, &c., &c., and the other advantages now derived by the men, a disinclination on the part of the sepoys for such service—which is not now the case—would probably be evinced.

16. No one can, I think, look at the Disposition Map of the Madras army without being struck by the anomalous distribution of its regiments. By degrees, to meet pressing calls, corps and detachments have been thrust into the Bengal Presidency, until in the north they approach to Allahabad, and in the east stretch away to Chota Nagpore and Cuttack. Practically speaking, this is repeating on a small scale, but with less inflammable material, what was done with the Bengal army after the large annexations by Lord Dalhousie. Such a course seems to me hurtful to the interests of the State, as being likely to engender the notion of our being too largely dependent upon this Native army; whilst it is certainly injurious to discipline and military efficiency.

17. The request now comes to send another regiment of infantry to Cachar—to enable a Bengal regiment to be stationed in reserve at Jhelum—consequent upon the advance of one regiment to Quetta and the employment of another in the Simla hills. Speaking on behalf of the interests of this army, I feel called on to oppose the measure not only on the general grounds already stated, but for other special reasons. Service in that province will be most unpopular. It will possess all the disadvantages of service in Burmah without any of its advantages. I presume that no distinction is intended to be made as regards emoluments between service to the north-east of Calcutta at Cachar, and service to the west of Calcutta at Dorunda. Unless it be so, the regiment must be accompanied by its families; suitable lines must be built: and the regiment can only be moved there at the commencement of the dry season, so as to be housed by the setting in of the rains. If the regiment is to be moved without its families, free quarters and rations, &c., must be furnished as in Burmah; but I do not see how this could be done without instituting a dangerous precedent as regards this army, and also creating an invidious distinction with respect to the Bengal regiments cantoned in that neighbourhood.

18. Rather than send a Madras regiment to be cantoned in a remote corner of the north-eastern frontier of Bengal, I would urge that this presidency occupy one of the southern stations of the Bombay army—whilst that army sends a regiment to occupy one of the southern stations of the Bengal Presidency.

19. This suggestion leads up to the much larger one involving a partial re-distribution of the Madras army and the Madras command. According to present arrangements the regiments stationed

Bengal Presidency Division.

Dorunda.

Saugor District.

Jubbulpore.  
Saugor.

Banda.  
Nowgong.

at the places named in the margin are not in any way under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief of this Presidency; whilst to reach Kamptee and the other stations occupied by regiments under his immediate control, much of the Bombay Presidency has to be traversed. It would appear to me less of an inversion of things to allow the Madras Native regiments to occupy Sholapore and all the stations south of that place; and transfer to Bombay—Kamptee, Jubbulpore and all the stations to its north. If such change be deemed advisable by this Government, I would suggest that the subject be referred to in the letter transmitting our reply to the Secretary to the Government of India.

20. III.—FOREIGN SERVICE.—I have said that service in Burmah and at the Andamans is what is considered in this presidency as foreign service. The men are housed and liberally rationed; and the widows of those who die whilst thus employed receive pensions. Before the regiment embarks, the families are either sent to their homes in the country, or to a dépôt formed at some suitable station; this is done at the public expense. Family tickets are given by the men to their families for such portion of their pay as they may desire. The period of such service is limited to three years, when



the regiment returns to the presidency. For this duty the roster is kept as carefully as practicable; and from fifteen to seventeen years may be accepted as the time now intervening before the turn of a regiment comes round again.

21. There is no disinclination on the part of the men to embark on such service. They live well, besides saving some of their pay. A regiment returning from such service is proverbially in much better physique than when embarking. All that is needed with regard to such service is to bear in mind that the tour must not be made to come round too quickly. I believe fifteen years would be the safest average; but under no circumstances ought it to be less than twelve years. To preserve this ratio, of course the regiments in the presidency must be in relative proportion to those in Burmah. Provided that attention be paid to this point, and that the three years' tour be not exceeded, I believe the Madras infantry soldier will always be found ready to obey the call to embark.

22. In conclusion, I regret the delay that has occurred in my taking up this case, but press of current work and other urgent calls have been the cause.

OOTACAMUND; }  
The 30th May 1878. }

(Sd.) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, General,  
Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.

*Comparative Statement of troops of Madras Presidency in 1837, 1857, and 1877.*

	1837.		1857.		1877.	
	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.
Northern District	...	14	...	7	...	4
Centre ditto	2	6	1	4	...	5
Southern ditto	1	6	1	6	...	5
Mysore Division.	1	6	1	4	...	4
Malabar and Canara	...	3	...	4	...	3
Ceded Districts	1	3	1	2	1	2
Hyderabad Subsidiary Force	2	7	2	5	1	4
Nagpore Force	1	4	1	5	1	4
British Burma Division	...	1	...	12	...	5
Saugor District	...	...	...	...	1	3
Bengal Presidency	...	...	...	...	...	1
Singapore, &c.	...	2	...	3	...	...
Bombay Presidency	...	...	1	...	...	...
TOTAL	8	52	8	52	4	40

[ Confidential. ]

*Memorandum on the nomination of Military Officers to appointments in the Civil Branch of the Administration.*

I have to request that Government will be so good as to take into its early consideration the manner in which appointments in the civil administration, heretofore filled by officers of the army, are in future to be provided for. I allude to nominations to posts such as Cantonment Magistrate, to the Police, Jails, &c.

2. When the Native army was much larger than it is now, and when every Native regiment had some twenty officers borne on its rolls with only about half the number ordinarily present, it was easy to make the army provide for the requirements of some of the lower branches of civil administration; but now that the supernumerary officers in the junior grades have been exhausted, and that the complement of the British officers is seven per regiment, and each of these has to be effective, the time has, it seems to me, come when this question must be fairly considered and decided.

3. Formerly young officers used to be nominated by Government, either by selection or because of personal interest, to some of the civil branches after they had gone through a few years of military training, and had acquired some knowledge of the people and of their language. They received either a staff salary in addition to the military pay of their rank, or a consolidated salary. Many of these officers rose from appointment to appointment, until they either claimed to return to command their regiment or a brigade, or retired from the service. Those not considered to be a success were usually remanded to their corps, on the plea of their services being no longer required. The regiment, it may be said, was always in the back ground, ready to receive them, whether they returned by choice, unavoidable circumstances, or as a punishment. Their regimental and army promotion was always going on; and however long the period they had failed to perform military duty, or whatever their unfitness to exercise military control, they could always claim to revert to military employment.

4. This system possessed manifest and solid advantages in favor of the civil administration. It obtained, on comparatively easy terms, the services of disciplined officers, possessed of experience of the

country ; it paid them for only exactly so long as it used them, whilst their furlough pay and the pension or Colonel's allowances they were earning during such employment was to be a charge upon the military budget. The money annually debited to the military department, in payment of such charges on behalf of such officers, must have been considerable; and I may add that such must continue to be the case until the disappearance of the officers now remaining in such positions, unless, indeed, a more equitable balancing of such charges be now arrived at.

5. Every possible consideration is, I consider, due to the majority of the officers now to be found working under the civil administration, for they found themselves supernumeraries, and shut out of military duty without any fault on their part, whilst the conditions of their present service hold out little chance of prospective preferment; but, nevertheless, the interests of the army forbid to most of them any hope of future military employment; and this is the answer it is incumbent upon me to give them, even though they be fit for military duty. Already the regiments are filled with officers too old for the positions they occupy; and, so far as I can see, unless some scheme be brought into operation to accelerate promotion, things will grow worse instead of better for some few years to come. During and after the mutiny young officers were sent out in numbers to complete the establishment of that period, whilst since that time there has been reduction in regiments, and reduction in the number of officers per regiment: thus, in a double manner, blocking the way to advancement.

6. The most pressing want in this army, at this moment, is the restoration of the feeling of *esprit de corps*, which was shaken to its foundation on the disbandment of so many regiments, and the introduction of a system universally unpopular and almost universally resented, if not resisted. The only means known to me, for bringing about the result desired, is to retain, as far as may be practicable, officers with regiments, and this cannot be done if either officers on civil duties be forced back into regiments, or if junior officers be required, or even allowed, to enter civil employ. Now-a-days the British officers must be content to remain with their men; there is ample occupation for each one of them in the daily routine of duty and instruction to be carried on in a regiment. An officer's proper home is his regiment; and the expectation of obtaining civil employment ought, I venture to consider, to be now as much cut off from the officers of the Native army as it is from his brother in the British service.

7. I trust that, for the reason above set forth, Government will cease to apply to me for the services of junior officers for employment in the civil branch of the administration. Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, and Majors are at its disposal in numbers, and I shall be glad to transfer their services if needed.

OOTACAMUND ; }  
The 6th June 1878. }

(Sd.) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, *General,*  
*Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.*

*Minute by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army, on the nomination of Military Officers to the Civil Branches of the Administration, dated 7th July 1878.*

This question ought, I think, to be referred for the consideration of superior authority, for, unless a remedy be speedily applied, considerable inconvenience will soon be felt in some branches in carrying on the ordinary duties of administration. Already the want of military officers to fill certain posts heretofore held by them is beginning to be experienced; and as it is certain that vacancies will continue to take place, whilst the source from which it has been customary to supply them is fast drying up, it cannot be prudent to defer facing the difficulty.

2. The army has no longer any supernumerary junior officers to part with. The remaining supernumerary senior officers are either unsuited or unwilling to accept minor civil appointments, or the administration is unwilling to accept of their services, because of their cost to the civil department. The question, therefore, is, in what manner are the vacancies in the minor civil appointments to be filled up in future?

3. Already the Native army is suffering, because of the great disproportion of senior to junior officers; and I say most distinctly that no efficient junior officer can now be removed from his regiment without injury to the army. The service is at present greatly deficient in that class of officer. They are only to be made by a few years of training with Native troops; and, further, I would say that to remove an officer of the kind is to his future injury, unless he be nominated to one of the branches of the administration in which service is continuous, and in which he is ensured prospective rise in position and increase of pay proportionate to that enjoyed by those officers who remain in the discharge of purely military duty.

4. If the staff corps is to meet the demand, then its ranks must be recruited largely in excess of the wants of the Native army; and judging by my own experience in maintaining the complement of British officers with Native regiments, I feel justified in expressing the fear that the authority in India that selects and demands will be more resolute than the authority at home that appoints; and that consequently, then as now, the interests of the Native army will be of secondary consideration and be sure to suffer, though most persons must, I presume, acknowledge that the time has come when Government should cease to take away our best officers from their legitimate duties.

5. But supposing it to be admitted that the interests of individuals must give place to those of the State; that the efficiency of the Native army is still to be of less consideration than that of the efficiency of the minor branches of the civil administration; and that the nominations to the staff corps will keep pace with the demand: still I would submit for consideration whether such civil requirements could not be adequately met by a much cheaper system than through the ranks of the staff corps. Why should not the police and the jails, &c., become separate branches of the administration, as is the case in our own and in every other country? Why should officers of the staff corps sit as Cantonment and Police Magistrates, and also fulfil all kinds of minor civil offices, and then, without

doing any kind of military duty for years upon years, succeed to Colonel's allowances and become general officers? It may be, and I believe is, advisable that the ordnance, the commissariat, and some other branches of the service intimately associated with the combatant force, and also in the political department, should continue to draw their officers from the army; but I believe it will be for the good of the army and the good of the treasury when the demand is reduced to these exceptions.

6. At all events, I must express the hope that early steps may be taken to come to some decision on the question at issue, and also as to the charges now most unjustly debited to the military budget of the pay and pension of officers whose whole services are given towards the discharge of purely civil duties. It cannot be right that such a misrepresentation of figures should continue, and the sooner that the weight is put upon the right horse, the better for the public interests.

OOTACAMUND; }  
The 7th July 1878. }

(Sd.) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, *General,*  
*Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.*

[ Confidential. ]

*Memorandum relative to the retention of the Punjab Frontier Force as a separate body under the orders of the Government of India.*

The Punjab frontier force was raised in order to place under the direct control of the Government of India, and of the Punjab Government, a body of picked officers and men who should be trained to frontier service, be well acquainted with the border country and its tribes, and be ready at all times to act in immediate co-operation with the local civil authorities. It was felt that a body of Native troops, thus organized and controlled, would be well fitted to meet difficulties as they arose; and that they would be more ready and willing to act in concert with the local civil authorities than would be the case were they an integral portion of the regular army, and, therefore, acting under a different head, and liable to be changed periodically.

2. The soundness of this opinion has been fully justified by long experience, for efficiency and unity of action have at all times been found to prevail; and it is, I consider, beyond question that no other system could have produced equally favorable results.

3. In the first place, I would urge the great political advantage to be derived by isolating, as far as may be practicable, those interests which, being common, must always tend to bind together the several portions of the Native army, so as to lessen to the uttermost unity of thought and unity of action. No one who has given serious consideration to our position in India and to its past history would, I imagine, advocate that the Native army should be one and indivisible. In my opinion, the more you can keep the armies of the several presidencies and provinces distinct and isolated, the better will it be for efficiency, for *esprit de corps*, and for the promotion of loyalty; whilst the less will be the chance of any general combination to our disadvantage.

4. The Bengal presidency is a vast territory, and its Native army must necessarily be considerable; rather, therefore, than do away with the distinction which now separates the Punjab frontier force from the rest of that army, I would advocate a still further division of the Native troops occupying that presidency.

5. In 1857 we experienced the benefit arising out of the division of the Native army, and the more especially so from the distinction which separated the Punjab force from the Bengal army. It seems only prudent to turn such experience to account; and I know of no better means of doing this than by continuing the system which, at a time of great danger, gave us a body of Native troops through whose loyalty the Punjab remained tranquil, Delhi was captured, and the mutineers were finally coerced.

6. In the Madras presidency, besides the regular Native army, there is the Nair Brigade, the Mysore Silladar Horse and Infantry, and the Hyderabad Contingent; and I can only say that I consider these separate bodies an element of strength, because they are less likely to be influenced by the same causes, and are less likely to unite together for combined action. Indeed, if, after a service of forty-two years, I could leave a word of warning to those who are to come after me, it would be to bear in mind the wisdom of the policy which divides to conquer.

7. Besides the graver interests to be promoted by the segregation of the Native army, many other advantages are gained by the retention of a local force for frontier service, amongst which I would enumerate the following:—

- I.—To act with efficiency in the hills, the officers and men must be both trained and accustomed to the work, so as to understand and appreciate the real difficulties, and at the same time not needlessly be perplexed or lose heart.
- II.—They should have acquaintance with the country, both within and without the border.
- III.—They should know something about the tribes, their language, and their habits, and they should also be fairly conversant with our political relations with those people in the past.
- IV.—It is only those who are content to make the frontier force their military home who can be expected to fulfil these conditions; whilst it is beyond question that the officers and soldiers who do not voluntarily enter the frontier force are, as a body, never content to remain any length of time trans-Indus.
- V.—All the people of the trans-Indus, and many Panjabees, are much more willing to serve in the frontier force than in the line, because they can do so within prescribed limits and nearer to their homes, and will not be called upon to serve at distant stations in the Bengal presidency.

VI.—As regards the Pathan race, we have a better hold on those serving in frontier regiments than elsewhere, because, if they misconduct themselves and fly, they are afraid of being caught whenever they return to British territory; whilst their well-behaved comrades exercise more influence over them.

8. If there had ever been any inferiority in the frontier force as compared to the line, this circumstance might be fairly urged as one reason adverse to its isolation, but this has never been the case. It has invariably done its work admirably; its efficiency has always been commended by every General Officer and Commander-in-Chief; and both officers and men have never been backward in volunteering for any special service that arose.

9. So long as only selected officers are transferred to the force, it is sure to be in the future what it has been in the past, provided of course that promotions go by honest selection, and that measures be taken to secure a fair flow of advancement. It is not reasonable to expect that officers shall continue to hold the same position for years and retain their energy; nor is it fair to the service, or to the junior officers, that a Commandant should hold on to his position for an unlimited number of years. I believe that the frontier force has suffered in efficiency and popularity because of the absence of any rule requiring Commandants to vacate their regiments after a certain time; and I consider the introduction of such a regulation indispensable. I would limit the period to five years, with the power to re-appoint for two additional years, in reward for exceptional efficiency, or exceptional service rendered.

10. I am not aware under what rules the command of the force is now held; but, if there be no limit at present, I would introduce the system I have above advocated for the command of regiments.

11. In conclusion, I would add that as the British officers are, so will their men be; and that consequently it is indispensable that every promotion in the force be made with the utmost circumspection and on public grounds only.

OORACAMUND; }

The 22nd May 1879. }

(Sd.) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, *General,*  
*Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.*

[Confidential.]

*Memorandum by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.*

In forwarding the confidential reports on the Native regiments of this presidency for the past year, I desire to submit the following observations for the consideration of Government.

1. *General remarks.*—As a rule, the reports may be considered as generally satisfactory, although of course many things are brought to notice which require to be looked into and to be amended: and I would observe that it is only by the most careful consideration of these reports that any confidence can be impressed upon the army as to their utility, or that they can be expected to afford any help towards improving the efficiency of the service.

2. *British officers.*—For the past two years confidential reports on officers, after the model of War Office Form 1114, have been introduced by me. These reports have done much good, I believe, to the officers themselves, and have benefited the service by furnishing a reliable guide for making selections for promotion, or for employment on the general staff of the army.

3. *Excessive amount of leave.*—When forwarding the inspection reports of last year, I alluded to the case of officers who had passed long periods of their service out of India, either on medical certificate or on leave of absence on private affairs. Some cases of the kind have come under my notice this year, and I think they require careful watching by the Commander-in-Chief and by Government.

4. *Intemperance.*—During the past year and during the first six months of the present year, I have had to bring to the notice of Government the cases of officers rendered unfit for the discharge of their military duties by habits of intemperance; and I feel it to be my duty to urge upon Government, in the strongest terms, the necessity of dealing rigorously with such cases, both for the sake of maintaining the efficiency of the Native army, and as an example to those inclined to be guilty of such excess.

5. *Tenure of regimental commands.*—I have already brought to the notice of Government my opinion of the necessity of limiting the ordinary tenure of the command of a regiment to five years, to be extended only in the case of an officer who has proved himself exceptionally fitted for command.

This limit has, for some time past, been introduced into the British army, and the introduction of the system seems to be especially called for by the conditions incidental to service with the Native army of India.

As the rule stands, I may say that it is almost impracticable to rid a regiment of an inefficient commandant merely because of his general incapacity. A commanding officer may be practically nearly useless, without giving me an opportunity of making Government understand or accept the fact of his incapacity.

Occasionally I have been able to bring pressure to bear on some commanding officers coming under this category, in the same way as is done by the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief in the British army; but, at the same time, I have felt that if the officers had resisted, they would still have remained at the head of regiments to the injury of the service.

A good commandant is sure to have a good regiment, whilst no regulations or supervision can prevent a regiment indifferently commanded from deteriorating.

6. *Cavalry officers.*—During the past year, all cavalry officers who had joined the staff corps or remained locals or on the general list, and who had continued in the performance of military duty, have, with the sanction of Government, been posted to the four existing regiments of cavalry.

This measure was necessary in order to introduce into this branch of the service the regimental system; and by this means the officers will be able to count, with some confidence, on what their career is likely to be.

7. *Regimental system.*—During the time that I have commanded this army, I have endeavoured, as far as was practicable, to re-establish the retention of the British officers with their own regiments; and it may be said that the regimental system now generally prevails.

With this object in view, promotion has gone, as far as possible, in regiments, though not by pure seniority, since seniority has been combined with efficiency.

This change, as might have been expected, was not at first favorably received by a service which had practically degenerated into a system of the most rigid seniority; but I believe I am justified in saying it is not now looked upon unfavorably by the best and most efficient officers of the army.

They feel now that merit has a chance of success, and that the drones and the dipsomaniacs cannot stand in their way.

8. *Paucity of British officers with regiments.*—I would further draw attention to the small number of British officers now ordinarily found present and fit for duty with Native regiments.

The proper complement is seven, but out of this number two or more must be considered as being, as a rule, absent on furlough or otherwise not available.

Considering the amount of duty now imposed on officers, it seems to me that seven should be ordinarily present with a regiment, and for this to be possible two more officers must be attached to each. Up to the present, it has been practicable partially to meet this want from the supernumerary list, the result of previous reductions; but when this source is exhausted, it will be impossible to carry on the duties in the manner indispensable to efficiency.

*Musketry instructors.*—I would add, with all due deference to the decision arrived at by the Supreme Government, that one of the British officers of each regiment should hold the post of musketry instructor. The efficiency of the infantry soldier may be said to mainly depend on his being a good marksman, and it is not to be expected that he can attain to that standard, except under a trained instructor and under constant supervision.

*Probationers.*—I am glad to be able to report that the young officers who have come out from Sandhurst as direct probationers to join the staff corps during the past and previous years, promise to become an acquisition to the Madras army, and I am also able to report favorably of the officers who have become probationers from British regiments.

9. *Native officers—Confidential Reports on.*—When introducing sheets for the British officers, I required that the same system should be followed with regard to the Native officers; and thus the Commander-in-Chief has the ready means of ascertaining the character and qualifications of every Native officer in the service. If a Native officer is badly reported on, he is informed of the circumstance, as is done in the case of British officers, given a chance of reform, and warned of the consequences of continued misconduct.

This system has, I believe, already been followed by very beneficial results, and will tend to improve the status, self-respect, and efficiency of the Native officers.

10. *Honorary Commissions.*—During the current year, I have recommended two Native officers for honorary commissions—my Native Aide-de-Camp for the honorary rank of Captain, and the Subadar-Major of the 2nd Light Cavalry for that of Lieutenant—on the grounds of very long and meritorious service and unexceptionable character.

I believe that it will be for the benefit of the service, if Government will recognise the principle of granting such honorary rewards in special cases, as a means of assuring the Native officers that they may continue to earn distinction up to the very end of their service.

The system has been introduced in Bengal with advantage, and must tend to make the Native officers feel that the gulf which separates them from the British officers is not an impassable one.

The principle is largely accepted in the civil departments of the administration, and I cannot see why, when merit is found in the Native army, it should not be as adequately rewarded as when it occurs in the civil service; and I misjudge the Native character altogether if the opening out of such a road to distinction will not tend to the loyalty of the Native army.

11. *Widows of Native officers.*—Numerous petitions are still received from the destitute widows of Native officers.

I have had the practicability of the introduction of a Widows' Fund under my consideration, but the question is a very difficult one to deal with; and unless Government is prepared to accept the maintenance of the whole of this class, I am unable, for the reasons set forth in my memorandum of 1877, forwarded with Adjutant-General's memorandum No. 79, dated 9th May 1877, to recommend such petitions for favorable consideration. Their destitution is the result of the improvidence of their late husbands; and no grant of the kind is ever made in Bengal or Bombay.

12. *Modification in Pension Rules.*—The modification which has been introduced into the pension rules has done much to rid the service of old and incapable Native officers; and I am convinced that the ruling, which only allows the superior rate of pension to be awarded to officers of unblemished character, will help materially to influence this class to systematically discharge their duties with zeal and efficiency.

13. *Non-commissioned officers and sepoy.*—The above observation applies equally to the non-commissioned officers and sepoy of long service.

14. *Promotions by merit and good-conduct pay.*—Promotions, both in the commissioned and non-commissioned grades, are now much more largely based upon proved merit than used to be the case, and as time goes on, the objections which now prevent selection being of universal application ought gradually to die out.

When promotions to the non-commissioned grades are made by selection, it necessarily follows that the majority of the privates must be passed over and lose all hope of rising; when nothing remains to them, but to look forward to the increase of pay they are able to earn by continued good conduct. At present there are but three gradations of good-conduct pay, an extra rupee being obtainable after three, nine, and fifteen years' service. A private's pay is, therefore, made up to Rs. 10 a month after fifteen years' good service; but after this he can derive no further benefit from long and unblemished service, whilst the ranks are full of sepoy with service of 20 years and upwards.

I am of opinion that it would be politic to extend to the Native army the power of gaining two additional good-conduct badges with pay, at the end of twenty and twenty-five years' service, whereby

a deserving man might, though never promoted, attain in the end to the same pay as a naique, *viz.*, Rs. 12 a month. This principle is recognized in the British army, and with success; and what I advocate is merely the extension for the Native army of a principle already accepted.

I consider that such a boon would go far to lessen the heart-burning produced by supersession, and would provide an additional tie to the feelings of loyalty.

15. *Recruiting*.—A marked difference exists between different regiments as to the physique of the sepoy; but I cannot admit that there is any necessity for this distinction if the commandants did their duty, and did not give too much preference to mere height.

Steps have been taken to remedy this defect.

As it seems to me to be most important to maintain distinct the various presidential armies, I have prohibited the enlistment of recruits from the Bengal and Bombay presidencies, except under special sanction, to be only accorded in rare instances.

The difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of recruits to complete the establishment has this year, as well as last, been forced upon my attention, and I am about to submit the question for the consideration of Government.

As the question involves various considerations, I need not say anything further upon it in this memorandum.

16. *Lines*.—The condition of many of the lines of this army is still most unsatisfactory, and tends to indiscipline and sickness. This subject has been annually brought to the notice of Government, and with but little result; one cause being the large cost of providing suitable shelter for a married army. I am not insensible to this drawback; but, on the other hand, the family tie is beyond question a very strong guarantee of loyalty, and enables Government to repose a trust which, under other conditions, might not be so well founded.

Steps have been taken by me to limit, as far as possible, the number of relations allowed to reside with the sepoy in his lines; but the question is a delicate one, and will require very careful handling, or discontent will be sure to follow.

17. *Guard Duties*.—The amount of guard duty imposed on the Native army is much against its efficiency.

Some demi-civil guards, such as over commissariat stores, over stamp, pension, pay, and Accountant-General's offices, are still being taken by the Native army, and from some cause or another calls are frequently made on them for the temporary safe guard of jails and treasuries. The imposition of such duties is pernicious, and interferes with discipline and efficiency, by taking the men away from their officers and curtailing the time available for their instruction.

There is no more necessity to employ sepoys on such duties in this country than there is to employ British troops on similar ones in England.

By regulations, the men ought to have four nights in bed, but two or three is more like what they actually get.

The requirements now made upon the sepoy are quite different to what they were twenty years ago, and he can only be kept thoroughly efficient by constant instruction in the various duties now expected of him.

Men who have been on duty all night cannot be expected to take much interest in their drill the moment they come off guard, and further constant night duties must be prejudicial to the health of the men, and create a distaste for the service.

18. *Dress*.—The dress of the Native army requires, I consider, to be changed, and to be made more suitable to modern requirements. This matter is under my consideration, and will be referred to Government separately. I would, however, mention that I am of opinion that their head-dress, boots, and great coats should be given to the men by the State, as is done in the case of the British soldier.

*Boots*.—The want of good shoes for the Native infantry is a pressing one, and is one which this presidency is as yet unable to supply. I recommended the introduction of a Government tannery at Madras, partly with a view of removing this difficulty, and the matter is now, I believe, before the Government of India.

19. *Field Service*.—In conclusion, I would beg to urge the necessity which exists for giving this army a fair share of field service whenever active operations have to be engaged in.

It has often had but scant justice in this respect; and I would represent to Government that it is hopeless to expect to maintain a high feeling of *esprit de corps* if the officers and men feel that they are only to occupy a secondary position to that held by the armies of the other presidencies.

OOTACAMUND;  
The 14th July 1879. }

(Sd.) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, General,  
Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.

*Memorandum by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army, on the subject of recruiting for the Madras Native Army.*

The impossibility of obtaining a sufficient number of suitable recruits to complete the established complement of privates in the regiments of this Native army has for some time come under my observation, and I now consider it my duty to bring the subject specially to the notice of Government, in order that it may receive the consideration it seems to me to deserve.

2. The annexed tabular statement shows the number of privates wanting to complete in the several regiments of cavalry and infantry on the 1st of June last; and the records of the Adjutant-General's office establish the fact that for some time past the majority of commanding officers have not been able to keep their regiments complete, and that consequently the army has had to remain short of its complement.

No doubt, some few vacancies must, from the nature of things, always exist in regiments; but the numbers now regularly found to be deficient are far in excess of what need be the case, and the reasons are therefore to be sought in other causes.

3. In support of this view, I have to state that when the three regiments of Native infantry sent to the North-Western Provinces to aid in carrying on the war against the Amir of Kabul were ordered to increase their number of privates from 600 to 800, notwithstanding that volunteers were called for to fill up these regiments, and that recruiting depôts were established at Vizagapatam and Palaveram, both favorite recruiting grounds. On the 1st June, or at the end of six months after the order for the augmentation had been issued, the following was the result:—

The 21st Madras Native Infantry had but 567 privates, or thirty-three below its peace establishment, and 233 below the war establishment.

The 30th had 606 privates, or six above its peace establishment, and 191 below the war establishment.

The 36th had 660, or sixty above the peace establishment, and 140 below the war establishment.

It is clear from the above that the supply of recruits even in time of peace falls short of the demand, and that on the outbreak of a war no reliance can be placed upon our being able to augment even a few of our regiments up to a war footing.

4. Having placed myself in communication with some of the best officers of the Native army as to the causes which operate to prevent young men from entering the service, and having duly considered their reports, I feel myself justified in giving the following as the principal causes which go to make military service unpopular at the present day:—

A.—It is much easier now than it was formerly for a young man to obtain employment, other than military.

At present numbers are required for service in the police and public works, in the railway and on coffee estates, while many men emigrate.

Admission is to be gained to these careers without satisfying all the conditions required of a recruit, and in most of them, if a man is required to leave his district, it is only for a short time, and he is able to count as a certainty on returning with what to him is a considerable sum of money.

With reference to this subject, I would request attention to my memorandum, dated the 14th July, which accompanied the confidential reports of the Native army for the year 1878-79.

REMARK.—The causes above alluded to cannot be obviated except by improving the condition of the sepoy, and thus giving a young man increased inducements to adopt the army as a profession for life.

B.—The calls now made upon the Native army both as to drill and discipline are very much more varied and more strictly enforced than they used to be, and much more is required of all ranks.

REMARK.—There can be no remedy to this objection; for instead of any relaxation being possible, the reverse, owing to the demands of modern scientific warfare, is likely to be the case.

C.—The amount of guard duty is at most stations excessive, and beyond what is sanctioned by Army Regulations. Theoretically a sepoy is supposed to have four nights in bed, whereas in practice, he has more often three or even two. The man who has been out of his bed all night can hardly be expected to turn out for drill with any alacrity on being relieved from guard; whilst the requirements of musketry and drill of all kinds make incessant practice a necessity.

Further, it is supposed that civil duties are not to be imposed upon the army; yet emergencies are constantly occurring which oblige them to take charge of jails and treasuries.

See my memorandum previously referred to.

All these duties take the men away from their officers, make instruction irksome, and their proper duty a drudgery.

REMARK.—The above objection is remediable, but can never be corrected unless the police are sufficiently strong and sufficiently organized and trustworthy to discharge all the duties which ought to be expected of them.

D.—The amount of service out of the presidency proper, and of foreign service, has largely increased of late years; and although the men employed in the Bengal presidency find some advantages from the savings they are able to make from the increased compensation for dearness of rice, and those serving in Burma in the shape of pensions to their heirs and free quarters and free rations, nevertheless many parents are disinclined to allow their sons to enter a service which entails on them the necessity of leaving periodically their own presidency.

One-eighth of the Native infantry regiments are always in the British Burma Division; and they have to remain there for three years without their families.

REMARK.—It may be possible to remedy that part of the objection which is based on service in the Bengal presidency, by a redistribution and by garrisoning with Madras troops the most southern stations of the Bombay presidency; but there can be no remedy to that which applies to service in British Burma; indeed, the course of events points rather to an increase than to a decrease of the Native force stationed in that province.

E.—This army, as is well known, may be termed a married army, and of course numbers of sons are born to the soldiers. In former days, these sons, when they grew up, almost invariably enlisted; now, of those fit to enter the service, many, if possessed of ability, hope to improve their condition by finding admittance to some more favored branch of the public service. A few still enter the army, but a great number who present themselves have to be rejected as not coming up to the required physical standard.

This is partly to be accounted for by the increased cost of food, by the men, notwithstanding this, continuing to marry early, to have large families, and to be too charitably inclined to the host of connections who swarm into the lines for food and shelter.

REMARK.—For this there can be no present remedy, though steps have been taken by me to get commanding officers to exercise their influence to prevent a sepoy marrying before he has three years' service, and thus become entitled to another rupee a month, and to bring pressure to bear to keep

hangers-on out of the lines; such reforms, however, as

I lately remarked in another paper, require careful handling, and can only be introduced with great caution.

F.—Another difficulty which has been experienced has arisen from the standard of height and the different ways in which the chest measurement of recruits has been taken.



The scarcity and famine which has prevailed during the past three years has no doubt had its effect in reducing the physique of the whole population, and in causing many recruits to be rejected who would, but for their emaciated condition, have been able to pass muster; but this alone cannot be considered a sufficient explanation for the large number of rejections.

REMARK.—The present standard of height might, I think, with advantage be lowered one inch, viz., from 5 feet 5 inches to 5 feet 4 inches. The population of Southern India is not a tall race, and I do not consider that any advantage is gained by looking for mere height, though I believe many commanding officers take almost as much pride in the height of their men as in their possessing more serviceable qualifications.

Outside of the army one sees hundreds of men who are in every way physically fit to carry a rifle and a soldier's equipment, but who must be now excluded because they would not come up to the present standard of height.

As regards the measurement of the chest, orders have been issued to ensure a uniform system being followed, and the measurement is for the future to be taken with the arms hanging close to the side.

G.—The miserable condition of the lines of many of the regiments must also, I think, be held to help to render service in the army unpopular and therefore to check recruiting.

REMARK.—This is a matter which can be remedied by expenditure, and is one which I have repeatedly urged the Government to take into its consideration. Small, ill-ventilated, dirty hovels are alike injurious to discipline and to health, and many of the lines now occupied by regiments are a disgrace to the Queen's uniform. In the present day Government feels bound to improve the sanitary conditions under which the general population lives, and it seems only reasonable to give the sepoy shelter which shall not outrage every rule of sanitation.

H.—Some officers have suggested that one of the causes of our failing to get recruits is that the military spirit is dying out among the population; but in this opinion I cannot concur; and I believe that if a remedy is applied to the other drawbacks which undoubtedly exist, this Native army will regain its popularity; but as stated by me in another paper, no army can be expected to retain its self-respect and *esprit de corps* unless it is allowed to have its fair share of field service.

I. Everybody must admit that it is impossible to hold and administer India without the assistance of an efficient and loyal Native army, and I would therefore again urge upon Government the full consideration of the several points brought to notice in this memorandum.

OOTACAMUND; }  
The 28th July 1879. }

(Sd.)

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, General,  
Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.

Statement showing the number of Privates wanting to complete the Establishment of Native Cavalry, Infantry, and Sappers and Miners on the 1st June 1879.

Corps.	Number wanting to complete.	Corps.	Number wanting to complete.
1st Regiment, Light Cavalry ...	25	22nd Regiment, Native Infantry ...	33
2nd do. do. ...	5	23rd do. do. ...	16
3rd do. do. ...	...	24th do. do. ...	36
4th do. do. ...	16	25th do. do. ...	1
Total ...	46	26th do. do. ...	21
1st Regiment, Native Infantry ...	101	27th do. do. ...	57
2nd do. do. ...	27	28th do. do. ...	47
3rd do. do. ...	23	29th do. do. ...	15
4th do. do. ...	3	30th do. do. ...	Supy. 6*
5th do. do. ...	12	31st do. do. ...	12
6th do. do. ...	13	32nd do. do. ...	31
7th do. do. ...	99	33rd do. do. ...	29
8th do. do. ...	29	34th do. do. ...	40
9th do. do. ...	20	35th do. do. ...	44
10th do. do. ...	42	36th do. do. ...	Supy. 60*
11th do. do. ...	34	37th do. do. ...	99
12th do. do. ...	75	38th do. do. ...	17
13th do. do. ...	35	39th do. do. ...	21
14th do. do. ...	44	40th do. do. ...	42
15th do. do. ...	1	41st do. do. ...	25
16th do. do. ...	13	Total ...	1,220
17th do. do. ...	42	"Queen's Own" Sappers and Miners	40
18th do. do. ...	22	Grand Total ...	1,306
19th do. do. ...	32		
20th do. do. ...	33		
21st do. do. ...			

\* Deducted from total.

(Sd.) A. R. CLEPHANE, Colonel,  
Deputy Adjutant-General.



## I.

## ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION.

Replies by Lieutenant-General H. J. Warre, C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

What, in your Excellency's opinion, should be the full war establishment of the army of India calculated under the two heads:—

(a) The number of troops that India ought to be able to place and maintain in the field for service wherever required?

(b) The garrisons and reserves to be maintained?

1. The Government of India alone can decide what is to be the full war army of India.

(a) Judging by the object and the result of the recent campaign on the frontier of Afghanistan, India should be able to maintain in the field for service, wherever required, not only a similar army-corps to that composed of Bengal troops, recently divided into three columns, and acting on distinct and separate basis, but also additional columns of at least 5,000 each of all arms from Bombay and Madras.

(b) The accompanying distribution return shows the garrisons and stations required to be maintained by the Bombay army; the regiments not absolutely required for garrison purposes together with a contingent of artillery and cavalry, amounting in all to about 5,000 men, are all that Bombay can, at present, afford, with due regard to the internal security of the presidency.

*Distribution return of the Force required for the Bombay Presidency.*

STATIONS.	Horse and Field Artillery.	British Cavalry.	Garrison Artillery.	British Infantry.	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.
Sind ...	2	...	1	1	1	3
Rajkot ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Deesa ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Ahmedabad ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Baroda ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Surat ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bombay ...	...	...	8	...	...	...
Karlee ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Poona ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Satara ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Belgaum ...	1	...	...	1	...	...
Ahmednagar ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Malgaon ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Mhow ...	1	1	1	1	1	...
Nichildpur ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Nusserabad ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Aden ...	...	...	8	1	...	1
Total ...	10	1	8	9	4	21
Present strength of the Bombay Army ...	12	1	8	9	7*	31†
Required for garrison duty (as above) ...	10	1	8	9	4	21
Balance available for field service (vide reply to Query 6) ...	2	...	...	...	8*	7†

\* Exclusive of the body guard and the Aden troop.

† Including the corps of sappers and miners.

I annex a copy of memorandum I have written on the establishment of a reserve for the Bombay Native army in connection with the district police. This reserve is intended to feed the Native army in time of trouble. It may either be an addition to the present establishment, or a diminution of the active army to the extent of, say, 2½ regiments.

I do not advocate a diminution of the present strength, being convinced that, in India especially, we should at all times be fully prepared for every contingency.

2. What, in your Excellency's opinion, should be the organization of the army of India? Is it necessary, in the present circumstances of the country, to maintain the three presidential armies under the separate Governments and three Commanders-in-Chief, with three large staffs and separate departments?

2. Whatever may be the organization of the army of India (and a very considerable difference of opinion exists, whether the whole of the forces in India should be concentrated under one head; or continued, as at present, in separate armies, under their own Local Governments and local Commanders-in-Chief), there is one point that should never be lost sight of, *viz.*, the relative proportion of British to Native infantry; this should not be allowed to remain below the established scale, *i.e.*, one-third of the former to two-thirds of the latter; the necessity for maintaining the three presidential armies under three separate Governments was declared by the late Duke of Wellington, as far back as 1826, to be necessary for the safety of India. The mutiny of 1857-58

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

3. Could not all the advantages of separate armies be secured with a great increase of efficiency and economy by forming the entire army of India into one army under one Commander-in-Chief and dividing it into four army-corps? Each army-corps to be under the command of a Lieutenant-General, and to be entirely complete and self-contained in respect of organization, arms, and equipment?

The Lieutenant-General to be vested with complete powers of control, and to be responsible for the appointment of all regimental officers, subject only to the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief for India in respect to the nomination of officers commanding regiments.

The officers of all the army-corps to be equally eligible for service on the staff of the army.

The army-corps to be territorial and localized one in the north, one in the south, one in the east, and one in the west. The army-corps of the south and west to be, as far as practicable, recruited from the district from which the present armies of Madras and Bombay are now recruited, thus maintaining four armies distinct in race, religion, and language, but so organized as to be practically in a state of thorough efficiency and readiness for action in any direction in which the army of India may be called upon to undertake separate or combined operations under the Commander-in-Chief of India.

What should be the strength of each army-corps?

and other similar warnings confirm the opinion then recorded, and under whatever denomination the separate armies may be continued, it is essential for the safety of the empire that their individuality should be maintained. I may therefore reply to the second part of No. 2 question, by saying that it is necessary to maintain (three) or more separate armies under three (or more) separate commanders with separate staffs and, to some extent, with separate departments, but not necessarily under Local Governments, provided the armies are kept distinct.

3. I believe that all the advantages of separate armies can be secured, but with no material increase of efficiency, and hardly any decrease in expenditure, by creating one army for India, under one Commander-in-Chief, and dividing it into four (or five) army-corps under separate commanders.

I say very little increase of efficiency, because the rank which each commander of the presidential armies holds as Commander-in-Chief of the local army gives him greater authority, and secures for him greater attention to his orders, than can be obtained by any general officer holding an inferior title; especially in an army where lieutenant and major-generals are permitted to hold departmental appointments, whose rank and standing trench very closely on the position of the general officer in command, whose authority is thereby weakened.

If 'army-corps' are to be substituted for the presidential armies, and the command given to a lieutenant-general, the saving in military pay is hardly appreciable, as the general officer in command of a division gets, within a few hundred rupees a month, the same military pay that is now accorded to the local Commander-in-Chief. The lieutenant-general commanding could not uphold his position, and secure the entire completeness and discipline, in respect to the organization, arms, and equipment of his army-corps without a very similar staff and departmental organization to that now in force. The economy of the new formation would, therefore, be confined to the difference in the pay between an Adjutant and Quarter Master General and a Deputy in each department, less the additional Deputy Assistant who would be required to assist the others in doing the work of the departments. It is therefore of doubtful economy, and almost certain loss in efficiency, to invest the complete powers of control in the lieutenant-general instead of, as at present, in the local Commander-in-Chief, assuming that the lieutenant-general is to be made responsible for the appointment of all *staff* and *regimental* officers, subject only to the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief in India, in respect to the nomination of officers to the higher *staff* appointments, and of officers commanding regiments.

The officers of all the army-corps should not only be equally eligible for service on the head-quarter staff of the army, but every army-corps (to secure efficiency and perfect equality in the patronage of the army) should in turn furnish the head-quarter staff with administrative officers, who should, also in turn, fill the higher appointments. Thus supposing No. 1 army-corps gave the Adjutant-General of the army for (say) five years, this appointment on the termination of that five years should be given to another army-corps, so that each in its turn should be fairly represented; this arrangement applying to all the different staff appointments.

The lieutenant-generals commanding should have the selection of their own staff from their own army-corps, on vacancies occurring, subject, in the higher appointments, as previously admitted, to the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief.

Whatever may be the appellation of the several divisions of the one army, each army-corps should be territorial and localized as at present, maintaining the natural territorial boundaries and recruiting from the several districts as the local armies are now recruited, so as to keep the several armies distinct in race, religion, and language, but so organized that every army may be in a state of thorough efficiency and readiness for action in any direction in which the army of India may

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

be called upon to undertake separate or combined operations under the one Commander-in-Chief of the army of India.

The strength of each army or army-corps must depend entirely on local circumstances, on political influences, and the extent of territory to which it is allotted.

4. If such a formation of the army were adopted, would it not, in your Excellency's opinion, be possible to carry out a very material reduction in the staffs and departments, placing at the same time at the disposal of the lieutenant-general commanding army-corps a staff so efficient and complete as to enable him to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of India of much unimportant work which now comes before him?

4. If the separate armies of the north, south, east, and west are formed as proposed, it will not be possible to carry out any very material reduction in the staffs and departments, supposing that the intention of making each army-corps complete and self-contained is to be carried out. The Commander-in-Chief in India should be freed from all local influences. He should not be in command of any separate army-corps; consequently, by dividing into two divisions the present Bengal army (after its amalgamation with the Punjab forces), two additional lieutenant-generals, with their staffs, will be required to make these separate army-corps efficient and complete, and to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of India of much unimportant work which now comes before him. Instead, therefore, of having, as at present, three separate armies to all intents and purposes under one Commander-in-Chief, there would be four separate armies under four lieutenant-generals, with four separate staffs, under one separate Commander-in-Chief, with another staff, composed of officers taken from all the several army-corps. The army head-quarters should be fixed in some central point, say Allahabad; but the Commander-in-Chief must necessarily be constantly near the Viceroy when the Commander-in-Chief is not on inspection tours.

5. Supposing such an organization to be adopted, what proportion of each army-corps should be prepared for mobilization, and maintained in a state of readiness to take the field at short notice? What should be the relative proportion of each arm of the service in such active portion of each army-corps?

5. Supposing that this organization of four army-corps be adopted, they will take the duties, and do the same military work, that is required of the now existing presidential armies, supplemented possibly by some additional territory which the redistribution of the allotments may render necessary. Under this uncertainty as to the strength of each army-corps, it is not possible to determine what proportion should be prepared for mobilization and maintained in a state of readiness to take the field at short notice; but as the garrison duties have been reduced to a minimum, and it has been clearly shown (*vide* the Commander-in-Chief's Distribution Return of the Bombay Army) what are the political requirements of the Bombay presidency, the difference between the number of batteries, regiments of cavalry and infantry, shown on that return (annexed for reference) and the full strength of the Bombay army will show what force can be 'mobilized and maintained in a state of readiness to take the field at short notice.' The relative proportion of each arm in such active portion of each army-corps must depend on the nature of the country such portion is required to act in, and the enemy to whom it will be opposed.

6. Setting aside historical sentiment, and looking to the relative importance—the population, and the wealth of the various Local Governments of India—is there any more reason why the armies of Madras and Bombay should at the present time be under the Local Governments of Madras and Bombay and under local Commanders-in-Chief, with separate departments for every branch of military administration, than there is that the same system should be followed in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab?

6. I believe (looking to the relative importance, the population and wealth of Bombay) that as it has been shown that but a very trifling saving of expense can be effected by detaching the present army of Bombay, under its local Commander-in-Chief, from the Local Government of Bombay, and placing it (the army) under the command of the Commander-in-Chief and under the Government of India, there is more reason to maintain the separate Governments of Bombay and Madras with their local armies than there is to maintain the independence of the Lower Provinces of Bengal, where the Native population is essentially peaceful. The troops serving in the Punjab and in the North-Western Provinces have hitherto enjoyed a local supremacy independent of military control and of all conditions of relative importance, or even of historical sentiment. Being under the immediate control of the Viceroy and the Government of India, as well as the Commander-in-Chief in India, these provinces have enjoyed a monopoly of Government patronage, which the armies of Bombay and Madras could not expect to be filtered through the Local Governments under which they are immediately serving.

7. As a matter of fact, if a large reserve for the northern armies is to be maintained, is it not the duty of Government to see that this

7. As a matter of fact, it is not necessary for India to maintain a large reserve, either for her northern, or for her other armies. The armies of India should be at all times

reserve is formed of the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure and to maintain with due regard to the admitted necessity of keeping up armies of different races and religions, and with due regard to the safety of the Empire?

Does your Excellency look upon the Madras and Bombay armies in their present organization as constituting the most efficient reserve for the armies of Upper India?

8. What is the feeling of the Madras and Bombay armies in respect to employment in other presidencies in India in times of peace? For instance, at the present time, 26 regiments of the Madras army are employed within their own presidency, and no less than 14 outside its limits, some of them at distant stations in Bengal. Is this service popular with the army? Are the Madras regiments more efficient than the Bengal regiments; or are they, when on this duty, cheaper, the cost of relief, transport, of clothing, equipments, and compensation for food, being taken into account. If they are neither cheaper nor more efficient, is there any object in garrisoning Bengal and Burma partly from the Madras army?

9. Is your Excellency aware of any difficulty in obtaining recruits for the army of a good class of healthy strong young men of agricultural population physically qualified to perform the duties of a soldier?

10. Has it ever been asserted that a difficulty in obtaining efficient recruits is attributable to the unpopularity of the service of the local army beyond the limits of its own presidency in times of peace?

prepared to meet the emergencies which no foresight or precaution can entirely guard against; and, in order to be prepared for such contingencies, India's reserve should be found in the separate and distinct armies of the several presidencies, so that, from whichever side the danger threatens, and whether it threatens from the insubordination of one of its mercenary armies, or from the exuberant growth of the armies of the Native independent States, or from external and foreign enemies, the neighbouring army-corps, of a different race and religion, can at once be called upon to support the Empress' supremacy, and form a reserve to the troops engaged, far better than that which, of necessity, must be hastily summoned from a state of semi-pastoral existence, where, as '*pensioners on the reserve*' worn-out sepoys have been lingering in idleness, and in forgetfulness of an empire it is against their religion to support. The armies of Bombay and Madras do, therefore, constitute a reserve for the armies of India; and the more efficient the armies of the south and west can be made, the more decidedly will they become efficient reserves for the armies of Upper India. History has proved that the whole of the western coast of India is a military country, producing a warlike population. The Southern Mahrattas have proved themselves in former days, and are still, equal to any other race in India as a fighting people. Their power has been broken and their military ardour quenched by an almost total disarmament, but they are still a hardy people, in a mountainous district, inured to toil, and especially good at tracing their steps over the rough and impracticable Ghâts. What more can we require to make soldiers? But, in addition to these hardy mountaineers, we must remember that the armies of Bombay and Madras in 1857 and 1858 saved India. What better reply can be found than the efficiency of these southern armies as a reserve?

8. Bombay has troops at Mhow, Nusseerabad, and other stations beyond the limits of the Bombay presidency; and so long as these troops are relieved at intervals, to enable them to return to their own country, and occasionally to revisit their villages and families, they have no feeling or prejudice against such employment.

As regards the comparison between the armies of Bengal and Madras, or whether the Madras regiments are more efficient than those of Bengal, I am not in a position to reply; nor can I say whether India saves by the employment of Madras troops in Burma. India certainly cannot gain by employing any local troops at great distances from their base or presidency, when, owing to local circumstances of communication, &c., it would be more convenient to employ the troops of a nearer army.

Such, for instance, is the case with the Madras troops occupying some portion of the Central Provinces. These troops have to pass through a very large extent of the Bombay presidency, and frequently to remain in a rest-camp at Poona for one or two days to pass from the stations in Central India to Madras.

9. There has been some difficulty in keeping the infantry regiments complete; and there is little doubt that the dearness of living, the smallness of pay, and the competition derived from the number of otherwise qualified recruits being employed on the railway, or in the police, combine to prevent healthy strong young men of the agricultural class from enlisting into the army.

10. The army, in fact, is no longer the popular service it used to be; but as regards Bombay, this is to be attributed not to the service of the local army beyond the limits of its own presidency in times of peace, but to the causes named above, and to the want of energy on the part of commanding officers, who are satisfied by sending out recruiting parties into districts already overstocked, and think they have then done all that is necessary, and complain that they cannot complete their regiments.

Within the last eight months I have by constant enquiry reduced the number of 'wanting to complete' in the Native infantry regiments from 1,500 to 620.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

11. If your Excellency is of opinion that the army-corps should be formed territorially, and as far as possible localized within its territorial area, what alterations would you propose in the strength of the various armies to render them fit for their home duties, and to place them in a position to take part in any war going on in India by the detachment of a force of all arms?

12. Could not the duties of the Native army be very materially decreased by a general concentration of troops in large centres in the neighbourhood of railways, thus abolishing all small cantonments and outlying and isolated stations?

13. Would not this arrangement enable the officers commanding army-corps to make a much larger number of men available for service, and justify a very considerable reduction of troops in some parts of the country; and would it not enable the discipline, exercise, and instruction of the troops to be more effectively carried on, and render the formation of camps of exercise more feasible?

14. Recognizing the fact that India cannot afford to maintain the most perfect army which could be devised in which economy did not enter, and that large reductions of army expenditure are absolutely essential, what changes and alterations would your Excellency be prepared to recommend in the organization and administration of the army?

There is no doubt that an army of mercenaries requires to be well paid; and the present pay of Rs. 7 a month is not now considered sufficient to secure a first-class recruit for the Bombay army.

11. I have already given it as my opinion that, in order to maintain that balance of races which in 1826 the Duke of Wellington considered so essential to the safety of India, the several army-corps or presidential armies should be territorial, and as far as practicable without destroying their efficiency localized within their own territorial area; but I am not prepared to say what alteration would be necessary in the strength of the various armies to render them fit for home duties, &c., because I can only assume at present that each army-corps will be, as far as possible, equalized in strength, and that provision will be made 'to place each army-corps in a position to take part in any war going on in India by a detachment of a force of all arms,' so that in future we shall not see the field service corps monopolized by one portion of the army of India to the exclusion of others, whose claims, when they form part of the army of India, cannot be ignored.

12. As regards a general concentration of troops throughout the whole of India, I am not prepared to give an opinion.

I have endeavoured, as far as regards the Bombay army alone, to establish a general concentration of troops in the neighbourhood of the junctions of railways, or at such convenient points as may be selected; but the political influences invariably prevent my carrying out such an idea. In addition to the expense, which would be very great, the civil officers at small stations require protection.

13. An arrangement such as is proposed in the preceding question would undoubtedly, if feasible, enable the officers commanding army-corps to hold a larger number of men available for service; but I doubt whether, as far as regards the Bombay presidency, it would justify any considerable reduction of troops, because it would leave a large number of small civil stations unprotected. And although these civil stations may not actually require troops, the presence of troops in their neighbourhood gives security that could not be obtained by a concentration of troops in distant cantonments.

Camps of exercise are excellent schools when well conducted under experienced officers; but they are very expensive schools, not required except at intervals, for special purposes.

I consider that camps of exercise, if within reasonable distance of large cantonments, may prove the working of the commissariat and transport departments; but they are comparatively of little practical use for troops, and in my opinion should never be dependent on *railways*. If within easy distance (6 or 8 miles) of a cantonment, from whence all the supplies, &c., should be conveyed by the moveable column transport, supplemented by country carts, &c., the exercise and instruction not only of the troops in escort duties and convoys, but the practical working of the transport and commissariat departments, is duly tested.

14. If India cannot afford to maintain an army 'so organized as to be practically in a state of thorough efficiency and readiness for action in any direction' in which it may be called upon to act, we must resign our hold over the vast territory that the industry and valor of our predecessors have added to the British empire.

If large reductions of expenditure are necessary, they must be sought in the departmental rather than in the combatant branches.

As far as regards the Bombay army, I am not prepared to recommend the reduction of a single regiment. On the contrary, I think the Governor's minute of the 31st ultimo shows that it would be advisable to increase the rank and file

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

15. Are you in favor of amalgamating the Adjutant General and Quarter Master General's departments under a Chief of the Staff, so that, as in other armies, the staff of the army shall consist of certain grades of staff officers, the work being apportioned as may be desirable, but without a division, as at present, into two distinct departments?

16. If the army were divided into army-corps, and power given to the lieutenant-generals commanding to dispose of many questions which are now referred to superior authority, so that important matters only were treated of by the central military authority at head quarters, would not a staff of about the following strength be sufficient—

*Head-quarters.*

- 1 Chief of the staff.
- 4 Officers of the general staff.
- 3 " " " for intelligence duties.
- 1 Officer of the general staff for royal artillery, to be Inspector General of Artillery, with two staff officers.
- 1 Officer of the general staff for royal engineers.
- 1 Officer of the general staff for musketry inspection, &c.
- 1 Judge Advocate General.

*Army-corps.*

- 1 Chief of the staff.
  - 2 Officers of the general staff.
  - 1 Staff officer of royal artillery.
  - 1 Staff officer of royal engineers, to be Inspector General of Engineers, Military Works, and Fortifications.
  - 1 Deputy Judge Advocate General.
- Departmental staff officers in addition to be under the chief of the staff of the army-corps.

17. If your Excellency does not approve of this arrangement, either in strength of personnel or nomenclature, what would your Excellency propose?

of both European and Native regiments, thereby adding to the effective force without increase in the administrative department.

15. I believe that if 'you require to have anything well done, you must do it yourself,' and that, under all circumstances, an officer commanding an army or force, however exalted may be his rank, is his own best chief of the staff. I am not therefore in favor of amalgamating the Adjutant and Quarter Master General's departments, because I am satisfied that these departments must practically be kept separate; that is to say, there will be an Adjutant and a Quarter Master General's branch in every office; therefore it is preferable that the officer on whom the responsibility rests shall be known and acknowledged under his proper title. If a general commanding is superannuated or incompetent, he then requires a chief of the staff; but otherwise, and however small the staff may be, I consider that each officer should be responsible for the proper working of his own department.

16. If the army of India is divided into army-corps, and power given to the lieutenant-generals commanding to dispose of many questions which are now referred to the superior authority, so that 'important matters only' may be referred to the Commander-in-Chief, some small reductions might be made in the establishment of the Adjutant and Quarter Master General's offices; but as the clerical labor only would be reduced, no alteration of the strength of the head-quarters staff would be admissible. Nor can I advocate the replacement of the Military Secretary (who in the proposed *corps d'armée* would be responsible for the admission of the names of officers eligible for all appointments, staff and regimental) by a chief of the staff, who would in fact only repeat the orders he receives from the lieutenant-general commanding to the officers of the several branches of each department in which there would be no real head or responsible officer. In very large commands, combining great administrative and political functions, with military movements on a grand scale, a chief of the staff may be desirable to relieve the general officer of details, which are obvious; but in all smaller operations, and in all secondary positions of trust and command, the general officer on whom the responsibility rests cannot abdicate his responsibilities, and must therefore practically give his own orders to the officers of the several departments, with whom he should be also in constant personal communication.

17. As I have shown in the preceding replies that I do not approve of the change in the nomenclature of the officers who are to compose the staff of the *corps d'armée*, notwithstanding that I consider the strength of the proposed staff sufficient for all ordinary purposes, I can only distribute the same number of officers, so that each officer may have his separate work, for which he, under the head of his department, must be held responsible:—

*Head-quarters of the Army-corps.*

- 1 Lieutenant-General Commanding.
- 1 Military Secretary (may be styled *Assistant*).
- 1 Interpreter and Aide-de-Camp.
- 1 Aide-de-Camp.
- 1 Deputy Adjutant General.
- 1 Assistant Adjutant General.
- 1 Assistant Adjutant General for musketry.
- 1 Deputy Quarter Master General.
- 1 Assistant Quarter Master General.
- 1 Colonel Royal Artillery.
- 1 Staff Officer Royal Engineers, to be Deputy Inspector of Engineers, Military Works, and Fortifications, &c.
- 1 Deputy Judge Advocate.

It is presumed that each army-corps will be divided into divisions and brigades.

Each division to be under the command of a major-general, who will hold his command for five years, but will

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vacate *without appeal*, on promotion. The division staff to consist of—

- 1 Major-General.
- 1 Interpreter and Aide-de-Camp.
- 1 Assistant Adjutant General.
- 1 Assistant Quarter Master General.
- 1 Brigade Major, who would also perform the duties of Deputy Assistant Adjutant General for Musketry and be station staff officer.
- 2 Assistant staff officers (on probation).

Each brigade to be under the command of a colonel, with the rank of brigadier, who will also vacate on promotion, subject however to being continued in command for the full five years, provided the lieutenant-general commanding the *corps d'armée* and the major-general of the division recommend such extension, and subject also to selection on promotion to rank of major-general to the command of a division, on a vacancy occurring.

Brigade staff to consist of—

- 1 Colonel on the staff (with the rank of Brigadier).
- 1 Brigade Major.
- 1 Staff Officer and Interpreter.

18 Does your Excellency consider that it would be advisable to place the administration of the royal artillery in India more directly under the Adjutant General or Chief of the Staff, as is the case with the other arms, the Adjutant General being provided with assistance in special artillery questions or technical subjects in the person of the Inspector General of Artillery?

18. Without producing any adequate result, this step would add one more to the channels through which the administration of royal artillery is conducted, increasing delay in the settlement of questions and the communication of orders. Our steps, I think, should be in quite the opposite direction, and tend to decentralization rather than further centralization in artillery matters.

19. Would it not be in all respects a more efficient arrangement if the Inspector General of Artillery acted as the artillery adviser of the Commander-in-Chief; the Inspector General having two staff officers to assist him, one of whom should carry out the duties now performed by the present Deputy Adjutant General of Royal Artillery in India? Or in other words, the amalgamation of the offices of Inspector General of Royal Artillery and Deputy Adjutant General of Royal Artillery effected, making the former the head staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief?

19. The work of inspection is quite separate and distinct from that of administration, and cannot be carried on by the same person at the same time. It must be remembered that the duties of Inspector General of Artillery involve constant travel for from 6 to 8 months, during which time communication with him for administrative purposes is out of the question on account of the delay which it would involve. The amalgamation, therefore, of the duties of Inspector and Deputy Adjutant General Royal Artillery could only be nominal. I consider that the Inspector General should be the head staff officer of artillery in India, as his personal acquaintance with the condition and requirements of the artillery in all parts of India render him peculiarly fitted to act as artillery adviser to the Commander-in-Chief. I should imagine that he is largely so employed in this capacity under present arrangement. In all large matters the Inspector General of Artillery and the Inspector General of Ordnance (now *not* directly available) should be consulted; departmental and administrative details being in the hands of the Deputy Adjutant General Royal Artillery.

20. In your relations as Commander-in-Chief with the Military Department of Government, does your experience suggest any modifications of procedure or other matters tending to facilitate business, reduce expenditure, or add to general efficiency of administration?

20. The Commander-in-Chief's relations with the Local Government are confined chiefly to subjects connected with the Military Department and with the <sup>Military</sup> ~~Public~~ Works Department of the Government. No great reduction in expenditure would be made, but a very considerable amount of correspondence might be saved, by the Commander-in-Chief's views in his military capacity being recorded on the Council paper, instead of, as now, in an official letter through the Adjutant or Quarter Master General's Department. The course of a letter through the several channels will illustrate my meaning.

This letter is (1) recorded in the Secretariat; a short summary of the subject is made, and it is transmitted (2) to the Governor, who returns it (3) to the Secretary, for transmission (4) to the Commander-in-Chief in Council. The Commander-in-Chief initials the docket, or records his views on the subject in a minute, and, if necessary, sends it on to the civil Members of the Council; but under ordinary circumstances he returns it (5) to the Secretary, by whom it is sent (6) to the Adjutant or Quarter Master General (as the case may be) for the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief.

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The correspondence is then again submitted by the departmental officers (7) to the Commander-in-Chief; and his views are recorded by the departmental officers, who returns the letter (8) to the Secretary, by whom, if necessary, the correspondence is again submitted (9) to the Governor, before being sent (10) to the printing office. On the return (11) of the printed form, the Government Resolution is again sent (12) to the staff officers of the Commander-in-Chief and to the Military Department of the army to which it belongs, to be acted upon. Thus after a lapse of at least a fortnight, and the transmission of the correspondence, by post or messenger, through 12 different stages, an order from the Government of India may be acted upon or replied to by the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army.

21. Does your Excellency think that the department of ordnance, military works, commissariat, and military accounts should be brought more *en rapport* with the Commander-in-Chief; and if so, will you suggest the mode of giving effect to your views?

21. As the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army has no control over the military department of ordnance, public works, commissariat or control, except through the Governor in Council, to whom the heads of the above-named departments are solely responsible, I consider that the said departments should be brought more *en rapport* with the Commander-in-Chief of the local army, who cannot be said to command an army when the power of control over the most necessary departments of supply and transport is withheld, and the appointment of all officers connected with said departments is in the hands of the Governor in Council. There are 144 officers belonging to the Bombay army now in the employ of Government over whom the Commander-in-Chief has no, or only a very nominal, control. It is difficult to suggest a remedy while Government retains the control of military departments, and economy dictates the rule; but the anomaly exists, and must exist until the several departments are placed under the immediate control of the Commander-in-Chief, subject only to the control of Government in the matter of expenditure and audit.

22. Does your Excellency consider it an advantage or otherwise to have three separate departments of commissariat, ordnance, medical, clothing, &c., &c., for the work of the army of India?

22. Generally speaking, it would appear to be unnecessary to have separate departments for the work of the army of India; but when we consider the enormous extent of territory over which that army is spread, the different interests of the different presidencies, the necessity for, especially in making contracts, prompt decision, and local knowledge, I am of opinion that the commissariat of Bombay should be kept, like its army-corps, distinct and separate, as at present, under its own responsible head.

The same ruling does not apply so directly to the ordnance, as I have no doubt a reduction in expenditure might be made, if the direction of the ordnance department were placed under one head, who could regulate the demands and supply between the different presidencies, and not allow vast supplies to be accumulated in one presidency, while there may be a deficiency of the same articles in another.

The medical department is susceptible of improvement by abolishing the two separate departments, *viz.*, European and Indian (local); but I see no object in centralizing the whole medical department of the armies of India under one head. No saving of expense would accrue, and much inconvenience might arise, if the demands of the several presidencies were left to the decision of one central office.

23. I do not consider that any reductions can be made either in the number or class of British troops serving in India.

On the contrary, as far as regards Bombay, I should be glad to be able to relieve the one cavalry regiment now always stationed at Mhow by another regiment, which would be extremely useful, if not absolutely necessary, at Kirkee or Ahmednagar.

The substitution of horse, field, or garrison batteries, the one for the other, can only be decided by the object for which any one or other of these batteries is required. Their *rôle* is distinct, and the proportion of each arm must be determined by the general measures that may be decided on for the military occupation and defence of the country.

23. Is your Excellency of opinion that any reduction can be made in the number or class of British troops serving in India? Could India dispense, for instance, with any regiments of infantry or cavalry or any batteries of artillery; or could garrison batteries at any station safely take the place of field batteries, or field batteries take the place of horse artillery?



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24. Bearing in mind the fact that the annual cost of officers to men is as follows—

	For a regiment, British cavalry. Rs.	For a regiment, British infantry. Rs.
Officers	1,40,797	1,48,793
Non-commissioned officers and men	1,14,061	1,76,126

is your Excellency of opinion that any change in the organization of regiments is possible so as to maintain the fighting strength of the British force in India, and at the same time diminish the relative cost of officers to men?

25. In your opinion is it desirable, on the score of economy and efficiency, to substitute for Indian service a local British force in place of a portion of the Home army?

26. In your Excellency's opinion would it be advisable, apart from the question of reduction of the strength of the army, to modify the present proportion of British to Native troops?

27. Reviewing the Enlistment Act of 1870, together with the Regulations issued under the Act, War Office Circulars, clauses 36 and 169, of 1878, especially as applicable to India, are you of opinion that in the event of a local force not being employed, any further modifications of existing Acts should be made?

28. Can you suggest any means by which the present cost of supplying British soldiers for service in India can be reduced, without decreasing in any way their efficiency?

In discussing this subject, a fair consideration must be given to the share India should take in support of the general maintenance of the British empire.

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24. In order to diminish the relative cost of officers to men, it is only necessary to increase the number of rank and file, and to prevent the embarkation from England of all men under say 21 years of age. Looking to the medical statistics, I should prefer even an older soldier, it being evident that the mortality (*i.e.*, cost) of the lads who are now enlisted and sent to India must add very materially to the relative cost of officers to men.

25. I cannot consider that greater efficiency can be attained by the substitution of a local British force for the British army that now holds India. Economy might be attained in transport by enlisting men specially for long service in India; but the collapse of the European army (as regards efficiency) raised and maintained by the late Hon'ble East India Company should serve as a warning to prevent the repetition of a local army, which at the best could only be subordinate to the Imperial troops from England.

26. Under no circumstances should the relative strength of British and Native troops be modified. Looking to the very large numbers of troops maintained by the Native Princes of India, and to the evident efforts of these Princes to make their armies equal to, if not superior to, the Native army of mercenaries now employed under the British Government—a Government repugnant to the religion and feelings of every Native—policy would demand a larger proportion of British to Native troops than is now maintained.

Under no circumstances should that proportion be reduced until we can restore to the ranks of the British army the same class of non-commissioned officers, the backbone of a regiment, and the same description of men, inured to danger and to climate, that saved India in the time of the mutiny.

27. The Enlistment Act for 1870 gives to the Secretary of State for War power to determine the limit of enlistment up to 12 years with the colors. If this power had not been abrogated by a Horse Guards Order, all British infantry required for service in India could be enlisted for the full term of 12 years; and the Act should so far be modified as to allow of every man physically fit being re-engaged for a further term of 9 years, making in all 21 years, before he becomes ordinarily eligible for pension.

The whole of this service need not necessarily be passed in India. The object will be gained if on completion of 21 years' service with the colors, at home or abroad, he should be entitled to pension. Pension to be paid by the Indian Government if the man has served 15 years in India, and by the two Governments in relative proportion if, after 9 years' service in India, the health of the man fails, and the greater part of his service for pension is passed out of Indian limits. No man should be allowed to embark from England until he has completed 21 years of age. Supposing that he entered at 18, this would give 9 years' service in India, if not re-engaged, and 18 years' service in India or with the colors, if re-engaged to serve for pension.

28. The cost of supplying British soldiers for Indian service may be very materially reduced, and with considerable increase to their efficiency, by not permitting any soldier to embark for India from England or elsewhere until he shall have completed 21 years of age, or 3 years' service at home or with the *dépôt*. Medical statistics show that it is the very young men who succumb to climate. Many of these very young men die and are a loss to India to their full cost. Many are invalided, thereby increasing the cost of transport; while all are for a greater or less time in hospital, and consequently a burden and an expense to the State.

By the course suggested in my reply to the previous question (No. 27), long service and pensions would be restored to the army in India: and the restoration of these two essential points, which not only made efficient non-commissioned officers, but excellent soldiers, would, I believe, reproduce the old stamp of British soldiers who formed the army of India at the time of the mutiny of the sepoy regiments.

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29. There is a large staff of Assistant Adjutant Generals, and Deputy Assistant Adjutant Generals for Musketry, Regimental Instructors and Assistant Instructors of Musketry, throughout India.

Does not your Excellency consider that regimental instruction in musketry can be carried on by Company's officers as part of their ordinary military duty, and that the staff for musketry inspection can be largely reduced; the duty of inspection being carried on by generals and their staff, assisted, if absolutely necessary, by a specially trained officer?

29. In the Bombay presidency there is one Assistant Adjutant General and two Deputy Assistant Adjutant Generals for Musketry.

Each European regiment (9) has a Musketry Instructor, but there is no Musketry Instructor allowed for Native infantry regiments. The appointment of Assistant Instructor of Musketry in European regiments may be considered abolished, as there is no pay for such officer.

In the Native army, to which I assume that the question is particularly directed, I do not think, judging by the returns, that the method of instruction is properly understood; nor do I think that the Native officers are as yet capable of teaching the ordinary musketry drill.

In England schools exist at which officers may learn this very important part of a soldier's duty; but in India the only schools of instruction are the annual meetings got up by private subscriptions, and carried out by the zeal and exertions of the officers who compose the musketry staff.

For the present, a specially trained officer should continue to be entrusted with the inspection of regiments, as I feel sure that this duty would not be effectually performed by generals, or their staffs.

Even if the duties of inspection could be so carried out, the preliminary drills and instruction of the sepoys would be left to chance, as, owing to the want of trained officers with regiments, the instruction is necessarily faulty.

I should advocate the appointment of a trained officer instructor for each regiment, the compulsory instruction of every European and Native officer, all of whom should become marksmen; and the more frequent practice of the sepoys, not only at the target, but at field-firing, to give them confidence in their arms, for which a special allowance of ammunition would be required. Every ricochet shot, fairly delivered, should count. It is of more importance to make men fire *low* than to deprive them of the very insignificant benefit arising from being able to add such shots to their score.

30. Is any reduction in the Judge Advocate General's Department practicable by the concentration of work at head-quarters; courts-martial being conducted by officers with the usual allowance for the discharge of this duty, and in very special cases by an officer deputed from head-quarters?

30. The Judge Advocate General's Department in Bombay consists of one Judge Advocate and two Deputy Judge Advocate Generals, specially appointed, after having passed a departmental examination in military law.

Judging from the mistakes which occur in the proceedings of ordinary district and regimental courts-martial, I cannot recommend any reduction in the very small staff of Judge Advocates in the Bombay army.

If the work be concentrated at the head-quarters of the army, there must be *one* deputy to conduct the proceedings of courts-martial at distant stations, and to assist the Judge Advocate. Until regimental officers, generally, attain a more accurate knowledge of military law and the forms of procedure, it will be necessary to appoint a qualified officer to conduct the proceedings of all general and any special court-martial; consequently the reduction of one deputy would be no saving to Government.

31. Is it necessary to retain the allowance now passed to interpreters of British cavalry and infantry regiments? No such allowance is found necessary for batteries of artillery, with large Native establishments.

31. No such allowance being found necessary for batteries of artillery with large Native establishments, it may not be considered necessary to maintain interpreters with cavalry and infantry regiments; but it must be remembered that, in doing away with such appointments, one of the very few inducements now offered to regimental officers to qualify in Native languages is withdrawn; and as court-martial duties must be carried out by a paid English officer, as interpreter, very little saving would be effected by the change.

32. Does your Excellency see any objection to the assimilation of the scale of syces allowed to British cavalry? Excluding the horses of the non-commissioned officers, for which one syce each is allowed, the present scale is in Bengal one to two, in Madras one to four, and in Bombay one to three horses: which of these scales would your Excellency adopt?

32. There is only one British cavalry regiment attached to the Bombay army. I believe that the Madras scale of one syce to every four horses would be found sufficient; but the syces must be well paid.

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33. Might not bazar sergeants be abolished?

33. Bazar sergeants can be dispensed with as soon as the new cantonment rules are published.

It is understood that provision will be made for the employment of qualified civilians, who will be paid and do the duties now required of bazar sergeants in a proper and efficient manner.

34. (a) Does not your Excellency consider that the present expenditure on punkah-pulling is excessive; are not large reductions possible; and would it not be feasible to reduce the cost of punkah-pulling by resorting to the old system of a fixed allowance per company, &c.?

34. (a) In the Bombay presidency the climate does not necessitate any great amount of expenditure on punkah-pulling, which is required at very few stations. The cost has been reduced by the introduction of a lever punkah, not altogether satisfactory.

(b) Would the abolition of khush-khush tatties, except in hospitals, cause any discomfort or risk to the health of the troops?

(b) Khush-khush tatties are only used at some of the northern stations. The medical officers say that they cannot be abolished without risk to the health of the troops in hospitals.

(c) Can your Excellency suggest any way of reducing the very heavy expenditure annually incurred in the purchase (or manufacture) and repair of barrack furniture, barrack bedding, &c.?

(c) The repair of barrack furniture has, I understand, been very recently made over to the engineers department; but I cannot say with what effect on expenditure.

35. Does your Excellency consider it necessary to maintain any reserve of Government horses; and if so, how many; and on what basis should the reserve be calculated?

35. It is, I think, necessary to maintain a reserve of Government horses; and I would fix the number at 200 for this presidency. This number represents rather less than the average number of remounts which have been required yearly by British cavalry and batteries of royal artillery in the Bombay army for the last five years. Four batteries have recently proceeded on service from this command; and, in order to complete them, it was necessary to withdraw 103 horses from other batteries. I do not think, therefore, that 200 is more than should be kept in reserve to meet emergencies, or more than are likely to be absorbed within a year on ordinary occasions. The intermittent state of the horse market in Bombay is a strong argument in favor of the establishment of a reserve, as horses are only obtainable there at certain times of the year.

Should this reserve be attached to corps and batteries, or to one or more dépôts?

There should also be a yearly importation of mules from Persia for mountain batteries. The dealers should be encouraged to bring a few with the horses from the Gulf. The mules that are getting past their work in the mountain batteries should be handed over to the commissariat, by whom they could be utilized for some years longer.

36. If the former, to what particular division of the army should they be posted?

36. The reserve should be attached to a dépôt on a line of rail and in a good climate. Ahmednagar answers these conditions. Horses are known to thrive there well, forage is cheap, and the requisite stabling is available in the deserted cavalry stables.

The difficulties of attaching the reserve to batteries are—

1st.—The horses would then be separated, and it would be necessary to collect them from various quarters to meet a sudden call.

2nd.—They would lose the advantage of being in the best climate that can be selected.

3rd.—Additions would have to be made to the existing stabling.

37. Would your Excellency approve of the reduction of the establishment of horses for horse and field batteries to the war scale laid down in Army Circular No. 186 of 1877, deducting such carts as in India are drawn by bullocks?

37. There being no reserve of horses at present established, and horses being very scarce in Bombay, except at particular seasons, I do not think that any reduction ought to be made in the established number for horse or field batteries. Indeed the efficiency of the batteries in the field in time of war would be greatly increased by the substitution of horses, instead of bullocks, in battery carts.

38. Can your Excellency suggest any improvements in the constitution and working of the commissariat department?

38. The Officiating Commissary General (Colonel Willoughby) has in his replies to the questions transmitted to him (B) taken such a broad and liberal view of the whole question of commissariat organization, and has so much practical knowledge, of which I am deficient, that I can only refer to his replies, and record my own opinions which are derived chiefly from Colonel Willoughby's experience.

The points which would appear to require notice are—

(a) As regards the large supervising staff of the department, I believe that, in order to avoid peculation, the staff must be adapted to the necessities of the moment, reducing it once to the ordinary establishment so soon as the pressure is passed.

(a) The large supervising staff of the department.

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(b) The number of senior officers of high rank and with high pay, doing comparatively subordinate and unimportant work.

(c) The large office establishments kept up with each executive officer in consequence of a want of simplification and unification in the examination of accounts.

(d) Relative advantages of the contract and agency system of supply.\*

(e) Expense of the movement of commissariat stores, owing to want of supervision and system.

(f) As to the advisability of having three separate departments for India, each with its own large supervising and office staffs.

(g) The advisability of bringing commissariat duties more within the knowledge and control of the general officer commanding both in peace and in war.

(h) Whether it would not be advisable to confine the operations of the commissariat department entirely to the issue of consumable stores, taking from it the issue of such things as line-gear, bedding, &c., which do not seem to appertain to it.

(i) What should be the organization of a division of transport in war, *i. e.*, as to number of animals, officers, supervising staff, drivers, artificers, and veterinarians?

39. What are your Excellency's views generally regarding the organization of the transport for the army in India?

The following points suggest themselves—

(a) As to whether the transport should be under the commissariat, or organized as a separate department?

(b) What are the arrangements which your Excellency would propose should be carried out for the formation of a nucleus of a transport department by utilizing existing carriage, such as moveable columns, and without adding to the present cost of these? How could a system of regimental transport be organized?

(c) As to the most effectual means of securing the speedy collection of transport in the event of a war.

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(b) High rank and high pay seems to be the normal condition of Indian departmental officers, who, having attained rank rapidly, cling to their appointments, and are obliged to do unimportant work, which might be done equally well by more subordinate officers on less pay.

(c) I am not prepared to say in what manner a simplification and unification in the examination of accounts would affect the office establishments of executive officers.

(d) The contract system prevails in Bombay; and can hardly be changed for a better.

(e) The expense of movement of stores does not arise from want of supervision, although it may arise from a want of system. Colonel Willoughby recommends that a commissariat commissioned officer should be employed at all stations where British troops of more than one arm are stationed; and states that two important stations are now under warrant officers.

(f) Although the supervising and office staffs may be large, it would appear to be desirable to maintain the three separate departments of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay on account of the great dissimilarity in the different presidencies of the mode and conduct of business matters, contracts, &c., and the necessity of prompt decision and local knowledge to avoid deception, so universally practised by Native contractors.

(g) If the provisions of the Government of India's letter (No. 941) of 19th February 1877 are properly carried out, the general officer is able to give his orders direct to the commissariat officer, who ought to be, and really is, under the immediate orders of the combatant officer in command in time of war, and of the general officer of the district in time of peace.

(h) I consider the course suggested in this portion of the question to a great extent advisable.

(i) See Colonel Mignon's very useful little manual or hand-book on commissariat organization.

39. I am not aware that there is any organized system of transport in the Bombay army.

Moveable columns are established at all the larger stations; and they have a certain amount of Government transport always ready (but utilized when not required) to enable the column to move at very short notice. This transport might rapidly be supplemented by the employment of the carts and bullocks of the country, and is a good nucleus on which to organize a transport service, which, however, I do not consider necessary as a separate department. In November last, I ordered by telegram, without previous warning, the moveable columns to march at daylight on the following morning four miles out and back to the cantonment. This experiment had never been tried before, so that in some few cases the transport was not wholly available, but the columns moved at once as ordered, and only with 12 hours' notice.

As regards the several points to which my attention is drawn, I believe that—

(a) For the requirements of an army in the field there should be two distinct divisions of transport, *viz.*, for the commissariat and for the other requirements of the army.

(b) Moveable column transport, as at present organized in this presidency, offers a good nucleus on which to utilize existing carriage, without adding to cost. Except as regards the surplus ammunition, I do not advocate a system of independent regimental transport.

(c) Through the agency of the civil officers of Government in time of war, transport adapted to the particular field

\* Vide Financial Review of Commissariat Department, 1877-78, paragraphs 18, 21, 37, 85, 109, 117, 119, 121, 130, 131, 139, 140, 143, 152, 154.

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(d) Whether it would not be advisable to endeavour to introduce a better and a lighter description of cart into India with a view to the substitution, when possible, of wheeled for pack carriage?

(e) Whether your Excellency thinks anything can be done to increase the supply and improve the breed of mules?

(f) Looking to the fact that the supply of camels is believed to be steadily decreasing, can you suggest any means by which that supply can be kept up? Could not elephants be largely dispensed with as army transport?

(g) Which do you consider it most advisable to use on service,—Government or hired transport?

(h) Whether you think that, in the event of a Government nucleus being kept up, much of the cost could not be saved by its utilization for the relief of troops and the carriage of commissariat and other stores?

(i) What should be the organization of a division of transport in war, *i. e.*, as to number of animals, officers, supervising staff, drivers, artificers, and veterinarians?

40. Does your Excellency consider that the Military Works Branch of the Department Public Works should be brought more directly under the military authorities than at present, and could not its organization be so arranged as to make the engineer department more efficient for war? Or should the Military Works Branch be abolished, the ordinary works being constructed and maintained by the ordinary Public Works staff, a special establishment being appointed, under the Military Department, for any large works requiring peculiar knowledge or skill?

41. In what way can your Excellency suggest the reduction of the expenditure of the Military Works Branch, Public Works Department?

(a) Could not the expenditure for each year be limited to a fixed annual grant, and the completion of the works necessary for the accommodation of troops and the defence of the empire be distributed over a series of years?

(b) What is your Excellency's opinion of the barrack accommodation in India generally? Are not many of the barracks constructed in late years designed on a most extravagant scale; are these new barracks any more comfortable or conducive to the health of the occupiers than many of the older and cheaper single-storeyed barracks?

(c) Might not many of the barracks throughout India be constructed in a more economical style; and might not many of the troops on the hills be housed for many years to come in cheap huts or cottage barracks?

(d) Could not the ordinary repairs of completed barracks, and the construction of barracks on standard plans, be well left to the Local Governments, subject to inspection by officers employed under the Government of India?

## ANSWERS.

of operations can be very effectually and speedily collected, as was evidenced in Sind lately, when nearly 20,000 camels were collected for the service of the Kandahar column, after its own carriage had failed.

(d) In all mountainous and difficult countries I believe that pack carriage is preferable to wheeled carriage; but undoubtedly a lighter description of cart might be introduced with advantage.

(e) Endeavour has been made by the introduction of stallion jacksasses to improve the breed of mules, but I am not prepared to say with what success.

(f) I have no information to offer any suggestions regarding the increase of the supply of camels, which are bred extensively in Sind and Rajputana. Sind was almost denuded of serviceable camels by the demand which was made on that province during the recent campaign; and I believe the Rajputana camels are not well adapted to rough countries. Elephants are only useful for heavy draught beyond the reach of musketry-fire.

(g) Whenever hired transport can be made available, it is less costly than Government transport, which, to be efficient, must be maintained at great expense for an indefinite time during peace.

(h) By the universal adoption of railway carriage in the relief of troops, much of the cost of transport is saved, and no advantage would be gained by keeping up Government transport, for that purpose, during peace.

(i) The organization of a division of transport is laid down in the printed regulations, and much practical information on the subject is contained in a small manual published by Colonel Mignon, Commissary General, Bombay army, for the use of the commissariat department.

40. I can see no reason why the Military Branch of the Public Works Department should not be brought more directly under the military authorities, by the submission, in the first instance, of all military questions to the Quarter Master General for the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief. Government may require the control of expenditure; but the military authorities are responsible for the efficiency of the work. There is no separate Military Department in the Public Works in the Bombay presidency.

41. As already stated, in the Bombay presidency there is no separate Military Works Branch in the Public Works Department.

(a) The expenditure is limited, and, if one may judge by the result, too much limited, by a fixed annual grant. So that the completion of all works is really distributed over a series of years.

(b) The barracks recently constructed in the Bombay command are more costly than necessary, but are not on what I should call a 'most extravagant scale.' I believe that the new barracks are not more comfortable, although infinitely more commodious and handsome, than the older and cheaper single-storeyed barracks which prevailed formerly in India. I have a strong feeling that my regiment twenty years ago, when occupying less palatial buildings than do regiments in the present day, was infinitely less subject to fever, caused, as I believe, by overheated men being exposed to the extreme ventilation and thorough draughts of the present costly buildings.

(c) The present single-storeyed barracks are very substantially built, and are excellent in their design; but I think their cost is out of proportion to the requirements of British soldiers, who are not accustomed to, and do not appreciate, so much cubic space, which means 'thorough draughts' and little real comfort.

(d) The Local Government of Bombay now undertakes through the Public Works Department the repairs and construction of barracks on standard plans, which are carried out at every station with but little reference to climate, local

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

(c) Might not European soldiers be more frequently employed in public works, especially in the construction of their own barracks on the hills and the roads leading to them?

circumstances, or other contingencies essential to the comfort and well-being of the occupants.

(e) I believe that much more use might be made of British soldiers if the medical officers did not at once negative any attempt to employ them usefully in time of peace.

In war time British soldiers are exposed at all hours to all the vicissitudes of climate, without apparently any injurious effect.

42. Do you consider that a clearer and more appropriate classification of the subjects dealt with in each department of the staff and the army could be adopted, and if so, would it not add to efficiency, and tend to the reduction of labor?

42. I believe that the classification of the subjects dealt with in the staff office of the army has been very carefully considered, and that each department has adopted a system to secure efficiency and reduce clerical labor to the utmost.

43. Do you consider that the amount of correspondence and returns in the army could be reduced; and would you approve of a committee to consider this question?

43. The necessity for reducing the amount of correspondence and returns in the army has frequently been mooted; but I believe that their reduction depends very much upon the idiosyncrasy of the head of the department, and that but very little benefit would arise from further enquiry by committee.

44. Do you consider that the system of payment, audit, and army account is susceptible of improvement; and what alterations would your Excellency suggest?

44. The subjects contained in this question are of such importance, that I only consider myself qualified to give a concise answer through the information afforded by the Officiating Controller of Army Accounts; who very candidly admits that the system of audit is searching and prompt, but repudiates the possibility of eliminating trivial objections for fear of establishing precedents; and he admits of no exercise of judgment in subordinate auditors. The payment of the army is concluded before the middle of the ensuing month for which payments have been made; and the audit of accounts is completed so rapidly, that the regimental paymaster is relieved from much responsibility.

45. Is your Excellency in favor of station (or general) hospitals in large cantonments, and field and base (or general) hospitals in the field, in place of regimental hospitals?

45. There is much economy in station hospitals for large cantonments, whereby the dispensing and cooking departments, as well as the establishment of servants, are much reduced. But there is a strong prejudice in European regiments, as there would be in private life, against patients being sent to a station hospital, to be treated by the medical officer on duty instead of by the regimental medical officers, for whom the old soldier not only had a great respect, but a personal regard. This he does not feel for a stranger, who cannot take the same interest in his ailments. Every regiment should have its own medical officer; but the services of this officer could of course be utilized in large cantonments at station hospitals. On active service, field hospitals become 'base' or general hospitals, according to their position and permanency. The old system, by which every regiment was encumbered with a large hospital and medical establishment in time of war, is now shown to be impracticable.

Field hospitals, with one or more regimental surgeons and stretcher-bearers actually present with the regiments in the field, seem to meet all the requirements of active service.

46. Do you think it desirable that the power formerly granted to commanding officers of Native regiments to dismiss men of bad character or inefficient for service should be restored?

46. If I could believe that, under the present system, commanding officers of Native regiments took as much interest in the welfare and discipline of their regiments as formerly, I would restore to them the power of dismissing any man (sepooy) of bad character, or who was otherwise not really efficient; but I have not that faith in the present system, and therefore I consider that the restraint on dismissal given by the summary courts-martial should be continued.

47. (a) What changes, if any, would your Excellency recommend in the constitution, organization, and equipment of the Native cavalry and infantry?

47. (a) I consider the organization, constitution, and equipment of the Native cavalry and infantry must be made the subject of a separate minute, if it is necessary to supplement the very voluminous correspondence that took place under my predecessor, Sir Charles Staveley.

(b) Is your Excellency in favor of the substitution of pioneer regiments for line regiments; and could more Goorkha regiments be raised?

(b) As every regiment should be equal to the performance of any duties that may be required of it, the substitution of pioneer regiments for line regiments would lead to invidious distinctions, without any corresponding benefit to the army at large. Goorkhas make excellent soldiers; but a preponderance of any particular class or race in the Indian army is to be deprecated.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

48. In the ryotwari districts, or in other parts of India, would grants of waste lands, revenue free for their lives, be acceptable to Native officers and soldiers in lieu of part of their pension?

49. Would it not be desirable to alter the designation of *ressaidars*, *ressaidars*, and *subadars* of the Native army, who now command troops and companies, to that of captain, and *jemadars* to that of lieutenant?

50. For the education of cadets of good family for direct commissions as Native officers, would it not be desirable to afford them the means of instruction in military schools, say one at *Roorkee* for Eastern, and one at *Poona* for Western India, where the fees should be sufficiently high to ensure only gentlemen of a superior class entering their sons, and to which nominations should be made by the Viceroy?

51. To what extent would you recommend the grant of commissions, otherwise than by promotion from the ranks; and what should be the attainments qualifying for such nominations?

52. With reference to the comparative small amount of pension to pay of Native officers, and to afford them greater inducements to retire, would it be desirable and acceptable to them to establish a system of deferred pay, by deduction of a small percentage, say 5 per cent., from the pay of all Native officers hereafter promoted, to amass to individual credit, with interest say at 4 per cent.? The sum to be handed over on retirement, or to his heirs at any time in case of his death, and to be inalienable by any authority, except by being confiscated to the State in case of cashiering.

53. Has your Excellency any suggestions to make with a view to alter or improve the terms on which Native officers and soldiers can obtain pension, or to alter the periods after which Native officers and soldiers can obtain pension on medical certificate or otherwise?

54. Do you consider that, under a proper system of concentration and distribution at important centres, the strength of the present Native army in India can be reduced, should it be resolved to create a system of reserves supplying extra men to meet a call for service, say to an extent equal to half the strength of the present Native army?

48. Grants of waste land would not meet the approval of Native officers and soldiers in lieu of pension. The system was tried and failed, because the land was barren, and the want of capital prevented its being brought into proper cultivation.

49. I can see no object in altering the designations of Native officers, which now serve as a distinction to prevent confusion between their regimental rank and the rank of the European officers.

50. I have not sufficient experience to state positively from personal knowledge what effect the education of Natives of good families in military schools would have upon the appointment of officers to direct commissions in the Native army. I should have thought that such an idea would be rendered impracticable from caste-prejudices; but if it were practicable, I doubt whether they would on appointment to regiments obtain that control over the various castes of sepoys necessary to make such cadets good and efficient officers. I think that our first care should be to improve the class of those enlisted into the army, either by extending the area of enlistment, or by giving additional pay to induce a better class to enlist. The training and education of a sepoy who has passed through the various grades of rank before he becomes an officer apparently fits him for the peculiar position he has henceforward to hold, better than if he were appointed direct to a commission in the army.

I do not think that such nominations, if feasible, should be made only by the Viceroy.

51. Compulsory retirement at the end of 32 years' service in all ranks ensures promotion, at a desirable age, to younger men who are serving in the ranks. I would not, therefore, recommend the grant of commissions, otherwise than by promotion from the ranks, except under very exceptional circumstances.

52. I cannot see that any advantage would be gained, either to the Native officer or to the State, by the introduction of any system of deferred pay; the terms of pension are generally approved, and no officer should continue in the service after he becomes inefficient, nor after he has completed the full period on the termination of which he becomes eligible for pension.

53. If the sepoy, at the end of 15 years' service, sees little prospect of becoming a non-commissioned officer, he endeavours to obtain his discharge on medical certificate on the smaller pension of Rs. 4 a month rather than await the full period of 32 years before he can be eligible for the full pension of Rs. 7.

In the Bombay army over 17,000 men are under 15 years' service, proving conclusively that Native soldiers only remain with the colors until they can secure a pension, however small, to supplement their earnings in private life.

54. For the reasons already stated, I do not think that the small force composing the Bombay army can be concentrated in the manner proposed. If the system of reserves were connected with the district police, so that, in addition to the ordinary police, a military police were established, the objections to the concentration of troops at important centres would cease, and the strength of the Native army might then be reduced to the extent of, say, one-third of the present number.

But I do not advocate this reduction, because I believe that reserves are altogether impolitic.

The best reserves are the separate armies of the separate presidencies, who, speaking different languages, and having different customs, are nevertheless paid by the same master to support the same Government, and maintain English supremacy, whether threatened on the north, east, west, or south.

## QUESTIONS.

55. Would it be advantageous, in your Excellency's opinion, to establish such reserves; and, if so, on what principle?

56. Do you consider that the home or any continental system of reserve force could, with alterations, be adapted to the Native armies of India?

57. If you object generally to the creation of extra reserve forces of Native troops (but having regard to the fact that annually a large number of men are transferred to the pension lists, and that the cost for the total number of pensioners, viz., 63,178, is Rs. 46,08,539 per annum), do you see any reason why the present system of invalid pensioning after 15 years' service should not be abolished, and a limited number of effective men be passed to a reserve on reserve pay, after say not less than 8 years' service, non-effectives being at all times examined by a medical board, and struck off with gratuities equal to one month's pay for regimental or reserve service, as the case may be, for every year's service?

In such an organization the men of the reserve could be retained under the immediate control of their own regimental officers, and be liable, during a fixed period, to be called out at any time in case of war to join their own regiments and for one month's annual training at the depot; after which period they might pass into a second reserve, liable only to be called out for garrison duty in case of war, until entitled to reserve pension.

On the score of efficiency and economy, and to afford the means of maintaining regimental depôts and such reserves as have been proposed above, might it not be advisable to increase regimental strength from 600 to 800 sepoys, with a corresponding reduction of the number of battalions in the proportion of 4 to 3?

58. Would it be possible to utilize the men of the sappers and miners and the pioneer corps, who may have passed to the reserve, in arsenals, depôts, railways, and other workshops?

59. Would you, in like manner, approve of the conversion of Native cavalry corps into regiments of 4 instead of 3 squadrons, with a corresponding decrease in number of regiments from 4 to 3, a squadron commander and officer being added to each corps?

60. Should the Punjab and Sind Frontier Forces be placed wholly or entirely under the Commander-in-Chief in India?

61. What are the communications the construction of which appears to be of the first moment from a military point of view?

## ANSWERS.

55. I do not consider that in a military point of view any advantage would accrue to the army by the establishment of such reserves, although a small economy might benefit the State; because the sepoys who now malingering to obtain their discharge after 15 years' service would be available to form reserves on possibly Rs. 2½ or Rs. 3, instead of Rs. 4, which they now obtain. This apparent saving is not, however, real, as the same man would continue for ever on the smaller pension, whereas in the reserve he would obtain a higher pension after, say, 32 years' service.

56. I have always been under the impression that the restoration of the martial spirit in India would be fatal to our supremacy. If, however, as these questions of reserves lead me to suppose, there is no objection to trained men being scattered throughout the villages in country districts, possibly training the armies of the Native Princes, I can see no reason why the home system of reserves should not be adapted to the Native armies.

57. It must always be borne in mind that the Native army in India is purely an army of mercenaries, animated by no feelings of love for British rule, but by religion and by tradition hateful of our presence, and antagonistic to our Government. Natives give only that amount of allegiance we pay for, and that amount of service we buy. Under such circumstances it would not appear to be desirable to pay men for doing nothing, in a country where they might become mischievous unless retained under the immediate control of their officers, which could only be effected at considerable expense.

I do not therefore see that any further reserve is necessary than that now formed by the older pensioners, who, I am informed, were called out in this presidency during the mutiny, and did good garrison duty. The present system of invalid pension after 15 years' service might, therefore, be abolished, and all men retained for the full period of their enlistment in the army; but, if found inefficient before their full time for pension arrived, they might be discharged with a gratuity, proportioned to the number of years' service they have given to the State.

58. The corps of sappers and miners in the Bombay presidency is so small (there are no pioneer corps), that the number of men passed into the reserve and fit for further employment in arsenals, &c., would hardly be appreciable.

59. The paucity of this arm of the service in the Bombay army would prevent any reduction in the number of regiments, although it would be very desirable to increase the number of squadrons, with an increase in the number of officers to the extent notified, viz., one squadron commander and one troop officer being added to each regiment.

60. All military forces should be under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the territorial army or army-corps in which the force is acting; therefore the Punjab and Sind Frontier Forces should be under the command of the respective Commanders-in-Chief, subject to such local regulations as the state of the country may demand and its political officers deem necessary.

61. India is now covered with a network of railways, daily increasing in extent, and rendering the construction of military lines of communication unnecessary. At the same time it is essentially necessary for the Government of India to maintain such a control over the working of railways, that no local difficulties may exist or restrictions be offered to the rapid transport of troops by rail in any direction, and at any time that their services may be required. The Bombay presidency is also well traversed by excellent highways which pierce the Ghâts in different places, giving easy communication between the coast and the Deccan, and extending across the Bombay frontier into the interior of India. If these roads are kept in proper repair, there is little necessity for the construction of other lines of communication for military purposes.



## II.

## STAFF CORPS.

Replies by His Excellency Lieutenant-General H. J. Warre, C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.

I do not consider that, personally, I have sufficient practical experience of the working of the system to be able to record more than a general desire that the present enquiry may be the means of abolishing defects in the staff corps, which, as applied to the Bombay army, if they cannot be considered as positively mischievous, are certainly not satisfactory.

The promotion of officers to the higher grades for whom there is no appropriate employment has encumbered the army with field officers far in excess of its possible wants, thereby obliging them to undertake duties derogatory to their rank, and consequently entailing an expenditure far above any corresponding result; while the interests of the State have suffered by the disunion caused in British regiments by the removal of officers to serve in the staff corps, whose vacancies are not always immediately filled up.

I consider that it is only due to the careful study and consideration that he has given to the subject, to state that I have availed myself of Brigadier-General Brooke's (Adjutant General of the Bombay army) experience in replying to the questions submitted in the paper No. II on the Staff Corps.

## QUESTIONS.

1. What is your Excellency's opinion of the working of the staff corps system?

2. Beyond meeting the grievances of certain officers of the army, who in consequence of reductions came to be in excess of requirements, has its formation been beneficial or mischievous to the army?

3. Has it not thrown upon the State an enormous expenditure, with little or no corresponding result; and has it not encumbered the army with field officers far in excess of all conceivable wants?

4. Is it not demoralizing to an army that all the officers of that army shall be entitled to regular promotion, grade by grade, to the highest ranks of the army by mere expiry of a certain number of years in each rank or grade, and without any reference to merit or efficiency?

## ANSWERS.

1. The staff corps system of promotion differs so essentially in its main principles from that on which promotion in the English army has been, and is, carried on, that the two could hardly be expected to harmonize or agree; nor can it be for the interests of the State to promote officers to the higher grades, for whom there is no appropriate employment. The staff corps system may be said, in general terms, to have been as disadvantageous to the State in all its aspects as it has undoubtedly been advantageous to the individual officers, even though, in some instances, duties which would be equally well, if not better, performed by subalterns, are now required of captains and field officers. I am not aware of any other instance of a system of promotion, such as that which was devised for the staff corps, *viz.*, promotion by mere length of service without reference to the necessities of the State. The Bombay staff corps now numbers 440 *effective* officers; of these 234 are field officers, and 206 captains and subalterns. Before the 1st April 1880, 11 of the captains will complete 20 years' service, and will then be promoted to the rank of major, when the field officers will number 245, against 195 captains and subalterns. The staff corps rule of promotion has been applied to the officers on the general list (*i.e.*, officers who entered the service between 1857 and the formation of the staff corps, but who did not enter the staff corps) with similar results, as the 44 captains who are now on those lists will all be promoted to the rank of major before April 1882. These figures seem to prove that the working of the staff corps system cannot be said to be in any respect satisfactory.

2. The problem which the Government of the day had to solve was doubtless the most difficult which could well be imagined, as they were bound by the covenants which existed between the East India Company and its officers to deal very tenderly with individual interests; and it would appear that these interests, rather than those of the State, received first consideration. As a matter of fact, although it is probable that this view might not be readily accepted by officers of the Indian army, the effects of the mutiny were, on the whole, favorable to the officers of the East India Company's service. At the same time it cannot be said that the rate of promotion arrived at under the staff corps system is at all in excess of the requirements of the service; and though that system imposes an unnecessary financial burden on the State, it can hardly be described as mischievous to the army.

3. I reply in the affirmative to both these questions.

4. This question puts the case in an extreme way. It is true that officers in the staff corps do rise to the highest grades by the expiry of a certain number of years, and that only by the adoption of the severe measure of placing an officer on the half-pay list can his promotion be prevented or retarded; but, even in regiments of the British army, it demands the exercise of special powers to prevent the promotion of an officer when it comes to his turn to pass to the higher grade. At the same time there can be no doubt that an

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

5. The three staff corps contain, exclusive of general officers and lieutenant-colonels in receipt of allowances, 1,961 officers: of these, no less than 49½ are in civil employ. Many of these officers have not done any military work, others have had no connection with the work of the army for very many years; yet they all of them, under the rules of the staff corps, are qualifying by the passage of time for promotion to the highest rank in the army, and the colonel's allowances. If they hold on to their appointments long enough, they will receive a pension double the pension of the highest civil officers in the country; though they have from their first appointment been receiving precisely the same pay as civilians in the department to which they belong. Is not this, in your Excellency's opinion, a very serious blot on the system?

6. Out of the 1,467 officers who remain after deducting officers on civil employ, 1,187 are employed as regimental officers, and only 201 are employed on the military and departmental staff. Was it not an entire reversal of the proper order of things to form nearly the whole of the officers of the army into a staff corps, when the number of staff appointments bore so small a relation to the number of regimental appointments?

7. Is there any other army in the world in which the regimental officers of an army of 120,000 men would be taken entirely from the staff?

8. Is it not better that the staff should be formed from regimental officers, and that the officers of staff duties, than the regiments should be officered from the staff?

9. If your Excellency admits that the staff corps organization has been mischievous, would your Excellency leave it as it is, in consideration of the difficulties of establishing a fresh organization; or would your Excellency propose to abolish it?

10. Several schemes for reclassifying the officers of the army for the purposes of promotion have been suggested—

(1) That the classification should be entirely regimental; and that for this purpose several battalions should be linked into one regiment, and promotion up to the rank of second-in-command should go regimentally; command to go by selection. The regimental cadre, &c., include a certain percentage of officers in excess of regimental requirements, in order that the necessary number of officers may be withdrawn from the staff.

(2) That the whole of the officers of the three armies should be formed into one general list; that army promotion should go either by length of service in each rank or by seniority on the occurrence of vacancies in the rank above, the regimental promotion being confined to the officers of the regiment.

Would your Excellency be in favor of any such change in respect to officers joining the Indian army for the future?

element of uncertainty as to whether he will be promoted or not is a valuable incentive to an officer to endeavour to deserve the promotion which he knows he cannot claim as a right.

5. No officer on civil employment should be allowed to qualify for the rank of colonel. In this way, his passage to the higher ranks of the service would be barred in a perfectly legitimate manner. The present state of affairs as set forth very clearly in this question is most objectionable (*vide* reply to query 11, where the remedy for this is set forth).

6. I do not consider the staff corps in the same light as the general staff of an army. The staff corps is entirely a local creation, formed to benefit officers who are deprived of their legitimate calling by the dispersion of their regiments. The staff corps was intended to supply the reformed regiments with officers, as well as the several departments (civil and military), and cannot be considered a purely staff service corps.

7.

8. This appears to be the sound and proper principle, so long as the places of officers temporarily removed from their regiments for staff employment are at once filled up. I believe an officer is greatly improved for the general purposes of the service whose regimental experience and knowledge, which are the only sure foundation of military efficiency in the higher grades, are supplemented by the wider experience and self-reliance to be obtained by service on the staff.

9. I am not prepared to admit that the staff corps organization has, in the full meaning of the term, been actually mischievous to the army; but the fact that it has already been detrimental to the finances of the State, and will probably prove even more so in the future, renders it highly desirable that a beginning should at once be made towards abolishing the existing system altogether.

10. The officers of the army might be reclassified either—

(a) by giving the three staff corps fixed establishments of each grade, and promoting officers who were efficient and deserved promotion to the higher grades in succession to vacancies, as is the case in the royal artillery and royal engineers and the other regiments of the British service; or

(b) by forming the officers of four regiments into one list, to which would be added a certain percentage of officers in excess of regimental requirements, to provide for the demands of departments and the staff. Both army and regimental promotion should proceed as in regiments having four battalions in the British army. To this amalgamated list should be assigned a fixed establishment for each grade, say—

4 lieutenant-colonels,  
9 majors,  
10 captains,  
10 subalterns,

which would give 33 officers to each list and provide a margin of—

1 major,  
2 captains,  
2 subalterns,

for extra regimental employment. Officers so employed should be seconded for five years, and at the expiration of

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

that time should, if on the military staff, rejoin their corps, and, if on civil or political employment, be required to elect finally which line they would adopt. There seems no reason to suppose that promotion would not proceed sufficiently rapidly in a cadre composed of 33 officers, of whom 12 or 13 would be field officers. The rank of major would of necessity carry with it the position of wing-commander; and to avoid too frequent changes the special appointment of second-in-command should be abolished. To an arrangement of this nature it will be objected that it would be necessary to transfer officers from one regiment to another on promotion; and this is inevitable. But it could be carried out without detriment to the service if the regiments so linked together for the promotion of the officers were those composed of the same classes and castes. The transfers would take place at considerable intervals; and rarely more than one officer of a regiment would be moved at a time. The difficulty which would no doubt arise of one regiment containing a larger number of officers suitable for staff employment than another, would have to be met by a process of absorption, and the transfer of the supernumerary officers to other regiments as occasions might offer.

The first plan would have all the objections, as far as regiments are concerned, of the present system, as it would perpetuate, though in a modified form, the dual lines of promotion which now make it possible for a field officer to be found holding a position in a regiment which should be filled by a subaltern; but it would meet the financial difficulty, and prevent the excessive increase to the ranks of the field officers. The second plan, though not free from difficulties in its initiation, presents a means of avoiding the double system of promotion which must eventually lead to complications; and would also have the effect of permitting a recurrence to a modified form of regimental promotion, which seems very desirable.

The course indicated in paragraph 2 of this question is not desirable.

11. Would your Excellency be in favor of calling upon all military officers now on civil employ to elect within a certain time between civil and military employment; and if they elect to remain in civil employ, to be prepared to give up the advantages of promotion in military rank and all claims to colonel's allowances, substituting for these privileges a pension calculated on the pension rules of civil servants?

11. The course indicated in this question seems to be most desirable.

12. Under the staff corps system, is your Excellency in a position to retard or refuse the promotion of an inefficient or incapable officer, or to accelerate the promotion of officers of distinguished merit and ability?

12. No.

13. When an officer is considered to be personally undeserving of further promotion, should it not be in the power of Government, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, to place him on half-pay; or to call upon him, if he is entitled to pension, to take the pension of his rank?

13. The Secretary of State can, and does, place an inefficient officer, or one who has misconducted himself in any way, on the half-pay list. It would possibly be advantageous that this power should rest with the Government; but as an appeal would in all cases no doubt be made to the Secretary of State, there are advantages in the original decision being given by him.

14. Should not the pension of officers in the army be fixed for the future on a scale the object of which should be to secure the services of officers during the prime of their life, and at the same time not to offer them inducements to drag on their service in hopes of an increased pension after they have ceased to be efficient?

14. This would be very desirable.

15. At what period of service should the maximum pension be obtainable; and what should this maximum be?

15. Thirty-one years' service, and £750 a year at the utmost.

16. If this principle be adopted, may not the system of colonel's allowances, which really amounts to giving a very high special pension, not to the most meritorious or most distinguished, but to the longest-lived officers of the army, cease?

16. A limited number of these pensions should be retained, and dealt with as rewards for long and good service; but officers should not be eligible for them till after they had taken the ordinary pension.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

17. Should all staff and departmental appointments, whether under your Excellency or under Government, be tenable for a limited period; what should this period be; and would it be advisable to vest the Governor-General in Council with authority to extend the period on the special recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief when, on public grounds, it is undesirable that an officer should vacate his office?

18. When an officer is passed over for command by his junior in the army, should he not be called upon to retire after a certain period of service?

19. Should not officers after five years' tenure of regimental command vacate their commands, subject to their being reappointed at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief up to 31 years' service?

20. Should not officers who have been passed over for brigade commands be required to return to England under the terms of paragraph 2 of G. G. O. No. 797 of 1st August 1872?

21. In what way does your Excellency consider a reserve of officers can be provided for in time of war—

- (a) For regiments.
- (b) Military staff.
- (c) Departmental staff.

17. All military staff appointments are now tenable for five years; and this period in the *same appointment* should never be exceeded, though the power to authorize an extension, if necessary, should certainly be vested in the head of the Government. It would be highly advantageous if the appointments in the Military Secretariat of Government were also only tenable for five years, instead of being, as now, unlimited. It seems doubtful whether the five-year rule could be advantageously applied throughout all grades of the commissariat department; but the Commissary General should only hold that appointment for five years; and young officers, on first joining the department, might be seconded in their regiments, and required to elect finally for regimental or commissariat service at the end of five years. The pay department should be treated as a civil department, and the officers joining it dealt with as proposed in query 11.

18. As succession to regimental commands does not at present depend on army seniority *only*, this question would appear to refer to a state of things such as that suggested in clause 2 of query 10; but the course of action indicated is not one I would recommend, because, although an officer may not be considered sufficiently good to be selected for the command of a regiment, he may be quite efficient and useful in the less important position he may be holding.

19. This question seems to assume that an officer obtains the command of his regiment simultaneously with his attaining the rank of lieutenant-colonel; and that consequently when he reached 31 years' service, he would have had the command for five years. This is not the case at present in the Bombay army, as the average length of service of the commandants of Native infantry regiments is 33 years, and the average time in which the officers now in command attained their present position was 28½ years; and had it not been for the annual retirement scheme, these averages would have been still higher. A limit to the length of time an officer might hold the command of a regiment is, however, very desirable, and five years appears a sufficiently long tenure; and it is even worthy of consideration whether it would not be better to fix three years, with an extension of two more, in those cases where such might be considered really desirable. The adoption of this course would necessitate a change in the pension rules, to induce the retirement of officers between 20 and 26 years' service, and also the application of a system of compulsory retirements in the lower grades.

20. For the reason stated in the answer to question 18, I do not approve of the suggestion made in this query.

21. As long as the establishments of regiments and departments are maintained at a minimum, there appears to be no way in which the demands for extra officers on the outbreak of war can be met than by drawing on those regiments not required for immediate active service, the vacancies thus caused being filled as rapidly as possible by young officers from British regiments (if available) and from Sandhurst. Recent experience, however, proved that the capabilities of regiments to supply officers in this way were very limited; and made evident the objectionable nature of this arrangements, which rendered the corps from which the officers were taken inefficient, and naturally failed to provide officers of experience and knowledge for the special duties suddenly demanded of them. The only absolutely certain method of ensuring a sufficiency of trained officers for the requirements of war would be to allot to each regiment and department a certain proportion of officers beyond the number actually required for peace time. But this would materially add to the cost of the army; and it is therefore for consideration whether the necessity of the case renders a continuous expenditure of this nature justifiable.

POONA;  
The 26th August 1879. }

(Sd.) H. J. WARRE, *Lieut.-Genl,*  
*Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army,*

*Minute by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.*

Army reserves in connection with the district police.

The necessity for providing the Native army with a reserve is admitted.

The chief difficulty in India consists in disposing of this reserve during peace, so that an indefinite number of trained soldiers shall not be thrown on native villages, or scattered throughout the agricultural districts, thereby inculcating an undesirable military spirit amongst the now quiet and naturally non-military population.

Formation of the reserve.

In order to form a reserve we must consider—

- (1) How long a sepoy should serve with his regiment before he is eligible for the reserve?
- (2) How the reserve is to be disposed of in time of peace?

In nearly every regiment it takes twelve months to drill and train a recruit before he is fit to take his place in the ranks. For the next year the recruit is still learning his duty, and it is not until he enters upon his third year of service that he may be considered a trained soldier.

It may therefore be fairly admitted that the regiment is entitled to claim the services of every recruit for, say, 12 years.

This period may be considered the prime of every man's life, but after such an apprenticeship he may probably weary of the monotony of garrison life; and supposing that he has not obtained promotion, or is not aspiring to higher rank after this period (or the age of, say, 30 years), the sepoy would gladly change his soldier's life for that which gives him greater liberty, and throws him a little more on his own resources.

I find that every well-conducted infantry sepoy, after 13 years' service, would be in receipt of Rs. 9 per mensem, viz., Rs. 7 pay and Rs. 2 good conduct pay, with the expectation of obtaining another rupee a month good-conduct pay on completion of 15 years' service.

In addition to his pay, a sepoy would be in receipt of compensation for dearthness of provisions, varying with the price of grain, from Rs. 1-8 to as much as Rs. 4 (or even Rs. 6 a month), according to the station at which he may happen to be quartered. His house (lines or barracks) and, if sick, hospital, as also clothes, are provided for him, and after 32 years' service he is pensioned.

Taking the Native army as it is at present constituted, I find that there are—

Under 13 years service	...	...	...	17,140 men.
Under 20 years', i.e., between 13 and 20 years	...	...	...	2,315 "
Between 20 and 32 years	...	...	...	4,041 "
Over 32 years	...	...	...	214 "

Although these figures are very satisfactory as showing that a very large proportion of the Native army is composed of men in the prime of life, they do not give so many men as I had expected from whom to select in order to form a reserve.

I must now proceed to note the difference that exists between a sepoy and a police constable, in

Comparison between sepoys and police constables.

order to show that, presuming it to be necessary to eliminate "the somewhat too civil element that prevails

in the police," we can do so without any great additional expense, and at the same time form the nucleus of a reserve which at once will not only render the police more efficient, but will, eventually, and in the event of necessity, secure to the army a reserve from which it can draw, to complete its ranks should they be thinned by a prolonged campaign, or by any extraordinary number of casualties. The police constable commences with Rs. 7 a month (in the 4th class), and he rises gradually until, when after 12 or 13 years' service, he may attain the second class, he then gets Rs. 9 a month, and in the 1st class as a constable Rs. 10; after this he becomes a head constable, which rank also has four classes; and gradually rises according to merit until he may become a chief constable (4th class), but this would be beyond the ambition of any with whom we are at present dealing.

It would appear, therefore, for the purpose required that a sepoy at 13 years' service, and a police constable of the same standing, are not very far removed from an equality as regards pay and emoluments.

The sepoy has to serve 32 years and the policeman 30 years for his pension, which is also slightly in excess of the sepoy; but the policeman has to provide his own lodgings, is not so well cared for when sick, and has compensation for dearthness of provisions only so long as he is in the lowest class at Rs. 7 a month. I would therefore suggest that from the sepoys now serving (2,315) who have been in the army between 13 and 20 years, a certain number (say 1,500) should be allowed to volunteer for the police, to be considered as a "military police," commencing in the 2nd class at Rs. 9 a month and allowed to rise according to merit or service, as may be the custom now prevailing in the police, but liable for 7 years (or until they have 20 years' service complete) to be called upon to rejoin the army, in such regiments, or in such places, as Government may decide.

As an equivalent to the above number, deducted from the strength of the army, I further propose that the same number of police constables, medically and physically fit, shall be allowed to enrol in the regular army,

serve till they have completed 13 years' service, when they, and every sepoy of good character and otherwise eligible—on completion of 13 years' service—shall be allowed to volunteer for the police, thereby improving the physical strength of the police, as well as infusing into that force discipline and military bearing, at the same time opening the field of recruiting to the army, which cannot at present compete with an undisciplined force, perhaps rather better paid, with fewer restrictions on the liberty of the individual, and in the country districts under less supervision by superior authority.

To recapitulate:—

- (1) I propose to form the nucleus of a reserve for the army in the police.

- (2) To commence by exchanging, say, 1,500 trained soldiers (sepoys) for the same, or, if practicable, for a greater number of police constables, medically and physically fit, to be trained as sepoys, who at the end of 13 years, or at 30 years of age, will rejoin the police, and continue to serve under the same conditions as are imposed on sepoys now joining the police.

(3) To allow every sepoy of good character on completion of 13 years' service, or 30 years of age, to volunteer for the police on the terms above stated.

The advantages to be derived from this scheme are doubtless, in the first instance, considerably in favor of the police, which will be made more efficient by a large number of trained men being drafted into its ranks, and a similar number of untrained men being eliminated from its ranks; but prospectively, I hope similar advantages to the army will accrue by the superior organization of the police, enabling this force to deal with all internal commotion without requiring aid from the army—by extending the now somewhat limited field for recruiting—and by giving the sepoy a relief at the end of 13 years from the monotony of his ordinary garrison life.

As the police number in all over 21,500 officers and men, the infusion of 1,500 soldiers would hardly be felt, until they have trained the other constables and infused a military spirit into their ranks.

H. J. WARRE, *Lieut.-General,*  
*Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.*

The 1st August 1879.

### District Police.

GRADES.	Monthly pay.	PENSION.		CLOTHING ALLOWED.		Compensation in lieu.	Is lodging accommodation provided?	Is grain compensation allowed?	Are wound or injury pensions allowed?	
		Years' service required.	Monthly rate.	In kind.						
				Articles.	No.					
Inspector, 1st Class	Rs. 250	15	25	Provide themselves at their own expense.	None.	None.	None.	Only to 4th class constables, when articles of common staple food of the district are sold below 10 seers (cf 80 mals) to the rupee.	Special cases are treated on their own merits.	
" 2nd "	200									
" 3rd "	175									
" 4th "	150									
" 5th "	125									
Chief Constable, 1st Class	95	25	30	Receive Rs. 6 per annum with which they provide clothing.	None.	None.	None.	Only to 4th class constables, when articles of common staple food of the district are sold below 10 seers (cf 80 mals) to the rupee.	Special cases are treated on their own merits.	
" 2nd "	80									
" 3rd "	65									
Head Constable, 1st Class	30	30	2 and not less than Rs. 4	Overcoat, every 7 years. Cloth coat ... Pantaloons ... Haversack ... Summer coat, annually ... Mounted men pay for their own horse trappings.	1 2 1 1	None.	None.	Only to 4th class constables, when articles of common staple food of the district are sold below 10 seers (cf 80 mals) to the rupee.	Special cases are treated on their own merits.	
" 2nd "	20									
" 3rd "	15									
" 4th "	12									
Constable, 1st Class	10	30	2 and not less than Rs. 4		Overcoat, every 7 years. Cloth coat ... Pantaloons ... Haversack ... Summer coat, annually ... Mounted men pay for their own horse trappings.	1 2 1 1	None.	None.	Only to 4th class constables, when articles of common staple food of the district are sold below 10 seers (cf 80 mals) to the rupee.	Special cases are treated on their own merits.
" 2nd "	8									
" 3rd "	6									
" 4th "	4									

### Native Infantry.

GRADES.	Monthly pay.	PENSIONS.		Good-conduct pay.	Marching bounty monthly.	Half mounting allowance annually.	CLOTHING ALLOWANCE.			Compensation when lodging is not provided.		Compensation for clearance of provisions at favourable (average) rates.	Pension allowed for	
		Years' service required.	Monthly rate.				In kind.		Full.	Half.	Wounds.		Injuries.	
							Articles.	No.						Compensation in lieu.
	Rs.		Rs.	A rupee a month after 3, 5 & 15 years' service.	Rs. A.				Rs. A. P.	Rs. A.	Rs.			
Subadar-Major ...	100 plus 25 staff	16	30	A rupee a month after 3, 5 & 15 years' service.	15 0	...	Coat	12 0 0	One alternately each year.	99 0 at a new station.	24	For repacking these.	3 7 3	
					15 0	...	Trousers	6 0 0						
Subadar, 1st grade ...	100	32	50		15 0	...	Coat	12 0 0						
" 2nd "	80				15 0	...	Trousers	6 0 0						
Jemadar, 1st grade ...	50	15	15		15 0	...	Coat	12 0 0						
" 2nd "	40	32	25		15 0	...	Trousers	6 0 0						
Havildar ...	14	15	7	5 0	4 0	Coat	4 0 0	15 0 at a new station.	4	3	As per scale in Pay Code.	As per scale in Pay Code.		
Naique ...	12	32	12	5 0	4 0	Trousers	4 0 0							
Private and Drummer ...	7	16	4	1 8	4 0	Coat	4 0 0							

*Minute in continuation of the Commander-in-Chief's (Bombay Army) reply to question No. 25, from the Army Organization Commission at Simla, on the subject of the European Garrison of India.*

The matter presented for consideration in question No. 25—"In your opinion is it desirable, on the score of economy and efficiency, to substitute for Indian service a local British force in place of a portion of the home army?"—is one of so great importance, not only as affecting the garrisoning of India, but also as bearing upon the recruiting and organization of the whole British army, that I desire to add some observations to those which I have embodied in my reply to that question as submitted to me by the Commission at Simla.

The substitution, for Indian service, of a local British force in place of a portion of the home army, the alternative suggested by the question, might be attended by some reduction of expense, and might eventually secure to the Indian service a supply of mature and seasoned soldiers, physically better fitted for service than the lads who now fill the ranks (and the hospital!). But there are disadvantages attaching to the constitution of such a force which more than counterbalance these undoubted advantages.

Sooner or later a local British force would inevitably fall below the high standard of excellence which it is necessary to maintain in all parts of the army of the Empire; and in no part of that army is high efficiency more essential than in that force to which, although small in numbers, is committed the charge of the momentous interests connected with our rule in India.

The alternative suggested in question 5 (c) addressed to departmental officers—"What is your opinion regarding the propriety and feasibility of continuing the present system, but with special enlistments for India?"—suggests an alternative, free from the objection above mentioned, though open to another, which I shall hereafter state, and which appears to make its adoption impossible.

If, as the question seems to suggest, all recruits were enlisted under the powers of the Army Enlistment Act, 1870, for twelve years, subject to the liability of being either retained with the colors for the whole of that period, or of being discharged into the reserve at the expiration of six years, or some shorter period at the option of the Secretary of State; and if the Secretary of State, in exercise of that option, were to require twelve years' continuous service with the colors from *all* men belonging to regiments actually serving in, or shortly about to proceed to, India, the difficulty now felt, arising from the extreme youth and physical unfitness of the men composing our Indian battalions, would be lessened if not entirely removed. And if the present system of periodically relieving regiments serving in India by regiments furnished from the Imperial army serving at home were adhered to, the unimpaired efficiency of the Indian force would be maintained, and the whole problem of garrisoning India satisfactorily solved.

It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that this alternative has been warmly advocated by several officers of high standing and experience to whom the question has been submitted by the Commission, and who, serving in India, regard the matter primarily from an Indian point of view.

But whilst this alternative offers so satisfactory a solution from the Indian stand-point, it does so at a sacrifice which renders it, in my opinion, impossible of adoption.

For by refusing to the recruit the option of enlisting for short service, it virtually surrenders an essential principle of the short service system, a system, which was deliberately adopted by the nation in 1870-71, and which has been for the past eight years and is now upon its trial.

It is no doubt true that many military men of ability and experience, whose opinions are entitled to consideration (as well as a section of the press, representing ignorant impatience of any experiment not crowned with immediate and complete success) are now urging that the eight years' trial, which has been given to the system of short service introduced by the Secretary of State in 1870-71, has proved it to be altogether unsuited to the requirements of the British army; and that the only way in which the question of the organization of our forces can be settled is to give up short service altogether and to revert to the system of long service which obtained before 1870.

But though I admit that the existing system of short service, owing to certain defects in the mode in which it has been applied, has hitherto proved less successful than its author anticipated, has indeed been in some respects so far a failure as to partially justify the cry which has been raised against it, I am not prepared to join in the cry for its abolition; on the contrary, I recognize the great economical and social advantages of a short service system in England, and I believe that not only does it possess these advantages as compared with the old system of long service, but that, though not susceptible of being universally applied, and not suited to Indian service, where the conditions require that soldiers should be engaged for comparatively long periods, it is peculiarly adapted to the requirements of a very large portion of the Imperial army of Great Britain.

For this reason, in discussing the question of garrisoning India, I limit myself to the consideration of proposals consistent with the maintenance of the short service system adopted by Parliament in 1870 so far as regards service at home.

From this point of view I propose to consider the feasibility of the plan suggested in question 5 (b), *viz.*, "that the European part of the garrison of India should consist of local battalions affiliated to the line battalions at home."

If by local battalions we are to understand battalions the whole of whose commissioned officers as well as the non-commissioned officers and rank and file are to be permanently quartered in India, the system of affiliated local battalions would be open, though in a less degree, to the objections which attach to a local European army.

The regimental officers, to whom an exclusively Indian career alone would be open, would be unable to keep themselves abreast of the time in military knowledge and idea; they would inevitably sink into a local groove of thought and habit, whereby the battalions under their command would gradually but surely deteriorate.

This influence could, however, be effectually guarded by making the Indian battalion, not only affiliated to, but equally with the home battalion, an integral part of the regiment, keeping up a regular interchange of officers between the two battalions.

Each officer of the regiment serving alternate periods at home and abroad would have the full advantage of an Indian experience, and he would also have the opportunity of keeping up his professional knowledge.

With this interchange of officers regularly kept up, the system of affiliated battalions could be introduced without danger of deterioration.

The system might, moreover, be introduced into the service with little disturbance of existing arrangements, and its adoption, far from dislocating our regimental system, of which we are so justly proud and tenacious, would restore that system from the state of dislocation to which, by the indiscriminate and unsystematic introduction of short service, it has been most regretably reduced.

The infantry of the line consists of 141 battalions, distributed amongst 110 regiments, of which some comprise two, some four, and some a single battalion, the single battalion regiments being linked in pairs.

By amalgamating each pair of linked regiments into one double battalion regiment, it would be possible, without much change or disturbance, to redistribute the infantry into, say, seventy regiments, consisting each of two battalions.

One of these two battalions would be the foreign battalion quartered permanently abroad, the other permanently quartered (during peace) at home.

If it were possible, and I see no reason why the question should not now be definitively settled, the third battalion of each brigade or regiment should be the corresponding country militia regiment, affiliated to and linked with its line battalion, for which the militia head-quarters staff would form a permanent depôt for the supply and training of all recruits, whether destined to serve for the remainder of their career in India, or for the shorter period in or about the islands of Great Britain.

This separation of battalions would render it possible to enlist men for each battalion upon distinct and different terms, each suitable for the home and foreign service for which they were respectively required, and enable us at once to break with the compromise of six years with the colors, and six years with the reserve, which suits neither.

Men would be engaged for home service for a short term of service with the colors, *viz.*, a time limited to the minimum required to convert the raw material "recruit" into the manufactured article "soldier," and a long term of service in reserve, *viz.*, a term extended to the maximum, during which he may be held in reserve, without losing the effect of his training.

For service abroad he might be enlisted for twelve years' continuous service with the colors, subject to a renewed engagement for such further term as the man might be physically fit for; *all soldiers so re-engaged to become entitled to a pension.*

If the permanent staff of the militia regiment cannot be made available, a depôt must be formed at the localized head-quarters of the regiment for the supply and training of the recruits of both battalions, the recruits of the battalion in India being retained at the depôts until they have attained the age of 21 years.

The cost of the depôt companies for Indian battalions, calculated according to the number of men maintained at each, upon a scale of cost per man ascertained by average, as well as the pensions payable to men who had completed upwards of twelve years' continuous service in India, would be a charge upon the Indian revenues.

The interchange of officers between the home and foreign battalions of each regiment should be regularly and systematically kept up; they should, as a rule, serve equal periods at home and abroad alternately; and although exchanges between officers for their mutual convenience might be permitted, the privilege of private exchange would require to be zealously watched, and an inflexible rule observed as to the time beyond which no officer should be allowed to serve continuously in India, in order to counteract the tendency for the officers of the regiment to gravitate into an Indian set and a home set.

Thus safeguarded, this system of local battalions affiliated to home battalions, this scheme appears to offer the most satisfactory solution of the very difficult problem of finding an army for home service and an army for India, interchangeable the one with the other, thereby offering a chance for men of long service to exchange or be transferred into the home battalion, and by their experience and service restoring to the ranks of the army of England that admirable class of non-commissioned officer which has gradually been dying out, but which was formerly the bone and sinew of the ranks.

It can be introduced without interfering with the application to the remainder of the British army of a complete and *bonâ fide* system of short service.

So far the subject has been considered primarily from an Indian point of view and as a question of Indian organization. It remains to be considered whether any, and what, advantages can be claimed for it over the existing system as affecting the organization of the home army; and, lastly (though by no means last in importance), as bearing upon the urgent burning question of recruiting for the army,—a question which affects equally England and India.

It has been shown that a system of local affiliated battalions possesses the negative advantage of not prejudicing the adoption of short service at home; it would, however, be more correct to claim for it that the separation of home and foreign battalions which it involves, for the first time, renders it possible that a real system of short service should receive what it has never yet received, *viz.*, a fair trial in the British service.

It will be necessary, in order to make this claim good, to say a few words upon the general principles of a short service system.

A short service system, as it is understood in continental armies, where enrolment is compulsory, and where no necessity for Colonial or Indian garrison service has interfered to prevent its adoption in its entirety, is a system under which the rank and file of every battalion or other similar unit is divided into two distinct classes—

- (1) Those retained with the colors during peace for the purpose of being trained for war.
- (2) Those who, having been so trained, are in reserve, or on furlough from their respective battalions.

These last are liable and ready to return to the ranks of their battalion as soon as it is mobilized for war; they form an essentially a part of the battalion as the men who are with the colors; they are, in fact, its real soldiers; the men with the colors are its recruits.

These reserve or furlough men constitute more than half the strength numerically, and in fighting strength far more than half of the battalion.

This intimate and close connection between the reserve men of each particular battalion and the men and officers actually serving with its colors is the very essence of the short service system.

If the above statement of the principles of the short service system be correct, it follows—

- (1) that it is a system which it is wholly impossible to apply to the garrison army of India;
- (2) that though we have, to some extent, provided a short service system, we have, so far from having given it a trial for eight years, never really tried it in our service at all, either in India or elsewhere.

When the soldier has been fully trained in the ranks and has been dismissed into the reserve, the pay which he receives is merely a retaining fee in consideration of his liability to be recalled to service; he must provide himself, like a civilian, by labor, with the means and necessaries of existence; but if he is to be available for service in his battalion at short notice, it follows that his civil employment must be found within a reasonable distance from the head-quarters of his battalion; this is, of course, impossible in India, where there is no demand for unskilled European labor.



A recruit should not be sent to India until he is a perfectly trained soldier.

Medical statistics show that the percentage of deaths of men under 22 years of age in India is much greater than that of men over that age. The more matured man may suffer, but his stronger constitution enables him to bear up against fever—the prevailing cause of sickness—and after a time entirely to conquer it. It is therefore evident that a considerable saving of expense must eventually accrue by retaining the lads now sent to fill the hospitals and die in India at home with the *depôt* for the first three years of their soldier's life.

Nearly every recruit enlists (or so states on enlistment) at 18 years of age. Three years of home training with regular drill and regular rations produces a different man, fit for any service, or any climate.

By the adoption of the proposed system the army of England would be increased by the addition of the Indian *depôts* attached to the militia head-quarters, or to the *depôt* which must be formed at the head-quarters of the brigade or regiment.

*N.B.*—This *depôt* need not be separated from the *depôt* of the battalion at home; on the contrary, the recruits of both battalions should be trained together and considered as one, the only difference being the term of enlistment; and by freely sanctioning transfer between both officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the two line battalions, I believe that many of the short service men (having got over the drudgery of drill) will freely volunteer for the longer service in India with the certainty of pensions, provided they serve the requisite number of years.

The short service system is in fact wholly unsuitable for India; it is also ruinously extravagant for two main reasons: first, because of the waste of costly life, due to sending out lads of weekly stamina and too young to stand the climate; secondly, because owing to the very short term remaining between the date of embarkation and the completion of the soldier's six years' engagement, as well as to the great length and expense of his passage between this country and India. The cost of the soldier's transport to and fro is out of all proportion great as compared with the service rendered abroad.

A short service system never has and never can be adopted in India. But, in fact, it has never been really tried either here or elsewhere in our service.

So soon as a man has completed his period of service in the ranks and is manufactured into a trained soldier, instead of maintaining, as it is maintained in continental armies, the all-essential close connection with his battalion, all connection with it forthwith ceases; the soldier is turned adrift into the inchoate mass called the army reserve.

Moreover, when a battalion is sent to take the field, whether in South Africa or elsewhere, it is raised from its peace to its war strength, not by filling up its ranks with trained soldiers called in from furlough or reserve, but by adding to its recruits other recruits taken from other regiments.

In short, the attempt to reconcile in one system the requirements of service abroad and at home has led to the adoption for the last eight years of a parody of a short service system which combines all the disadvantages both of long and short service without the advantages of either,—a parody from which it would be unwise and unfair to condemn short service.

There remains to be considered the effect which the separation of home and foreign battalions, with the separate terms of enlistment, hereby made possible for each, is likely to affect the pressing question of manning the army.

When Lord Cardwell shortened the period of service with the colors from twelve years to six years, he confidently expected that this alteration alone would have the effect of attracting to the army a greater number of men as well as men of a higher class than had previously offered themselves.

This anticipation has not been fulfilled. The experience of the past eight years has shown that recruits continue to be drawn, as of old, from the lowest stratum of society, and from the sweepings of large towns, whilst the supply of this inferior material is so limited that, provided they come up to a certain very low standard, we are unable to select or reject any. In order to keep up the strength of the army to the number voted by Parliament, it is necessary to admit recruits both younger and of lower physique, to say nothing of character, than is at all satisfactory.

The fact is that it is not, and was not, the length of engagement alone which deterred men from enlisting. A far more powerful deterrent is the uncertainty as to where they are to serve.

There were three particulars in which the alteration in the terms of engagement made in 1870 failed to attract recruits—

First, the period of service with the colors, when shortened, was not shortened enough.

Second, the soldier was given no choice between home and foreign service in his new career.

Third, the amount of pay during reserve service was not sufficient.

Potential recruits may be roughly divided into two classes—one class willing enough to soldier at home, but unwilling to serve in India, because they dislike the severance from home and family ties.

On the other hand, men of another class, having no objection to, rather a preference for, foreign service, desire a complete change from civilian to soldier's life.

The first of these two classes is probably far more numerous, as well as socially superior to the second; it is the class *which we must attract to the ranks if we are ever to have in our army a higher class of recruits than those which now enlist.*

But under our present system, whilst we do not heartily bid for recruits of the second class, we absolutely exclude from the field of our recruiting operations the more numerous and better class.

The proposed separation of regiments into home and foreign battalions, with distinct terms of engagement for each, would at once enable us to offer terms attractive to each of the two classes of possible recruits above described, and would immensely extend the field of recruiting.

The question of manning the army would be then half solved. Something, however, remains to be done, besides offering the intending recruit his choice between home and foreign service, if we desire that soldiering shall successfully compete in open market with other employment for unskilled labor, namely, to offer to the short service recruit a substantial increase in the pay to which he becomes entitled after having served his apprenticeship in the ranks whilst serving in the reserve.

In this part of the proposal there is nothing which need startle the most timid economist, as will be seen by the following calculations:—

Every soldier now serving in the ranks costs, with clothing, food, lodging, fuel, &c., about £65 a year.

If the pay of the reserve men were trebled, each would still cost less than £20 a year.

The number of men with the colors provided for in the home army estimates now before me for reference is 136,000.

The number of men in the first class army reserve is (about) 8,000.

	£
The cost of 136,000 men with the colors, calculated at the rate of £65 each per annum is	8,840,000
And of 8,000 men with the reserve at £6 each per annum is	48,000
Total annual cost of 144,000 soldiers	8,888,000

If the proposed system were in force and the strength of the home army were maintained at the same figure (144,000), we should have—

	£
The cost of 77,000 men with colors at £65 each	5,005,000
And of 77,000 men on furlough at £20 each	1,440,000
Total annual cost of 144,000 soldiers	6,445,000

showing a saving of £2,443,000 per annum.

Whilst, if the strength of the home army were raised to the respectable figure of 200,000 men, we should have (under the proposed system)—

	£
100,000 men with the colors, costing annually £65 each	6,500,000
100,000 men on furlough, costing annually £20 each	2,000,000
making a total cost for 200,000 soldiers of	8,500,000

or 200,000 soldiers maintained under the proposed system at a less cost by £388,000 annually than 144,000 under the present system.

The reserve being localized, the great majority of the men belonging to it would reside near the head-quarters of their regiment, and although it is not intended to call upon the reserves or to take the men from their civil employment, except under circumstances rendering their rejoining the ranks absolutely necessary, each reserve man would be at hand and would be equivalent to, if not something better than, his partially trained comrade in the ranks.

Thus a reduction in the number actually serving might be effected without in any degree diminishing the fighting strength of the army, although it might reduce the parade appearance of the battalions.

Apart from the direct saving which may be effected in this way, there would be an indirect saving in money, and money's worth, which it is almost as difficult to exaggerate as it is to estimate with accuracy.

If the pay of the reserve men were raised to a sum worth serving for,—and £20 a year so easily earned is worth something to an unskilled laborer,—then the military crime of desertion, the scandal, the weakness, and the evidence of the unsoundness of our army system would cease, military convict prisons might be shut up, and for the punishment of gaol and treadmill would be substituted dismissal from the service.

When dismissal from the service comes to be regarded as a punishment, the regeneration of the army is accomplished.

Although it may be assumed that I have approached this question primarily from the Indian points of view, the organization of the two armies is so intimately connected, it is not possible to treat the two questions otherwise than as one subject.

It must, however, be borne in mind, especially by the English tax-payer, that not only is the army of India paid for by the Indian Government, but that the expenses of the Government of India at home are entirely defrayed from the revenues of India. That in granting pensions after long service in India it is not proposed to ask the English Government to pay such pensions, which devolve as a matter of course on India, although it would only be fair for England to pay the pensions of such non-commissioned officers who elect for long service in India, but whose services may have been transferred to the home battalion, in order to restore to the ranks the old class of long service non-commissioned officers, without whose assistance training and discipline have so seriously deteriorated.

I shall conclude by recapitulating the several alterations necessarily following the adoption of the system advocated—a system which may be called one of regiments having two battalions (exclusive of the militia battalions), the one battalion being for home service, the other for furnishing the European garrison of India and its dependencies. These are—

- (1) That the several regiments of the army be divided into foreign and home battalions.
- (2) That of these the one be in time of peace permanently quartered at home, the other permanently abroad.
- (3) That recruiting for these battalions be kept separate.
- (4) That a depot for the foreign battalion be attached to the corresponding home battalion.
- (5) That recruits for the home battalion be engaged for ten years, of which the minimum time required to train him into a perfect soldier shall be with the colors; the remainder on furlough from the battalion, by which he would continue to be paid and to which he would continue to be attached.
- (6) That recruits for the foreign battalion be engaged for 12 years' continuous service, increased to 21 for pension.

- (7) That the pay of the men on furlough be not less than one shilling per diem, the pay of the recruit under training or period of apprenticeship being the same as at present.
- (8) That promotion to the higher grades of non-commissioned officer be on condition of re-engagement for continuous service with the colors.
- (9) That the pay and status of non-commissioned officers be considerably increased; that they be liable to transfer from battalion to battalion, and be entitled to a substantial pension on discharge.
- (10) That officers serve for alternate periods with the home and Indian battalions of their respective regiments.

BOMBAY; }  
The 20th October 1879. }

II. J. WARRE, *Lieut.-Genl.*,  
Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.

### Question of forming a reserve for the Native Army.

#### *Minute by His Excellency the Governor of Bombay.*

The tenor of the papers which have come before us, regarding military organization, renders it necessary to submit some opinion on the question of forming "a reserve" for the Native army in India. We have duly to observe the passage of the published instructions of the Government of India to the Commission on Army Organization, which runs thus: "The great problem of modern military organization is to provide the largest and most efficient force in war, with the smallest permanent peace establishment and expenditure."

By the technical term "reserve" we mean a system, as in England, whereby a man is enlisted for twelve years, of which years six are to be spent with the colors on full pay, and six at home on a small retaining allowance. This system is commonly called "short service." In this minute the term "short service" will be employed in the above sense.

In discussing the applicability of this system to the Native army in India, the first point relates to its practicability. Is the system practicable? That is, could desirable men be induced to accept it on such conditions as the Government might be able to offer? I believe that it is quite practicable on certain conditions; but that those conditions must in some respects be different from, and in other respects more liberal than, those in England. The matter then resolves itself into a question of conditions.

In England the retaining allowance which a man while at home on "reserve" receives is very small, namely, 4d. a day; and the time of service is very limited.

I do not think that Natives would generally care for, or anyhow accept, service, if the time is to be very limited, and the reserve allowance very small. In some civilized countries military service is regarded as a burden to be patriotically borne by citizens as private soldiers; but in India it has always been regarded, even for privates, as a valuable profession, and as a provision either for life, or for a long time. In many countries the private soldier looks to serving for a brief period without any thought of pension. In India the private soldier looks to retiring either on a good pension after lengthened service, or on a lesser pension after lesser service; but in any case on some pension of considerable worth to him, that is, enough to contribute towards his maintenance. Therefore, I apprehend that the Natives will not care for service on "reserve," except on conditions somewhat analogous to the existing condition of service. By Natives I mean men of eligible character and physique, such as we have always had in our army hitherto.

A private of Native infantry (sepooy) is enlisted permanently, subject to good conduct and physical fitness. He receives on the average eight or nine rupees a month (according to length of service with good conduct) with prospect of pension of four rupees a month after fifteen years' service if invalidated, and seven rupees a month after thirty-two years' service without invaliding. He finds his own ration, but receives an additional allowance whenever the market prices of food-grains exceed certain rates, it being thus ensured that the pay and allowances shall be such as to support him and his family. He receives some assistance from Government in erecting his own hut. He is allowed furlough occasionally to visit his home. He will not be discharged except for his own fault. He will not be invalidated save on medical authority, and then he will receive a pension. If in case of necessity the Government has disbanded regiments, it has settled some adequate provision for the men. Thus the sepoy has, heretofore, regarded military service under the British Government as a thing not to be thrown off but to be clung to. These are the bonds which have subsisted between the Native soldiers and their European masters. These are the reasons why service under the British Government is more popular with the Natives of India than service under their own indigenous States.

To the above rules there are some exceptions. For instance, on the north-western frontier of India, there are, I understand, some classes of sepoys who decidedly prefer short service. And in the Bombay army there is an inclination showing itself with many sepoys,—a greater inclination than was perhaps expected by many experienced authorities,—to obtain a lesser pension after a shorter service rather than to wait for a better pension after longer service.

The pension of four rupees a month after fifteen years' service on invaliding has been instituted in recent years only. It is evidently regarded by the men as a great boon. They are evincing anxiety to obtain it, and they will probably avail themselves of it in future to the fullest extent that the authorities, medical or other, may allow.

From this we may certainly infer that if the Government were to offer to enlist men permanently on the condition of their receiving full pay, eight to nine rupees a month for a certain time, say fifteen years, while with the colors, and half pay, say four rupees a month, while at home on reserve, the time on reserve to count for a pension of the same amount after 32 years, then such offer would be largely accepted, quite as largely as could be desired.

But such conditions would probably be regarded as too liberal, more liberal indeed than Government could afford. It is therefore necessary to consider how the conditions could be lessened in favor of Government.

It is impossible to say for certain without actual trial what conditions would be acceptable to the Natives—those Natives, I mean, who would be desirable as sepoys. But after confidential consultation and enquiry, I incline to think that, if three rupees were offered instead of four, the other conditions remaining as above, the offer would be largely accepted. Or, if three rupees were thought too much, then possibly two rupees a month might attract men, if the time of the preliminary service with the colors were reduced from fifteen years to ten. In other words, men would be invited to serve on full pay for fifteen years, then to go home “on reserve” on three rupees a month, with liability to be called out, up to thirty-two years’ service, and thereafter to receive the three rupees a month as pension without that liability; or to serve for ten years and then to go home “on reserve” on two rupees a month, till thirty-two years’ service, when the two rupees monthly would be drawn as pension.

It is to be remembered that a sepoy has almost always some occupation on which to fall back, which occupation is generally connected with agriculture, so he would regard his “reserve” allowance as eking out his income.

In favor of the above conditions it is to be observed that the four pence a day allowed in England is equal to about ten shillings, or five rupees a month. Thus by English analogy, two or three rupees a month ought to be allowed in India.

Perhaps such conditions might still be regarded by Government as too onerous to the State; but I fear that any less favorable conditions would fail to attract desirable men. The salient point is that of the pension, but experience has invariably shown hitherto that, without pension, desirable men cannot be obtained in any large numbers. It were fruitless to discuss what inferior conditions would suffice to attract undesirable men, because such men would never be approved by Government.

It is to be borne in mind that the military service of Government, though still valued, is not so highly prized as it formerly was, because the pay and allowances, much improved as they have been of late, do not bear the same proportion to the cost of living as the old pay and allowance bore, and because there are many more competing employments now than formerly, such as the improved service of the police, the service of the railway companies, and many kinds of private service.

If such offers as those above described were largely accepted by recruits in the future, then a considerable body of men, numbering many thousands, would be absent from the colors, and would yet be drawing two or three rupees a month each; the aggregate of such charges would be considerable, and would be open to financial objection. If, say, the total number of such were twenty-four thousand (a figure which is given by way of illustration, and which will agree with figures I shall have to give presently), then the monthly charge would be Rs. 48,000, or Rs. 72,000 (according as the allowance were two or three rupees); that is, Rs. 5,76,000 (£57,600), or Rs. 8,64,000 a year (£86,400). The fact would be remarked that here is a body of men drawing these allowances, not temporarily but permanently for life—men who, though trained as soldiers and liable to be called out, are yet not at the moment rendering any service.

The only answer to such financial objection would be this, that these men, though not quite as good as soldiers with the colors, are yet soldiers, having received their training and are ready to join their colors at the shortest notice, and in this sense may be regarded as a part of the fighting strength of the Government. If then the Government must maintain a certain total of fighting strength, of which strength these “reserves” form a part, it is manifestly cheaper to keep these “reserve” men on two or three rupees a month, instead of the eight or nine rupees a month which they would be receiving if they were with their colors. The financial economy of the measure is represented by the difference between two or three rupees on the one hand, and eight or nine rupees on the other hand, multiplied in each case by twenty-four thousand.

I present the above reply as a financial rejoinder to a financial argument; whether such reserves should be reckoned as real fighting strength, is a question on which military authorities may perhaps feel doubt, as sepoys, when away from their usual exercises, are apt to become slack, and are not restored to complete efficiency so quickly as Europeans.

On the other hand, financially, it is manifest that, if a reserve should be wanted in addition to the established strength with the colors, it can be managed at a small cost, for the £86,400 shown *plus* contingencies, bringing the total up to, say, £100,000, would give a reserve strength of 24,000 men, the charge being slight as compared with the accession of power.

It will, of course, be asked why not try in India a system of “short service” as in England; or, if not exactly that, still a system of limited service without pension, enlisting, say, sepoys for fourteen years, of which years seven might be spent with the colors on full pay and seven at home on half pay.

To such a question I should reply, first, that, if the foregoing considerations should prove correct, the offer would not be accepted by men of the desirable classes; and, secondly, that there would be a grave political objection.

This particular objection may be explained in this wise. The effect of forming “reserves” for either “short service” or limited service is to pass a number of the civil population through the military ranks; the shorter the service the larger the number passed through. In many civilized countries, especially in a country like England, this is justly considered a collateral advantage of the reserve system. But in India the case is quite opposite, because there an alien race governs subject races under a benevolent despotism. In India, under British rule, the former martial tendencies of the Native population gradually become lessened till they almost disappear, and this circumstance is considered to be one of the safeguards of our rule. So conscious has the Government been of this, that within the present generation the Native population has been generally “disarmed,” that is, the people have been enjoined to give up their arms. The Government has never passed its Indian subjects through the ranks, nor sent them to their homes in the vigour of life. On the contrary, it has heretofore never parted with its Native soldiers till they were pensioned in the evening of life. And even now-a-days, when it is beginning to part with them in middle life, still it does so only on invaliding them. Therefore, to train them, to keep them for a limited time, either with the colors or

on reserve, and then to altogether discharge them without pension to their homes in numbers increasingly large, that is, numbers increasing as each set of men should in succession be passed through the ranks, would be to ensure a constant influx into the civil population of military men no longer bound to Government, and to infuse again into the people a part of that martial spirit which has been disappearing, and the disappearance of which is still advantageous to us. This would be different from the past policy of Government, which is still as sound now as it ever was, and would militate against those maxims of political safety which are likely to continue as imperative in the future as they have been in the past and are in the present. In short, to have in the interior of the country some considerable number of men trained to arms, but no longer in the British service, would be to produce one of those very dangers which the Government have hitherto avoided, and will doubtless be still anxious to avoid.

It is to be observed, however, that the plan above suggested by me is free from this political objection, because by it the "reserve" men would never be altogether discharged, but would be receiving their regular allowances with the prospect of pension, and so would remain bound to us.

Even then it might be argued that "reserve" sepoy, though still bound to us, would, while at home, be out of our sight and control, and might be exposed to temptation from political plotters. This objection is, however, reduced to a minimum by the plan of allowance and pension.

There is yet another way in which a "reserve" might be formed in India, which is this : a certain number of sepoy might be enlisted on the condition that, after being trained as soldiers, they should serve in the police, or as messengers and attendants in the various civil departments (such messengers and attendants being styled variously "peons," "chuprassies," "puttawallas," &c., &c.) on full military pay, with prospect of pension, and with a liability to rejoin the ranks whenever wanted. This plan would be free from the financial and political objections above set forth. Such reserve men would, *pro tempore*, form part of the establishment of the police and the civil departments, that is, the police and civil departments would have their fixed numbers, from which numbers would be deducted those "reserve" sepoy who might be at the time employed in civil capacities; if the said sepoy were withdrawn for military service in war, then the police or civil departments would entertain substitutes to make up the complement of their establishment; such "reserve" sepoy would thus, while on "reserve," be doing full work for their pay, though in civil capacities; and would be causing no extra charge whatever, and might yet be counted as part of the fighting strength of the Government. So far then this plan would be free from the financial and political objections just indicated.

It is to be added, too, that the pay of the sepoy, and that of policemen and messengers, is about the same, so that there would be but little or no adjustment of accounts required between the civil and military branches of the service.

There would, of course, be some occasional inconvenience to the police and to the civil departments from having this part of their establishment thus withdrawn for war; and some permanently recurring inconvenience from having this part of their establishment, from time to time, called before military authority for inspection. Moreover, the vigour of the police would be impaired, to the extent to which these trained men were withdrawn for war, at a time when the police duties were especially urgent. But these drawbacks and inconveniences would have to be endured, for the sake of an important object, if they were limited in their extent. It is to be observed, too, that "reserve" sepoy would during peace impart to the police a soldierly element which is always needed, and would be excellently suited to the ward and guard duties which pertain to the police.

Inasmuch as the establishment of the police in British India, including regular and municipal police, but excluding all village police, stands at 155,000 officers and men (*vide* account of "Moral and Material Progress of India" for 1876-77, presented to Parliament); inasmuch also as the civil establishments mentioned include some thousands more of men, I should think that at least 10,000 sepoy on reserve might be employed among these police and civil establishments in all India in the manner above indicated.

If then the formation of a "reserve" for the Native army, not of a temporary character, but with the permanency and on the conditions above described, were to be undertaken, what should its proportions be?

The Native infantry of British India, including sappers, has an established strength of 104,000 non-commissioned officers and privates (*vide* page 99, East India Account for 1878-79, presented to Parliament). All these are now serving with the colors, and none are at home "on reserve."

Now the formation of a "reserve" would, in the ordinary sense of the term, be understood as supplying a resource, in addition to the above established strength, as in England. Indeed, in consideration of the vast population and extensive countries with which the Native infantry is concerned, and in view of the contingencies and exigencies of war, there might be strong reasons why a reserve should be formed in India also in addition to the established strength above set forth. But *per contra* there are financial exigencies, and I believe that the Government cannot afford the expense of a reserve in this manner. I rather apprehend that Government will have as much as it can do to maintain the established strength as now existing.

But I suppose (subject to correction) that what is being, or will be, suggested to Government is to subtract the reserve men from the men now serving with the colors, or to include such reserves in the existing total of established strength, and so to count them as part of the fighting strength, that is, if (hypothetically) the "reserve" were fixed at 24,000 non-commissioned officers and privates, then of the total 104,000 there would be 24,000 on "reserve," either at home or else employed temporarily in the police or the civil establishments, and 80,000 with the colors. Out of the 24,000 men on reserve, there would be 10,000 temporarily in the police and the civil establishments and 14,000 at home.

The question then is what would be the saving financially? Take the average pay of a sepoy at Rs. 8 a month or Rs. 96 a year, to which something should be added for contingencies, including compensation for dearthness of grain, making up the total to about Rs. 120; take the cost of a reserve

\* The actual cost of a sepoy is a point on which there will be some difference of opinion. I have assumed the amount approximately.

sepoys at Rs. 3 a month or Rs. 36 a year with contingencies, bringing the amount up to Rs. 40, then the whole annual pay of 10,000 sepoy on "reserve" with police and civil establishments, or  $10,000 \times 120 = 12,00,000$  would be saved to the military budget, and would be a real saving to the State, as it has been already explained that the pay of the sepoy and that of the policeman and the messenger is about the same. Then, too, 14,000 reserve sepoy at home would be receiving Rs. 40 a year each, or Rs. 5,60,000 in all, instead of Rs. 120 each, or Rs. 16,80,000 in all, which would be their pay with the colors. So the difference between Rs. 5,60,000 and Rs. 16,80,000, namely, Rs. 11,20,000, would be a saving to the military budget and a real saving to the State. The total saving then would be Rs.  $12,00,000 + 11,20,000 = 23,20,000$ , or £232,000 per annum. If Native non-commissioned officers were placed on the "reserve," there would be some additional economy. The saving is only estimated approximately. It would hardly, I think, be less than the above; it might be more, in which case it would mount up at least to £250,000, or one quarter of a million sterling. It is to be remembered, however, that this amount, though considerable, is small relatively to the aggregate of the military charges of India.

If, however, it were held that reserve sepoy could not be placed temporarily in civil employ to the number of 10,000, that is, if the police and the civil departments could not manage to take so many, then the above saving would be proportionately diminished. If none could be thus employed, for instance, then all the 24,000 men would be at home on reserve.

The difference between their pay at Rs. 40 each a year, or Rs. 9,60,000, and their cost at Rs. 120 with the colors, or Rs. 28,80,000, would be Rs. 19,20,000 per annum, or more than 19 lakhs of rupees, or £192,000 saving annually.

If, again, the "reserve" rate of allowance at home were two rupees a month, the cost would be Rs. 24 per head, plus Rs. 4 for contingencies, or Rs. 28, which would give Rs. 6,72,000 for the whole, which, as compared with the Rs. 28,80,000, would show a saving of Rs. 22,08,000, or 22 lakhs of rupees.

There would be many circumstances affecting the financial result in detail for better or for worse, and I only give the above figures to afford a notion of what the financial value of such a measure would be.

At the best, however, the financial result, namely, a saving of one quarter of a million sterling annually, or thereabouts, in the annual charges for the Native infantry in India, is not great relatively to the total present military expenditure of India (16½ millions sterling) annually. While in order to produce even this much financially, a reduction of Native infantry strength with the colors from 104,000 to 80,000 non-commissioned officers and men would have to be undertaken, or a diminution of one-fifth. It is manifest that such a reduction would be serious from a military point of view, and would be regarded by military authorities as a grave disadvantage. One question would then arise for consideration, namely, whether the military disadvantages must not be held to outweigh the financial advantage, or whether the particular advantage to be gained financially is such as to justify the military disadvantages being endured.

This question would, however, be superseded by another question, namely this, whether so large a number as 24,000, or anything like that number, could possibly be spared from the colors, or whether any sepoy can properly be spared from their colors in any part of India. As regards the Bombay presidency and the Bombay army, our last official despatch has shown that we cannot spare any sepoy from the colors, as the territories to be guarded are so extensive with so many elements of possible trouble, as we have but 21,300 Native infantry, and our battalions are only thirty in number, and as the established strength of a battalion is already at a minimum (being 600 sepoy, or 712 officers and men), as our sepoy are reported to be overworked, and as being often employed on night duties to an extent not contemplated by the regulations, notwithstanding all the efforts made to reduce their routine work to a minimum. We may fear that the circumstances of other parts of India will be found similar, but on this we need not offer any opinion.

If the battalions were still strong numerically, say with 900 sepoy as was once the case, then there would have been some scope for forming a reserve as a means of reducing expenditure; for instance, 300 might have been kept at their homes on reserve, 600 remaining with the colors. But in 1861 and 1862 the strength was reduced to a minimum, namely 600, and military authorities will not consider it properly possible to have fewer sepoy with the colors, inasmuch as even now a battalion, after allowing for men on furlough, in hospital and on indispensable routine work, would hardly turn out 500 sepoy for duty. If, again, there were spare battalions, there might be some scope for a reserve as a means of reducing expenditure; but within the last twenty years the number of battalions has been reduced by one-fourth or more, till at last they are only enough to hold the military stations in the country, and to allow a slender margin for war. The number of military stations, too, has been diminished, at least in Western India, within recent times, and, as a rule, only those stations are retained which must be held for political or strategic reasons. If here or there some small station might be reduced, still that would not affect the total force, which must be kept up in any given province for garrison purposes and the maintenance of internal order.

Next, as regards cavalry, I know not whether the principles of "reserve" and "short service" will be applied to the cavalry in England; but in India, if they were applied to the Native infantry, I presume they would be applied to the Native cavalry also, inasmuch as there is one difference between a cavalry recruit in England and in India, namely this, that in England the recruit usually joins without previous practice in horsemanship, whereas in India he generally, though not always, joins as a horseman already.

Now, the general principles, as above explained, regarding Native infantry are valid or invalid (according as opinions vary) regarding Native cavalry, with certain modifications or additions which I will specify.

By the old system, the regular Native cavalry had their horses, their arms, and equipments found for them by Government; while the irregular cavalry received a consolidated pay from Government, out of which they found their own horses, arms, and equipment. Had the regular system been universal with the Native cavalry, and had it lasted, then the principles of "reserve," as applied to the infantry, would have been more completely applicable to the cavalry than they now are. But of late years the

regular system has been abolished, and the irregular system rendered universal with the Native cavalry in all parts of India, except, as I understand, Madras.

There are now 18,000 non-commissioned officers and men in the Native cavalry of British India (*vide* East India Accounts for 1878-79, presented to Parliament). Suppose that a portion, say one-fifth of these men, or about 3,500, were placed on "reserve," a question would immediately arise as to the disposal of the horses. The animals might perhaps be disposed of on the spot, some adjustment being made with the funds existing in each cavalry regiment for the purchase of horses and remounts. Or, the men going home on "reserve" might take their horses with them. But if a man goes home with his horse on reduced pay, can he afford to keep the animal as well as himself? Take his pay and allowances at thirty-two rupees a month with the colors (including compensation for dearness of grain and forage) and at sixteen rupees when at home on reserve, could he at home keep himself and his horse in proper state, and fit for service? This is doubtful. But if he could not be depended upon for this, then, on being placed on "reserve," his horse might be disposed of, and he would receive, while at home, the dismounted or infantry rate of allowance; and if he were called out for service in war, the Government would find a horse for him. To that extent then (say one-fifth of the whole) the irregular system would be infringed.

I should add that, in cases where a man (generally a Native officer) owns several horses and finds troopers to mount them, he drawing the consolidated pay for the whole, he might be able to maintain the men and horses at home on the "reserve" allowances.

The saving in time of peace would be at the rate of sixteen rupees a horse on 3,500 men, or Rs. 56,000 a month, or Rs. 672,000 a year, or £67,200.

Possibly the above saving might be increased if some of the troopers on reserve were to be employed in the mounted branch of the police, a corresponding number of mounted policemen being discharged. But then these mounted policemen being on the same system as irregular cavalry, there would be a difficulty in disposing of them, and the police could not easily afford to have their mounted men withdrawn in event of war, as such men could not be immediately replaced.

Whether 3,500 troopers could be spared from the colors is a serious question from a military point of view. As already shewn officially, we cannot properly spare any in the Bombay presidency, as there are but 3,400 (*vide* East India Accounts) non-commissioned officers and privates in the Bombay cavalry for such extensive territories. Whether the circumstances are similar in other parts of India is a question on which we need not offer an opinion.

The total saving of cost annually by forming a reserve in the manner above indicated would be—

On the Infantry, about	...	...	...	...	£ 250,000
„ Cavalry	...	...	...	...	67,000
					<hr/> 317,000

or something less than one-third of a million sterling, on a withdrawal of 24,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, in all 27,500 men, from their colors. And these considerations have been set forth, relative to the question, whether the financial saving is commensurate with the military sacrifice.

In brief, the conclusions are—

- 1st, that a system of "reserve" for the Native army in India could not be formed exactly after the English model, because it would probably not prove attractive, and might be open to political objection;
- 2nd, that however as a matter of practicability, as distinct from military expediency or safety, a system of "reserve" could be so arranged as to suit the political and social circumstances of India, and to prove attractive;
- 3rd, that such a system is not likely to be adopted in India, as an additional military resource, as in England, but might be contemplated in India as a means of reducing military expenditure;
- 4th, that as a means of financial reduction it would produce a saving, considerable indeed by itself, but not great relatively to the total army charges;
- 5th, that such saving could, however, be obtained only by withdrawing a large proportion of men from the colors at a time when the Native army is not numerically strong in comparison with its work and its duties; a question thence arising as to whether the financial advantages are sufficient to justify the military disadvantages.
- 6th, that such withdrawal of men from the colors is not safely possible in Western India, the question as to whether it is possible in other parts of India being beyond our cognizance;
- 7th, that while the formation of a reserve is quite practicable, yet, if it be wanted as an addition to the established strength with the colors, there is doubt whether it can be afforded from a financial point of view; and if it be wanted as a means of diminishing the strength with the colors, there is doubt whether it can be afforded from a military point of view.

BOMBAY,  
The 15th August 1879. }

RICHARD TEMPLE.

Remarks on matters referred to the Commission on Army Organization.

*Minute by His Excellency the Governor of Bombay.*

It may be desirable to state an opinion on some of the several points in the printed instructions of the Government of India to the Commission on Army Organization.

Points 1 and 2 relate to the number of troops, British and Native, to be maintained in India in peace time for internal order and garrison duty only, and to their distribution among the several provinces.



On these points I have, by my minute of the 31st July 1879, given full answers as respects the Bombay presidency and the Bombay army; and further answers do not seem to be required from me regarding other parts of India.

*Point 3 runs thus:* "What should be the full war establishment of the Indian army calculated under the two heads of—

"(a) the number of troops that India ought to be able to place and maintain in the field for service whenever required;

"(b) the garrisons and reserves to be maintained in India?"

Regarding (b), I need not offer any further answer.

Regarding (a), as the war just concluded successfully in Afghanistan affords the most recent experience, it may be well here to look at the number of regiments engaged with the three columns operating at and near Kandahar, in the Kuram Valley, and with the Peshawar Field Force.

The Bengal Army List corrected up to 31st December 1878 gives the following number of regiments as composing the entire force, irrespective of the Bombay reserve brigade, which will be noticed separately :—

*Sappers and Miners.*

9 Companies, subsequently increased to 14 companies—*vide* Bengal Army List, 31st March 1879.

*Royal Artillery.*

Afterwards reduced to 19 batteries—*vide* Bengal Army List, 31st March 1879. 24 Batteries.

*Cavalry.*

3 Regiments (European).  
12 " (Native).

*Infantry.*

Increased to 12 regiments—*vide* Bengal Army List, 31st March 1879. 10 Regiments (European),  
20 " (Native),

and two Native Levies.

Of the above force, the Bombay army supplied 2 batteries artillery, 1 regiment Native cavalry, and 2 regiments Native infantry; Madras supplied 3 companies of sappers and miners and 2 regiments of Native infantry at Vitakri, which are included in the above 29 battalions of Native infantry.

The Bombay reserve brigade consisted of 2 companies sappers and miners, 1 regiment Native cavalry, and 2 regiments of Native infantry.

As Madras was indented upon for 3 regiments of Native infantry to garrison Fort William, Alipore, and Dorunda, it is presumed that the Bengal army could spare no more troops for field service, having already supplied, besides the greater part of the fighting strength, reserves at Peshawar, Mooltan, and Quetta.

In my minute of the 31st July 1879 it is shown that Bombay has a slender margin of 1 regiment of cavalry and 7 regiments of Native infantry, which this presidency could use for external purposes; and assuming that the Madras army could spare about as many, we are forced to the conclusion that the following troops were alone available for service to reinforce the forces already engaged :—

*Bengal*—None.

*Madras*—1 regiment cavalry (or perhaps 2 regiments) and 2 (or perhaps 3) regiments of Native infantry.

*Bombay*—5 regiments Native infantry (two of which were with the reserve brigade).

From the above it will be seen that if we are engaged in another war, such as the one just concluded, and presuming that doubtless the force lately engaged was not greater than the exigencies of the service required, and, further, taking into consideration our present extended frontier and the necessity for strong garrison, then the troops India should be able to place and maintain in the field should amount, at least, to the force employed in the recent Afghan War.

For the safety of the Indian Empire, I would rather say that India should always be able, at very short notice, to place in the field one army-corps of strength English system of  
(33,000) in readiness to support the first army-corps, or to fill up the gaps caused in it by casualties of service; in all 66,000 men. And besides this force, there should be in India troops sufficient for garrison purposes and maintenance of internal order.

*Points 4 and 5 run thus:—*

(4) "By what means short of permanently maintaining the army on a war footing can the difference between one and three be most efficiently provided for?"

(5) "Having regard to one, three, and four, what number of troops must be kept permanently under arms to garrison the country in peace time and furnish the required cadres for war; and what organization will best combine the necessary elasticity with efficiency in peace and war?"

These points seem to indicate the formation of a reserve for the Native army in India; on that question I have written a separate minute.

*Point 6 runs thus:—*

"Assuming that the British force now in the country is not to be reduced, can the cost of its maintenance be diminished by alteration in its organization, or in the system by which it is recruited and relieved?"

That branch of the British force in India in which, perhaps, some reduction of cost might be effected in its maintenance is the infantry, as I understand that the organization of the artillery and cavalry cannot be properly disturbed.

The established strength of a regiment of infantry (European) stands at 23 combatant officers, 84 combatant non-commissioned officers, 16 drummers and 780 privates, which gives 3 officers and 110 non-commissioned officers, rank and file, per company. It has been suggested that the number of privates might be materially increased without a corresponding increase of officers being necessary.



The present number of infantry regiments serving in India is 52, *i.e.*, Bengal 35, Madras 9, Bombay 8. Railway communication, good roads, and the development of telegraphic correspondence renders the increased concentration of our European forces in India more feasible than it formerly used to be, and if the Government is prepared to carry this out, a considerable saving might accrue to Imperial funds.

If the number of British battalions in India were reduced from 52 to (say) 40, it might be carried out in the following manner without any reduction of fighting strength in *men* :—

Companies are composed at present of 110 non-commissioned officers rank and file; if the companies were increased to 140 non-commissioned officers rank and file, or by an addition of 30 men to each company, the cost of the officers and staff of 12 battalions might be saved to the Indian revenue. This suggestion is made on the supposition that the Home Government can arrange to dispose of the officers thus spared from India, on which matter we are necessarily uninformed.

The addition of 30 men per company, or 300 men per regiment, would of course entail more work on the commanding and company officers. The military authorities would be able to judge whether this is practicable. But if it were found practicable, then a regiment would be able to turn out at least 1,000 strong. The saving to the Indian revenues would possibly be, on a rough estimate, about 13 lakhs of rupees a year.

As regards recruiting and relief, a great saving to Government would be made by retaining, in India, all men who are physically fit with the colors for 12 years, and by including healthy strong men of a certain age, and under 12 years' service, to volunteer for service in India on their regiments being relieved, provided there are vacancies in the battalions remaining in India; also by requiring all soldiers embarking for India with their regiments to complete 12 years' service, *i.e.*, if a man had served 4 years at home, on embarking for India he would have to serve 8 years in India to complete his 12 years' service.

All this might be considered if the question of "short service" shall be brought under discussion. It is to be inferred that the time of service in India is capable of extension, because up to a very recent time a term of 12 years was usual for service in India, and before the war of the mutinies the term was much longer.

To render the completion of 12 years' service for regiments ordered to India compulsorily would not very seriously affect the army reserves, for the formation of which the short service system was introduced; for only 52 battalions out of 131 are serving in India. And the men serving in India having completed their 12 years would also pass into the reserves.

Another strong reason for advocating 12 years at least as the term of service in India is that it will ensure a better and older set of non-commissioned officers for the supervision of men subject to many temptations in a trying climate. This is a subject which we know is causing much anxiety to the military authorities in India.

Many means of reducing cost in the administration of the European army in India could doubtless be found, notably in the system of canteens; and if necessary a scheme for the better administration of the latter can be elaborated which would effect a considerable saving to Government.

*Point 7.*—"What should be the territorial organization and divisions of commands and the proportions of superior officers and staff?"

The present territorial organization and divisions of command, by which I mean organization and command of the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, have now been working satisfactorily for a century, and I am not aware of any reason why the great divisions of command should now be altered. My views on this point will be further explained in the reply to point 9.

The presidencies of Madras and Bombay have each a compact army amounting in strength to about an army-corps. This organization need not, I think, be disturbed. The Bengal army has much larger proportions; it will doubtless remain under one Commander-in-Chief; whether within it there should be any re-distribution of commands is a subject on which I need not offer any opinion.

*Point 8.*—"What units of organization for field service seem best suited to the usual conditions of Indian warfare, and can these be adapted to, or connected with, the territorial organization as in Europe?"

The unit of organization for service in the field is a technical military question on which I need not offer any opinion. But whether any such unit can be connected with, or adapted to, any territorial organization as in Europe, is partly a political question on which some brief remarks may be offered. The question must be answered decidedly in the negative. The question amounts to this—Can certain regiments, certain brigades, certain divisions, be recruited in certain localities, and be connected with those localities? Certainly armies, or army-corps, can be connected with territorial organization, as the Bombay army is recruited in Western India, the Madras army in Southern India, and so on. But beyond that it is impossible to connect particular portions of those armies with particular localities. Troops have often to be maintained in places which never furnish recruits. Again, recruits are largely forthcoming in places where troops are never kept, such as the Concan in Western India. Extensive provinces, such as Bengal, never furnish recruits at all. In some provinces, such as Oudh, where recruits would be largely obtainable, it would perhaps not be thought desirable to obtain them largely.

*Point 9.*—"Is it desirable to maintain the presidential armies distinct as at present; and are large staffs and separate departments now maintained essential to the efficiency of the army administration under the present presidential system?"

It has always been maintained that for high political reasons, and for the prevention of dangerous combinations, it is necessary to keep the armies of India distinct in race and creed; and I am not aware that of late years any sufficient reason has been brought forward to weaken this conviction.

The men of any particular country make the best protectors for their own homes. They have more interest in serving in the country of their birth during times of peace, though ready to go anywhere in times of war. Recruiting for any great division of a country like India must of necessity go on within that division, and it would be objectionable, even if it were practicable, to recruit the armies of Madras or Bombay with Sikhs, Pathans, or men of Oudh; or to offer inducements for

Deccanees, Concanes, Mahrattas, or Madrasees to volunteer for the army of Bengal. These reasons of themselves tend to keep the armies distinct. The fact of serving under a particular Government, as the armies at present do, adds to this feeling and encourages emulation.

To do away with the distinct character of the three armies of India would be at once to encourage that excessive degree of centralization which is apt to be so dangerous in a country like India. In that case the command of the three armies, and of guarding, as they do, a vast extent of territory, would be placed in the hands of one Commander-in-Chief. This would entail upon him more work in the way of inspection than he could properly perform, and more general business than he could manage with efficiency.

All this would, moreover, at once have the effect of concentrating the administrative departments of the army (the commissariat, the ordnance, and the like) in one place, leaving deputies only with the Local Governments. These deputies would be responsible to the respective heads of their departments at the head-quarters of India, instead of as at present allowing each presidential army to have its local head of each department. Any such concentration would, in my opinion, be without advantage as regards economy and very disadvantageous as regards efficiency. For instance, what advantage could there be from one Commissary General at Calcutta directing the commissariat affairs of Bombay and Madras? What but inefficiency could result from such concentration? The Commissary General at Madras and at Bombay would be styled deputy of the Commissary General at Calcutta, and would be doing much the same work as he does now, only with diminished responsibility and reduced pay.

So impossible would it be for one Commander-in-Chief to command all the three armies in India, that there would doubtless have to be under him a commander of the forces for each of the armies of Madras and Bombay. Then, presumably, in each of the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, the present army would be called an army-corps, and the present Commander-in-Chief would be called Commander of the Army-Corps. He would have to perform the same work as the present local Commander-in-Chief on perhaps reduced emoluments.

Similar remarks are applicable equally to the head-quarter staff of the local army in each of the presidencies of Madras and Bombay. If the Commander-in-Chief in India is to command all the three armies, and the head-quarter staff of each of the local armies is to be abolished, then what is saved by reducing the salaries of the staff of local or presidential armies would be swallowed up by the increased emoluments which must be given to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief for all India. But as this arrangement would doubtless be found impracticable, the head-quarter staff of each of the presidential armies would become the head-quarter staff of army-corps, that is, would do the same work that they are now doing, perhaps on lesser emoluments.

Again, under this arrangement the commanders of army-corps would be responsible for every move to the Commander-in-Chief, which would entail frequent reference to head-quarters, instead of as now, being under the immediate control of the Local Governments on the spot. The Local Governments of Madras and Bombay are at such a distance from the head-quarters of the Empire, that it would be difficult for the authorities at those head-quarters to efficiently manage urgent affairs, like the despatching of troops to expedition, or on other service, at all events impossible to manage them so efficiently as a local Commander-in-Chief acting under a Local Government; and it would be a waste of power not to employ the services of these local authorities.

The organization of the armies of India, as it stands at present, gives to the army in each of the presidencies of Madras and Bombay a Commander-in-Chief with an efficient head-quarter staff. Besides his high functions as commander of the army, the local Commander-in-Chief is a member of the Council of the Presidential Government. Moreover, he has powers which it would be most inexpedient to concentrate and give under one Commander-in-Chief for all India. For instance, all regimental promotions, whether European or Native, in the Native army, are made absolutely by the local Commander-in-Chief, and he practically, although not nominally, makes all the staff appointments, for he makes nominations, which are, however, submitted to the Presidential Government for approval. The local Commander-in-Chief necessarily possesses great local knowledge of his respective army, and is thoroughly acquainted with the capabilities and merits of the men he promotes or appoints. He can see all his officers from time to time and inspect their work, because he has an area of command which, though large, is not too large to be overlooked by him. But all this cannot possibly be done by one Commander-in-Chief for the whole of such a vast country as India.

If, however, the presidential Commander-in-Chief becomes the commander of an army-corps, a question might arise whether the function of making all these appointments and promotions should not devolve on him, or whether it should not naturally fall to the Commander-in-Chief in India, who, unless he had an adviser of rank from each army-corps (an additional source of expense), could not possibly have the local and personal knowledge for administering it in a satisfactory manner, and could never manage it without frequent references and delays.

But if the presidential commander must exercise this high function,—a function above and beyond the duties ordinarily of a commander of an army-corps,—it is better that he should retain his present title and rank of Commander-in-Chief, which adds to his moral weight with his subordinates.

The same principle applies to the head-quarter staff. When an officer really does the work of an Adjutant-General or a Quarter Master General, it is better that he should be styled so, rather than that he should be styled by some lesser title.

If by an alteration in the status of the three armies the Military Secretariat of the Government at Madras and at Bombay were abolished, there would be little or no saving of expense, for the Military Secretariat of the Government of India would require a corresponding augmentation.

On the whole, there would be but little financial saving from altering the status of the armies of Madras and Bombay. The army commands, the army head-quarters of these two presidencies, the administrative departments, could not be abolished, or if they were, then there would be a corresponding addition at the head-quarters of the army of India. The only effect would be that a limited number of high staff officers would have to do the same work as before on somewhat less pay. There would be some slight reduction of staff salaries, but not enough to produce any appreciable effect financially.

I would answer this question No. 9 then as follows :—

It is expedient to maintain the presidential armies distinct as at present, and the separate departments, as now maintained, are essential to the efficiency of the army administration under the present system.

*Point 10.*—"Should the troops of the several presidential armies as a rule serve in their own presidencies only, except when called out for war, or should they take a recognized share of frontier and other general duty?"

It seems to me that the military arrangement for garrison and maintenance of order in each presidency must of necessity be carried out by the army of that presidency, although the army may at the same time have territory outside its own presidency given over to its safe keeping, as, for instance, Bombay troops garrison Rajpootana and Aden, and the troops of the Madras presidency garrison the Central Provinces, Mysore, the territory of the Nizam and portions of British Burma. In time of war, of course, the troops of all armies consider it the highest honor to be selected for service, and the armies of all the presidencies are liable to serve anywhere, as exemplified by the late expedition to Malta and Cyprus. Except in time of war we should not consider it expedient to hand over the garrison duties of one presidency to another. In the late war with Afghanistan, for instance, the Madras army gave 3 regiments, I believe, for garrison duties performed in time of peace by the Bengal army. Thus the troops near at hand were utilized for immediate service in the field, those at a distance supplying their place for garrison purposes. But in time of peace no doubt all the troops of the armies having frontier stations in their military charge should take a recognized share of frontier duties.

The frontier is the nursery for good soldiers, and we would not advocate its being made over to corps localized for that purpose. Localization in the general acceptation of the term means deterioration. It sometimes happens that the men so localized purchase land, collect their families around them, and are not so willing and ready to serve in all parts of the Empire at a moment's notice as their comrades in arms brought up under different circumstances.

*Point 11.*—"Having regard to the alterations made on our frontier, and redistribution of our frontier garrisons, is it desirable to retain the Punjab frontier force on its present footing, or to place it, in part, or altogether, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief?"

Though necessarily well acquainted with the past circumstances of this force, I am not sufficiently well informed of the proposed change to enable me to offer any remarks on this point.

*Point 12.*—"Assuming that Sind is to be annexed to the Punjab, should the Sind regiments remain localized as at present, and under whose command should they be placed?"

This question is fully replied to by the Government of Bombay despatch addressed to the Government of India, No. 5137, Military Department, dated 28th October 1878, which is attached for easy reference.

BOMBAY;  
18th August 1879.

RICHARD TEMPLE.

No. 5137, dated Bombay Castle, 28th October 1878.

From—The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Having received a copy of the Government of India despatch, Foreign Department, No. 203 of 1878, dated the 26th September 1878, upon the reorganization of the western and north-western frontier of India, I am desired to offer the following remarks on one of the military portions of that despatch.

2. The Governor in Council feels constrained to express extreme regret at the proposal conveyed in the latter portion of paragraph 8, page 4, of the despatch, to amalgamate the Sind frontier force with that of the Punjab, and to place it (paragraph 9, page 5) under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India.

3. The Governor in Council would again refer the Supreme Government to my letter No. 258, Military Department, of the 13th March 1878, and to the minute of the late Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Staveley, dated 11th February 1878; also to the reply received thereto, contained in Government of India, Military Department, letter No. 1098, dated 21st March 1878, wherein His Excellency in Council is informed that, "when the time arrives for determining what changes, if any, are to be made, the opinion of His Excellency in Council and of Sir Charles Staveley will receive the full consideration of the Government of India." The Governor in Council feels confident that the consideration of the Government of India has been given to the opinion and wishes of the Government of Bombay as expressed in the Military letter and the Commander-in-Chief's minute above quoted, but is concerned to find that the opinion therein expressed does not seem to meet with the approval of the Government of India. But as the subject is one of such vital importance to the Bombay army, I am directed to forward copy of a minute on the same subject by the present Commander-in-Chief, and to recapitulate briefly the arguments before advanced, in the hope that even now they may receive favorable consideration from the Government of India.

4. To premise, I am directed to state that if the amalgamation of the Sind frontier force with the Punjab frontier force were a political necessity, the keeping of the forces distinct would never be advocated by the Government of Bombay. But the Governor in Council believes that no political inconvenience can arise in keeping the Sind frontier force separate from the Punjab frontier force, and that all political and administrative objects, at which the Government of India aim, can be equally well attained if the Sind frontier force continues to form part of the Bombay army. On the other hand, as the separation of the Sind force is certainly detrimental to the Bombay army, His Excellency in Council hopes to be excused in again pressing this point on the consideration of the Government of India.

5. The late Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, in his minute before quoted, brought to notice the necessity of keeping, as far as possible, the various armies of India in an equal degree of

efficiency, and that pre-eminence or superiority of any one of these armies over the others should, for imperial interests, be avoided. In this maxim His Excellency in Council entirely concurs, and apprehends that it needs no arguments to show how vastly superior an army must become when continually engaged in the responsible duties of guarding an extensive frontier to another occupied only in peaceful parade grounds in the precincts of cantonments. An army so privileged will always find the greater favor in the eyes of the population from which it is drawn. The people from among whom the army of Bombay is recruited, especially the Mahrattas and the Beloochees, are brave and hardy by nature. To now deprive the Bombay service of the right to watch a frontier which, as Sir Charles Staveley truly remarks, it almost looks upon as its heritage, and which is connected with so many of its associations and traditions, will be to impair the soldierly tone and the standard of efficiency of an army which has ever distinguished itself, not only in India, but also in Afghanistan, Persia, China, Abyssinia, and other parts of the world to which the Government of India may have been pleased to order it. The many good officers existing and the many more in the future will likewise be deprived of an admirable school of practical training, and a promising field of distinction for young men of energy and character, so happily described by His Excellency the Viceroy as one of the greatest advantages of a frontier army.

6. Again, if the Bombay army is to be an effective force in all its arms, its cavalry arm ought to be maintained in proportionate strength. At present its Native cavalry consists of seven regiments, and one regiment of European cavalry. Of the seven regiments, three are represented by the Sind Horse. The abstraction of the Sind Horse then would reduce the Bombay cavalry to four regiments only, with one regiment of European cavalry, or five regiments in all,—an unprecedentedly low strength. In fact, the cavalry arm of the Bombay army would, as justly observed by the Commander-in-Chief, be brought into a state of comparative inefficiency from numerical weakness.

7. Sir Charles Staveley's suggestion is as follows: that the division of the army of the frontier from Mooltan to Kurrachee be supplied by the army of Bombay, the Sind frontier force being delocalized, and the regiments taking their turn in relief with other regiments of the army. It appears to the Governor in Council that this proposition meets all the requirements of the case, as Sir Charles Staveley explains, that "it would then be the duty of the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army to keep up in that portion of the frontier the number of troops decided on as necessary by the Supreme Government, relieving them from time to time by other corps of the army, such reliefs being carried out in communication with the political authorities on the "frontier." The services of the troops so employed would be under the control of the Frontier Commissioner, except in matters of discipline and interior economy, &c., which would remain in the responsibility of the officer commanding the Sind District, who would be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, to whom also he would submit the annual confidential reports.

8. I am also again to invite attention to the fact that, in the event of effect being given to these proposals of this Government, no new precedent will thereby be established, as the Bombay army is already serving, without any political inconvenience or detriment to military efficiency, in Malwa, Central India and Rajpootana, or, in other words, under the immediate administrative or political jurisdiction of the Government of India.

But if the Government prefers that the Sind frontier force should remain local as at present, that force may still as a military body be a part of the Bombay army, and its services would be entirely at the disposal of the political authorities whom the Government of India might depute to the frontier, just as the Bombay troops in Malwa and Rajpootana are at the disposal of the political authorities there, under the direct supervision of the Government of India.

From the tenor of the present despatch of the Government of India, the Governor in Council hopes that the disbandment of a regiment of Sind Horse, and of Jacob's Rifles, will not really be carried out. Except from actual necessity, disbandment ought not, the Governor in Council submits, to be ordered, because it must unavoidably have a depressing effect on the Native army of this presidency, and must diminish the value of the British service in the estimation of the people. At the dictates of financial economy this measure might indeed have to be adopted; but in this case the reduction of the Sind Horse is proposed only in order to provide a military police on the frontier, without any particular saving of expense. But the duty of such an armed police force might be performed quite as well, or indeed better, by the Sind Horse, which is ready to hand, which has performed, and does perform, these very duties, and is moreover efficient cavalry if called for service in the field.

The same remark applies to any other Native cavalry regiment of the Bombay army.

9. The Governor in Council, moreover, concurs with the late Commander-in-Chief in the belief that the army of the Bombay presidency is already reduced to the lowest limits compatible with the duties it is required to perform.

10. In again urging the views of the Bombay Government on this subject, the Governor in Council does so with the desire of giving prominence to what are imperial rather than local interests, and I am to reiterate the assurance already expressed, that the Bombay troops heretofore serving in the western frontier shall be permitted to retain that honorable position; they will discharge their duties to the entire satisfaction of the political authorities to whom the charge of that frontier may be committed by the Government of India.

#### *Minute by the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.*

Having read the copy of the despatch of the Governor General in Council to the address of the Secretary of State for India, dated 26th September 1878, which paper has been transmitted to us officially by the Government of India, there is one particular part of this despatch on which I feel bound to offer some remarks.

The proposal to transfer from the army of Bombay to that of the Punjab three regiments of cavalry, one mountain battery, and one regiment of infantry (Jacob's Rifles) is so serious a diminution of the force to which I have but recently had the honor of being appointed, that, in justice to

myself and to that army, the interests of which I am bound to uphold, I cannot resist supporting the opinion of my predecessor, General Sir Charles Staveley, and placing on record my protest against a reduction which cannot fail to be injurious to the interests of the officers of this army, who look for employment in a frontier force where their military zeal and intelligence find scope not only for advancement, but for the development for those special interests which produce real soldiers.

As at present constituted, Bombay has offered many fields for the development of talents which have produced an efficiency second to none of the three great armies of India; but deprived of its external frontier and shut up within the circle of the other presidencies, the credit and efficiency of the Bombay army may suffer, and all power to gain a practical knowledge of this profession will be cut off from officers whose loyal spirit and soldier-like bearing have ever distinguished this army.

My predecessor has pointed out an alternative scheme upon which I do not feel myself prepared to offer a remark, but the efficiency of the Sind Horse, the mountain battery, and Jacob's Rifles would in no way be influenced by the proposal to make them available throughout the whole of the Punjab, while the discipline and efficiency of the individual regiment would remain, as at present, under the immediate control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army.

The principle of effecting the union, more or less complete, of Sind and the Punjab being affirmed by the Government of India, and the transfer of the upper portion of Sind being provisionally sanctioned (1876), it becomes necessary to consider the whole question as it affects the Bombay army; and although I cannot but admit that the employment of the troops in the new frontier province should be left to the control of the local military command under the direction of the Chief Commissioner, it still appears to me that no inconvenience can arise, and the Bombay army may be kept intact if the regiments so employed are supplied from Bombay, and belong, as at present, to the Bombay army.

I may instance the position now occupied by the Madras troops at Jubbulpore in the Saugor District of Bengal, some of whom belong to Madras, but *are* under the control of, and are commanded by, a General Officer of the Bengal army.

Another instance suggested by His Excellency the Governor of Bombay is also apposite, but the troops so detached from their own presidency being under their own staff and officers, the anomaly is not so great as in the case at Jubbulpore. I allude to the troops of the Madras presidency employed in British Burma, nor am I aware that any difficulty arises from the employment of these troops under the Chief Commissioner of Burma, although they are under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army.

In addition to the withdrawal of the troops in Sind already noted, I am apprehensive that, by the proposed rectification of the frontier, the whole of the staff as well as the European and Native troops now serving in Kurrachee and Hyderabad, in Lower Sind, as well as those of Jacobabad, may be detached from the Bombay army, and made to form part of the frontier force under the Chief Commissioner of the united province, and consequently under the Government of India, instead of their being, as at present, under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army.

I hope, however, that this surmise may not be realized. If unfortunately it were to prove correct, then the Bombay army would be still further curtailed of the regiments shown in the accompanying detail (A), and more especially in cavalry the Bombay army would be reduced to a state of inefficiency which the Government of India could hardly contemplate, should Bombay be suddenly called upon to supply a contingent for field service, or have to detach a column on active service, either within or beyond its own frontier.

The anomaly briefly alluded to in Sir Charles Staveley's minute of the transfer proposed to be effected of the Sind and Punjab forces from the control of the military to that of the civil authorities is one of so wide a scope, endangering not only the efficiency of an army but the safety of an empire that I refrain from comment, more particularly as I see from paragraph 51 (Military) of the Viceroy's minute (dated Nynce Tal, 22nd April 1877) that His Lordship is opposed to it, and recommends that the frontier force shall be placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India.

BOMBAY;  
18th October 1878. }

H. J. WARRE, *Lieutenant-General*,  
*Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.*

#### TROOPS IN SIND.

##### *Kurrachee.*

I Battery, 1st Brigade, Royal Artillery.  
Head-Quarters and 5 Companies 83rd Foot.  
10th Native Infantry.  
29th Native Infantry, Beloochees (temporarily quartered at Dehra Ghazi Khan).

##### *Hyderabad.*

II Battery, 2nd Brigade, Royal Artillery.  
3 Companies 83rd Foot.  
27th Native Infantry, Beloochees.

##### *Jacobabad.*

1st Sind Horse.  
2nd ditto.  
3rd ditto.  
2nd Mountain Battery.  
30th Native Infantry, Jacob's Rifles.

#### STAFF.

##### *Kurrachee.*

1 Brigadier-General.  
1 D. A. Q. M. General.  
1 Brigade-Major.

##### *Hyderabad.*

1 Staff Officer.

##### *Jacobabad.*

1 Commandant.  
1 Brigade-Major.

##### *Summary.*

2 Field Batteries, Royal Artillery.  
1 Regiment British Infantry.  
3 Regiments Native Cavalry.  
1 Mountain Battery.  
4 Regiments Native Infantry.

*Point 13.*—"Is the present organization of the supply and transport departments of the army that best adapted to its requirements in peace and war, or are any changes desirable; and if so, of what nature?"

I am glad to believe that the commissariat department of the armies of India is second to none in any country. There may be faults of complicated accounts and in minor points of administration, but, on the whole, I believe the British soldiers to be better supplied than any other fighting man in Europe. Recent experiences in Persia, Abyssinia, the expedition to Malta, and the campaign in Afghanistan, all tend to confirm this opinion regarding the great department of supply.

But during time of peace the demands on the commissariat are very different to those in time of war, as was very fully brought out on several recent occasions. Establishments had been very rightly cut down to the smallest proportions consistent with efficiency, and when a sudden call was made to fit out an expedition in a comparatively short time, the commissariat became over-taxed. From it was demanded, not only a very varied supply of food of sorts, but clothing for followers, gear for horses, horse shoes, nails, medical comforts, boots, blankets, carpentry in all its branches, curry combs, horse brushes, and many articles for cleaning ships' deck, such as swabs, scrapers, and brooms; also cabooses and latrines; all these things and many more were required from the commissariat department. The packing of medicines also devolved on this department; indeed, with the exception of fitting up the ships, providing the water-supply and clothing the troops, *everything* was expected to be done by the commissariat. It was found very difficult to enlarge the existing establishment with sufficient rapidity to meet all these demands, and it is well worthy of consideration whether the system should not be altered.

For instance, the great clothing department might well be called upon to relieve the commissariat of the supply of clothing, boots, blankets, water-proofs, &c., for the followers of an army. The medical departments, through their store-keepers, might be required to see to the packing as well as to the supply of medical stores and comforts. The ordnance departments might supply horse shoes and horse gear generally, and for expeditions beyond the sea the charter parties of each ship engaged might include the supply of all articles necessary for the cleanliness, sanitation, and comfort of the troops while on boardship; in other words, the master of the vessel should supply swabs, scrapers, latrines, cabooses (cooking places), and lanterns for use on boardship. The commissariat might be relieved in many other ways, and the work more evenly distributed among the great departments, with great benefit to the more expeditious working of the system of supply.

With these few words on the department of *supply* I turn to the transport department.

I must premise by representing that there is no such department existing in time of peace in India. Nor do I at all advocate that any such expensive department should be maintained in time of peace, for we see by recent experience that with a small amount of well-understood organization in time of peace such a department could be readily formed in time of war. The remarkable manner in which thousands of pack animals, camels, mules, bullocks, &c., and hundreds of carts were collected, in a short space of time, by the civil administration, all along our frontier at the commencement of the late war, confirms me in the opinion that it is quite unnecessary for Government to go to the expense of keeping up expensive carriage during peace.

On the other hand, when carriage including both beasts of burden and vehicles, is collected for the army, there is much difficulty in taking care of, and making the best use of, the said carriage. The reason is that the management of carrying is a speciality requiring separate and undivided attention, and much special knowledge and experience on the part of those engaged in it. It is not to be expected that military men can have an intuitive knowledge of all this, and to do it well they must be trained. And as such training cannot be acquired on the spur of the exigency in war, it follows that the Government should in time of peace maintain a small but efficient number of transport officers and transport officials.

As auxiliary to this, and with little or no extra expense, a beginning might be made by telling off in each regiment and battery, whether European or Native, a certain number of intelligent soldiers (when Europeans able to speak the language), whose duty it would be to read up and understand thoroughly any order which might be from time to time published on the subject of army transport, and who would, when their regiment was on the march, be responsible to the commanding officer, under the orders of the regimental quarter-master, for the transport of their regiment. When the regiment was in garrison these men could perform their ordinary duties, and a very slight remuneration, with some small distinguishing mark, would be quite sufficient, during times of peace, to keep them up to the mark, particularly if they had the certainty during times of war of at once taking their places as conductors or sub-conductors of the different division of the transport train about to be formed. Recent experience has taught us that any number of good officers can be obtained for transport duties; and these officers gifted with small powers of organization, which exist in almost every intelligent Englishman, would, with the assistance of these trained men, thoroughly up in all orders regarding transport, very quickly organize a train quite equal to the ordinary requirements of an army in the field.

It is, I am aware, a vexed question as to whether the transport department should be a department of itself, or whether it should (in the field) be under the control of the Commissary General of the army. Now I take the wants of an army to be divided into four parts:—

- 1st—regimental equipment;
- 2nd—food supplies;
- 3rd—warlike stores;
- 4th—comforts, such as hospital tents and supplies for standing camps.

Regimental equipment is, of necessity, under regimental charge, and the carriage with its proper establishment for this equipment having once been handed over, the officer commanding is responsible for its safety. Casualties will of course occur which must be filled up by the transport train. Of the other three requirements, two, *i.e.*, food supplies and comforts, are the direct care of the commissariat, whereas the remaining requirement, warlike stores, falls to the responsibility of the ordnance department. But the latter department having been once supplied with the necessary amount of



carriage and establishment, becomes independent of the transport train, except for the supply to fill up casualties, much in the same manner as a regiment. The commissariat then is responsible for the bulk of the stores to be carried, and the Commissary General knows the wants of the troops in front, and is kept well informed regarding the resources of the country, and consequently knows what to push forward and what to keep back. Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that the transport train of an army in the field should be under the control and at the orders of the Commissary General, subject, of course, to the immediate command of the general officer or other officer commanding the forces in the field.

*Point 14.*—"Are the warlike stores now procured and maintained in the manner most economical consistent with efficiency?"

To this question I think I may reply on the whole in the affirmative, although certain suggestions may be made here for the more economical working of the ordnance department and other departments of supply of India. The orders lately issued, by which the ordnance department is enabled to purchase locally or by private arrangement stores which were formerly obtained from England, will, we hope, reduce expenditure considerably.

The cost of our gunpowder and small arms ammunition might be reduced by increasing our area of supply, and consequently the outturn. It is a question whether Mooltan and Ferozepore could not be more cheaply supplied from Kirkee than from Dum-Dum. The Ordnance Commission certainly recommended that Ferozepore and Mooltan should be so supplied from Kirkee on the opening of the Indus Valley Railway.

The cost of our manufacture of both powder and ammunition is high, in consequence of our superintendence being costly in proportion to the outturn, but the outturn might be materially increased, in both factories, without increase or with very little increase, of superintendence.

The cost of supplying harness to Madras and Bombay might hereafter be reduced by establishing a factory in either presidency for the supply of both armies. At present Madras procures its harness from England, and Bombay, although it makes up its own, has to procure a great deal of its leather from England, because country leather, however carefully cured by natives, cannot be used for the more important parts of the harness; consequently, if good and cheap harness is to be made, a tannery is required. The military budget estimate of India for the year 1879-80 shows an estimated expenditure for ordnance establishments, stores and camp equipage for all India in India of Rs. 56,38,000, and the estimate of expenditure *in England* for stores as expected to be a charge in the English accounts for the same year at Rs. 32,90,000, or a total of Rs. 89, 28,000.

The charges are high for the purpose of meeting the possible exigencies of the late war with Afghanistan. But in these days of improved communications of steam and telegraph, it becomes a question whether the charge for the ordnance department could not be materially reduced by reducing the ordnance stores to a minimum. War does not break out so suddenly that we should have no time to communicate with England by telegraph, and procure what was urgently required by canal steamers on an emergency. But I would also remark that in these days of improved armament, and when that armament is constantly changing, a large accumulation of stores of a particular kind is frequently a dead loss to the State, because they become obsolete on the change of one description of gun for another: thus stores procured in large quantities for breech-loading ordnance is now nearly useless on the re-introduction of muzzle-loading guns, and these stores may again become obsolete on the possible re-introduction of breech-loading ordnance. Again, our arsenals are now stocked with shot and shell of an obsolete pattern which, if sold as old iron, would not recoup the price of carriage from the arsenals to the principal metal marts. The same remark may be applied, though in a lesser degree, perhaps, to other warlike stores in which I would include clothing for the army, medicines, and miscellaneous stores. It appears to me that if reductions of expenditure can be made in all these departments of supply, so as to meet our actual requirements without retaining a large surplus, subject to deterioration, it will be a far better economy than any that can be obtained by reducing fighting strength or general efficiency by small savings in the salaries of an efficient staff, which must tend to make the profession of arms less *honorable and valuable* in the eyes of our fellow-countrymen.

*Point 15.*—"What lines should be considered and maintained as our main lines of communication, and what new lines of road and railway are of the most urgent importance?"

In the Bombay Presidency the main lines of communication to be maintained are as follows:—

#### *Railways.*

The Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Railway starting from Bombay\* runs nearly due north

to Surat and Broach, crossing the Taptee and Nerbudda rivers, and taking a slight bend to the east passes through Baroda, and here with a decided westerly curve strikes the province of Guzerat, and crossing the Mahy River passes Ahmedabad, the head-quarters of the Northern Division, and terminates at Veeramgaum, a distance of 349 miles from Bombay.

The one important branch of this line of railway is the branch to Wadwan, as it places us in easy communication with Rajkote, our only military cantonment in Kutchwar. This branch has its junction at Veeramgaum, and extends to Wadwan, a distance of 30 miles, from which place Rajkote is distant about 50 miles by a good road. Veeramgaum is also the junction of the great line of railway, which, already completed to Kharroghora, a distance of 14 miles, will eventually join the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway with the Rajputana State Railway at Ajmere *via* Fahlunpur, Mount Aboo, Erinpura, and Pali. It is also proposed to extend the Bombay, Baroda and Central India line through Cutch to Hyderabad (Sind) *via* Aujar and Luckput, or by an alternative line having its junction at Fahlunpur which would strike Hyderabad (Sind) *via* Deesa, Nuggur, Parker, and Budena, and in either case join the Indus Valley State Railway at Kotree.

The Sind, Punjab and Delhi Railway leaves Kurrahee, the head-quarters of the Sind Brigade, the most northern and westerly point of the presidency, and terminates at Kotree on the Indus opposite Hyderabad (Sind), a distance of 105 miles. Here it is joined by the Indus Valley State Railway, which, following the course of the river, on the right bank, as far as Sukkur *via* Sehnan and Larkhana, is there broken by the Indus, which is not yet bridged. Sukkur is 329 miles from Kurrahee and 224 miles from Kotree. The line of rail is taken up again at Rohri on the left bank of the river, and,

taking a north-easterly direction, reaches Mooltan *viâ* Bahawulpur, leaving Sind about 80 miles from Rehri, nearly opposite Kusmore, on the frontier between Sind and the Punjab. It has been proposed to extend this line by a branch from Sukkur to Jacobabad *viâ* Shikarpur, a distance of 50 miles.

The Great Indian Peninsula Railway starting from Bombay makes its way in a north-easterly direction through Callian (the junction for Poona and Madras) up the Tull Ghât to Deolalce, a great depôt for troops arriving in and leaving India, and passing through the collectorates of Nassik and Khandesh, crossing the Godavery and Tapti Rivers it leaves the Bombay Presidency near Bhosawal, which station is the junction for the lines striking into the Central Provinces.

Bhosawal is 276 miles from Bombay. Further on at Khandwah we find the Holkar State Railway having a northerly direction, and which crossing the Nerbudda passes Mhow, the head-quarters of the Mhow division of the Bombay army, and so on through Indore to Rutlam, where it at present terminates.

This line will eventually be extended through Neemuch to Nusseerabad and Ajmere, where it will join the Rajputana State Railway. I should not have mentioned this line at all, as it is out of Bombay territory, were it not that the country through which it passes is held by Bombay troops, and is therefore one of our important lines of communication.

At Callian junction the Great Indian Peninsula Railway takes a south-easterly bend, and ascending the Bhore Ghât reaches Poona 119 miles from Bombay, the head-quarters of the Poona Division of the army, and continues through Sholapur, near which station it leaves the Bombay presidency and joins the Madras Railway at Raichore. Near Sholapur is Shahabad, the junction of the Nizam's State Railway, to Hyderabad (Deccan). Sholapur is 283 miles from Bombay.

At Munmad, north of Nassik, a chord line has been lately opened, but is not quite finished, which crossing the Godavery passes through Ahmednugger, a large military cantonment, and joins the line to Sholapur at Dhond on the Bhima River.

This completes the description of finished railways; others are in contemplation, such as the one to Hyderabad, Sind, already mentioned; one from Sholapur to Gadduck, which at that station will eventually join the line from Carwar on the west coast, which passing Dharwar, a military cantonment of the Bombay army, will go through to Bellary in Madras Presidency where a large force of the Madras army is stationed, and there join the Madras Railway. Dharwar above mentioned is about 50 miles from Belgaum, the head-quarters of a brigade of the Bombay army.

The principal roads in the presidency are those leading from Bombay to Gwalior *viâ* Nassik, Malligaum (a military cantonment), Dhoolia, Indore, and Goona. Another from Bombay passes through Poona and Ahmednugger to Nagpur in the Central Provinces, and a third leads from Poona to Dharwar *viâ* Satara, a military station, Kholapur, and Belgaum. From Dharwar there is a good road to Carwar on the coast, and Belgaum is connected with Sholapur by a fair-weather road passing through Beejapur. There are many other fair roads all kept in good order.

All the above must be considered and maintained as our main lines of communication, but there are no lines of roads or of railways in the Bombay presidency calling for immediate or urgent construction.

RICHARD TEMPLE.

Further answers to questions regarding the strength, the duties, and the requirements of the Bombay Army.

*Minute by the Governor of Bombay, dated 9th September 1879.*

The Commission on Army Organization, under cover of letter No. 380, dated 29th August 1879, from the Secretary to the Commission, having forwarded to me a series of questions on which they request my opinion, I have much pleasure in supplementing my minutes of the 31st July and the 15th and 18th August 1879, on the subject of army organization and reserves, with a few remarks on subjects not already reported on in those minutes.

QUESTIONS.

1. What, in your Excellency's opinion, should be the full war establishment of the army of India calculated under the two heads—

(a) The number of troops that India ought to be able to place and maintain in the field for service wherever required?

(b) The garrisons and reserves to be maintained?

2. What, in your Excellency's opinion, should be the organization of the army of India? Is it necessary, in the present circumstances of the country, to maintain the three presidential armies under three separate Governments and three Commanders-in-Chief, with three large staffs and separate departments?

3. Could not all the advantages of separate armies be secured with a great increase of efficiency and economy by forming the entire army of India into one army, under one Commander-in-Chief, and dividing it into four army-corps? Each army-corps to be under the command of a lieutenant-general, and to be entirely complete and self-contained in respect of organization, arms, and equipment. The lieutenant-general to be vested with complete powers of control, and to be responsible for the appointment of all regimental officers, subject only to the confirmation

ANSWERS.

1. Is fully replied to in my minute of 18th August 1879.

2. My remarks on question 1 refer to this question also.

3. This has already been partly replied to in point 9 of my minute of 18th August 1879; but in this question allusion is made to four army-corps.

For reasons already explained, I do not consider that all the advantages of separate armies would be secured by forming the entire army of India into one army under one Commander-in-Chief, and dividing it into four army-corps under lieutenant-generals. I cannot see how greater efficiency could be secured by reducing the status and power



## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

of the Commander-in-Chief for India in respect to the nomination of officers commanding regiments.

The officers of all the army-corps to be equally eligible for service on the staff of the army.

The army-corps to be territorial and localized, one in the north, one in the south, one in the east, and one in the west. The army-corps of the south and west to be, as far as practicable, recruited from the districts from which the present armies of Madras and Bombay are now recruited, thus maintaining four armies distinct in race, religion, and language, but so organized as to be practically in a state of thorough efficiency and readiness for action in any direction in which the army of India may be called upon to undertake separate or combined operations under the Commander-in-Chief of India.

What should be the strength of each army-corps?

of the existing heads of the local armies by centralizing the greater part of the administrative labor in one army head-quarter some thousands of miles removed from at least two out of the four *corps d'armée*.

As regards economy of administration, I would suggest that the proposition under review might have the effect of causing some slight economy as regards the armies of Madras and Bombay as at present constituted, but at the expense of efficiency, and that too, without any mark financially being made on the military budget. But in other respects expense, and serious expense, would be incurred. In the first place, the proposition, although advocating a partial (of course only a partial) reduction of two high appointments in the Madras and Bombay armies, with their staff, entails, for what is now called the Bengal army, the material increase of two lieutenant-generals commanding army-corps (north and east) and their respective staffs, in addition to the one Commander-in-Chief for all India, thereby making three high appointments in the superior ranks of the army of Bengal where one now suffices, *i.e.*, the Commander-in-Chief in India, and five high appointments in the whole of India when at present only three exist, *i.e.*, the three commanders-in-chief. I therefore think that the proposed arrangement, so far from conducing to economy, would lead to augmentation of expenditure.

Again, lieutenant-generals commanding army-corps would, of course, be expected to inspect their corps thoroughly in the same way as local commanders-in-chief do at present, and would doubtless be accompanied under the new staff administration (as proposed in question 16 of the paper under reply) by an equal number of staff officers as at present accompany a local commander-in-chief; a chief of the staff, with higher rank, emoluments, and functions, being substituted for a military secretary. The expenses incurred by the State for travelling allowances under this arrangement would be much the same as at present; but the system would have the disadvantage of concentrating on the staff, travelling with the lieutenant-general, all the minor work at present carried on by the deputies to the adjutant, quartermaster, and judge advocate generals during the absence of the lieutenant-general and staff on tour of inspection, thereby causing delay in the ordinary army routine.

The Commander-in-Chief of the army of India also must necessarily travel from the Northern provinces to those of Southern India and from east to west at very great expense, in excess of present expenditure, which, under arrangements now pertaining, is neither required nor incurred; for by paragraphs 2 and 3 of question 3 it is proposed to vest all the patronage of the four army-corps, with the exception of the appointment of regimental officers and the nomination of regimental commanders, in the one Commander-in-Chief for all India, who, to administer this patronage efficiently, must, of necessity, travel and gain a personal knowledge of the merits of the officers of his four army-corps. He could not possibly administer this important patronage in the two distant army-corps of Madras and Bombay as well as it is now administered by their respective commanders-in-chief. The regimental officers, owing to the great distances which separate them from army head-quarters, would seldom, if ever, have the opportunity of seeing the head of the army, unless he visited them.

Those who have experience of the great distances to be travelled in India will perhaps acknowledge that one Commander-in-Chief for all India could hardly be expected to visit the whole of his army more than twice in his tenure of office, and it might be considered inexpedient that he should do more, or even this much, on the score of the great expense to be incurred.

Indeed it appears to me that any one Commander-in-Chief, unless endued with strength, energy, and activity far above the average of men having attained the standing which his exalted army rank would, under our present military system, necessitate, would be overtaxed with work and responsibility.

Another objection is well worthy of consideration:—would it be expedient for the one head of the armies of India to

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

be constantly removed from the head-quarters of the Viceroy and Supreme Council, of which he is *ex-officio* senior member? But either this objection must be endured, or else the greater objection must be faced, of the one Commander-in-Chief being so widely separated from two at least of his four army-corps.

Paragraph 4 of question 3 deals with the distribution and recruiting of the army-corps. This also has been partly dealt with in my reply to point 9 in my minute of the 18th August 1879; but a few remarks may now be added so as to deal with the question of the fourth army or army-corps.

The armies should doubtless be territorial and localized as far as possible in time of peace, and required to serve anywhere in time of war as at present; and should generally be kept distinct in race and religion. But this would entail recruiting one of the army-corps, according to the proposition under reply, from Hindustanis, that is, from the North-Western Provinces and Oudh—the very races which caused all our troubles in the mutinies of 1857-58. It may be replied that, as at present, the Bengal army and the Punjab Frontier Force are recruited and maintained generally from the Punjab and Oudh, with an admixture of Hindustanis. This plan can still be carried out under the new arrangement proposed; but, in this case, the proposition “to maintain four armies, distinct in race, religion, and language,” would not be fulfilled, and would tend to make the army-corps of the north and east as one, and so maintain that preponderance of the (so to speak) one army over those of the west and south which has always been considered objectionable.

4. If such a formation of the army were adopted, would it not, in your Excellency's opinion, be possible to carry out a very material reduction in the staffs and departments, placing at the same time at the disposal of the lieutenant-general commanding army-corps a staff so efficient and complete as to enable him to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of India of much unimportant work which now comes before him?

4. In reply to this question, I would answer, if the lieutenant-generals commanding army-corps under the proposed scheme of organization with a reduced staff could “relieve the Commander-in-Chief of India of much of the unimportant work which now comes before him,” how much more in a position to do so are the present local commanders-in-chief (with their able and efficient staffs), were such assistance asked or required of them. The formation proposed would not, in my opinion, effect any reduction of staff for reasons before given, *i.e.*, that two extra lieutenant-generals and their staff would be created and two local commanders-in-chief reduced partially: the proposed arrangement would probably be more expensive than the present organization.

5. Supposing such an organization to be adopted, what proportion of each army-corps should be prepared for mobilization, and maintained in a state of readiness to take the field at short notice? What should be the relative proportion of each arm of the service in such active portion of each army-corps?

5. Supposing the organization of army-corps to be adopted, the proportion of each corps to be prepared for mobilization and maintained for instant active service would depend, first, upon the strength of the army-corps, and secondly, on the internal and garrison duties required of it. When this information is furnished, I shall be glad to record my opinion. As regards the latter portion of the question regarding the proportion of each branch of the service to be maintained for purposes of war, this is a technical military question with which I need not deal.

6. Setting aside historical sentiment, and looking to the relative importance, the population, and the wealth of the various Local Governments of India, is there any more reason why the armies of Madras and Bombay should at the present time be under the Local Governments of Madras and Bombay and under local Commanders-in-Chief with separate departments for every branch of military administration, than there is that the same system should be followed in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab?

6. Although it may be unnecessary to advert to historical sentiment alluded to in the question, yet it may be well to remark that traditions and associations are valuable in State affairs; and that the maxim of not disturbing and unsettling old-settled institutions, which have worked well for several generations, is applicable to the armies of Madras and Bombay. The system of having these separate armies with separate administrations under their respective Local Governments has never failed on any one occasion, but has always succeeded; and on the greatest occasion of trial (1857-58) proved one of the several means of preserving the empire of India. And on many other historic occasions the aid of the Local Government at Madras or Bombay in the management of expeditions and such like military operations has been conspicuously valuable.

There is an entire difference between the Local Governments of the Madras and Bombay presidencies and the three Local Governments forming the Bengal presidency. In the three sub-divisions of the Bengal presidency, there being one army, the regiments are interchangeable between Bengal, the

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## ANSWERS.

North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab. This interchanging is indispensable, and therefore the army is necessarily separated from the Civil Government. Even if the present Bengal army be formed into two army-corps, still this interchange of troops must be to a great extent maintained; for the Lower Provinces (Bengal and Behar) must be garrisoned by troops from the North-Western Provinces. But the case is different in the Madras and Bombay presidencies. In each of those presidencies the troops belong entirely to their own presidency: there is no interchange within the presidency of troops belonging to other presidencies, and consequently the connexion between the Local Government and the local army is convenient, and its practicability has been shown by experience uniformly favorable.

Moreover, the system of having these two local armies under their respective Local Governments distributes properly the military business of the country, and relieves the over-taxed Supreme Government of much military work. Anyhow, there must always be much military business which must come before the Government, whether that Government be Local or Supreme.

The present question then contemplates that all the military business now done by the Governments of Madras and Bombay should be transferred to the Government of India. This business is very considerable. It must, in the aggregate (Madras and Bombay), be nearly equal to that of the Bengal presidency, inasmuch as the Madras and Bombay armies are together nearly equal to the Bengal army. Thus the project would about double the military business of the Government of India. And while this additional demand is made on the governing strength of the Government of India, the governing strength of the Madras and Bombay Governments would, in this particular, be wasted. Having myself served a full term in the Government of India, I am in a position to submit an opinion that the Supreme Government has already work as vast as it can conveniently perform, and is indeed almost overburdened. Why should it now be asked to undertake a large additional burden, which burden has been, and is, borne efficiently by the two Local Governments of Madras and Bombay? If thereby any large saving of expense could be managed, or, if there were some manifest improvement of military efficiency, then there might be some reason for piling a new burden on the heavily-burdened Government of India. But it has been shown that no such saving of expense is possible, nor any such improvement of military efficiency. As to administrative efficiency, there would be deterioration instead of improvement by reason of the extraordinary concentration of all the commissariat and ordnance affairs throughout India, with their infinity of detail, in the hands of one single departmental office at Calcutta or Simla.

Again, the Government of India ordinarily resides within the Bengal presidency, and has the various parts of the Bengal army under its observation; but such observation is physically impossible as regards the Madras and Bombay armies, which are so widely separated at such great distances. For this reason alone, it is obviously desirable that the responsibility should be in the first place upon the two Local Governments on the spot, subject always to the general control of the Government of India.

I have therefore to answer to this question, that there are manifold and grave reasons why the Madras and Bombay armies should remain, as heretofore, under their respective Local Governments.

7. As a matter of fact, if a large reserve for the northern armies is to be maintained, is it not the duty of Government to see that this reserve is formed of the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure and to maintain, with due regard to the admitted necessity of keeping up armies of different races and religions, and with due regard to the safety of the empire?

Does your Excellency look upon the Madras and Bombay armies in their present organization as constituting the most efficient reserve for the armies of Upper India?

7. In replying to the two paragraphs of this question, I would deal with them generally. Taking into consideration the admitted necessity of keeping the military forces of India distinct (whether they be called presidential armies or army-corps) in race and religion, it becomes necessary to recruit each army from its own territories. The Government of each presidency, with the aid of the local head of the army and the officers serving under his orders, naturally recruit from the very best fighting material available, and

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

8. What is the feeling of the <sup>Madras</sup> ~~Bombay~~ army in respect to employment in other presidencies in India in times of peace? For instance, at the present time, 26 regiments of the Madras army are employed within their own presidency and no less than 14 outside its limits, some of them at distant stations in Bengal. Is this service popular with the army? Are the Madras regiments more efficient than the Bengal regiments, or are they, when on this duty, cheaper, the cost of relief, transport of clothing, equipment, and compensation for food being taken into account. If they are neither cheaper nor more efficient, is there any object in garrisoning Bengal and Burma partly from the Madras army?

consequently obtain the men most efficient as soldiers, so far as it is in their power to do so. It is undoubtedly the duty of Government to see that the most efficient men are procured and maintained, as is the case in the Bombay army. One army or army-corps naturally acts as reserve to the other in time of danger; as, for instance, the Bengal or Madras armies would have reinforced the Bombay army in the Persian campaign of 1857, had their services been required. A considerable portion of the Bombay army rendered assistance to the Bengal forces in the Central India campaign in 1858. Both the Madras and Bombay armies took subordinate parts to the army sent from Bengal to China in 1860-61. The Bengal army, on the other hand, supplemented the force sent from Bombay to Abyssinia in 1867-68; and the three armies took part in the expedition to Malta. Again, in the recent campaign, all the armies of India took their share. In the latter campaign the Bengal army took the most prominent part, the war taking place in the first instance just across its own frontier, in the Khyber pass and Kuram valley. But the Bombay army took an active part in the Kandahar column, and supplied the reserves for that column; the army of Madras garrisoning, in some instances, important positions in Bengal, the troops from which, by the exigencies of the service, had been withdrawn. But I think it would be questionable policy, and likely to lead to military deterioration, if the armies of Madras and Bombay were in future to be considered and spoken of as "reserves to the armies of Upper India," as the wording of the question under discussion would seem to imply.

8. To the first portion of this question I reply, the Bombay army would undoubtedly gladly serve beyond their own territories in time of peace if required to do so. This fact is exemplified by the willing service rendered in Rajputana and Aden. Rajputana is garrisoned by Bombay troops at Deesa, Mhow, Neemuch, Nusseerabad, &c.; and it should be remembered that the Bombay forces also garrison the Melran Coast and positions in the Persian Gulf. The climate of Aden and the coast of Melkan is not such as to render this service, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, popular; yet it is accepted and carried out in a soldier-like spirit. I believe the same spirit to exist in all the armies of the empire. The latter portion of the question, whether there is any object in garrisoning a portion of Bengal and Burma with Madras troops, may be answered as follows. The Bengal Native army, as by military budget estimate for 1879-80, numbers 64,039 men all told, against 34,293 men in the Madras army, and 26,646 in the Bombay army. The number of British troops employed in each presidency is Bengal 40,198, Madras 12,624, and Bombay 11,798, which gives a total fighting strength, British and Native, for each presidency as follows:—

				Men.
Bengal	...	...	...	104,237
Madras	...	...	...	46,917
Bombay	...	...	...	38,444
Total	...	...	...	189,598

By the above figures it will be seen that the Bengal army numbers more than double those of the other two presidencies together. If, then, Bengal were called upon to garrison Burma and Rajputana, it would require a very material increase to its army, which would add to the preponderance of the one army as it now stands, or of the two army-corps as now proposed, over the other two armies or army-corps; which would be undesirable, and perhaps politically dangerous. Although in my replies to paragraph 10 in my minute of 18th August 1879, I do not advocate that the troops of one presidency should garrison another presidency, except in time of war, I make no objection to their having territory outside of their own territorial division to guard. Indeed, I think this in many respects advantageous to the presidential armies, as it gives the men more self-confidence and pride in themselves, in virtue of the trust reposed in them by the Supreme Government, for which reason I should

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

9. Is your Excellency aware of any difficulty in obtaining recruits for the army of a good class of healthy strong young men of the agricultural population, physically qualified to perform the duties of a soldier?

10. Has it ever been asserted that a difficulty in obtaining efficient recruits is attributable to the unpopularity of the service of the local army beyond the limits of its own presidency in times of peace?

11. If your Excellency is of opinion that the army-corps should be formed territorially, and as far as possible localized within its territorial area, what alteration would you propose in the strength of the various armies to render them fit for their home duties, and to place them in a position to take part in any war going on in India by the detachment of a force of all arms?

12. Could not the duties of the Native army be very materially decreased by a general concentration of troops in large centres in the neighbourhood of railways, thus abolishing all small cantonments and outlying and isolated stations?

13. Would not this arrangement enable the officers commanding army-corps to make a much larger number of men available for service, and justify a very considerable reduction of troops in some parts of the country; and would it not enable the discipline, exercise, and instruction of the troops to be more effectively carried on, and render the formation of camps of exercise more feasible?

14. Recognizing the fact that India cannot afford to maintain the most perfect army which could be devised in which economy did not enter, and that large reductions of army expenditure are absolutely essential, what changes and alterations would your Excellency be prepared to recommend in the organization and administration of the army?

15. Are you in favor of amalgamating the Adjutant General and Quarter Master General's Departments under a Chief of the Staff, so that, as in other armies, the staff of the army shall consist of certain grades of staff officers, the work being apportioned as may be desirable, but without a division, as at present, into two distinct departments?

16. If the army were divided into army-corps, and power given to lieutenant-generals commanding to dispose of many questions which are now referred to superior authority, so that important matters only were treated of by the central military authority at head quarters, would not a staff of about the following strength be sufficient?

*Head-Quarters.*

- 1 Chief of the staff.
- 4 Officers of the general staff.
- 3 Officers of the general staff for intelligence duties.
- 1 Officer of the general staff for royal artillery, to be Inspector-General of Artillery, with two staff officers.
- 1 Officer of the general staff for royal engineers.
- 1 Officer of the general staff for musketry inspection, &c.

regret to see Rajputana taken from the Bombay army; and the same feeling would probably actuate the Madras army as regards the military charge of Burma and the territories of the Nizam. Moreover, it would be politically objectionable to have Bengal troops (which under the new organization would be really Hindustani) in the Nizam's dominions.

Madras troops, again, are much better suited to the climate of Burma, which would prove very trying to the Bengal troops, who chiefly come from the north-western extremity of India. Service in Burma can hardly be popular with Madrasis; but it would be very unpopular and distressing to Punjabis.

9. I am not aware that there is any difficulty in procuring recruits of the class and physique mentioned in this question; and the liberal concessions lately made to the Native army will doubtless add to its popularity.

10. This question has been replied to in answer to question 8; but I would here remark that I have never heard it asserted that service beyond its own territories, such as in Rajputana, Aden, the Mekran Coast, and Persian Gulf, in time of peace is unpopular with the Bombay army, or that such service militates against obtaining efficient recruits. For a fuller explanation of this subject, I would refer to point 10 of my minute of 18th August 1879.

11. The general military requirements of the Bombay army are clearly laid down in my minute of the 31st July 1879, page 10, and the following, by which it will be seen that, after supplying troops for all internal purposes, a slender margin of one regiment of Native cavalry and seven regiments of Native infantry is all that remains for purposes of war; so, to place a force of all arms in the field for war, additional strength in cavalry and artillery would be necessary.

12. This is very fully replied to as regards the Bombay army at page 11 and following of my minute of 31st July 1879. But it should be remembered that every concentration of troops means the building of new lines at considerable expense.

13. I have always advocated the concentration of troops as far as is consistent with political and military safety; but in the Bombay presidency no very considerable reduction of troops could be made in any particular division of our territories. Any concentration which can, with due regard to safety, be carried out, will certainly tend to the better discipline, exercise, and instruction of Native troops. It would, moreover, meet with the approval of all military men, and conduce to the more practicable formation of camps of exercise, than which, in times of peace, nothing can be more desirable for the proper training of our armies.

14. My reply to this question will be found at page 2, point 6, and at page 8, point 14, of my minute of the 18th August 1879.

15, 16, and 17. As I have throughout endeavoured to show that the establishment of army-corps would lead neither to financial advantage nor military efficiency, I do not think it necessary to offer any opinion on the above questions.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

*Army Corps.*

- 1 Chief of the staff.
  - 2 Officers of the general staff.
  - 1 Staff officer of royal artillery.
  - 1 Staff officer of royal engineers, to be Deputy Inspector General of Engineers, Military Works, and Fortifications.
  - 1 Deputy Judge Advocate General.
- Departmental staff officers in addition to be under the Chief of the Staff of the Army-Corps.

17. If your Excellency does not approve of this arrangement, either in strength of *personnel* or nomenclature, what would your Excellency propose?

18. Does your Excellency consider that it would be advisable to place the administration of the royal artillery in India more directly under the Adjutant General or Chief of the Staff, as is the case with the other arms, the Adjutant General being provided with assistance in special artillery questions or technical subjects in the person of the Inspector General of Artillery?

19. Would it not be in all respects a more efficient arrangement if the Inspector General of artillery acted as the artillery adviser of the Commander-in-Chief; the Inspector General having two staff officers to assist him, one of whom should carry out the duties now performed by the present Deputy Adjutant General of Royal Artillery in India? Or, in other words, the amalgamation of the offices of Inspector General of Royal Artillery and Deputy Adjutant General of Royal Artillery effected, making the former the head staff officer of artillery in India, and associating with him two staff officers who would carry on the work under him?

20. In your relations as Commander-in-Chief with the Military Department of Government, does your experience suggest any modifications of procedure or other matter tending to facilitate business, reduce expenditure, or add to general efficiency of administration?

21. Does your Excellency think that the Departments of Ordnance, Military Works, Commissariat, and Military Accounts should be brought more *en rapport* with the Commander-in-Chief; and if so, will you suggest the mode of giving effect to your views?

22. Does your Excellency consider it an advantage or otherwise to have three separate Departments of Commissariat, Ordnance, Medical, Clothing, &c., &c., for the work of the army of India?

23. Is your Excellency of opinion that any reduction can be made in the number or class of British troops serving in India? Could India dispense, for instance, with any regiments of infantry or cavalry, or any battery of artillery; or could garrison batteries at any station safely take the place of field batteries, or field batteries take the place of horse artillery?

24. Bearing in mind the fact that the annual cost of officers to men is as follows—

	For a regiment, British cavalry.	For a regiment, British infantry.
	Rs.	Rs.

Officers	...	1,46,797	1,43,793
Non-commissioned officers and men	...	1,14,061	1,76,126

Is your Excellency of opinion that any change in the organization of regiments is possible so as to maintain the fighting strength of the British force in India, and at the same time diminish the relative cost of officers to men?

25. In your opinion is it desirable, on the score of economy and efficiency, to substitute for Indian service a local British force in place of a portion of the Home army?

26. In your Excellency's opinion would it be advisable, apart from the question of reduction of the strength of the army, to modify the present proportion of British to Native troops?

27. Reviewing the Enlistment Act of 1870, together with the regulations issued under that Act, War Office Circulars, clauses 88 and 180, of 1878, especially as applicable to India, are you of opinion that, in the event of a local force not being employed, any further modifications of existing Acts should be made?

18, 19, 20, and 21. Questions 18 and 19 refer to the royal artillery: I have no remarks to offer; and questions 20 and 21 hardly call for any reply from me.

22. This is fully replied to at page 4, point 9, of my minute of 18th August 1879.

23. I am very decidedly of opinion that no reduction of the number of British troops serving in India should be allowed. The Bombay presidency could certainly not dispense with a single regiment of European infantry; and it has but one regiment of British cavalry at its disposal. As to whether garrison batteries could take the place of field batteries, and field batteries be substituted for horse artillery, I am generally inclined to the opinion that no such change could be made with safety or advantage to the State, as it must depend on the strength of the army and the territories to be occupied.

24. I again refer to page 2, point 6, of my minute of 18th August 1879, for reply to this question; but I may, on further consideration, suggest that the addition of one troop to each regiment of British cavalry and the decrease of one regiment from the Indian establishment would (if one regiment can be spared from any portion of India) possibly tend to some slight reduction of expense; but I think it would be doubtful whether any such very small saving would compensate for the loss of a regiment from the present territorial organization of the armies.

25. I am in every way opposed to the formation of a local European army for India.

26. I am decidedly of opinion that it would be impolitic to alter the present proportion of British and Native troops serving in the Indian empire. The European force is only about one-third that of the Native, including the artillery, with the exception of mountain batteries.

27. I have no remarks to offer on this question, further than what is mentioned at page 3, point 6, of my minute dated 18th August 1879.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

28. Can you suggest any means by which the present cost of supplying British soldiers for service in India can be reduced, without decreasing in any way their efficiency?

In discussing this subject, a fair consideration must be given to the share India should take in support of the general maintenance of the British empire.

29. There is a large staff of assistant adjutant generals and deputy assistant adjutant generals for musketry, regimental instructors and assistant instructors of musketry throughout India. Does not your Excellency consider that regimental instruction in musketry can be carried on by company officers as part of their ordinary military duty, and that the staff for musketry inspection can be largely reduced, the duty of inspection being carried on by generals and their staff, assisted, if absolutely necessary, by a specially trained officer.

30. Is any reduction in the Judge Advocate General's Department practicable by the concentration of work at head-quarters, courts-martial being conducted by officers with the usual allowance for the discharge of this duty, and in very special cases by an officer deputed from head-quarters?

28. This has already been considered at page 4, point 6, of my minute of 18th August 1879.

29. This is a question requiring no reply from me.

30. It will be noticed that, throughout my minutes on army organization, I have objected to any reduction of staff appointments and salaries as a general rule, and I have pointed out the advisability of looking for financial results in reduction of stores, &c. But if there is one department of the army which, in my opinion, might be reduced with advantage, this department is that of the Judge Advocate General. The necessity for such appointment at all is probably the result of complicated military law. The question then arises whether military law could not be very much simplified and confined to purely military offences in time of peace. It is rightly and justly acknowledged that there is no court by which justice (in accordance with military rules) is more honorably administered than by the court-martial; and the guilty soldier as well as the innocent brought before such a court for a purely military offence knows that he is being tried by his peers, honorable gentlemen judging him by common sense, who will take into consideration all his good qualities as well as his bad, and judge him in strict accordance with laws rigidly laid down, from which there is no escape except by the clemency vested in the Commander-in-Chief, the general officer of the division in which he is serving, or the officer commanding his regiment, according to the nature of the court-martial by which he is tried. In times of peace crimes such as drunkenness, insubordination, desertion, making away with his kit, sleeping on his post, are all military offences, with which no court is more competent to deal than the court-martial; and the punishment of these offences, carrying with them as they do overpowering evidence of guilt (otherwise a commanding officer would not send the case for trial), requires no very complicated legal knowledge to regulate the award. The sentence of the court is seldom, if ever, questioned. But, on the other hand, if the offence once takes a more civil character, such as for instance, embezzlement, grave cases of assault, such as firing at a comrade, theft, and other cases where the evidence is not overwhelming, where there is a doubt, when the evidence is circumstantial only, or the case is in any way open to argument and the punishment not very clearly laid down, and when, on account of the seriousness of the charge, a lawyer would probably be called in to defend the accused, the justice dispensed by the court-martial is very open to miscarriage; and the prisoner is likely to escape the penalty in consequence of the legal arguments of his counsel before a court naturally unacquainted with the law in all its ramifications.

But it may be argued that the Judge Advocate and his assistants are purposely appointed to combat the arguments of a skilful lawyer. I am not aware, however, that the officers of this department are, at least on first appointment, selected for any eminent legal acquirements; and even if in course of some years they do acquire a certain legal knowledge, what chance, I ask, would they stand against a professional lawyer, who had made the law the one study of his life?

In cases as above enumerated, then, in time of peace, I would advocate the utilization of the civil power. If such a course were adopted, military law might be so simplified as to require nothing but common sense to deal with it; and the Department of the Judge Advocate General could be very

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

31. Is it necessary to retain the allowance now passed to interpreters of British cavalry and infantry regiments? No such allowance is found necessary for batteries of artillery with large Native establishments.

32. Does your Excellency see any objection to the assimilation of the scale of syces allowed to British cavalry. Excluding the horses of the non-commissioned officers, for which one syce each is allowed, the present scale is in Bengal one to two, in Madras one to four, and in Bombay one to three, horses: which of these scales would your Excellency adopt?

33. Might not *baznar* sergeants be abolished?

34. (a) Does not your Excellency consider that the present expenditure on *punkah*-pulling is excessive; are not large reductions possible; and would it not be feasible to reduce the cost of *punkah*-pulling by resorting to the old system of a fixed allowance per company, &c.?

(b) Would the abolition of *khush-khush* tatties, except in hospitals, cause any discomfort or risk to the health of the troops?

(c) Can your Excellency suggest any way of reducing the very heavy expenditure annually incurred in the purchase (or manufacture) and repair of barrack furniture, barrack bedding, &c.?

35. Does your Excellency consider it necessary to maintain any reserve of Government horses; and if so, how many; and on what basis should the reserve be calculated?

Should this reserve be attached to corps and batteries, or to one or more depôts?

36. If the former, to what particular division of the army should they be posted?

37. Would your Excellency approve of the reduction of the establishment of horses for horse and field batteries to the war scale laid down in Army Circular No. 180 of 1877, deducting such carts as in India are drawn by bullocks?

38. Can your Excellency suggest any improvements in the constitution and working of the Commissariat Department?

materially reduced, with pecuniary benefit to the State and advantage to the better administration of the laws of the land. Instances could be quoted where the sentence of the court-martial has been quashed by reason of some informality of procedure in cases of serious offence. This could hardly occur in a civil court. In time of war punishment is, of course, summary. I only advocate trial by civil tribunal for what may be termed civil offences during time of peace.

31. If the allowances to interpreters are given as a reward and inducement for officers to become acquainted with the Native languages; and if such inducement is still considered necessary, since the Government ruled that no staff appointment could be held without the applicant qualifying according to a certain standard, then I would advocate the retention of allowance now passed. It is certainly open to question whether the officers who simply pass a certain test, and who thereafter never mix with the Natives, are really fitted in the majority of cases to act as interpreters—a duty which is generally carried on by the regimental *kotwal* or *chowdry*.

32, 33, 34 require no reply from me.

35. I think it highly necessary to keep a reserve of Government horses, but am not prepared to enter into any details of the numbers, or the basis on which the calculation should be made. In former years large studs were kept up in India; and these establishments have been abolished within the last few years only. To replace the remount supplied by the late stud depôts, we have, I believe, trusted to Australia principally to supply remounts for our artillery and European cavalry. These horses are usually purchased in Calcutta and Madras in very low condition, and require great care and attention to bring them into proper form. As these horses are purchased, as a rule, at an age quite fit for work, it appears to me that the best possible means of looking after them would be to hand them over to batteries and European cavalry regiments throughout India, where the conditions of the country were such as to allow of plentiful and cheap supply of forage. This would entail but little trouble on batteries and regiments, the proper establishments of *ghorawalas* or syces being provided for the charge of the extra horses; can by this means first class professional attention would be secured for valuable Government property. In time of war the extra horses could be handed over by each regiment and battery on reaching the base of operations, when they would be ready to supply vacancies in the corps which had taken care of them, or otherwise as circumstances might require. If a depôt is to be established in the Bombay presidency, Ahmednagar would be a good locality.

36. No reply to this is required from me, other than is given to reply No. 35.

37. I need offer no opinion on this question.

38. My opinion on this question generally will be found at page 7, point 13, of my minute of 18th August 1879.



## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

The points which would appear to require notice are—

- (a) The large supervising staff of the department.
- (b) The number of senior officers of high rank, and with high pay, doing comparatively subordinate and unimportant work.
- (c) The large office establishment kept up with each executive officer in consequence of a want of simplification and unification in the examination of accounts.
- (d) Relative advantages of the contract and agency system of supply.\*
- (e) Expense of the movement of commissariat stores owing to want of supervision and system.
- (f) As to the advisability of having three separate departments for India, each with its own large supervising and office staff.
- (g) The advisability of bringing commissariat duties more within the knowledge and control of the general officer commanding, both in peace and in war.
- (h) Whether it would not be advisable to confine the operations of the Commissariat Department entirely to the issue of consumable stores, taking from it the issue of such things as line-gear, bedding, &c., which do not seem to appertain to it, and which would seem more appropriately to belong to equipment?

39. What are your Excellency's views generally regarding the organization of the transport for the army in India?

The following points suggest themselves—

- (a) As to whether the transport should be under the Commissariat, or organized as a separate department?
- (b) What are the arrangements which your Excellency would propose should be carried out for the formation of a nucleus of a transport department by utilizing existing carriage, such as moveable columns, and without adding to the present cost of these?

How could a system of regimental transport be organized—

- (c) As to the most effectual means of securing the speedy collection of transport in the event of a war?
- (d) Whether it would not be advisable to endeavour to introduce a better and lighter description of cart into India, with a view to the substitution, when possible, of wheeled for pack carriage?
- (e) Whether your Excellency thinks any thing can be done to increase the supply and improve the breed of mules?
- (f) Looking to the fact that the supply of camels is believed to be steadily decreasing, can you suggest any means by which that supply can be kept up? Could not elephants be largely dispensed with as army transport?
- (g) Which do you consider it most advisable to use on service,—Government or hired transport?
- (h) Whether you think that, in the event of a Government nucleus being kept up, much of the cost could not be saved by its utilization for the relief of troops and the carriage of commissariat and other stores?
- (i) What should be the organization of a division of transport in war, i.e., as to number of animals, officers, supervising staff, drivers, artificers, and veterinarians?

Points (a) to (c) call for no comment from me; point (f) is answered at page 5, point 9, of my minute of 18th August 1879 (last paragraph); on point (g) I have no remarks to offer; and point (h) is fully replied to in paragraph 2, point 15, page 7, of my minute of 18th August 1879.

39. This is replied to generally by the second portion of point 13, page 7, and following of my minute of 18th August 1879, which touches on the question of army transport. Points (a) and (b) are both fully answered. In reply to point (c), I would remark that, so long as a great transport department is not kept up for army purposes only (a department which I by no means advocate), the natural and most effectual means of securing the speedy collection of animals is through the civil authorities nearest to the base of operations in the first instance, supplemented by animals from a distance as the supply at the base runs short or fails. This must, as a rule, be done through contractors; and as the civil authorities are well acquainted with the means and capabilities of the principal inhabitants of their districts, the best men available will hereby be secured. But the animals once supplied by the contractors, it becomes a matter of the greatest importance that the military authorities should be in a position to receive and care for them, and that the organization of the transport service should be sufficiently completed to ensure the proper enrolment and payment of the drivers or other men employed with the transport animals. As regards point (d), the Maltese cart, used in Abyssinia and lately in the Bolan pass, are highly spoken of; and the city of Bombay itself has an excellent light cart, well suited for transport purposes. Models of these carts could be prepared and submitted, if necessary.

To points (e) and (f) I offer no remarks.

To point (g) I would reply that the amount of transport required for active service, such as the late campaign in Afghanistan, is so great, that to hire transport is synonymous to pressing it from the people of the district from which it is hired; and impressment of the means of transport must lead to impressment of drivers, who naturally (having no interest whatever in the campaign in which they are called upon to serve) render the most unwilling service, and take the earliest opportunity of rendering their animals unserviceable, in hopes of escaping a distasteful duty. This service is frequently so unpopular that, sooner than leave the boundaries of their Native country, the impressed drivers desert, leaving their animals in the hands of the transport authorities, or take them away with them, if not supervised and guarded with the utmost care. Again, compensation must be given for animals hired in case of death or hurt. This very fact of compensation is in itself

\* Vide Financial Review of Commissariat Department, 1877, paragraphs 18, 21, 57, 86, 109, 117, 119, 121, 130, 131, 139, 140, 143, 152, 154.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

an inducement to owners to damage, or even kill, their animals, and is a source of great expense to Government. The hire and consequent impressment of transport thus becomes a real hardship on the people of the country nearest to the seat of war; and the experience of the late campaign will doubtless show the immense difficulties of settling account for this sort of transport. For the above reasons I would recommend that all transport for a campaign be the property of Government. This will induce better care of the animals, which, if properly looked after, will, even in the face of great casualties, prove valuable property to Government at the end of a campaign. When transport on a large scale is really hired without impressment,—if such be possible, which I doubt,—we must take what we can get; whereas, if we purchase, we can pick and choose, and supply willing attendants from other parts of India if necessary.

In reply to point (b), I would say that, although I advocate the formation of a nucleus of non-commissioned officers or conductors for the transport department, I do not see the necessity of Government going to the expense of forming any such nucleus of animals other than is absolutely necessary for commissariat or ordnance purposes and for moveable columns during time of peace. In the late campaign it was not the difficulty of procuring carriage, but the care of it when procured, that proved the stumbling-block. In time of peace, for the ordinary movement of troops, the civil authorities can always supply on hire sufficient and efficient carriage on short notice; as witness that procured for the army assembled at Delhi in 1876, and again in 1877, when, on the latter occasion, not only was transport required for a considerable force, but for the camps and retinue of every Native prince and noble of note in the empire. Of course, the numerous railway lines greatly aided the assemblage of the great multitude at Delhi; but, apart from this, the transport hired for the occasion must have been enormous. Hire for this description of service is sufficiently popular, as it entails no personal danger or hardship, and the pay is certain.

On point (c) I have no remarks to offer.

40. Does your Excellency consider that the Military Works Branch of the Department Public Works should be brought more directly under the military authorities than at present; and could not its organization be so arranged as to make the engineer department more efficient for war? Or should the Military Works Branch be abolished, the ordinary works being constructed and maintained by the ordinary Public Works staff; a special establishment being appointed, under the Military Department, for any large works requiring peculiar knowledge or skill?

41. In what way can your Excellency suggest the reduction of the expenditure of the Military Works Branch, Public Works Department?

(a) Could not the expenditure for each year be limited to a fixed annual grant, and the completion of the works necessary for the accommodation of troops and the defence of the empire be distributed over a series of years?

(b) What is your Excellency's opinion of the barrack accommodation in India generally? Are not many of the barracks constructed in late years designed on a most extravagant scale; and these new barracks any more comfortable or conducive to the health of the occupiers than many of the older and cheaper single-storied barracks?

(c) Might not many of the barracks throughout India be constructed in a more economical style; and might not many of the troops on the hills be housed for many years to come in cheap huts or cottage barracks?

(d) Could not the ordinary repairs of completed barracks and the construction of barracks on standard plans be well left to the Local Government, subject to inspection by officers employed under the Government of India?

(e) Might not European soldiers be more frequently employed in public works, especially in the construction of their own barracks, on the hills and the roads leading to them?

40. There is no separate Military Works Branch in the Department Public Works in the Bombay presidency, nor do I recommend that any such branch should be formed. As the department is at present constituted, I do not think that it could with any advantage to the State be brought more directly under the military authorities; but I am of opinion that the engineer department might to some extent be made more efficient for warlike purposes by employing more sappers and miners on the public works, provided their services could be spared in time of peace.

41. I answer point (a) of this question as follows. The expenditure for each year necessary for the completion of works for the accommodation of troops and the defence of the empire is practically limited to a fixed annual grant, and the completion of works is spread over a series of years. The grants may vary somewhat year by year; but they are never sufficient to complete works very expeditiously.

Point (b) is replied to thus. The barracks generally, and more especially those of recent construction in which sanitary requirements have received closer attention, are decidedly good. I cannot think that the accommodation can be considered "most extravagant," although it is perhaps more costly than absolutely necessary. Indeed, I would deprecate any such expression as "most extravagant" as being stronger than the case requires, and as being likely, if accepted, to prejudice the cause of those improvements which are essential to the welfare of the British soldier in India. The barracks are certainly more comfortable and presumably more healthy than the old style of accommodation. At the same time I am inclined to think that the troops, unaccustomed to any great amount of comfort at home, would find all the comfort they required in single-storied, and consequently cheaper, barracks.

The construction of barracks mentioned in point (c) is being carried out in this presidency, for instance at Poona,

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with due regard to economy. In the Bombay command we have no hill stations answering to those of the Bengal or Madras presidencies, although we have sanitarium at Purandhar, Asirgarh, Mount Abu; but these places accommodate a few invalids only. The hills of Mahabaleshwar could not be used by troops on account of the excessive rainfall during the monsoon months.

In answer to point (d), I would remark that in this presidency the repair of completed barracks and the construction of barracks on standard plans are carried out under the orders of the Local Government through its Public Works Department. The standards are usually supplied by the Government of India.

Point (e).—I do not think soldiers in the plains could be more frequently employed in public works to any extent beyond their own workshops.

42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 (a and b).—I have no remarks to offer on these points.

42. Do you consider that a clear and more appropriate classification of the subjects dealt with in each department of the staff and the army could be adopted; and if so, would it not add to efficiency, and tend to the reduction of labor?

43. Do you consider that the amount of correspondence and returns on the army could be reduced; and would you approve of a Committee to consider this question?

44. Do you consider that the system of payment, audit, and army account is susceptible of improvement; and what alterations would your Excellency suggest?

45. Is your Excellency in favor of station (or general) hospitals in large cantonments, and field and base (or general) hospitals in the field, in place of regimental hospitals?

46. Do you think it desirable that the power formerly granted to commanding officers of Native regiments to dismiss men of bad character or inefficient for service should be restored?

47. (a) What changes, if any, would your Excellency recommend in the constitution, organization, and equipment of the Native cavalry and infantry?

(b) Is your Excellency in favor of the substitution of pioneer regiments for line regiments; and could more Gooikha regiments be raised?

48. In the ryotwari districts, or in other parts of India, would grants of waste lands, revenue-free for their lives, be acceptable to Native officers and soldiers in lieu of part of their pension?

49. Would it not be desirable to alter the designations of *ressaldars*, *ressaidars*, and subalterns of the Native army, who now command troops and companies, to that of captain, and *jemadars* to that of lieutenant?

50. For the education of cadets of good family for direct commissions as Native officers, would it not be desirable to afford them the means of instruction in military schools, say one at Roorkhee for Eastern, and one at Poona for Western India, where the fees should be sufficiently high to ensure only gentlemen of a superior class entering their sons, and to which nominations should be made by the Viceroy?

51. To what extent would you recommend the grant of commissions otherwise than by promotion from the ranks; and what should be the attainments qualifying for such nominations?

52. With reference to the comparative small amount of pension to pay of Native officers, and to afford them greater inducements to retire, would it be desirable and acceptable to them to establish a system of deferred pay by deduction of a small percentage, say 5 per cent, from the pay of all Native officers hereafter promoted, to amass to individual credit, with interest say at 4½ per cent? The sum to be handed over on retirement, or to his heirs at any time in case of his death, and to be inalienable by any authority, except by being confiscated to the State in case of cashiering.

53. Has your Excellency any suggestions to make with a view to alter or improve the terms on which Native officers and soldiers can obtain pension, or to alter the periods after which Native officers and soldiers can obtain pension on medical certificate or otherwise?

48. In my opinion grants of waste land revenue-free for life would not be acceptable to Native officers and soldiers in part payment of their pension.

49. This calls for no remark from me.

50. If, on enquiry, it be found that commissions as Native officers would be acceptable to young Native gentlemen of family, I would certainly advocate military schools being established for their education; but I am not at present prepared to offer an opinion as to whether such a step would be acceptable, as it would, at least at first, entail the close comradeship with men of a much lower class. For the most part the present holders of Her Majesty's commission, however estimable in themselves as loyal servants to Government, might not, as a rule, be looked upon as eligible comrades for young men of the Native nobility and gentry.

51. For reasons given in reply to question 50, I am not at present prepared to offer an opinion.

52. I do not myself think that the Native officers of the army would view with favor a system of deferred pay by which they would suffer an immediate decrease of even 5 per cent. of their salaries, with the prospect of receiving it in the future with the addition of 4½ per cent. per annum as proposed.

53, 54, 55, 56, 57, have all been replied to generally in my minute on "Reserves for the Native army," dated 15th August 1879.

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54. Do you consider that, under a proper system of concentration and distribution at important centres, the strength of the present Native army in India can be reduced, should it be resolved to create a system of reserves supplying extra men to meet a call for service, say, to an extent equal to half the strength of the present Native army?

55. Would it be advantageous in your Excellency's opinion to establish such reserves; and if so, on what principle?

56. Do you consider that the Home or any Continental system of reserve force could, with alterations, be adapted to the Native armies of India?

57. If you object generally to the creation of extra reserve forces of Native troops, but having regard to the fact that annually a large number of men is transferred to the pension list, and that the cost for the total number of pensioners, viz., 63,175, is Rs. 46,08,539 per annum,\* do you see any reason why the present system of invalid pensioning after 15 years' service should not be abolished, and a limited number of effective men be passed to a reserve on reserve pay after, say, no less than 8 years' service, non-effectives being at all times examined by a medical board, and struck off with gratuities equal to one month's pay for regimental or reserve service, as the case may be, for every year's service?

In such an organization the men of the reserve could be retained under the immediate control of their own regimental officers, and be liable, during a fixed period, to be called out at any time in case of war, to join their own regiments and for one month's annual training at the depot; after which period they might pass into a second reserve, liable only to be called out for garrison duty in case of war, until entitled to reserve pension.

On the score of efficiency and economy, and to afford the means of maintaining regimental depôts and such reserves as have been proposed above, might it not be advisable to increase regimental strength from 600 to 800 sepoy, with a corresponding reduction of the number of battalions in the proportion of 4 to 3?

58. Would it be possible to utilize the men of the sappers and miners and the pioneer corps, who may have passed to the reserve, in arsenals, depôts, railways, and other workshops?

59. Would you, in like manner, approve of the conversion of Native cavalry corps into regiments of 4 instead of 3 squadrons, with a corresponding decrease in number of regiments from 4 to 3, a squadron commander and officer being added to each corps?

60. Should the Punjab and Sind Frontier Forces be placed wholly or entirely under the Commander-in-Chief in India?

61. What are the communications the construction of which appears to be of the first moment from a military point of view?

58. If it be found practicable and essential to form a reserve for the Native army, I think the services of men of the sappers and miners and of pioneer corps on passing into the reserves might be profitably used, as proposed, i.e., in arsenals, depôts, railways, and workshops generally, provided vacancies can be found without disturbing existing interests.

59. In replying to this question, I answer as regards the Bombay army only. In Sind, for instance, where we have three regiments of cavalry permanently stationed on the frontier, the substitution of two regiments or eight squadrons for three regiments or nine squadrons might perhaps be carried out; but I would not be prepared to accept the services of three regiments of cavalry of four squadrons each for four regiments of three squadrons each in other parts of the presidency, nor would I be prepared to reduce fighting strength, for reasons pointed out in my minute of the 31st July 1879, page 10 and following, "General military requirements of the Bombay presidency."

60. A reply to this question will be found at page 6, point 11, of my minute of 18th August 1879.

61. For reply to this question, see my minute of 18th August 1879, page 9, point 15, where it is answered in full.

RICHARD TEMPLE.

### Military occupation of Belgaum by the Bombay Army.

*Minute by the Governor of Bombay, dated 17th September 1879.*

A proposal has, I understand, been made to the Army Reorganization Commission to the effect that the Bombay army should relieve the army of Madras of its military charge of Kamptee, Jubbulpore, Raipore, and Saugor, and that the territory in the heart of the Southern Mahratta Country, now held by the Belgaum brigade of the Bombay army, should pass to the military care of the Madras army.

\* Note.—Actuals for 1877-78.

If it should appear expedient to the Supreme Government that Bombay should occupy the country now garrisoned by the Nagpore force at the stations above enumerated, the Bombay army will, I am sure, undertake the task cheerfully, and will be proud of the charge; but I would strongly represent to the Government of India the undesirability of disturbing the present territorial distribution of this army, so far at least as concerns the Belgaum brigade.

My reasons for deprecating any such change in the Belgaum brigade are briefly as follows.

North Canara was not many years ago given over to the Civil Government of the Bombay Presidency for political and territorial reasons; and Belgaum and Dharwar are the only military stations within reach of that territory, should armed assistance ever be required.

It is manifestly convenient that the territory of a Local Government should be garrisoned by its own troops. In event of trouble, it is very inexpedient that the Local Government, which is responsible for the safety of the country placed under its immediate control, should be dependent on another Local Government at a distance for the troops necessary to quell disturbance in its own territories, and for which it alone is responsible.

It might perhaps be argued that the very inconvenience here represented has to be incurred by the Government of India; by the fact of Bombay troops holding Rajputana and Madras troops guarding the territories of the Nizam outside of their own territorial divisions. But the cases are not analogous; for Rajputana and Hyderabad are Native States, governed as it were by Residents and Agents to the Governor-General; and the troops guarding these territories are from one army or the other entirely, and are not in any way mixed up with the army of another presidency, as would be the case if the military charge of the Southern Mahratta Country were transferred to the army of Madras.

Again, political officers, be they Resident, Chief Commissioners, or Agents to the Governor-General, have no local forces under their immediate orders, and consequently look to their military requirements being supplied by the Supreme Government. For these reasons, they experience no inconvenience in the arrangements as they at present stand.

But the general inconvenience of having Bombay territories garrisoned by Madras troops would be specially aggravated in the case of Belgaum. For the cluster of Native States called the Southern Mahratta Country and the British districts of Belgaum and Dharwar, often called the Southern Deccan, constitute, in a military and political point of view, one of the most important parts of the Bombay presidency, and one of the very parts in which trouble is at all times most likely to arise, and in which it is almost certain to arise in event of any general disturbance in India. This is one of those divisions of the country in which the Mahratta power had a basis, in which the revolutions and counter-revolutions connected with Mahratta affairs injured the people to hardships, and imbued them with a martial spirit. A long series of petty wars occurring in a hilly country rendered these people turbulent by nature. Ever since the commencement of British rule, in the early part of this century, this part of the country has been periodically a source of anxiety. The Mahratta existence having been one long struggle for empire in India from the days when Sivaji revolted against the Mahomedans of Bejapore, to the day of Assaye when the Mahratta confederation was vanquished, and to the day of Kirkee when the central authority of the Peishwas was finally extinguished, that same Mahratta spirit still survives under British rule to this very time in Western India. This is well known to all experienced officers now in Western India; and it will be a cause of insecurity to British rule if ever unfortunately this consideration were to be forgotten or overlooked. After the first Afghan war in 1812-43, there were disturbances in the South Mahratta Country, distinctly traceable to the popular impression that British power had been severely stricken. Similarly, in connexion with the Indian mutinies of 1857-58, troubles were excited throughout the Southern Deccan; and Belgaum itself was threatened. Rebel emissaries tried to corrupt our sepoys, our feudatories, and our subjects. The idea was actually fostered that history would repeat itself, and that like as the Hindu uprising against the Moguls began in the Mahratta country, so an uprising of all India against the English should begin in the same country. The ruler of one Native State was hanged for the murder of one of our political officers. The ruler of another Native State was confined for some time on a charge of treason.

It is not to be doubted that if ever the Bombay army shall be required to repress disturbance in the interior of the Bombay presidency, then Belgaum is the most likely scene for such service. In such event the Local Government, instead of relying on its own troops and its own officers, would have to rely on the troops and officers of another Government. If reinforcements had to be sent (as would most probably be the case), questions would arise as to whether they should be sent from the Bombay side or the Madras side. Various conflicts of authority might arise. The Bombay Government could not expect the same absolute obedience from the officers of another Government as from its own, and would, in many ways, be placed at a considerable disadvantage.

And the above arguments will hold equally good whether the Bombay army remain as at present under a presidential Commander-in-Chief, or whether it be constituted an army-corps under a lieutenant-general. The commander of the army-corps will stand in much the same relation to the Local Government as the presidential Commander-in-Chief now does.

Further, I would call attention to the fact that Belgaum is distant 104 miles from Bellary, the nearest military station of the Madras army, and is connected with it by a fair-weather road only, a road almost impassable in the rainy season; whereas it is in communication with Poona and Satara, military stations of the Bombay army, by a trunk road, metalled and bridged throughout.

Again, there is indeed a prospect ultimately of a railway between the Southern Deccan and Bellary. But there is equally a prospect of a railway in the Eastern Deccan to connect the Southern Deccan and the Central Deccan near Poona.

If necessary, the Bombay army, even as at present constituted, could, as a preferable alternative to relinquishing Belgaum, hold Kamptee, Jubbulpore, and Sangor, in addition to Belgaum. If this should be objected to on territorial grounds, then the Madras army might keep Kamptee, which they have always held heretofore, the Bombay army taking Jubbulpore and Sangor, if such should be the desire of the Government of India. In other words, let Madras keep Kamptee (Nagpore) as heretofore, Bombay keeping Belgaum; thus a double change would be avoided, and a transfer calculated to embarrass Bombay would be averted.

(Sd.) RICHARD TEMPLE.

## I.

## ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION.

## Replies by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

1. What, in your Excellency's opinion, should be the full war establishment of the army of India calculated under the two heads—

(a) The number of troops that India ought to be able to place and maintain in the field for service whenever required?

(b) The garrisons and reserves to be maintained?

2. What, in your Excellency's opinion, should be the organization of the army of India? Is it necessary, in the present circumstances of the country, to maintain the three presidential armies under three separate Governments and three Commanders-in-Chief with three large staffs and separate departments?

3. Could not all the advantages of separate armies be secured with a great increase of efficiency and economy by forming the entire army of India into one army under one Commander-in-Chief, and dividing it into four army-corps? Each army-corps to be under the command of a Lieutenant-general, and to be entirely complete and self-contained in respect of organization, arms, and equipment. The Lieutenant-general to be vested with complete powers of control, and to be responsible for the appointment of all regimental officers, subject only to the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief for India in respect to the nomination of officers commanding regiments. The officers of all the army-corps to be equally eligible for service on the staff of the army. The army-corps to be territorial and localized, one in the north, one in the south, one in the east, and one in the west. The army-corps of the south and west to be as far as practicable recruited from the districts from which the present armies of Madras and Bombay are now recruiting; thus maintaining four armies distinct in race, religion, and language, but so organized as to be practically in a state of thorough efficiency and readiness for action in any direction in which the army of India may be called upon to undertake separate or combined operations under the Commander-in-Chief in India.

What should be the strength of each army-corps?

4. If such a formation of the army were adopted, would it not, in your Excellency's opinion, be possible to carry out a very material reduction in the staffs and departments, placing at the same time at the disposal of the Lieutenant-general commanding army-corps a staff so efficient and complete as to enable him to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of India of much unimportant work which now comes before him?

5. Supposing such an organization to be adopted, what proportion of each army-corps should be prepared for mobilization and maintained in a state of readiness to take the field at short notice? What should be the relative proportion of each arm of the service in such active portion of each army-corps?

6. Setting aside historical sentiment, and looking to the relative importance, the population, and the wealth of the various Local Governments of India, is there any more reason why the armies of Madras and Bombay should at the present time be under the Local Governments of Madras and Bombay and under local Commanders-in-Chief, with separate departments for every branch of military administration, than there is that the same system should be followed in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab?

7. As a matter of fact, if a large reserve for the northern armies is to be maintained, is it not the duty of Government to see that this reserve is formed of the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure and to maintain

1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Without any special knowledge of the military requirements of other parts of India, and only judging from what is suitable for the Punjab, His Honor thinks there would be no difficulty in organizing the army of India into four army-corps, as suggested in these questions.

In a previous communication to the President, Army Commission (No. 406, 19th August), His Honor has stated that this province will require—

Artillery	{ 10 batteries of British horse, field, or mountain. 6 batteries garrison, British.
Cavalry	{ 4 batteries mountain, Native. 13 regiments of Native.
Infantry	{ 11 regiments, British. 80 regiments, Native.

This force, with the addition of four companies of sappers, one pontoon train, and one telegraph troop, might form an army-corps for the Punjab provinces. Its strength would be about 40,000 men, with eighty-four guns.

The other three army-corps might on the average be equal in strength, giving for the army in India a total force of 160,000 men. The component parts of each army-corps might be varied to suit the different localities and requirements.

In the Punjab His Honor would advocate that carriage be maintained so as to put 15,000 men in motion at a day's notice.

In the other three army-corps perhaps it would be sufficient to maintain for each a sufficient amount of carriage to move 10,000 men.

Thus we should have 45,000 of all arms ready for immediate service; and this force might be followed by another army of 45,000 men in three months. That is to say, out of the 160,000 men in all India, 90,000 should be kept for service in any part of India, and 70,000 should be kept to garrison certain obligatory positions, which must at all times be held.

His Honor is aware that some exception may be taken to the composition of the army-corps for the Punjab. It may be urged, and perhaps correctly, that it is wanting in an essential particular of British cavalry, in order to render it complete and as perfect as an army-corps can be made; but in dealing with this question, His Honor has limited himself to the consideration of what is the smallest number of troops required for the maintenance of order in the Punjab, and the protection of the province against foreign aggression. He has not alone based his recommendations on what may be considered the best, the most perfect army-corps to have.

If the means at the disposal of Government were unlimited, His Honor would most assuredly add some British cavalry to each army-corps; but as economy demands the lowest possible numbers with the lowest possible expenditure, he has omitted this branch of the service, because he thinks it is not absolutely necessary for the maintenance of our empire in India, and because the Native cavalry now in our ranks are more than equal to any cavalry which is likely to be brought against them.

6. His Honor thinks there is no apparent reason why separate departments of military administration should be kept up for each presidency.

7. Assuming that provincial army-corps are granted, His Honor thinks that recruits should be drawn from the best fighting classes within their respective provinces. His Honor is opposed to having one recruiting-field for the whole of the

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## ANSWERS.

with due regard to the admitted necessity of keeping up armies of different races and religions, and with due regard to the safety of the empire?

Does your Excellency look upon the Madras and Bombay armies in their present organization as constituting the most efficient reserve for the armies of Upper India?

2. Is your Excellency aware of any difficulty in obtaining recruits for the army of a good class of healthy strong young men of the agricultural population, physically qualified to perform the duties of a soldier?

12. Could not the duties of the Native army be very materially decreased by a general concentration of troops in large centres in the neighbourhood of railways, thus abolishing all small cantonments and outlying and isolated stations?

13. Would not this arrangement enable the officers commanding army-corps to make a much larger number of men available for service, and justify a very considerable reduction of troops in some parts of the country; and would it not enable the discipline, exercise, and instruction of the troops to be more effectively carried on, and render the formations of camps of exercise more feasible?

25. In your opinion, is it desirable, on the score of economy and efficiency, to substitute for Indian service a local British force in place of a portion of the Home army?

34. (a) Does not your Excellency consider that the present expenditure on punkah-pulling is excessive; are not large reductions possible; and would it not be feasible to reduce the cost of punkah-pulling by resorting to the old system of a fixed allowance per company, &c.?

(b) Would the abolition of khus-khus tatties, except in hospitals, cause any discomfort or risk to the health of the troops?

(c) Can your Excellency suggest any way of reducing the very heavy expenditure annually incurred in the purchase (or manufacture) and repair of barrack furniture, barrack bedding, &c.

armies in India. It will be necessary, for political reasons, to prevent a preponderance of one nationality. The fighting classes are scattered all over India, and from these classes alone should enlistments be made. The lower castes, such as melters and chamars, musicians, should not be admitted into the ranks.

9. There is no difficulty in obtaining recruits in the Punjab.

12 & 13. Undoubtedly; and this has been proposed in letter No. 406C., dated 19th August 1879.

25. It is most desirable in His Honor's opinion to raise a local British force for service in India, on the grounds of health and economy in transport. His Honor believes that in a local regiment habits are formed which render men better able to resist the effects of climate; and recruits joining such regiments readily adopt the customs which the older soldiers follow, and thus they are more likely to keep their health.

Economy would be effected by avoiding the necessity of sending whole regiments to and from England. Men should be enlisted for long periods of service, and facilities might be afforded to a certain number of men to obtain long leave to England.

His Honor is not prepared to advocate the application of this principle to artillery, as there might be difficulties in keeping the officers trained up to the improvements of the day.

34. (a) The present expenditure on punkah-pulling is very great, and the effect on the comfort of the men small, as the service is insufficient. A few punkahs, well pulled, would give better results. His Honor would limit punkahs during the day to the day-rooms, or even to a portion of the day-rooms only. The number of night-punkahs should be reduced, so that the number given to one coolie to pull should not exceed his strength; and the men's beds might be massed under the punkahs, even at the risk of spoiling the symmetry of the barrack-room arrangements. Such men as liked should be allowed to sleep outside during the hot winds.

(b) Tatties, as worked in European barracks, are, His Honor believes, a delusion. He would allow one day-room per company (say the reading-room) being cooled by a well-arranged system of tatties, placed under the control of a man selected from the company.

The men would thus have a well-cooled room to sit in, if they choose. His Honor would stop all tatties in the bed-rooms as a useless expense.

By concentrating the tatties under supervision, one room could be fairly cooled at a quarter of the present cost; and he feels convinced this curtailment of expense would not affect the comfort or health of the troops.

(c) Full half the damage done to barrack furniture is from the continual shifting. The furniture is lifted, carried out, and dropped instead of being put down gently. In permanent barracks the furniture should be fixed as far as possible. For instance, the mess tables should be on cast-iron standards, screwed to the floor; and all heavy furniture should be fixtures likewise.

In fact, the furniture in barracks should be treated as far as possible as it is treated in large schools in England.

The moveable furniture, particularly that on "legs," should be better made and of better wood. The cheap wood used in Upper India (usually of the fir kind or deodar) is not suited to stand the knocking about the articles get. A better kind of wood should be used for those parts of the furniture

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39. (b) What are the arrangements which your Excellency would propose should be carried out for the formation of a nucleus of a transport department by utilizing existing carriage, such as moveable columns, and without adding to the present cost of these?

How could a system of regimental transport be organized?

most liable to injury, and it should be well seasoned. Better workmanship is also necessary.

This will undoubtedly increase first cost; but it will largely save in repairs, in which by far the greatest part of the money goes.

39. (b) In all regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force (infantry) Government carriage is maintained sufficient to move a wing of a regiment with tents, but only sufficient to move the whole regiment at a day's notice without camp equipage. This system should be applied to all those regiments in the Punjab which are likely to be called upon to move at short notice. Some increase to the carriage establishment is considered necessary, more especially for the additional supply of ammunition which is now carried since the introduction of sniders. All ammunition should be carried on mules, which can accompany a regiment into action. His Honor would particularly advocate that a certain number of mules be sanctioned for each cavalry regiment armed with snider carbines for the carriage of the ammunition. His Honor does not deem it necessary here to enter into details, but merely to record his conviction that the principle here urged is sound.

He is fully impressed with the importance of maintaining regimental carriage, and would insist upon each regimental officer keeping up a certain amount of carriage. The officers should purchase the animals, but Government should feed them.

By this system a regiment is ready for immediate service. The cattle are looked after by the officers without any special payment or remuneration; and in most infantry regiments of the force, they (the officers) evince a constant interest in the animals, and take some pride in keeping them in good condition, and both officers and men become acquainted with the treatment of baggage-animals, their loads, and their requirements as to food.

His Honor sees no reason why, in times of peace, these cattle establishments should not be utilized, under a certain amount of discretionary authority of the commanding officers, in earning some money to pay for, or help toward paying for, their keep.

(c) As to the most effectual means of securing the speedy collection of transport in the event of a war?

(g) Which do you consider it most advisable to use on service,—Government or hired transport?

(c) and (g) If a system of regimental carriage were organized, the requirements of a transport department would be materially lessened. His Honor thinks that the transport department should be separate from the commissariat or supply, and that all animals required for a long campaign across the border should be purchased by Government and looked after by a body of competent officers. Up to the base of operations on the border, if operations are taken out of British India, as in the present campaign in Afghanistan, the Lieutenant-Governor would endeavour to work the carriage arrangements through contractors; but if they failed, he would employ hired cattle, always engaging to purchase at once any animals required to cross the border line.

His Honor can suggest no cheaper way of collecting carriage than that followed during the late and present campaigns, *viz.*, through civil officers. It seems to His Honor very necessary to urge that whenever cattle are hired and the owners are called upon to perform duties involving more than ordinary risk, to which all carriers are liable, the Government should in a liberal spirit declare under what circumstances compensation for losses will be given; and having declared this, that some officer or officers on the spot should be authorized to pay (or to give certificates for payment of) whatever compensation may be considered to be due. Some such rules are, in His Honor's opinion, very necessary, as otherwise the owners of cattle are put to much loss, and are thereby deterred from maintaining a supply for future contingencies.

It may also be necessary to pay some retaining-fee or premium to the owners of animals, on condition of their being ready to supply a certain number of animals.

The cost of any system under which Government keeps up baggage-animals for transport may be much reduced if the animals, when not required for military purposes, are used on hire for the ordinary traffic of the country.



## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

(d) Whether it would not be advisable to endeavour to introduce a better and lighter description of cart into India, with a view to the substitution, when possible, of wheeled for pack carriage?

(d) Where roads are fairly good, it certainly appears desirable to introduce carts of all descriptions; and any light cart suited to draught for ponies and mules would be used with undoubted advantage.

The ekkas of this country can travel over very indifferent roads, and are admirably adapted to the pony of the country; on good metalled roads they go great distances daily. There is no reason why carts with no greater breadth than that of the ekka, and built much on the ekka principle, should not succeed, especially for work on the lines leading to the base of an army or on the main lines of an advance.

But for the general traffic of the country the introduction of carts must depend entirely on the roads. It is believed that an ekka will carry 6 maunds a day for a distance of 20 miles over a hard road and 12 miles over a fair road.

(e) Whether your Excellency thinks anything can be done to increase the supply and improve the breed of mules?

(e) His Honor considers that the supply of mules has increased very largely of late years, owing to the large prices which good mules bring at all the fairs in the Punjab. The Local Government has for years past provided good donkey stallions in many districts of the Punjab; and His Honor thinks that this system should be continued, and that the numbers of donkeys should be increased as far as practicable. There is no better mule than the Punjab-bred mule by a Bokhara donkey.

His Honor would advocate a system of allowing commandants of all the mountain batteries to maintain a reserve of mules to an extent of 25 per cent. over strength, and that this reserve should consist of young mules in the following proportion:—

One-third of the reserve should be 4 years old.

“ “ “ “ 3 years old.

“ “ “ “ 2 years old.

Such a system would enable the battery officers to purchase mules at two years old, when they can be purchased at comparatively low rates. These animals would be attended to by the battery establishments without extra charge as attendants, so long as the twelve additional drivers are maintained with batteries.

(f) Looking to the fact that the supply of camels is believed to be steadily decreasing, can you suggest any means by which that supply can be kept up? Could not elephants be largely dispensed with as army transport?

(f) His Honor is not aware of the grounds on which it is stated that the supply of camels is decreasing. As far as concerns the Punjab, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that in January 1878, or before the Afghan campaign of 1878, there were in the Punjab as many camels as in any other previous years since the annexation of the province.

His Honor can suggest no better plan than that previously mentioned in answering question 39 (c) and (d), of giving a retaining-fee to owners of carriage, in order to ensure a supply of this class of animal.

(g) Whether you think that, in the event of a Government nucleus being kept up, much of the cost could not be saved by its utilization for the relief of troops and the carriage of commissariat and other stores?

(g) It is probable that during five months of the year, when reliefs are carried out, all the Government carriage would be brought into use, so that the carriage maintained by Government would be utilized to a certain extent. During the hot season a certain portion of carriage might be hired out, and worked on those lines where the general traffic of the country is extensive. For instance, on the line from Umballa to Simla a well-appointed transport train working at reasonable rates would always find full employment. Again in every large town in the Punjab it is possible to obtain contracts for the conveyance of goods to some distant place at maundage rates; and the Government cattle, under certain restrictions and a proper system, might advantageously be used on such work.

(h) What should be the organization of a division of transport in war, i.e., as to number of animals, officers, supervising staff, drivers, artificers, and veterinarians?

(h) There is one portion of this question which suggests the mention of an existing difficulty. There is a great scarcity of Native salutaris, or veterinarians.

Diseases of cattle, horses, and camels are very common in India; but there are very few Natives who understand the treatment of these animals in disease. It is very desirable that schools for training Natives in veterinary practice should be established. Men so trained would be employed largely in the districts of this province, and would provide a supply of men who could be most usefully employed in time of war.

## QUESTIONS.

## ANSWERS.

40. Does your Excellency consider that the Military Works Branch of the Department Public Works should be brought more directly under the military authorities than at present, and could not its organization be so arranged as to make the engineer department more efficient for war; or should the Military Works Branch be abolished, the ordinary works being constructed and maintained by the ordinary Public Works staff, a special establishment being appointed, under the Military Department, for any large works requiring peculiar knowledge or skill?

40. His Honor thinks that the Military Works Branch of the Public Works Department should be placed directly under the Military Department of the Government of India, with the Inspector General of Works as the executive head of the branch.

But His Honor thinks that this branch might be reduced to the number of officers sufficient to undertake the construction of original military works, such as arsenals, fortifications, or new cantonments. After cantonments have been constructed, and the only work required consists of maintenance, or the reconstruction or alteration of a barrack, His Honor sees no reason why all such work should not, as formerly, be entrusted to the ordinary Public Works staff attached to each Local Government. His Honor is quite sure that this would lead to a vast economy, as at present the systems in vogue give to the higher supervising officers duties to perform over an extended area; and it may happen that two superintending engineers meet at the same station, one to supervise the repairs of a barrack, and the other the repairs of a kutchery.

In regard to the construction of large military works, some separate officers are doubtless needed; and the officers of this branch His Honor would place under the Government of India, Military Department, because in that department the consideration of the style, size, and cost of barracks is practically entrusted. The Military Department settles the main points on which rests the cost of housing the British soldier, such as the superficial and cubical space to be allowed to each man, the running feet of wall to be allowed to each bed, and the number of day-rooms allowed to each company.

41. (a) Could not the expenditure for each year be limited to a fixed annual grant, and the completion of the works necessary for the accommodation of troops and the defence of the empire be distributed over a series of years?

41. (a) Undoubtedly the expenditure could be limited as stated in this paragraph; but such limitation is not reduction of expenditure at all, only spreading it over a greater series of years.

(b) What is your Excellency's opinion of the barrack accommodation in India generally?

(b) In discussing this question, it must be remembered that a double-storeyed barrack gives double the accommodation of a single-storeyed barrack covering the same area; so that, as long as the double-storeyed building does not cost more than two single-storeyed ones, it is not a more expensive style of building.

Are not many of the barracks constructed in late years designed on a most extravagant scale; are these new barracks any more comfortable or conducive to the health of the occupiers than many of the older and cheaper single-storeyed barracks?

Practically it is found to cost about nine per cent. more; but there are certain advantages to be set against this, so that really it makes little difference in point of expense whether a set of barracks are designed as single or double storeyed buildings. As to the buildings being designed on an extravagant scale, as long as the present superficial area, cubic space, and running feet of wall are laid down for the soldier on the present scale, the barracks must continue to be designed as they have been. It may not perhaps be understood that the space given to a soldier in superficial and cubic feet is a fixed unit, unalterable by the Public Works Department, whose functions are limited to carrying out the orders it receives from the Military Department, and the dimensions of a so-called "extravagant" barrack only so many multiples of that unit according to the number of men it has to contain.

With the Military Department lies the power of decreasing this unit; but till it is decreased, no saving need be expected in the cost of housing the European troops.

If the entire control of the funds now expended by the Military Works Branch was vested in the Military Department of the Government of India, that department would have a stronger interest in making the money go further; and doubtless many superfluities and excrescences would be lopped off the accommodation now given to a British regiment.

His Honor considers that the question of comfort and health depends on the climate and situation. Barracks for stations such as Peshawar and Rawal Pindi should not be designed on the same lines as for those required in Cawnpore or Bengal. The extremes of climate in parts of Northern India require a differently planned barrack to that for other parts of India near the tropics. It seems to His Honor that much of the criticism to which the barrack construction has been open is due to a too rigid adherence to uniformity in

(c) Might not many of the barracks throughout India be constructed in a more economical style; and might not many of the troops on the hills be housed for many years to come in cheap huts or cottage barracks?

(d) Could not the ordinary repairs of completed barracks and the construction of barracks on standard plans be well left to the Local Governments, subject to inspection by officers employed under the Government of India?

(e) Might not European soldiers be more frequently employed in public works, especially in the construction of their own barracks on the hills and the roads leading to them?

46. Do you think it desirable that the power formerly granted to commanding officers of Native regiments to dismiss men of bad character or inefficient for service should be restored?

48. In the ryotwari districts, or in other parts of India, would grants of waste lands, revenue-free, for their lives be acceptable to Native officers and soldiers in lieu of part of their pension?

50. For the education of cadets of good family for direct commissions as Native officers, would it not be desirable to afford them the means of instruction in military schools, say one at Meerut for Eastern, and one at Poona for Western India, where the fees should be sufficiently high to ensure only gentlemen of a superior class entering their sons, and to which nominations should be made by the Viceroy?

51. To what extent would you recommend the grant of commissions otherwise than by promotion from the ranks; and what should be the attainments qualifying for such nominations?

design. An instance of the difficulty of providing a building to contain a large number of persons, which shall be suitable to all extremes of climate, is found in the jails of this province. During the hot weather a large number of the prisoners sleep in the open air. No ventilation that can be given is sufficient to enable them to sleep inside in comfort, whilst in winter more than one-half the ventilation that is given during the temperate seasons has to be closed.

(c) His Honor believes that barrack construction can be made cheaper by reducing the space allowed to each soldier, according to the climate. For troops in the hills, the hut barracks are undoubtedly more economical, whilst they fulfil all the essential requirements. His Honor believes that the style of barracks lately constructed at Jutogh is, as a permanent style of building, as good as is necessary, whilst it costs Rs. 2-10 per square foot, against Rs. 6 per square foot for permanent barracks in the plains.

His Honor also thinks that much saving can be effected in using cheaper materials in out-houses, such as cook-rooms and privies; and he believes it would be of advantage in a sanitary view to make such buildings less permanent, in order that, when the ground which they occupy becomes defiled, the sites may be changed.

(d) Ordinary repairs and maintenance of completed barracks can be done by Public Works Department under Local Governments. New constructions in barracks, fortifications, or arsenals should be entrusted to the Military Branch, if the amount or extent of work is considered sufficient to engage the services of one executive engineer officer. If such an officer be placed over such works in any station, he should at the same time take charge of the repairs and maintenance of all other military buildings in that station. On the other hand, if the original work is small in extent, and not sufficient to require the services of one officer, it should be undertaken by the executive officer of the province.

(e) His Honor strongly advocates the employment of British soldiers on the hills, and Native soldiers in all parts of India. He believes that this question has been discussed in the Public Works Department. The success attending the employment of British troops on the Murree-Abbottabad road is well known; and the good results to the State do not only consist in getting the work done at fair rates, but in preserving the men in robust health. Working pay as given by the military regulations does not recompense a soldier for the extra labor, involving the consumption of more food and other incidental expenses. He accepts it of course on service; but on civil works, in times of peace, other rates and rules should be introduced, on the principle of paying the soldier at the same rate as a civil laborer for the work he turns out. His Honor believes that if volunteers were called for, the Government would have no difficulty in establishing a system which would in many ways be of immense advantage to the Government and its army.

46. His Honor thinks that all commanding officers should have the power to discharge. If a commanding officer exercised this power harshly and without judgment, he should be deprived of it, or removed from his command; but the great advantage which this power must give to commandants should not be withheld from all, because one commandant out of fifty may not be competent.

48. The grant of waste land revenue-free for life would not be acceptable in lieu of pension, if the value of the grant is strictly reckoned. Of course, if the grant is liberal, it might be acceptable; but His Honor does not think it would be economical to pursue such a practice.

50. His Honor thinks that existing schools furnish means for obtaining a good general education for all classes. For the young men who are selected for direct commissions, special military instruction may be provided with advantage as suggested, as it is in England at the Royal Military College, after the general education has been tested by examination.

51. The number of commissions to be reserved for direct nomination must be fixed in communication with the military authorities. It is necessary that men nominated to direct appointments should be of good family, fair education, and good physique. It is desirable that the nominee should bring

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52. With reference to the comparative small amount of pension to pay of Native officers, and to afford them greater inducements to retire, would it be desirable and acceptable to them to establish a system of deferred pay by deduction of a small percentage, say 5 per cent., from the pay of all Native officers hereafter promoted, to amass to individual credit, with interest say at 4½ per cent.? The sum to be handed over on retirement, or to his heirs at any time in case of his death, and to be inalienable by any authority, except by being confiscated to the State in case of cashiering.

53. Has your Excellency any suggestions to make with a view to alter or improve the terms on which Native officers and soldiers can obtain pension, or to alter the periods after which Native officers and soldiers can obtain pension on medical certificate or otherwise?

54. Do you consider that, under a proper system of concentration and distribution at important centres, the strength of the present Native army in India can be reduced, should it be resolved to create a system of reserves supplying extra men to meet a call for service, say to an extent equal to half the strength of the present Native army?

55. Would it be advantageous in your Excellency's opinion to establish such reserves; and if so, on what principle?

56. Do you consider that the Home or any Continental system of reserve force could, with alterations, be adapted to the Native armies of India?

57. If you object generally to the creation of extra reserve forces of Native troops, but having regard to the fact that annually a large number of men are transferred to the pension list, and that the cost for the total number of pensioners, viz., 63,178, is Rs. 46,08,539 per annum, do you see any reason why the present system of invalid pensioning after 15 years' service should not be abolished, and a limited number of effective men be passed to a reserve on reserve pay after say not less than eight years' service, non-effectives being at all times examined by a medical board and struck off with gratuities equal to one month's pay for regimental or reserve service, as the case may be, for every year's service?

In such an organization the men of the reserve could be retained under the immediate control of their own regimental officers, and be liable, during a fixed period, to be called out at any time in case of war to join their own regiments and for one month's annual training at the depot after which period they might pass into a second reserve, liable only to be called out for garrison duty in case of war, until entitled to reserve pension.

Our the score of efficiency and economy, and to afford the means of maintaining regimental depôts and such reserves as have been proposed above, might it not be advisable to increase regimental strength from 600 to 800 sepoy, with a corresponding reduction of the number of battalions in the proportion of 4 to 3?

a certain number of recruits (if wanted) of his own country, not as his servants, but men induced to enlist by his influence.

52. His Honor does not think that such a system as that suggested can be made acceptable or attractive to Native officers. To the extravagant it would be irksome, and to the prudent it would give no advantage, as a Native can always invest his savings at much more profitable rates than 4½ per cent. per annum.

53. For the Native army His Honor thinks that pensions should not be given until 18 years' service has been completed. All men declared physically unfit whose service is under 18 years should be discharged with gratuity. After 32 years' service the existing regulation allows a soldier to retire on the pension of his rank. All pensioners of less than 32 years' service who are physically fit for military duty should be required to serve on garrison duty when required.

54. This question has been answered by this department letter No. 406, dated 19th August 1879.

55, 56, 57. The following three schemes will provide a reserve for the army in the Punjab at a cost comparatively small:—

*First.*—To utilize the police force in this province as far as practicable. This force recruits from the fighting classes, and has men in its ranks equal, if not superior, in physique and general intelligence to the average of the men in the army.

*Second.*—To increase the strength of infantry regiments in the Punjab to a war strength, reducing the numbers in times of peace, and maintaining the balance as a reserve at their homes on half-pay, but ready to rejoin at short notice.

*Third.*—To make use of the troops of the Native States in the Punjab, and requiring each Chief to keep up a certain number of men ready for service in any part of India.

Before describing the particulars of each scheme, His Honor remarks that, although the first and third schemes may be practically useful in the Punjab, he does not feel certain that they can be equally applied to the other provinces of the Indian empire. But, as far the Punjab is concerned, the Lieutenant-Governor feels assured that both these schemes offer advantages which should not be disregarded in carrying out any measures of reorganization in a comprehensive sense. It must therefore be understood that the following remarks are only intended to provide a reserve for the troops in the Punjab.

#### *I.—Reserve in police.*

His Honor proposes to call upon men now in the police to volunteer for a military reserve, up to a maximum number of 3,000 men, which is about one-sixth of the police force. Each man after volunteering should go through a course of musketry instruction and be taught to use the snider rifle. As soon as he has passed this course, he should receive one rupee a month extra pay from the Military Department.

Instruction in shooting to be carried on at all the stations in the Punjab, and instructors from the Native infantry should be provided, and be worked under the general direction of the assistant adjutant generals for musketry.

The men in the police do undergo on enlistment a certain amount of training drill, quite sufficient to make them capable of readily acquiring on joining a regiment the chief essentials in military drill and discipline. What His Honor

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considers of the greatest importance is, that the men who are to form this military reserve should be taught to shoot well with the snider; and to attain this end, His Honor would risk the sacrifice of some portion of the man's efficiency as a policeman in making him go through a course of musketry instruction; and after passing this, he should receive the additional one rupee per mensem.

This reserve should be available by instalments as follows:—

1,000 men at once,  
1,000 men in 12 days,  
1,000 men in 30 days,

or the whole 3,000 in the month.

The cost of this scheme would be as follows:—

	Per mensem.	Per annum.
i.—Pay of men at Rs. 1 per mensem ...	3,000	36,000
ii.—Pay extra to instructors .....	.....	4,000
iii.—Pay of substitutes entertained during course of instruction ..	.....	8,000
Total per annum ...	.....	48,000

The above would give 3,000 men at an annual cost of Rs. 48,000, or 16 per annum per man. There would be no charge for pensions, except for wounds or for families of men killed in action.

#### II.—Regimental reserves.

All regiments of infantry in the Punjab to be increased to a war strength of 760 sepoys, and reduced in times of peace to 560 sepoys.

During peace the difference between war and peace establishments (200 sepoys) should be put on half-pay, or Rs. 3½ per mensem, and allowed to reside at their homes, on the condition of rejoining at short notice. They should be required to assemble at some fixed central dépôt for training for one month in each year.

They should be granted free passes by rail whenever proceeding to and from their training dépôts, or to and from their regiments.

It is estimated that this scheme would give a reserve of 6,000 sepoys, as there are 30 regiments in the province. It is intended to include the three Goorkha regiments in this scheme, as it is believed the system would be liked by the men, and would assist recruiting. It is also believed that in Punjab regiments the system would be popular, and that by recalling or changing the reserve men every four years, the necessity for granting long furloughs will be in a great measure removed. But if long leaves be granted, in addition to this system of reserves, His Honor would urge most strongly that for all leaves over three months all Native soldiers should lose the batta of their ranks.

For the Native cavalry His Honor would advocate an extension of the system now obtaining in the Punjab Frontier Force, which allows one-sixth of a regiment, or one full troop, to be absent on furlough, which is open throughout the year.

His Honor would give the men half their own pay, but full pay for their horses, and allow them to be absent for two years.

In connection with the above scheme, His Honor would also use the reserve centres as recruiting dépôts for all regiments which recruit in the Punjab.

The centres might be three in number, and placed—

- i.—At Rawal Pindi.
- ii.—At Lahore, with a branch in the Kangra hills.
- iii.—At Umballa.

There are in the army 27 regiments of infantry, chiefly composed of Punjabis, and about 32 companies, or the equivalent of four other regiments, scattered in other regiments of the Bengal army. The recruiting for these would

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give ample employment to an establishment of the following officers at each of the three reserve centres, as it is estimated that in ordinary times about 1,800 recruits will be annually required in the infantry, being 8 per cent. of strength.

Each dépôt should have the following establishments :—

1 commandant on a staff of Rs. 400.

1 adjutant on Rs. 250 staff.

2 officers { 1 squadron officer ... } withdrawn from  
                  { 1 wing officer ... } regiments.

1 medical officer.

During the cold season the duties of these officers would chiefly be in training reserve men, who should be assembled for a month at the time most convenient to the men themselves.

And during the hot weather these officers should be employed in recruiting.

It will be necessary to give to each reserve man an annual grant of Rs. 4 to enable him to keep up a suit of half-mounting. His regular clothing, arms, and accoutrements should be kept in store at the regimental headquarters.

In carrying out any measure on these general principles, His Honor thinks that advantage should be taken to revise the pension rules. At present all soldiers are granted invalid pensions after a service of 15 years. The changes advocated are as follows :—

I.—All men under 20 years' service declared physically unfit to be discharged with gratuity under the rules now in force, the maximum being 12 months' pay.

II.—All men of 20 years' service and over declared physically unfit to be pensioned on their rank under existing regulations.

III.—All men over 20 years' service, although physically fit, but declared by a committee of regimental officers to be professionally unfit for active service, to be granted  $\frac{1}{2}$  or  $\frac{2}{3}$  or full pensions, according to length of service.

IV.—To guard in a measure against cases of malingering, a commanding officer should be invested with authority to commute pensions to gratuity in cases when he considers a man has been malingering.

V.—All pensioners under 40 years of age to be considered liable to be called on to serve on garrison duty, unless declared by the invaliding committee to be incapable of performing garrison duty near their homes.

The cost of the foregoing proposals may be thus roughly stated :—

I.—The proposal to form a reserve of 200 men per regiment, or 6,000 men per 30 regiments of infantry, would cause an excess expenditure in times of peace of Rs. 21,600 per annum, the calculation being based on the present strength of infantry regiments in peace at 640 sepoys.

II.—In extending this system to 15 cavalry regiments, there will be a saving of Rs. 50,000 per annum.

III.—In carrying out the proposal for reserve centres and recruiting dépôts, there will be an increase of Rs. 80,000 per annum.

IV.—No estimate is formed of the saving in regard to the proposals to alter the pension rules and pay of men on furlough or long leave.

III.—*Troops of Native States considered as a reserve.*

The Lieutenant-Governor trusts that in the deliberations of the Army Commission the question of the permanent utilization of the contingents of Native States may find place. He can conceive no question more worthy of serious discussion by this competent body of officers. Nor does His Honor doubt but that the difficulties which exist, and they are numerous, can be met and put aside. Should it be undesirable to at once extend the system generally, the Punjab, which has shown so excellent a spirit, and the forces of whose Chiefs are so well disciplined that they may be brigaded without shame, with regiments of the Indian army, might be the province selected for first trying an experiment which eminently deserve trial, and which, in His Honor's opinion, would as certainly succeed.

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His Honor is aware that the conclusions of the Committee of 1877 on the armament of Native States were generally opposed to the principles which he here advocates; but he would urge that the whole position of the question has been lately altered, first by the imperative necessity of financial reduction, which must be effected, even at some risk; and secondly, by the results of the Cabul war, and the successful employment of the Punjab Chiefs' contingents.

The objections which may be raised against improving the discipline and equipment of the troops of Native States, so as to make them efficient auxiliaries to our own forces in time of war, are—

(1) The danger of creating a really efficient body of troops not under our control, and which may be used by the Chiefs for purposes hostile to our Government;

(2) or may be used by the Chief to create for himself a *despotism in his own State*, which would be oppressive to his own nobles and subjects;

(3) or may become uncontrollable by the Chief, and be a source of danger to the peace of the empire, as it is not composed of the subjects of the Chief.

These objections do not arise in the case of the Punjab Chiefs.

In the first place, the Chiefs have shown themselves exceedingly loyal at all times, and especially during the mutiny of 1857. There is no reason to suppose that this feeling will change, or that any feeling of hostility to the British Government is likely to grow up, so long as these States are treated with the same consideration as at present.

The Chiefs are not in the same position as those of Rajputana and other parts of India. They are not feudal sovereigns, with a large body of nobles under them, who furnish the contingents of fighting men required for State purposes, nor are they foreign conquerors, of a race different from that of the people over whom they rule. They have therefore no subjugation of their nobles and peoples to accomplish which cannot be done by the means already at their command.

Their troops are drawn from the population of their own territories, and are not *foreign* mercenaries.

The danger therefore of the troops being used for oppressing the subjects of the State, or becoming uncontrollable, is reduced to very small limits. The plans which His Honor would propose for utilizing the troops of the Native States in this province are—

(1) To make an agreement with each Chief to furnish a certain number of disciplined troops as auxiliaries when required to do so.

(2) These numbers might be as follows:—

			Cavalry.	Infantry.
Kashmir	...	...	...	2,000
Patiala	...	...	200	1,200
Jhind	...	...	200	600
Nabha	...	...	200	600
Kapurthala	...	...	200	600
Bahawalpur	...	...	100	300
Malair Kotla	...	...	50	200
Total	...	...	950	5,500
GRAND TOTAL			...	6,450

(3) In order that these troops should be mobile, each Chief should be desired to maintain mule carriage to the extent of one mule for every three men.

(4) His Honor would not insist upon British officers being employed in training these troops, unless the Chief concerned desired such a measure. The existing rules prohibiting the employment of Europeans in any State without the sanction of the Government of India should remain in force.

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61. What are the communications the construction of which appears to be of the first moment from a military point of view?

(5) The troops should be inspected periodically at the head-quarters of the State. They should not be required to perform duties in British territory in times of peace, but should be liable to be called out in times of war, either to serve in taking the place of our troops in garrison duties, or to take the field with any British force.

61. His Honor thinks that the most important work in communications in a military point of view is (1) the completion of the railway to Rawal Pindi; (2) its extension to Peshawar, including the bridging of the Indus.

If a large body of troops are maintained in the Kuram valley, His Honor would in that case urge the necessity of having a good metalled road from Rawal Pindi into the Kuram valley. He would also advocate the construction of a good road through the Khyber, in view to its being converted into a railway in the event of its being decided to connect Cabul with the railway systems of India.

(Sd.) S. BLACK, Colonel,  
Mily. Secy., Punjab Government.

No. 484C., dated Simla, 8th September 1879.

From—COLONEL S. BLACK, Secretary to the Government, Punjab, Military Department,  
To—The President, Army Organization Commission, Simla.

In paragraph 2, clause 11 of the Government of India, Military Department, letter No. 202S. of the 7th July last, the Army Commission are desired to give an opinion on the following question:—

*"Having regard to the alterations made in our frontier, and redistribution of our frontier garrisons, is it desirable to retain the Punjab Frontier Force on its present footing, or to place it, in part or altogether, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief?"*

2. It is now nearly 30 years since the Punjab Frontier Force was first raised, and placed under the control of the Punjab Government, for the purpose of strengthening the hands of the civil and political authority, in maintaining order on a border which had always been a source of trouble to the Sikh Government, and which, at the time of annexation, demanded from the Board of Administration the exercise of considerable vigor for its better management.

3. During this period of nearly 30 years, the question of the control of this force has on three occasions been exhaustively discussed, and placed before the Government of India. On each occasion this Government has felt it necessary, with no jealous regard for its own dignity and power, but with a sincere desire to further the imperial interests and policy to advance those arguments which appeared, and still appear, to the Lieutenant-Governor irresistible in favor of maintaining intact the special characteristics of this local force, without which it would lose its chief value and use. Its isolation was of immense advantage to the empire in 1857; and although its position may be considered anomalous, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that the causes which secured the active loyalty of this small force during the sepoy war should be studied and not forgotten.

4. In 1859-60 the question of placing the force under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was for the first time considered; and the views of the Lieutenant-Governor were communicated to the Government of India in letter No. 462, dated 1st October 1860, to which no reply was ever given. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that Lord Canning, the Governor-General, saw fit to leave the existing system undisturbed.

5. In 1862, after a visit to the frontier, Lord Strathnairn again raised the question; and for the second time the views of the Lieutenant-Governor were communicated in the papers which accompanied this Department letter No. 889, dated 10th December 1862, to which a reply was received, conveying the decision of the Governor-General in Council in the following words (letter No. 994, dated 29th March 1864, to Adjutant General):—

*"The question whether the relations of the Punjab Force with the Punjab Government, and with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, are to remain as at present or not, has been considered and decided in the affirmative; and the Governor-General in Council, on a review of all that has been urged for and against that decision, has no hesitation whatever in confirming it. He observes that Sir Hugh Rose himself has borne willing testimony to the efficiency of the force, which indeed has been amply proved by an experience of 14 years; and the few defects pointed out in its drill are not such, His Excellency in Council thinks, as materially to affect the question; whilst the argument in favor of the maintenance of the existing system, based on the constitution of the force, and on the advantage of its being under the direct control of the Local Government with reference to the special duties it has to perform, is strengthened by each year's experience."*

6. Again in 1869 Sir William Mansfield reopened the question in an able minute, dated the 25th August of that year; and for the third time the opinions of the Lieutenant-Governor were reiterated in this Department letter No. 108 of the 19th March 1870. It is believed that the whole question came under the consideration of the late Lord Mayo; but no orders were issued on the subject, and no change was made in the existing system. It is, however, a significant fact that, when this question came forward for discussion in the spring of 1870, Lord Napier had just assumed command



of the Indian army; and during the whole period of His Lordship's tenure of his command, His Honor is not aware that any opinion or desire was ever expressed to alter the position of the Punjab Frontier Force in its relations to the Local Government.

7. As Sir Robert Egerton believes that the efficient political management of the border has been, and still is, very considerably facilitated by the Punjab Frontier Force being under the control of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province; and as His Honor is further convinced that, were it withdrawn from his control, the efficiency of the administration would be seriously impaired, and the strength of the frontier line of defence permanently weakened, he is desirous of placing before the Army Commission, not only his own opinions, but the opinions of former Lieutenant-Governors on the following points:—

- (a) How the force came into existence as a separate body from the rest of the army of Bengal.
- (b) Reasons of the Governor-General for placing it under the Local Government.
- (c) Description of frontier. Changes made in strength of force for frontier defence.
- (d) Militia employed.
- (e) Constitution and duties of force.
- (f) Reasons for maintaining local character of the Punjab Frontier Force under the control of the Local Government.
- (g) Finally, how the duties of the Punjab Frontier Force can be appropriately extended under the altered condition of the frontier.

8. At the annexation of the Punjab, in 1849, the Board of Administration succeeded to an inheritance of anarchy, the result of the Sikh management of their trans-Indus districts. The whole country was studded with forts, each the head-quarters of a

robber-chief; and the revenue was collected by an army, or not collected at all. The Board, under these circumstances, found it necessary to employ some of the Sikh troops, and took the *élite* of that force, which Major Edwardes had enlisted and commanded during the Sikh war.

9. But for the more permanent protection of the western frontier other arrangements were proposed; and soon after annexation the Board received authority to raise five regiments of cavalry and five regiments of infantry for service in the trans-Indus districts.

10. In the course of 18 months these regiments were raised, and equipped on the irregular system; and Lord Dalhousie, in October 1850, explained his reasons for placing this frontier force under the authority of the Board of Administration. His Lordship said: "His object was to secure for the Local Government the full and complete control of military means, sufficient to effect any object which political considerations may, in their judgment, render it expedient to secure on the distant frontier."

At the same time the strength of the force was fixed; certain reductions of the Sikh levies were directed; the organization of three field batteries of artillery was ordered; and the appointment of a brigadier to the command of the force was sanctioned.

11. It was the conviction that the hill tribes must be promptly dealt with by an able and experienced local force that determined the Supreme Government to adopt these measures; and it is evident that Lord Dalhousie was aware of the necessity of strengthening the hands of the Civil Government. In June 1852 he thus addressed the Board of Administration:—

"Para. 10.—The Governor General thinks it expedient, in order to prevent any further misapprehension, that the powers of your Board, in relation to the military authorities, should be more definitely declared.

"11. Your Board, His Lordship in Council observes, although humble in its official title, is loaded with a greater responsibility, and exercises more important functions in regard to our foreign relations, than the Government of Madras or Bombay or any other Local Government of India. The nature of the frontier entrusted to your Board, and the character of the restless enemy with which we have there to deal, call for a prompt and decided course of action, which would oftentimes be impaired by a reference even to Lahore; while it is not difficult to imagine a concurrence of events which would render it of the highest importance that your Board should have the power of acting effectively without waiting for the sanction of the Supreme Government, which, under all ordinary circumstances, it would be the duty of your Board to seek. But there cannot be two masters having the power to control public measures; and as the distance at which the Supreme Government is placed obliges it to delegate the mastery to some authority, and as your Board is to receive that power in order that your means may be commensurate with your military authority cannot be admitted to any co-ordinate power with your Board, or allowed to refuse your requisitions, except on exclusively military grounds."

12. Some of the considerations which existed when the order from which the above extract is taken was passed, have been modified by the construction of the telegraph; but the necessity for checking promptly the incursions of a restless enemy remains in full force; and it is most important for the efficient administration of the border, and the preservation of public safety trans-Indus, that the control of the Punjab Frontier Force should remain with the Punjab Government, in whose hands it has proved a most effective means of maintaining the peace of the border.

13. For a description of the frontier, which has still to be guarded, an extract from a Frontier memorandum written in 1876 (paragraphs 3 to 10 and 20 to 24) is hereto appended (marked A), and will give all the information required without lengthening this letter. But it may be as well here to note the several changes made in the several arms of the force, in order to mark its growth up to the present time.

*Artillery.*—Three field batteries and one garrison battery were raised in 1849, subsequently reorganized and officered.

In 1855 the Hazara Mountain Battery, and in 1858 the Peshawar Mountain Battery, were added to the Punjab Frontier Force.

In 1869 one field battery was reduced; in 1877 the remaining two field batteries were converted into mountain batteries. The artillery now consisting of four mountain batteries and one garrison battery.

*Cavalry.*—The cavalry consists of five regiments; no change having been made in the number of regiments.

The corps of guides was raised in 1846. Since its first formation its strength has been increased.

#### Corps of Guides.

At the annexation of the Punjab it was placed under the Commissioner of Peshawar, and located at Murdan, for the defence of the Yusufzai border. Its commandant was invested with magisterial powers, and held civil charge of the Yusufzai portion of the Peshawar district. In 1855 the corps of guides was incorporated with the Punjab Frontier Force. Raised as "guides," and composed of varied elements, an endeavour has been made to preserve the distinctive character of this fine corps; and about one-eighth of its numbers have in late years gone through a course of instruction in military sketching and reconnaissance at Roorkee.

*Infantry.*—Five regiments of infantry were raised in 1849. The Sind camel corps was sent

#### Punjab infantry and Sind camel corps.

to the frontier in 1850, and in 1853 was converted into a regiment of infantry, taking its place in the force as the 6th Punjab Infantry. As these regiments took up their positions in the defence of the border, the irregular Sikh levies were gradually reduced.

In 1846 the four regiments of Sikh local infantry were raised for civil duties in the cis-Sutlej

#### Sikh infantry.

districts and the Jullundur Doab. After annexation, it was determined to employ these regiments on the frontier, and to withdraw certain police battalions from the frontier to the cis-Indus districts. In 1854 and 1855 these four regiments were ordered to the frontier, and became a part of the Punjab Frontier Force.

In 1858 the 5th Regiment of Goorkhas was raised, and located in Hazara, and placed

#### Hazara Goorkha Battalion.

under the orders of the Brigadier Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force.

14. Thus it will be seen that up to 1855 the limits of the command of the Punjab Frontier Force extended from Kohat to Sind, and that the force consisted of—

4 batteries of artillery.	5 regiments of cavalry.
	6 regiments of infantry.

After 1855 the troops at Murdan and at Abbottabad were added to the command; and the force was increased by—

2 mountain batteries.	4 Sikh infantry regiments.
1 corps of guides.	1 Goorkha regiment.

But there is also a body of militia which has been intermingled with the Punjab Frontier Force

#### (a) Militia employed.

403 horsemen	} Sanctioned in 1862.
217 footmen	
620	
389 horsemen	} As reduced in 1873-74.
206 footmen	
595	

and has materially assisted in the defence of the frontier. These men\* are employed in conjunction with the military in holding a chain of outposts for a distance of 450 miles, from Lattammar, in the Bannu district, to the Sind border. They are commanded by the cavalry commandant in each district, but are enlisted by the Deputy Commissioner.

15. Some militia or levies have always been employed in the defence of the border in Bannu and the

Derajat. Their numbers fell to a minimum in 1856; but on the outbreak of the mutiny in 1857, several of the Punjab frontier regiments had to be withdrawn from the frontier, and their places had to be taken by levies raised by the district officers. In the Kohat district the outposts and the fort of Bahadur Khel were made over to the Khattak Chief. In Bannu and the derajat bodies of levies had to be regularly entertained.

16. When the troops returned after the termination of the war, in 1859, these levies came under reorganization and gradual reduction. Finally, in 1862, when further reductions became imperative, the levies were fixed at 403 horsemen and 217 footmen, and placed under the military authorities. At that time the 6th Police Battalion, heretofore maintained at Dera Ismail Khan for civil duties, was disbanded.

17. At various times the policy of employing militia has been discussed. It is reassuring to know that these men can, under any sudden emergency, be entrusted with the joint defence of our border line; and it is generally admitted that there are advantages in giving some military service to the Chiefs and people of the border, as the best means of affording an outlet to their martial spirit, and enlisting their sympathies in favor of Government and order.

This was fully recognized by the Committee assembled to consider the question of the best means of improving the defence of the border in the Peshawar division, and whose recommendations, supported by the Lieutenant-Governor, have been generally approved by the Government of India.

As this system has worked well, His Honor would be sorry to see any change. Disagreements between the political officer who enlists and the military officer who commands seldom arise; but when they do occur, they are easily adjusted, as both officers are under the same controlling authority.

18. The regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force guard the entire length of frontier, with the exception of a part of the Peshawar valley, against the

#### (c) Constitution and duties of the force.

incursions of independent border tribes. Including the temporary increase lately made on account of the Afghan war, the force consists of—

Artillery	...	...	...	...	935 men
Cavalry	...	...	...	...	2,964 "
Infantry	...	...	...	...	10,137 "
					14,036

but the normal strength may be taken at 12,500.

It is composed of many races, chiefly of Sikhs, Punjabi Muhammadans, Dogras and Pathans. The Hindu element preponderates, there being 7,849 of Hindus to 6,171 Muhammadans.

The following statement gives details :—

				Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	Hindus.	Muham- madans.	
Hindustani	...	{	Muhammadans	...	11	617	154	782	...	782
			Hindus	...	8	203	359	565	565	...
Punjabi	...	{	Musalmans	...	461	298	2,118	2,877	...	2,877
			Hindus	...	95	151	67	313	313	...
			Sikhs	...	364	919	3,254	4,537	4,537	...
			Kukas	...	...	...	5	5	...	
			Dogras	...	...	160	1,411	1,571	1,571	...
Pathans	...	{	within border	...	...	545	1,131	1,676	...	1,676
			beyond border	...	...	65	771	836	...	836
Goorkhas	...	...	...	...	...	...	858	858	858	...
Other classes	...	...	...	...	1	6	9	16	...	...
					935	2,964	10,137	14,036	7,849	6,171

Out of the force of 14,000 men, 836 are Pathans from independent territory, mostly Afridis, who readily take service. The policy of enlisting men of independent tribes with whom hostilities are not improbable has been sometimes questioned, and recent experiences during the late war with Afghanistan have caused some doubts to arise in regard to the usefulness of the Afridi as a soldier in the ranks of the Bengal army. Opinions are divided on the subject; but His Honor, having regard to the good service rendered by men of this class, sees no sufficient reason for excluding them from the army, or for mistrusting them. Amongst the Native officers of the army are to be found some Afridis, who have, by their loyalty and courage, established for themselves a reputation. For instance—

- (1) Subadar-Major Payab (Sirdar Bahadur), 1st Punjab Infantry.
- (2) Subadar-Major Abdulla Khan (Sirdar Bahadur), 26th Native Infantry.
- (3) Subadar Mauladad (Bahadur), 20th Native Infantry.

It is quite probable that of late years sufficient care has not been devoted to enlistments. But His Honor thinks that with due restrictions on enlistments, and with the introduction of checks on desertion,\* this class of recruits may prove, under certain circumstances, most useful soldiers, whilst good must result from having some men of this tribe, pensioned or in service, favorably disposed towards Government. In 1878 there were 700 Afridis in the Punjab Frontier Force. Out of this number, there were the following desertions during the 14 months, from 1st January 1878 to 28th February 1879 :—

With their arms	...	...	...	...	14
Without their arms	...	...	...	...	37
Total					51

10. The duties imposed on regiments in the defence of the border varies very much in each district. In Hazara the troops hold the Haripur fort, and an outpost in the Agror valley.

In Yusafzai the guides hold positions on the border, whenever the state of feeling in any tribe renders such a measure necessary. The head-quarters of the corps is only 20 miles from the border.

In Kohat 6 posts (including the fort of Bahadur Khel) have usually been held; but the recent occupation of the Kuram valley necessitates changes and additional posts in that direction. In the Bannu district there are 12 outposts. In the Dera Ismail Khan district there are 13 outposts. In Dera Ghazi Khan there are 16 outposts.†

In all these posts cavalry are placed, ready to move out on the receipt of information of raids committed or threatened. In some of the larger posts detachments of infantry are placed, generally with the object of holding the post, whilst the cavalry move out in pursuit of marauders.

The outposts and the militia are under the special charge of the commandant of the cavalry regiment in each district; but all operations which the posts are not strong enough to undertake are directed by the officer commanding the district, who is assisted by the local knowledge of the district civil officer and the tribal Chiefs. No conflict of authority or inconvenience is found to arise from this separation of civil and military authority. It has indeed the best results; and in the normal and peaceful state of the border, it merely represents that division of labor which aids and ensures good administration.

20. It will be seen from the description which has been given of the duties performed by the Punjab Frontier Force, the nature of the country in which the force is employed, and the character of

\* NOTE.—As a safeguard against the desertion of Afridis or trans-border Pathans, a proposal has been made to the Government of India to require all recruits whose homes lie across the border to subscribe to a fund to a limit of Rs. 50. This sum to be refunded on discharge from the service. With other classes, British subjects, the verification of recruits by the civil authority is considered a sufficient guarantee.

the enemy with whom it has to contend, that the service is one requiring special training and local knowledge in both officers and men. These qualifications are acquired and maintained under the present system; and it would be difficult to make any change without impairing the efficiency of this local force, and rendering it necessary to increase the strength of the frontier garrisons, or to employ a large body of semi-military police to perform the duties which the Punjab Frontier Force now undertakes.

21. The arguments which exist in favor of the Punjab Frontier Force remaining "local," and also in favor of this force continuing under the control of the Local Government, appear to the Lieutenant-Governor to be as strong now as they were in the early days of the Punjab.

(f) Reasons for maintaining the local character of the Punjab Frontier Force, and the control of the Local Government.

They are clearly stated, in forcible terms, by Sir Neville Chamberlain and the late Major James in the following extracts :—

*Sir Neville Chamberlain, 1860.*

"That by localizing the force, both officers and men get accustomed to hill warfare, and learn the nature of the duties they are called upon to perform when entering the passes. They also become conversant with the history and character of the different tribes, and are able to appreciate the true nature and tendency of the reports which reach them from the border.

"That the officers of the force at present take an interest in the people of the border and border politics, and are closely associated with the district officers. Should the force be delocalized, and not remain under the Punjab Government, the officers will naturally confine themselves to their military duties, and cease to feel any interest in the people and its country.

"That the duties of the force partake partly of a political and police, as well as military character, and that, whilst both the civil and military officers are under the control and orders of the Local Government, differences seldom occur, and whenever they do, are easily adjudicated. If the force were not under the Local Government, all differences would have to be decided between the head military and civil authorities.

"That the force being under the control of the Local Government, strengthens its authority on the border, and enables it to give employment to men of family and influence. That the system of frontier defence requires the officers and men of the Punjab Frontier Force to act in concert with the militia of the border, both in times of peace and in the field; and that whilst this system is quite practicable under one controlling authority, it would be most difficult under any other arrangement."

*Major James in 1860.*

"Every one who has been engaged in expeditions on this frontier must admit that it is a peculiar style of warfare, requiring special training of officers and men. Independent of the harassing duties attendant on campaigning everywhere, there are peculiar difficulties to be encountered in the hills on the border, and which are overcome by practice only. I have no hesitation in saying that troops freshly and indiscriminately brought to the work would fail: even physically they would break down.

"Then, again, it must be remembered that we never meet the enemy in masses. They skip like goats about the hills; they try to lead us into unforeseen difficulties, and to take us at disadvantage. It is necessary to occupy many points, and to keep up communications with them all. This involves the detachment of many parties; and Native officers and non-commissioned officers are frequently commanding small, but important, posts, in which intelligence, care, and prudence are as indispensable as courage.

"Nothing which I have said can, I trust, be considered as in any way disparaging to the officers and men of the other divisions of the army. I simply assert that whilst the main principles of war must be the same everywhere, yet its details are necessarily dependent on the character of the country and of the enemy, and that these can be mastered only by experience and practice. Any attempt to theorize will prove abortive; and just as peculiar training is necessary for the various departments of the same profession in civil life, so is it essential in the army."

22. It is a fact that the political management of the border has been very largely assisted by a local force, acquainted with the country, and always ready and anxious to carry out, to the best of their ability, any orders which may be issued by the Civil Government. The duties are sometimes perhaps more of a police than a military character; but no difficulties arise in their performance, and officers and men, from experience, instinctively know what is wanted, and what has to be done. Besides this, it is an undoubted advantage to any Government to have at its command a selected general officer, and a body of officers, ready and able, from experience and local knowledge, to afford advice and information on any question affecting border management, or the correction of any offending tribe.

23. Another argument against delocalizing the Punjab Frontier Force was urged by Sir Robert Montgomery in his minute dated 3rd December 1862 :—

"Let us suppose that the arrangements now advocated by Sir Hugh Rose had been introduced before the mutinies, and instead of a local force, distinct from the regular army in organization and sympathies, it had been placed under the Commander-in-Chief, and incorporated and intermixed with the sepoy regiments. Then, in all probability, instead of remaining loyal and contributing essentially, as it did, to the restoration of order, it would have taken part in the insurrection, and greatly added to the difficulties of the time. The same circumstances may not recur. But I cannot but think that one great lesson of the mutinies was, not to trust to one uniform system; not to break down the distinctions of race and character, which preclude the combinations of Native troops; not again to stake all upon one cast, but to build our ship in compartments, and, by some varieties of constitution, prevent the circulation of any secret poison throughout the body. It would be assuming too much to predicate that no sudden emotion can again simultaneously convulse the whole army of India; and, in

my opinion, it will be well not to dispense with one of the checks which has already in practice retained a section of it in allegiance."

This argument has, from change of circumstances, lost some of its force, but it should not be wholly disregarded.

24. Ample testimony has been already given of the efficiency of the regiments composing the Punjab Frontier Force. If it were otherwise, or if the regiments as a military body did not compare well with the rest of the Bengal Native army, His Honor could then see some reason for placing the force under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; but happily no reason of this kind exists for the change.

25. If it be contended that the whole of the Bengal Native army, or the whole of the garrisons of the Punjab, should have the advantage of the special training on the frontier which has made the Punjab Frontier Force efficient, the reply is, that it is impracticable to give this training to the army at large without sacrificing the efficiency which is obtained by the use of a comparatively small local force, and without incurring a largely increased expenditure. The introduction of such a system would tend to make the Punjab Frontier Force more exclusively military; and would certainly end in such a complete separation of military and civil authority as would necessitate the employment of an increased police force under civil control for the duties which the Punjab Frontier Force, as now constituted, performs so efficiently. Should the force be transferred to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, some precautions will doubtless be taken to prevent any of the evils which Sir Robert Egerton anticipates. These may be effective for a time; but the tendency of all military organization is to reduce everything to one system. The special precautions enjoined at first will be found troublesome and anomalous, and the Punjab Frontier Force will become, in all respects, part of the regular army, bound by the same rules which apply to troops in more settled parts of the country; and will lose that relation to the civil power which at present makes it so efficient an instrument for preserving peace on the frontier.

26. But His Honor cannot help regarding this force as a part of the army of Bengal, lent, as it were, to the Local Government, for special service on a specially circumstanced border. It is ready for any service in any country, and it regards the Commander-in-Chief as its military head; and His Honor would be glad of the introduction of any measures (short of delocalization or entire separation from the Local Government) which will strengthen this feeling, and which will remove the disadvantage under which the officers of the force have, rightly or wrongly, been supposed to labor, that on account of its not being directly under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, their war services are not so readily acknowledged and recognized by the head of the army in India as they would have been if the force had not been removed from his immediate control.

27. For some time past a considerable portion of the Punjab Frontier Force has been serving under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. This has reduced the frontier garrisons much below their normal strength—a measure which can only be considered as temporary, and not safe to continue.

Still, with reference to possible reduction, and to the opinions expressed in my letter No. 406C. of the 19th August, it appears to His Honor feasible, without incurring any undue risk, to include in the duties of the Punjab Frontier Force the protection of the Kurram valley, if assisted by a body of militia. In my letter above quoted, His Honor remarked that reductions in frontier garrisons could not be made by any system of concentration. The considerations which apply to garrisons in the Punjab proper do not apply strictly, or in the same degree, to frontier stations. But, after carefully considering this subject, His Honor thinks that it will be quite possible to undertake the whole military occupation of the newly-assigned territory of Kurram when the troops belonging to the Punjab Frontier Force return from Afghanistan.

28. His Honor labors under the disadvantage of not having seen many of the reports which have doubtless been made regarding this new territory; but he has learned something of the nature of the country and the people from the report by Colonel H. B. Lumsden of his journey in 1857, and also in other ways. His Honor believes there would be no difficulty in holding this new territory for administrative purposes, with the following force, considering the additional strength which we gain by our present relations with the Cabul Government:—

- 1 mountain battery.
- $\frac{1}{2}$  regiment of cavalry.
- 4 regiments of infantry.

29. On the return of regiments of the force now serving under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a force of this strength can be furnished from the Punjab Frontier Force, as shown in statement given in appendix C. The precise localities for occupation by troops and militia can be settled hereafter, as a matter of detail, into which the Lieutenant-Governor does not now enter.

30. It will also be possible, and perhaps advisable, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, to convert one of the Punjab infantry regiments and one of the cavalry regiments into a corps of guides for special service in Kurram; employing the commandant and other senior officers in conducting the civil administration of the country. If, however, such an arrangement is not compatible with the highest military efficiency, on account of the number of British officers being limited to the military requirements of regiments, His Honor would propose the appointment of a selected military officer to hold military command of the troops in Kurram and political and civil charge of the administration of the valley, assisted by a small civil staff, the strength of which might be hereafter determined.

31. Eventually, as the Zaimukhts and Ormkzais settle down, it may be possible to reduce the infantry to three regiments, the extra or fourth regiment being in that case placed in reserve at Kohat.

32. If it is desired to keep British infantry regiments in the valley for sanitary reasons, and to keep up a force in the valley for the purpose of watching Cabul, the strength of this force should be regulated by military considerations, which should not be mixed up with the civil administration of the

country. It will be seen that a garrison for Kuram can be obtained from the Punjab Frontier Force as now constituted, there being no extra expense incurred in the military occupation of the new territory. In fact, the performance of increased duties with an unaugmented force is in reality equivalent to a reduction.

## APPENDIX A.

*Extract paragraphs 3 to 10 and 20 to 24 from Frontier Memorandum.*

**Para. 3.** The north-west frontier of the Punjab comprises the six districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan; the line of frontier being conveniently held to extend

General description of the frontier.

from a point on the river Jhelum, half-way between the hill sanitarium of Abbottabad and Murree, running due north with the Kaghan ranges into the high Himalayas, nearly to Chilas, and then descending to the south till it touches the Indus, where that river emerges from the hills at Torbeyla. Turning to the north to enclose the fertile plain of Yusufzai, it again takes a southerly direction, where it crosses the Swat river, and from that point descends almost due south till it touches Kasimor on the Indus, on the border of Sind. The frontier line has never been strictly defined, and the boundary shown on maps is merely that of the topographical survey, the limits of which were influenced by considerations of departmental convenience, and not of general policy.

Two of these districts, Hazara and Kohat, are hilly, and in parts mountainous. The other four are almost level plains, only broken by deep ravines and torrent beds, which make even the Peshawar valley difficult for the movements of cavalry and guns.

The characteristics of the people inhabiting them differ almost as much as the character of the districts themselves; and it is necessary, in as few words as possible, to describe each district before giving an account of the independent tribes beyond the border, and of the system by which they are controlled.

**4.** The area of the Hazara district is 2,835 square miles, and it is 95 miles in length. The land revenue amounts to Rs. 2,21,366, and the gross revenue to Rs. 2,52,922, per annum. The upper portion, special-

The Hazara district.

ly that known as Kaghan, is entirely composed of mountain ranges, covered with magnificent forests; the lower portion of the district is, although elevated, more level, and, possessing an abundant supply of water, produces excellent crops. The population, numbering 367,218 persons, is generally peaceable and unwarlike. Its largest element consists of immigrants expelled, some centuries ago, from the neighbouring Swat valley, a physically weak and contemptible race. These form nearly a third of the inhabitants of the Hazara district; nearly half of the remainder is composed of descendants from Rajput and other Hindu tribes, Gujars, Ghakkars, Dunds, and Karals, who have for the most part adopted the Muhammadan creed. They are industrious and good cultivators, and form the best part of the Hazara population. Descendants of Afghan immigrants, related to the Yusufzai and other tribes in the neighbourhood, constitute a fifth of the whole. It has, of recent years, been asserted that the inhabitants of the Hazara district are of a fierce and warlike disposition, and exceedingly difficult to control; but this false idea is really due to the fact of their rebelling against the oppression of the Sikh occupation. The country no doubt is mountainous and strong; but the people, though litigious, are singularly unwarlike in their habits. Their treatment has been so liberal, and the assessment of land revenue so light under British rule, that they are generally content. That they are prosperous is shown by the large annual export of silver from the district; and the only Hazara difficulties of late years have been in connection with certain unruly independent tribes, who will be hereafter referred to.

**5.** The Peshawar district contrasts remarkably with that just described. Consisting of a wide

The Peshawar district.

and level plain, it is abundantly watered by the large rivers of Swat and Kabul, and is broken only by deep ravines, which intersect it in every direction. The area, 2,497 square miles, is somewhat less than that of Hazara; but the land revenue, which exceeds Rs. 6,51,000 per annum, is larger than in any other frontier district. The length from north to south is 50 miles; but the border adjoining independent territory is 170 miles long. The lands of the Jaduns, Bonerwals, Swatis, Ranizais, Utman Khel, Mohmunds, and J. and fanatical tribes. From Sikh and Afghan days Peshawar has had an infamous reputation for the character of its inhabitants, who required for their control the sternest administrators the Sikh Government had at its command, and for its climate, which, owing to the excessive irrigation from the streams and rivers, and also from the valley being enclosed by lofty hills, is, at certain seasons of the year, pestilential in the extreme. The inhabitants are strangely mixed. Ninety-five per cent. are Muhammadans, the few Hindus being found as bankers, merchants, and shopkeepers in the city of Peshawar and the larger villages. This observation indeed applies to all the districts south of Peshawar. The population is Muhammadan, the Hindus being but a small minority, carrying on money-lending and trading in the towns. The majority is of Pathan blood; for the census estimate of 46 per cent. is believed to be considerably below the mark, and 60 per cent. to represent it more nearly. The total population of the district is rather more than half a million, of which about one-sixth are Yusufzais, an Afghan clan inhabiting the high plain to the north. After the Yusufzais the most important tribe is the Mohmund, about 30,000 in number, and related to the independent tribe of the same name beyond the border. The remainder of the population is made up of numerous Afghan tribes, representing all the tribes and clans on the Peshawar border, and Punjabi Muhammadans from cis-Indus districts.

**6.** The district of Kohat is almost entirely composed of a system of low barren hills, from which

The Kohat district.

it derives its name, intermingled with small but fertile valleys. Its area is 2,539 square miles; and it yields a gross revenue of Rs. 1,98,167 per annum, of which Rs. 94,213 is from the land. The importance of

the district is due to the existence of extensive salt mines, the produce of which is used throughout the trans-Indus territory and Afghanistan, and which, chiefly from political considerations, is taxed much more lightly than the produce of the Jhelum mines, which supply the greater part of North India to the east of the Indus. The Afridis are the principal carriers; and the power of being able to raise the price or stopping the supply of this necessary article is an important means of controlling this and the neighbouring tribes. The city of Peshawar is the central depôt of the salt trade, from whence it is taken by traders to Jelallabad, Kashmir, and Khasgar, and exchanged for the produce of those countries. The Sikh Government charged the same rates on the Kohat as on the red Jhelum salt, without any known injurious effect on the trade; but their income from this source never exceeded half a lakh of rupees, which is now doubled, notwithstanding the exceedingly low rate of duty levied. The inhabitants of this district, amounting to 145,419, of whom 102,431 are Afghans, are, in the north, Khattaks, one of the finest tribes on the whole of the frontier, who supply our regiments with many of their best soldiers. The Bangash tribe is almost as numerous, amounting to 31,212, and generally is quiet and well-disposed. The Kohat valley, which runs up to Afghan territory as far as the Kurm river, is well-watered and fertile; but the trade of Kohat, as its political importance, is centred in its mines of grey salt.

7. Bannu is a flat, open plain, like Peshawar, and, like it, abundantly watered by the Kurm and Gumbela rivers. The rainfall being exceedingly scanty, cultivation is almost entirely dependent upon irrigation

from these streams. The area of the Bannu district is 3,171 square miles; and a large sub-division named from its principal town, Mianwali, lies cis-Indus. In this part of the district there is a larger proportion of Hindu cultivators than in the trans-Indus portion, where Bannuchis, a mongrel Afghan tribe, are about the worst specimens of the race on the frontier—avaricious, litigious, bigoted, and false. Their physique, owing to the malarious climate, is as degraded as their morals. They are cowardly and unwarlike; and on this account give less trouble than the next most important section of the population, the Waziris, who are in appearance and in character immeasurably their superiors. The south of the Bannu district is inhabited by the Marwatis, a high-caste Pathan race, brave, simple, and honest, who form as great a contrast as can be conceived to their northern neighbours, the Bannuchis. Their country, a high plain with water so far below the surface that few wells can be sunk, is almost entirely dependent on rainfall for its crops, receiving in a few tracts partial irrigation from the mountain streams. The people are, however, in spite of great natural difficulties, successful agriculturists. They are exceedingly well disposed towards the British Government; and crime against property is rare among them. The land revenue of the district is Rs. 4,23,855 per annum, and the total revenue Rs. 4,70,976, raised from a population of 287,547 persons.

8. The district of Dera Ismail Khan, separated from Marwat by a range of hills which here crosses the Indus and joins the Salt Range in Rawal Pindi and Jhelum, is a long strip of country, measuring 102 miles

from north to south, dropping with an almost imperceptible slope from the independent hills to the Indus. That portion of it which has a sufficiency of irrigation is fertile, and especially the Tank valley, which till recently has remained in semi-independent charge of its hereditary Chief. In a great part of the district, however, the rainfall being very small and irrigation wanting, the country is little better than a desert, and can only be cultivated in those exceptional years when abundant rain may happen to fall. The population of the interior of the district is as peaceable and orderly as that of any cis-Indus territory, in which, indeed, by far the larger portion of this district lies; but this, with the exception of the low lands near the river, or where water is sufficiently near to permit wells to be sunk, is but thinly peopled and little cultivated. The manner in which cultivation has been extended since the last settlement in this wild and difficult country will be adverted to later. The area of the district is 7,096 square miles, but although, with one exception, more than double the size of any other frontier district, it stands only second in point of revenue; both the gross collections of Rs. 4,72,992 and the land assessment of Rs. 3,85,806 per annum, being below those of Peshawar. The original population of the district appears to have been Jat. Then came an immigration of Biluchis from the south, forming the bulk of the present population of the Kolachi sub-division, below the Ushtirana country, few being found north of the town of Dera Ismail Khan. In the south they are the dominant class; in the country cis-Indus they are mixed with, and practically on an equality with, the Jats. The only Biluch tribe found together in any numbers is the Kasranis, inhabiting the country about Daulatwala. The Pathans occupy the north of the district up to Isa Khel, together with Marwatis, all recent settlers and rapidly increasing in numbers. They are not, like Jats and Biluchis, scattered over the district, but form a continuous fringe along the Kolachi and Tank sub-divisions, and in number amount to about 50,000.

9. The characteristics of Dera Ghazi Khan resemble closely those of the trans-Indus portion of the Dera Ismail Khan district. It consists of a strip of

Indus and the hills, here entirely occupied by Biluch tribes. The area of the district is 4,740 square miles, the land revenue amounting to Rs. 3,88,007 per annum, and the gross collections to Rs. 4,66,816 per annum. The character of its independent neighbours has exercised as great an influence upon the interior of Dera Ghazi Khan as it has in the districts to the north. Out of the 308,840 forming the population, a third are Biluch. Half the population of the district consists of Jats, originally of Hindu descent, but Muhammadans for many generations past; and the remainder is composed of Pathan immigrants, and a large proportion of pure Hindus than are found elsewhere on the border. The character of the population of Dera Ghazi Khan may generally be described as being as well-disposed and law-abiding as that of any district in North India. As in Dera Ismail Khan, the rainfall is very scanty, in some years no rain falling at all. The people are, however, skilful cultivators; and the elaborate system of inundation canals from the river Indus both attests their industry and raises the producing power of the district to a not unfavorable standard of comparison with others possessing much greater natural advantages.



10. The length of frontier thus described\* is about 704 miles. As regards communications, the trans-Indus territory is, owing to the character of the country and the poverty of the local funds, far behind the rest of the Punjab. Communications are carried on for the greater portion of the length of the frontier by two roads, one in the interior of the districts connecting the principal towns, and the other, close to the border, connecting the outposts of the regular army and the militia, and maintained in order by the military commandants. All travelling has to be performed on horses or camels; and during the rainy season, owing to the alluvial character of the soil, which becomes after rain almost as slippery as ice, travelling is exceedingly difficult and laborious.

## Communications.

	Population according to census of 1868	Area in square miles.	Land revenue in 1875-76.	Gross revenue, 1875-76.	Length of district.	Length of frontier of district.
			Rs.	Rs.		
* Hazara ...	367,218	2,835	2,21,366	2,52,022	95 miles	120 miles.
Peshawar ...	523,152	2,497	6,51,537	7,75,213	50 "	170 "
Kohat ...	145,419	2,839	94,213	1,98,167	50 "	60 "
Bannu ...	287,547	3,171	4,23,558	4,70,076	55 "	60 "
Dera Ismail Khan ...	394,864	7,096	3,85,806	4,72,932	102 "	124 "
Dera Ghazi Khan ...	308,840	4,740	3,88,007	4,66,816	170 "	170 "
TOTAL ...	2,027,040	23,178	21,64,787	26,36,186	522 miles	704 miles.

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20. The whole line of the frontier, from the extreme northern limits of Hazara to below the fort of Harrand, in the Dera Ghazi Khan district, consists of a continuous line of difficult and rugged mountains. From the lofty peaks of Kaghan and the lower Himalayan ranges above Peshawar to the low hills on the Dera Ghazi Khan and Sind frontier, the ranges generally decrease in height and the passes in difficulty, from the north towards the south, only rising again to a formidable elevation in the Suliman range opposite the district of Dera Ismail Khan.

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21. A reference to maps and to the records of our hostile operations on the Beluch and Afghan

The military qualities of the Beluch and Afghan tribes.

frontiers will clearly show that the Afridis, Mohmunds, and the Bonerwals are each as much more formidable an enemy than the Beluchis, as the high rugged mountain ranges of the northern Punjab frontier are more difficult of penetration and invasion than the flat plain on the Sind border. Mere detachments have penetrated to the head-quarters of the Marri tribe; but no one acquainted with the facts would assert that anything less than a *corps d'armée* could cross our frontier and enter the Khyber or the Tira hills with a prospect of success. So far as the fighting qualities of the border tribes are concerned, it has been already shown that those adjoining the Hazara district are comparatively contemptible as soldiers, their extreme religious bigotry alone making up for their absence of martial qualities.

To the south, between the Swat river and Dera Ismail Khan, the Afghan tribes are both fanatical and brave in an extraordinary degree. Courage with them is the first of virtues, and cowardice the worst of crimes.

The Beluchis, as turbulent, and formerly of habits quite as predatory, as their neighbours, are still of a far milder and more amenable disposition. They are as brave as the Afghans; but they are animated by no fanatical hatred of the English; they have not the military genius of the Afghans, and, as an enemy on the hillside, they are far less formidable. As an illustration of their rude conception of tactics, it may be mentioned that, though famed as horsemen, it is their rule to dismount for a fight, which is conducted hand to hand, and often with sword and shield. Less robust than the Afghans, they still are remarkable for their endurance, and make incredibly long journeys on their mares of a renowned breed. The character of their country seems, to a certain extent, to have developed their method of attack. Comparatively low ridges, intersected by numerous and easy passes, favor their style of attack and reprisal, which consists of dashing and unforeseen inroads, followed by precipitate retreats.

22. The outrages perpetrated in British territory by the independent tribes are numerous and of many kinds. Sometimes, and especially in the early days of British occupation, raids in force have been directed against British territory, almost rising to the dignity of open war. Such was the attack of the Kasranis on Dera Fateh Khan in 1852. On the northern frontier, especially in the Peshawar district, fanaticism has excited wild and bigoted men to attempt the life of individual Europeans, believing that the assassination of an infidel was a sure passport to paradise. To this fierce feeling of fanaticism may be attributed the deaths of the customs officers, Messrs. Tapp and Carne, in 1851, on the Kaghan frontier, and the murders of Colonel Mackeson and Major Adams, Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, and Lieutenant Ommanney, in 1853 and 1865. Nor have Europeans alone been the object of attack. Natives and Native officers have been the victims of assassination; villagers killed in the commission of raids, and detachments of troops inveigled into murderous ambushes. If these more special forms of frontier offences be put aside, together with large class of murders due to female infidelity, and offences against the person attributed to the possession of arms, there remains as the residuum those crimes which it might naturally be presumed would be committed by fierce and savage tribes inhabiting barren hills, impregnable except to a large force, and overlooking fertile plains, which from time immemorial they have considered as their rightful prey.



23. Those offences which mostly fill the frontier calendar are horse-stealing, house-breaking, and, above all, cattle-stealing, the mere *brigandage* of wild tribes and the gravamen of which consists in an association of numbers to accomplish the offence, and the free and sacred asylum given in the independent hills to the successful marauders. The complete suppression of robbery in a land of brigands is of course impossible. Depredations may be said to be almost invited by the character of the country, and by special causes, prominent among which is the annual migration of the great trading tribe of Afghanistan, the Powindas, with their camels and immense herds and flocks, to Hindustan, for whose protection special measures have been adopted which will be hereafter noticed.

24. For the defence of the plain country against the incursions of hill-robbers there is a line of posts, military and militia, along the frontier. On the border of the Hazara, Peshawar, and Kohat districts these are comparatively few and far between, but are held in considerable strength by regular troops. Here the difficulty of the country, and, as regards the Peshawar and Kohat border, the jealous and stubborn character of the tribes, render the pursuit of raiders and robbers too difficult and too likely to cause future complications to be hastily adopted. Indeed, with the exception of the Afridis, the tribes on the Punjab border, including the districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, are the jealous guardians of mountain passes that lead to nowhere. Under such circumstances, and with no possible advantage to be gained by the occupation of these barren hills, obvious considerations of military prudence limit pursuit in the case of a raid to the mouth of the passes; and an officer who attempted to enter with an inadequate force a defile in possession of the enemy, would be undertaking a grave responsibility.

The line of defence in Bannu and the two southern districts of the Derajat is maintained by smaller and far more frequent posts, only 10 or 12 miles apart, and each situated so as to command one or more of the numerous passes leading to the hills. These outposts are garrisoned in part by troops of the Frontier Force, and partly by them associated with the Frontier Militia; and the smaller and the less important ones by the Frontier Militia alone. While from the local knowledge of the militia men intelligence is often gained which leads to the prevention of a raid or robbery, yet such is the inevitable exposure of the villages and cultivated lands which lie between the posts and the hills, such the carelessness of a population habituated to danger, and such the facilities for attack and flight which the numerous passes afford, that it is only too often the case that the first intelligence which a military outpost receives of a raid is the news that it has been committed, and that the robbers are already back in the hills.

## APPENDIX B.

*Return of strength of outposts held by the Punjab Frontier Force in 1862, 1867 and 1877 (alluded to in para. 18).*

		1862.				1867.				1877.			
		PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE.		MILITIA.		PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE.		MILITIA.		PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE.		MILITIA.	
		Cavalry.	Infantry.	Horse.	Foot.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Horse.	Foot.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Horse.	Foot.
HAZARA DISTRICT	Hariapur	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	15	...	...
	Ughl	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	26	...	...
	Kotul Picket	...	2	21	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Muhammadzai	...	2	15	...	...	...	...	...	...	25	...	...
	Gadda Khel	...	5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	...	...
KOHAT DISTRICT	Lachi	...	5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	...	...
	Banda	...	5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	...	...
	Nari	...	7	16	...	...	9	23	...	...	...	...	...
	Lattammar	...	9	22	4	...	7	16	...	...	12	23	...
	Bahadur Khel	...	31	78	...	...	31	81	...	...	21	58	...
BANNU DISTRICT	Gumbat	...	...	...	...	...	5	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Khushalgarh	...	...	...	...	...	5	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Fort Garnet	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	25	...
	Peyzu	...	...	...	20	20	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Sherghosah	...	...	...	...	15	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Mulazai	...	...	...	30	20	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Baindarra	...	...	...	6	56	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Gumatti	...	...	...	6	10	...	7	8	...	...	9	3
	Gumatti Tower	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8
	Damai	...	...	...	19	25	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Kuram	...	9	10	9	20	12	10	2	...	12	25	2
	Bairan	...	...	...	6	10	...	7	8	...	...	9	6
	Tochi	...	...	...	7	30	...	7	11	...	...	10	7
	Miran	...	...	...	17	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Jani Khel	...	50	81	9	...	54	70	4	...	38	35	4
	Hawed	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Burj	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	4	...	...	6	4

## APPENDIX B—continued.

		1862.				1867.				1877.			
		PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE.		MILITIA.		PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE.		MILITIA.		PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE.		MILITIA.	
		Cavalry.	Infantry.	Horse.	Foot.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Horse.	Foot.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Horse.	Foot.
BANNU DISTRICT— (concl'd.)	Khairu Khel	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	4	...	...	10	2
	Tajori	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	4	...	...	10	2
	Walli	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	4	...	...	10	2
	Adumi	...	...	...	...	...	...	18	7	...	...	...	...
	Barghanattu	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	21	7
DERA ISMAIL KHAN DISTRICT.	Bain	...	...	6	40	...	...	6	40	...	...	8	45
	Ama Khel	...	...	4	...	...	...	4	...	...	...	3	...
	Mulazai	...	...	20	10	...	...	16	10	...	...	14	8
	Kot Nasran	...	...	20	10	...	...	20	9	...	...	16	8
	Tank	231	62	4	...	43	62	4	...	31	20	2	...
	Tator	...	...	20	10	...	...	20	9	...	...	...	...
	Dabra	...	...	8	8	...	...	12	7	...	...	...	...
	Murtaza	...	...	8	8	...	...	10	8	...	...	13	8
	Jatta	21	22	2	...	43	22	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Gumal	42	...	...	...	...	...	8	6	...	...	...	...
	Manjhi	21	22	2	...	42	22	...	...	20	21	3	...
	Luni	...	...	20	10	...	...	19	9	...	...	12	8
	Zarkanni	...	...	20	10	...	...	20	9	...	...	13	8
	Draband	42	10	2	...	43	12	2	...	15	22	2	...
	Shah Alam	...	...	8	8	...	...	8	8	...	...	...	...
	Chaudwan	...	...	4	...	...	...	4	...	...	...	...	...
DERA GHAZI KHAN DISTRICT.	Kot Thagga	...	...	4	8	...	...	4	9	...	...	...	...
	Gurwali	...	...	6	...	...	...	6	...	...	...	...	...
	Daulatwala	...	...	6	...	...	...	6	...	...	...	...	...
	Kot Kirghi	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	20	12	44	...
	Ghirni	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	30	36	...	...
	Gangher	...	...	4	...	...	...	5	...	...	...	...	...
	Choti	...	...	4	...	...	...	5	...	...	...	...	...
	Viddor	...	...	4	...	...	...	4	...	14	...	...	...
	Yaru	...	...	4	...	...	...	4	...	...	...	...	...
MITTANKOT-RAJAN-PUR DISTRICT.	Nurpur	...	...	8	2	...	...	8	2	...	...	9	2
	Mahoi	...	...	16	7	...	...	14	5	...	...	13	4
	Mangrota	47	58	4	...	50	58	4	...	18	24	3	...
	Kot Kasran	...	...	5	...	...	...	5	...	...	...	...	...
	Vehowa	25	15	11	9	...	...	11	8	...	...	8	4
	Jok Budhu	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	...
	Bandowala	75	25	15	...	60	25	3	...	21	20	3	...
	Drigri	83	22	2	...	60	22	3	...	16	22	3	...
	Asni	...	...	4	...	...	...	5	...	...	...	...	...
MITTANKOT-RAJAN-PUR DISTRICT.	Karam-ki-Thul	...	...	22	5	13	...	14	...	...	...	...	...
	Lal Goshi	...	...	5	3	...	...	5	3	...	...	...	...
	Toziani	...	...	13	6	...	...	20	7	...	...	...	...
	Muhammadpur	...	...	10	5	10	11	4	...	12	12	3	...
	Rum-ki-Thul	...	...	17	6	...	...	12	5	...	...	17	8
	Harand	46	40	2	...	30	40	2	...	21	37	3	...
	Shaik Walli	...	...	...	...	...	...	10	5	...	...	11	...
	Dilbar	...	...	...	...	...	...	11	5	...	...	15	5
	Sabzilkot	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	26	7

## APPENDIX C.

*Present and Proposed Distribution of Punjab Frontier Force, with reference to proposals made in para. 29.*

	PRESENT.			PROPOSED.			REMARKS.
	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	
Abbottabad ...	...	...	2	1	...	1	(a) Garrison battery. (b) 1 garrison battery, and 1 mountain bat- tery.
Muridan ...	...	1	1	...	1	1	
Kohat ...	(a) $\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	(b) 2	$\frac{1}{2}$	2	
Kuram ...	...	...	...	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	4	
Edwardesabad ...	...	1	2	1	1	2	
Dera Ismail Khan ...	1	1	3	...	1	2	
Dera Ghazi Khan ...	...	...	...	...	1	...	
Rajanpur ...	...	...	...	...	1	...	
Serving under Commander-in-Chief ...	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	3	...	...	...	
	5	6	12	5	6	12	

## APPENDIX D.

*Actual composition of the Punjab Frontier Force as on 1st July 1879.*

## I.—ARTILLERY.

	No. 1 Battery.	No. 2 Battery.	No. 3 (Peshawar) Battery.	No. 4 (Hazara) Battery.	No. 5 Garrison Battery.	Total.
Hindustani Musalmans ...	2	1	8	...	...	11
Do. Hindus ...	...	1	2	...	...	3
Punjabi Musalmans ...	117	116	77	112	39	461
Do. Hindus ...	30	15	19	22	9	95
Do. Sikhs ...	79	97	70	87	31	364
Other classes ...	...	...	...	1	...	1
Total ...	228	230	176	222	79	935

*Actual composition of the Force as on 1st August 1879.*

## II.—CAVALRY.

	1st Punjab Cavalry.	2nd Punjab Cavalry.	3rd Punjab Cavalry.	4th Punjab Cavalry.	5th Punjab Cavalry.	Guides.	Total.
Hindustani Musalmans ...	134	93	153	102	127	8	617
Do. Hindus ...	...	70	20	41	66	6	203
Punjabi Musalmans ...	14	86	52	82	44	20	293
Do. Hindus ...	30	14	17	49	...	41	151
Do. Sikhs ...	92	159	193	149	199	127	919
Do. Kukas ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Do. Dogras ...	35	...	24	53	37	11	160
Pathans within the border ...	166	85	75	56	62	101	545
Do. beyond the border ...	4	4	5	7	10	35	65
Other classes ...	1	...	...	...	...	5	6
Total ...	476	511	539	539	545	354	2,064

## APPENDIX D—continued.

## III.—INFANTRY.

		Guides.	1st Sikh Infantry.	2nd Sikh Infantry.	3rd Sikh Infantry.	4th Sikh Infantry.	1st Punjab Infantry.	2nd Punjab Infantry.	3rd Punjab Infantry.	4th Punjab Infantry.	5th Punjab Infantry.	6th Punjab Infantry.	5th Goorkhas.	Total.
Hindustani Musalmans	...	2	22	9	14	33	...	1	52	16	3	2	...	154
Do. Hindus	...	...	66	...	2	66	...	39	...	75	1	110	...	359
Punjabi Musalmans	...	87	192	248	125	164	209	354	250	212	134	143	...	2,118
Do. Hindus	...	15	11	2	1	...	2	...	10	16	4	6	...	67
Do. Sikhs	...	228	466	218	462	421	185	218	259	249	340	208	...	3,254
Do. Kukas	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	1	...	...	5
Do. Dogras	...	130	48	304	111	52	93	129	171	143	109	122	...	1,411
Pathans within the border	...	201	66	38	69	53	105	74	84	86	136	219	...	1,131
Do. beyond the border	...	61	17	39	76	52	98	56	79	98	116	79	...	771
Goorkhas	...	90	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	768	853
Other classes	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	5	...	...	9
		817	888	857	860	841	692	871	905	900	849	889	768	10,137



